"There is nothing good about war. but for the end," stated Abraham Lincoln. The president of the United States did not see the end of the "his" civilian War, which tore up America in 1861–1865. He died in the bombing a fewer weeks before the military was put out. That's the cruel malice of destiny that doesn't overturn Lincoln's words. I quote them for a reason. The beginning of the calendar year, and the beginning of another full year of open war in Ukraine, prompts reflection on its finale. Many of us wonder if it will happen in 2025 and what it might look like. Let me draw a fewer scenarios.
The first script (which does not mean the most real): Russia's decisive victory. Let us remember that although the Russian Ministry of Defence is limiting operational objectives, so far the Federation authorities have not cancelled their first intentions towards Ukraine. It should so be assumed that Moscow, if circumstances arise, will search to occupy the full country. Alternatively – to conquer the east and south of Ukraine and to install in the west of the puppet government. Given the achievements of the Russian Army so far – and everything we know about its combat capabilities after February 24, 2022 – this seems very unlikely.
Unless Moscow breaks the opposition of the Ukrainians with emergency measures – a. atomic weapon, b. mass, at least 1.5 million invasive army equipped with anything that command can pull out of the warehouses. In both cases, this requires a very risky decision by the Kremlin – it is hard to measure how the West will behave (especially the US) in consequence to atomic escalation. In Moscow, they most likely do not foresee the exchange of atomic blows in "revenge for Ukraine" (I do not anticipate either), but a sharp, leaping increase in military aid to Kiev would be a viable option. What if it came before the Russian troops could disprove the effects of an atomic attack? Let us add further sanctions to this (and there is inactive plenty of area on this list) and failure of credibility even with declared friends of Russia. Cumulation of the consequences of these actions would entail a hazard of overturning the Federation, even in a situation where it would conquer Ukraine. Western military aid would then refocus on supporting the resistance. costly occupation, stifled economy and political isolation The Kremlin would like to avoid that. From his perspective, it is more rational to gradually "grow a Ukrainian frog" – defeating Ukrainians in a "fair" war, the course of which would be more acceptable to the planet (especially to the West).
As for mass mobilization, I lose religion that the Russians would say "enough." As a sociologist, I see in Russian society giant decks of conformism and fear of power, so I think that “mobs” (read: recently mobilized) would humbly go to the front. Especially if this mass could gain a strategical advantage – then there would most likely be enthusiasm. In my opinion, 1 fuse that protects Ukraine from Russian mass mobilization is costs. The one-time, short-term financial effort that Moscow would gotta take to put up a 1.5 million army only on Ukraine is besides much for Russia's budget. Hence the belief that they no longer have large hopes in the Russian MON or in the Kremlin for a decisive victory. Although there is inactive “and weary” reasoning there, there is inactive military, economical and political force on Ukraine.
Scenario two: Draw with a mention to Russia. In my opinion, this is what the Kremlin is playing about right now. This script can make differently erstwhile it comes to the effects of fighting. The war could end present with the territorial position quo, which is the failure of a crucial part of Donbas and the South by Ukraine. It could end in the next weeks or months, after erstwhile fluctuations on the front. Like what?
In the Kremlin, they know that in direct combat at best they will be able to “bring” the Ukrainians out the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast (and that is the focus of the Russian efforts outside the Kurdish front section). But they besides hope that the strength of the exchange of punches will weaken Ukraine adequate to get the Kievs to retreat from the Zaporosian and Khersonian circuits.
Of course, war can be unpredictable. Intellectual honesty dictates that it is possible to break down Ukrainian defensive operations in the east. In an effort to run out, Russia has more assets than Ukraine, unless we turn the western drip into a stream of aid – which is not expected. Theoretically, the Russian contingent would be able to implement the plan of the maximum minister Sergei Szojgu of April 2022 – to occupy the full Zadniepore. Let us remind you, Moscow has more than 600,000 soldiers in Ukraine (another 200,000 are active in the Kursk Oblast and supports the war effort in the back). It now seems that Ukraine would not accept the peace of the failure of specified crucial territories, but the request for pessimism to establish a situation in which it would have no another choice.
Why would this script be a draw? due to the fact that Russia entered the war with the intention to annihilate Ukraine, but on this issue it would be forced to accept defeat. As regards Ukraine itself, it is worth considering in this context the further destiny of its authorities. For us, the West, president Volodymyr Zelenski is simply a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, but in the country he is increasingly to the image of "undefiled". There are multiple accusations of not preparing the state for war, of mismanagement, which in a "remise pointing at Russia" would mean the immediate end of a political career, possibly with a criminal charge of treason.
Screenplay 3: Ukraine's limited victory. It is simply a situation in which Ukrainians win – as a consequence of war, political procedures or both – to dispel Russians from areas occupied after February 24, 2022. In order to make this possible, a crucial increase in supplies of western weapons is needed. And this cannot be a task for us, for remember that the Ukrainians are not of steel. They besides endure losses, they consume equipment and resources; at any point they may find that there is nothing left to fight. The rebellious statements of the erstwhile head of the Ukrainian MFA Dmytro Kułeby – that then “we will be fighting with shovels” – would most likely and will gain confirmation in individual situations, but with the shovel of all invaders it is impossible to kill. And with only a shovel in your hand, it's very easy to die.
But let's presume the West stops backing Ukrainians stress tests. That Donald Trump – as they anticipate over the Dnieprem – will implement the strategy of “forced peace by force”. Extortion on the Russians, of course. That for most of 2025, a mass of equipment will arrive in Ukraine allowing to extract an crucial majority of the “naked” part of the Ukrainian army. Today, the full Armed Forces of Ukraine number over 900,000 people, but the mystery of the polychinel is that only half has truly something to fight. say that in the autumn of 2025 “at the theatre” there will be Ukrainian aviation equipped – already in a proper, not apothecary dimension – in western aircraft. Under specified circumstances, in the following year the Ukrainians could deal with the task of clearing the areas occupied after 24 February.
Scenario four: Ukraine's decisive victory. No, it's not about going to Moscow and all that; it's fantasy. I mean the improvement of events in which Ukrainian armed forces besides occupy the areas of the alleged Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republic and liberate Crimea.
I consider this script highly unlikely, even assuming that the West will collapse and aid solve most of the Ukrainian army's pains. Why? Yeah, well, I don't think that triumph is in Kiev's best interest. The scale of the demolition of Ukraine is already devastating today. The effects of the attacks on the back can be offset comparatively quickly, but wherever the Russians have appeared, the country needs a thorough reconstruction. The imagination of adding economically, socially and environmentally disrupted erstwhile "republic" to this integration does not look attractive. Among the Ukrainians, there is an expanding number of opinions that “zombians” and “watt” (the contemptible designation of DRL/LRL residents) should be deleted, especially after what they did to Mariupol (separ militias were active in the assault) and what they do in another parts of Donbass.
Crimea, in turn, will defend the Russians to the bottom, incapable to afford to afford to lose back for the Black Sea Fleet (and it is hard to imagine a deal before 2014, erstwhile Ukraine guaranteed the extraterritoriality of Russian bases). Moreover, the situation in which Moscow loses its ‘its’ territory contradicts the fundamental presumption of putinism, or imperial subjectivity of Russia. It's like Hitler and his credo: “Germany must be large or they won't be at all”, which brought Europe a full war. I believe that the defence of Crimea would besides be "total" – including reaching for atomic blackmail. Moral rations are of course on the side of Ukraine, but Western kunktatorship would then talk with all power, forcing Kiev to reconcile with facts. Unless the Ukrainian army could carry out a blitzkrieg. And in Moscow, there would be a palace coup and a “renew” following it – something like Khrushchev’s thaw – resulting in the abandonment of the peninsula.
In another words, there would be a script in which Putin will not see the end of the war.
