In today's globalised and multipolar reality there are no more local conflicts, little crucial regions or the periphery of the world. All geopolitical events are part of a large game—the powers they play among themselves— either consequence from it or affect it, and most frequently both. This is why what happened in Syria in December erstwhile president Assad's government scattered like a home of cards in the face of the abrupt offensive of rebel groups, not only redesigned the mediate East's geopolitics, but will besides have effects felt far beyond the borders of the region. This besides applies to Russia's political-military expansion in Asia and Africa.
There is no uncertainty that the collapse of the government in Syria is simply a major blow to Russian global policy. The country remained 1 of the Kremlin's most crucial allies inactive in the russian Union, and in the 21st century its importance did not decrease. Military bases in Syria were crucial to Russia's presence in the mediate East but besides in Africa and in confederate Europe.
From the port of Tartus, the Russian fleet could operate freely in the Mediterranean. The Hmeimi Air Base allowed not only to bomb the positions of Syrian rebels, but above all it was a logistical hub for operations in Africa. Military transport aircraft are not able to scope straight from Russia the Sahel states in which Russian contingents operate. So far, they have flown off-landing in Syria, which is impossible today.
Russia is now trying to transform Libya into a akin hub, moving equipment and personnel there and expanding its bases, but the country will not be able to replace Syria fully. It is besides far away, in a worse position, there is no infrastructure there, and what is more, even though the civilian war has a bit quiet, it is inactive an unstable state torn apart by an interior conflict that could erupt again at any moment.
But the failure in Syria is more than logistical and operational problems for Russia. It's a powerful blow to the anti-Western coalition built by the Kremlin in the mediate East.. Of its 3 members, Iran, Syria and Yemen, only 2 remained, and the coalition itself mostly lost the ability to task force into the east Mediterranean. And in the end – not least – the destiny of president Bashar al-Assad one more time undermines the credibility of the Kremlin in the eyes of its allies. Russia has built its alliance network in Africa and the mediate East, presenting itself as a stronger partner, a patron who is able to warrant the endurance of regimes and warlords facing sanctions, isolation or armed opposition. And at first, she was successful: Russian expeditionary forces helped Asad deal with the muslim State and another armed groups, conquer Aleppo or bounce Palmira from the hands of ISIS. In the Central African Republic, a mercenary from Wagner Groups They rescued the junta of president Faustin-Archange Touadéra at the time erstwhile she was only controlling the capital and most of the country was overrun by rebels. In Mali, Vainners managed to regain the city of Kidal after 12 years, 1 of the largest centres in the separatist Azawad region.
The Syrians gathered in Clock Square to celebrate the overthrow of the 61-year-old government of the Assad family, Homs, Syria 18.01.2025r.
But then there were besides disasters: in Mozambique, Wagner Group, which was expected to aid defeat the jihadist groups there, suffered large losses and was withdrawn from the country. Neither in Libya nor in Sudan, the parties to civilian war supported by Russia achieved victory. Both in Mali and the Central African Republic do not look like the final defeat of rebels and jihadists, on the contrary, both countries are increasingly in chaos and violence. Regimes in Burkina Faso and Niger were to be supported by African Corps, Russian Expeditionary Unit, but for now in both countries only residual contingents are stationed, and Corps personnel, formulated with a view to action in Africa, are sent to “paint holes” on the fronts of the Ukrainian war, first in the Kharkiv region and later in the Kursk region.
The undermining of Russia's credibility besides caused last year Battle of Tin Zaoutine, where a joint operation of the Malian Army and Wagner Group aimed at the final submission of Azawadu and regaining control of the Malian-Algerian border ended in a complete failure. The expedition, intended to be a "criminal-pacification" expedition, turned into a massacre in which almost all its participants died, with the exception of respective Russians and Malians taken prisoner. Since then, the government has failed to full regain control of Azawad, and Wagner Group has managed to accomplish the only thing it has achieved after 3 months of conflict is to gather the bodies of the dead from the battlefield.
Finally, Syria, where the Russian presence in no way helped the government not only halt the rebel offensives, but even hold it. The air force that was expected to bomb the bridges on the Hims attack way managed to only somewhat harm them. And in the face of disaster, the Russians simply abandoned Assad and began withdrawing their contingent.
All of this must not be without influence on the political calculations of allies or possible Kremlin allies. Many of them are most likely wondering now, what is the point of trading their resources in exchange for safety guarantees, since they mean nothing? Why keep Russian contingents in their territory if they are incapable to cope with Tuarean rebels in Mali or jihadist militants in Syria? What is the competence of Russian instructors erstwhile the Syrian army trained by them scattered like a pile of dry leaves under the force of the armed opposition?
Failure in Syria is, of course, not a blow to Russia that will not be lifted. There is besides much to propose that she has not completely reconciled with the failure of the mediate Easthead and is already attempting to deal with the fresh authorities in Damascus. However, the trust of allies that Moscow has lost will not be easy to regain.
