The latest intelligence reports of the Baltic and Nordic States are in accordance with warnings against aggressive intentions and reconstruction of the Russian Federation (FR) armed forces. Its plans include the implementation of the improvement of land and air-deforestation troops by 2026. However, reports disagree in the assessment of the political circumstances and conventional capabilities of Russia, which would let it to launch an open conflict with NATO. Although the papers are of an information-analytical nature, they will likely translate into adjustments to the plans for the improvement of military capabilities of the countries of the region and decisions to increase investment in their defence.
Since December 2024, public and yearly reports on the safety threats of the Baltic and Nordic countries have been published. These were successive assessments of Estonia (VLA), Norway (E-tjensen), Finland (PVTIEDL), Denmark (FE), Sweden (MUST), the civilian Protection Office of the Constitution of Latvia (SAB), and both Lithuanian services (VSD and AOTD). Regardless of the importance noted in the reports of the sabotage run towards Ukrainian partners, it is worth comparing in peculiar their passages concerning Russia's military intentions and capabilities.
Similarity to Russia's assessments
Recent reports agree to recognise the Russian war against Ukraine for part of its strategy to break the unity of the West and change the safety architecture in Europe, which is based on NATO. Russia's precedence is to end the war on maximum favorable terms. Despite its predominance over Ukraine, Russia lacks resources to full accomplish its objectives – designation of territorial gains, impact on the Kiev authorities and change of the political strategy and disarmament of Ukraine (,denasification and demilitarisation). The papers are besides consistent with the conclusion that as long as the war on Ukraine continues, Russia's overall capacity to conflict with NATO is greatly limited. Russia's plans towards the Alliance besides complicate the entry into its structures of Finland and Sweden.
The services of the Baltic and Nordic States take seriously the plans to rebuild and grow Russia's conventional capacity by the end of 2026. These include an increase in the size of the Russian armed forces from 1.15 to 1.5 million personnel, mainly in land and air-desant troops (additional 350,000 people). They forecast their implementation within the expected time frame, thanks to the expansion of existing and fresh units in the vicinity of the Baltic States, Finland and Norway. Plans for the Leningrad forces and Moscow Military territory assume, for example, 3 times the current saturation of fresh units with artillery systems.
Analysts of the Baltic and Nordic services emphasize that Russia retains its capabilities for conventional and atomic rocket strikes against targets in Europe. The potentials of the Baltic and North Fleet and the Air and Space Force FR stay virtually intact, in contrast to the tremendous losses in humans and equipment of its Land Forces. The analyses are besides convergent on the deep militarisation of the economy and society of Russia. The fresh reports agree to item the intellectual function of Russian threats against NATO in the absence of real determination to atomic strikes. specified blackmail, however, is to be made credible by changes in the records of its authoritative doctrine and advancement in the modernisation of the atomic arsenal. The reports besides devote comparatively much to strengthening Russia's cooperation with China, Iran and the DPRK. Here they point to the importance of supplying Chinese equipment and dual-use materials for the continuation of the war with Ukraine and the implementation of plans to grow the Russian army.
Differences in Russia's assessments
The reports item any differences in the assessment of Russia's ability to proceed military engagement against Ukraine. The issues of the resilience of Russia and Ukraine and the prospects of their peace talks are otherwise assessed. Denmark's intelligence warns that even with a tiny simplification in the level of aid to Ukraine, it can importantly weaken the military and endure further territorial losses. According to Norwegian intelligence, Russia may not be able to proceed an equally intense war after 2025 unless it decides to bear even greater human and material costs. E-tjensen besides believes that Russia's strong negotiating position now may weaken at the end of this year or in 2026. Lithuania's intelligence estimates that FR is able to finance the war with current spending on the army and safety (minimum 40-41% of the national budget and 6.3% of GDP), but may even increase it in 2026. The Estonian study acknowledges, however, that the ,,war boom” in Russia's economy will end at the end of this year's Latvian SAB estimates in turn that Russia can bear specified burdens by 2027, which will be so hard and risky for it in the long word that it can favour any pause in the war against Ukraine and in the confrontation with NATO. However, Sweden's intelligence emphasizes that Russia's strategical ambitions will stay a precedence over the condition of its economy and the standard of surviving of society.
Allied NATO exercises.
While the reports agree on the prospects of rebuilding Russian land forces and expanding threats from the FR, they present different time horizons of its readiness for a possible NATO conflict. The MUST study stresses that the Russian authorities will take a decision on the substance on the basis of their own logic and assessment of the situation in the region. Finland's intelligence indicates that Russia's combat readiness will be adequate by the end of 2026. The FE study states that Russia may be ready to do so alternatively in 2027, while E-tiensen assumes in the same period inactive major deficiencies in the arms of the Land Army. The assessment of Estonia's intelligence in turn envisages an increase in the real threat of Russia's aggression against NATO countries alternatively than between 2028 and 1930. The Danish and Lithuanian analyses are little conclusive, pointing to the expanding threat from the FR, together with the restoration of its potential, the experience gained in the field of combat and a greater readiness to bear risks to NATO countries.
Baltic and Nordic interviews besides disagree in the analysis of any problems or details, which is the consequence of a different geographical location and focus on Russia's closest units and capabilities. The reports of the Nordic countries do not, for example, measure the possible of Belarus, most likely by examining it together with the Russian potential. The Baltic services emphasize the full subordination of Belarus' capabilities to Russian military plans and decisions. SAB points out that the Minsk government is inactive not ready to actively engage in the war with Ukraine. Lithuania's intelligence estimates that Belarus will implement any decision by Russia to face Ukraine or NATO.
The reports of the Nordic services in turn examine Russian intentions and capabilities in the Arctic. Finnish and Swedish intelligence believe, for example, that Russia's motivation here is mainly economic, but in the region there is simply a clearer military coordination with China. Norway's intelligence besides notes the shift to the north of part of Russia's strategical bombers (beneficial to Ukraine's attacks), the increased strength of their patrols in the Arctic, and the work on fresh atomic weapons systems in Russia's centres and outposts.
Impacts and conclusions
Published intelligence reports build public awareness of threats and foster a cross-party consensus on national safety issues. due to the sensitivity of the subject, no of the papers straight address the negative or affirmative impact of US policies on the conditions of the ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine and the safety of Europe. Since these reports are purely analytical and informational, they do not formulate strategical recommendations. Together, however, they attest to the almost converging perception of the increasing military threat from Russia to the Baltic and Nordic states. The uniformity of intelligence reports may translate into fast adjustments to plans to make their military capabilities and an even faster increase in defence spending in the Baltic-Nordic region. These changes may take place earlier than expected due to the likely simplification of the US contribution to NATO's deterrence and defence capabilities.
In the light of the expected concessions of the fresh US administration towards Russia, the importance of comprehensive analyses of the Russian military threat and of actions below the war threshold, specified as sabotage, is increasing. The convergence of the assessments discussed and the fundamental importance of the Russian threat to Poland's safety propose the request to strengthen political coordination between Poland and regional allies. For example, the establishment and improvement of the format of Poland – 8 Nordic and Baltic countries can service this purpose. In the coming years, there is simply a request for greater opportunism and risky decisions by Russia – even with the low level of training and professionalism of its army – towards NATO, whose peculiar nonsubjective will be the Baltic Sea region. It is so appropriate to strengthen cooperation in preparing for various conflict scenarios in the region, peculiarly in the context of uncertain prospects for the US military presence in NATO.
Source: == sync, corrected by elderman ==
