An effort to redefine the function of the German Army in the late 20th and early 11th centuries. Balance between military ambition and social pacifism.

Analysis in Brief

• The post-war bipolar division into the United States and the russian Union changed the perception of the national Republic of Germany's function in Central and east Europe. Its military subjectivity was intended to prevent the expansion of communist ideas to the West and to supply crucial strategical facilities for the alliance.

• Initially, especially in the 1970s, [1] The German government aspired to play a leading function in shaping European security. Social pressures have cooled these ambitions.

• German citizens are far from accepting the participation of the Bundeswehr in combat actions. That is why politicians left out the subject of defence and safety for home problems.

• The 2022 war in Ukraine is simply a breakthrough in the perception of German safety and defence policy. A concept announced by the German Chancellor Zeitenwende to rise citizens' awareness of the request to increase military capacity.

Circumstances of the establishment of the Bundeswehr

The change in postwar architecture forced the global community to adapt to the fresh reality. 2 antagonised spheres of influence were created, represented by the United States and the russian Union. In 1941 the first power abandoned isolationism and became a bastion that protected safety until the borders of the USSR and its subordinate states.

After planet War II, the area of the earlier 3rd Reich was divided into 4 business zones under the control of the victorious powers: the USSR, the United States, Britain and France. In 1949, the national Republic of Germany was established from the erstwhile American, British and French zones. In 1954, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United States, Canada and Italy and the recently formed national Republic of Germany signed the Paris Agreements. Among another things, the business zones in the national Republic of Germany were abolished and military entity was given to it. West Germany, or Germany, created a democratic and capitalist state that became an ally of the United States.

In the existing bipolar system, the United States formed the North Atlantic Pact Organisation (NATO) in 1949. [2] West Germany was granted the right to own its own army, subject to weapons of mass destruction. On the Paris Agreement, in 1955 Germany was incorporated into the North Atlantic Alliance and into the Western European Union (WEU). After formal approval of the document, the armed forces of the RFN – Bundeswehr were formed.

The northeastern part of Germany, occupied by the USSR, was among its satellite states and became the German Democratic Republic. In 1956, GDR joined the Warsaw Pact and formed armed forces – Nationale Volksarmeewhich functioned until the unification of Germany in 1990. The National People's Army has always been a counterweight to the national Republic of Germany and the North Atlantic Alliance. In 1990, the full achievements Nationale Volksarmee, including equipment and infrastructure, was incorporated into the Bundeswehr.

In this analysis, the word Germany means the national Republic of Germany, which was created in 1949, operating within its current borders. The erstwhile German Democratic Republic, as an area of influence of the USSR, is not the subject of this study. Army terminology only applies to the resources of the German Armed Forces.

The impact of social sentiment on defence building

After planet War II, German politicians believed that the only right direction for the improvement of the state would be the thought of a civilian power (Zivilmacht). [3] It was based on 2 main motives: multilateralism and military restraint (Zurückhaltung). Germany was a model civilian state: focused on solving problems in ways far from utilizing force. This thought was driven by the building of Europe's economical prosperity. Therefore, erstwhile Germany was economically successful, many Allied countries expected them to take greater work for the European safety system.

German society was affected by the tragedy of war and had a sense of historical work for Nazi crimes. It so had a problem with clearly defining its direction in safety policy. The beginnings of the Bundeswehr combine with large economical aspirations, so they were characterized by an increase in defence spending. Their highest came to the 1970s erstwhile the German army had 500,000 soldiers. At the time the Bundeswehr commanders held the highest positions in Europe as part of the alliance. After the unification of Germany, defence spending continued to decline.

^{Source: Own study, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database}

The final form of the scope of military action was influenced by a strong disapproval of the society, which protested the participation of the army in external combat actions. The deployment of Pershing II missiles in the West Germany after NATO's 1979 decision was followed by a large echo among the public. There were massive protests and demonstrations of environmental movements throughout Western Germany.

The culture of abstinence in reducing defence possible was influenced by parties with pacifist views: the post-communist organization of Democratic Socialism (PDS – now Die Linke) and the Green organization and part of the SPD. This political discourse continued Chancellor Angela Merkel until the outbreak of the Ukrainian War in 2022. She pursued a policy that responded to signals from the public. Citizens had had adequate of Bundeswehr's engagement in Afghanistan. [4] In addition, the German army could not number on supporting its defence possible due to the 2008 financial crisis and the draconian austerity policy. In 2011, compulsory military service was suspended, which further reduced the prestige of the army. [5]

Change in European order – Zeitenwende

The public claims that the speech of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz 3 days after the full-scale invasion of Russia in Ukraine opened a fresh phase in safety policy (Zeitenwende). The politician addressed 2 aspects: designation of the end of the current European order and strong focus on military issues. Russia's earlier annexation of Crimea failed to convince German citizens to change their moods about military activity. It can so be concluded that the speech of the German Chancellor after 27 February 2022 is to tame citizens with fresh reality. The message is clear: German society must realize that the period of the dividend of peace has ended (Friedensdividende) and defence expenditure should be increased.

Results of the 2017 survey by The Berlin Pulse [6] point out that there is simply a profoundly rooted political culture in German society that focuses on peaceful solutions. Most German respondents were in favour of maintaining restraint in engaging in global conflicts. At that time, 51% of the votes were cast to keep defence spending unchanged. In 2023 "The Berlin Pulse" [7] conducted a survey on military leadership in Europe. Most surveyed (71%) indicated that Germany should not play a leading function in defence activities. 54 percent supported a more restrained policy on engagement in global conflicts. erstwhile it comes to the distribution of opinions by organization groups, it is the far right organization Alternative für Deutschland (Afd) is most skeptical of the global engagement of German troops. But they're voters. CDU/CSU and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen most frequently support Germany's greater commitment to external conflicts.

The war in Ukraine changed social sentiments. Citizens began to support the military support of a war-stricken country and saw the request for their own rearrangement. At the same time, there is simply a dissonance between Western German citizens and those who live in the east part of the country. The erstwhile mainly support military support, and others place emphasis on humanitarian aid. Differences in the approach to Ukraine support may arise from historical issues. 2 parts of today's Germany have worked in another political systems for more than 40 years. The erstwhile Bosnian Republic as a faithful U.S. coalition had already understood the threat dimension of Russia since 1949. She was besides influenced by American narrative. The east part of Germany, on the another hand, for many years functioned in a network of interests and connections with the USSR: from the beginning of the East German Uprising to the unification of Germany. She was at the time willing to work with the Kremlin. It so understands the culture of present Russia more and tries to justify it more. It follows that the people of east Germany do not see specified a threat in Russia as the people of Western Europe. They are able to believe that the conflict in Ukraine can be resolved by diplomatic means. The difference between the 2 groups of residents is besides shown by the German safety study of 2024, which raised the concerns of the citizens of the erstwhile GDR. [8] In the context of the war in Ukraine, as much as 71% of them are more afraid about the deterioration of the financial situation, linked to the increase in energy prices after leaving supplies from Russia. Another origin of fear is the anticipation of bringing Germany into military conflict, which suggested as much as 76 percent of the respondents. on the basis of the report, it can be concluded that if the US had withdrawn from Ukraine's support, it was the people of the east region Germany would like to retreat from any engagement in the conflict area. Western German citizens are opposed to these issues. They treat the U.S. as a serious ally and realize the request for a fast energy transition after leaving the supply of energy resources from Russia. Material issues substance here, due to the fact that people from western areas Germany is richer and has not experienced specified increases in energy prices.

The function of the national Ministry of Defence of Germany in the formulation of safety policy in the 21st century.

From the creation of the national Republic of Germany until the unification dominated the discourse of civilian power (Zivilmacht). Its essence was to limit military engagement in global action. The communicative of Western German society revealed a large reluctance to rebuild the army and to engage in another armed conflict. Mass protests did not have the intended effect, as since 1955 there has been a process of remilitarisation of the western part of Germany. This was under the force of the United States and in the context of the request to presume work for the safety of Western Europe (The United States was then active militarily in the war in Korea). The Bundeswehr was created despite France's opposition. At the time Chancellor Konrad Adenauer felt that expanding the safety of the West Germany was more crucial than social discontent. The army's scope has been limited by many external and interior instruments. Land, naval, and combat air force units were subjected to NATO command structures. According to Article 87a of the Basic Act on the national Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr could not participate in UN peacekeeping missions that would require the usage of weapons. [9] Participation in abroad activities was limited to humanitarian, organisational or sanitary operations, which is besides a consequence to the signals of society. Since the beginning of the Bundeswehr, it has been apparent that it is essential to reconcile the restoration of military potential, including the fulfilment of alliance commitments, with social sentiments. For this reason, the Ministry of Defence was subject to the decisions of the Bundestag members. [10]

Army command was entrusted to the Minister of Defence during the time of peace. In the defence of the country, management turns to Chancellor. In the next step, Parliament makes decisions on the budget and scope of defence and equipment of the army. buying over EUR 25 million requires Parliament's approval through the Bundestag Defence Committee. The participation of the Bundeswehr in abroad shares is approved by parliament: at most for 1 year, with the anticipation of being extended to another. Army participation in abroad activities requires a parliamentary mandate each time.

The long-term objectives of the German defence and safety policy are set by the White Papers (Weißbuch) which focus on military issues. It is an initiative of the Ministry of Defence, which is besides attended by experts from various institutions. Last White Paper on safety Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (“Zur Sicherheitpolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr’) comes from 2016, erstwhile the Minister of Defence was Ursula von den Leyen. It was she who contributed to the first National safety Strategy. In principle, the White Papers and the first strategy are the consequence of a political consensus. papers were created during the regulation of many parties in the German Bundestag, so they are the consequence of dialogue. General and ambiguous definitions dominate their content. On the another hand, they warrant public support in the controversial area of safety and defence policy. The strategy Papers do not contain circumstantial recommendations, so clear and long-term demands are included in the Bundeswehr Concept (Konzeption der Bundeswehr). The last 1 was released in 2018. [11]

The impact of political discourse on allied commitments

In principle, German society supports the engagement of the Bundeswehr in defence alliances. On the another hand, he has reservations about participating in combat actions. Citizens agree to engage in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. The attitude of the Germans to participate in abroad actions determined the actions of the political parties that treated the subject side by side. Only Die Linke campaigned on the slogans of withdrawing from NATO membership.

Until the level of safety in Europe is relaxed, Germany was eager to hide behind the (false) claim that the NATO Treaty does not let military operations outside the alliance. However, an indecisive attitude could not be maintained in the face of expanding force in the Balkans. At the end of 1995, NATO sent a joint combat group to Bosnia and Herzegovina under the code name FIFG (Implementation Force). This is the first participation of the Bundeswehr in military activities after the end of planet War II. [12] The society has shared in assessing the army's engagement in a combat action. The usage of war for global policy was a taboo subject for citizens. The German constitution besides prohibited the Bundeswehra from operating outside NATO. In 1998, the armed escalation peaked. Operation has begun. Allied Force (Allied forces) against Serbian safety forces who oppressed the Albanian population. The German armed forces took part in the conflict in Kosovo during the word of SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. [13] This second organization grew out of protests for peace and climate protection, so it was peculiarly criticized by the public for changing the current political agenda. However, part of the Greens allowed participation in military outside interventions and it was they who prevailed in the womb of the party. [14] As part of the KFOR peace mission in Kosovo, more than 4,500 NATO soldiers are inactive stationed. [15]

Germany's next abroad mission as an alliance was the consequence of September 2001 events. The operation led to a reorientation of NATO's activities into more expeditionary. Schröder tried to convince German society to participate in abroad action. So he pointed out the incorrect name of the mission: International safety Assistance Force. He argued that the function of the Bundeswehr would be limited to stabilisation activities. On the slogans of supporting the Afghan population and the good image of the RFN, it was possible to renew the Bundeswehr's mandate in abroad operations all year. However, discontent began to grow among society. In 2009, a tragic event took place close Kunduz. By order of the German colonel, about 140 men and children were killed. Social support for the war fell to 69 percent. [16]

During the 16-year period of Angela Merkel's office, the multilateral nature of abroad and safety policy was highlighted. The Chancellor advocated strengthening integration in the EU and NATO and supported cooperation in the UN or OSCE. In 2014, Germany did not support sanctions against Russia erstwhile it occupied Crimea. [17] This was linked to a large energy connection to Russia at the time. Criticism by the North Atlantic Alliance mostly afraid defence spending, which did not scope a minimum of 2% of GDP for its government. An alliance failure in the stabilisation of Afghanistan was imposed on Angela Merkel's office. The 2001–2021 Allied Army Intervention ended with the Taliban regaining power in Kabul. The first German forces reached Kabul capital in January 2002. In total, about 150 000 Bundeswehr soldiers served in Afghanistan. 59 soldiers died in the mission, making it the bloodiest military intervention since the end of planet War II. [18] As a consequence of these events, the percent of the population wishing to retreat from the mission increased to 69 percent. [19]

Centre parties (SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP) have a akin approach to defence policy. They realize the request to increase defence spending and military support in Ukraine. But in their ranks there is no shortage of high-ranking politicians who insist on providing more aid Ukraine and those who advocate diplomatic measures. The SPD and the Greens are aware of the request for Ukraine's support, but they cannot afford greater consolidation of the budget for aid purposes at the expense of social support in the country. It is simply a solution contrary to the essence of these parties.

Party Die Linke Strengthen extremist views on Ukraine's support. He tries hard to fight support, which builds his advantage in East Germany. It builds political capital on public concerns about rising prices and energy supply. However, the organization has no clear position regarding Germany's membership of NATO.

Summary

German politicians seem to be aware of the work for guaranteeing safety in Europe as the largest European country in terms of population and economy. The safety strategy of 2023 allows you to believe that the national government wants to strengthen ties within the North Atlantic Alliance and from the US. In 1 interview, Olaf Scholz noted that Germany would effort to rebuild its defence policy. NATO allies anticipate German leadership to take over in Europe. Until now, Germany's expenditure has not reached a mandatory ceiling of 2% of GDP on defence. Now the government wants to make up for the losses and in 2024 allocate EUR 73 billion for defence purposes. The amount represents 2.1% of GDP, i.e. the value that the RFN achieved late in 1992. [20] After the events of 2022, the ruling coalition formed a peculiar defence spending budget of EUR 100 billion. The government in the Bundestag long hesitated to take a clear stance condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Now you can see that the ruling camp, despite interior disputes, does not want to lose a good reputation among allies. So he tries to compensate for the hold in making decisions. [21] The aid to Ukraine from Berlin oscillates within the limits of EUR 24 billion: in the form of arms supplies and humanitarian aid. In the form of dense equipment, Germany has supplied: rocket launchers, self-propelled howitzers, anti-aircraft kits, armored vehicles, air defence systems, as well as combat tanks. In addition, Germany took on the difficulty of energy independency from Russia. Information on the deployment of the Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania, where 4.8 1000 soldiers and 200 civilians will yet be present, can be concluded that the RFN has changed its approach to safety policy. [22] The public opinion poll shows that more than half of the population is showing greater support for NATO. At the same time, 45% of citizens agree to spending 2% of GDP on defence. [23]

Conclusions: The 2022 war in Ukraine touched the public of Germany. This is an unprecedented phenomenon in the past of post-war Germany. safety and defence policy issues are powerfully mainstreamed in political discourse. Concept Zeitenwende, formulated by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, announces a change of political priorities. The defence issue has become a central issue in the public debate. The question is how long the surviving defenses will remain. At the minute of the silence of the conflict in Ukraine, a culture of military abstinence, so powerfully rooted in the consciousness of the German society, can occur. This could lead to a shift from defence policy to interior problems.

Forecasts

One of the options for future safety policy Germany may be looking for a channel of cooperation with Russia. The winning FR can increase force and force on the EU. Ukraine is rich in many strategically crucial deposits. Lithium, called ‘white gold’, is essential for the production of electrical cars. Without it, the energy transformation of Germany is impossible. The Ukrainian resources of this precious deposit were not adequate to cover the needs of the EU, but would be an crucial channel of diversification so that the EU does not depend on 1 supplier. Germany, as the EU's largest economy, will lead and give speech to all specified talks.

A little likely script will be to strengthen the support of the German public for the Bundeswehr's participation in military actions. The government would respond to specified a communicative of public opinion: it would search to increase the financial effort to rebuild the army and extend the scope of military aid for Ukraine. In this script Germany would not hesitate to supply Ukraine with far-reaching Taurus-type maneuvering missiles. It would be a precedence for the West Germany to increase the safety of its country and thus besides to strengthen Ukraine. The German reorientation of offensive policy would attract more countries, especially from Central and east Europe. The aim would be to increase military force on Russia to retreat from Ukraine. It is possible that a European army would be created in this variant, which would be stationed in a conflict-stricken territory.

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