We're at a hybrid war.
There's a hybrid war going on, an opponent, without breaking borders by abroad troops, is working to reduce our social resilience. The first phase of this strategy is operations aimed at society: deepening divisions, sowing chaos, questioning authority, cognitive manipulation. The next phase is already more direct and violent – it includes acts of violence, arson and even possible assassinations. From the aggressor's point of view, it doesn't substance who becomes the victim. The effect is important: creating fear and undermining citizens' assurance in the institutions of the state.
It is worth remembering that a hybrid war is not carried out "instead of" conventional war – it is alternatively a preparation of the ground under a full-scale, kinetic attack. If hybrid action brings the aggressor its intended results, he may quit a costly military invasion. Modelly, however, hybrid warfare does not exclude the usage of force.
Reports of series of arsons in various parts of Poland show that we are already at an advanced phase of the hybrid war. This does not mean linear escalation – the opponent can usage complex, flexible tool combinations.
It is crucial to be able to operate on multiple levels simultaneously: neutralising hybrid threats, disposing of agents, building social resilience to cognitive manipulations and consistent reinforcements. The goal is 1 – to make the possible cost of aggression unacceptable to the opponent.
A hybrid war does not start with a shot – it starts with a division. The resilience of the state present is measured not only by the force of the army, but besides by social cohesion and the ability to recognise that we are already on the battlefield.
Ready for Black Screenplay
Black scenarios are peculiarly valuable in preparing for war – even the least likely ones. Members of the North Atlantic Alliance trust on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which requires a joint consequence in the event of an attack on any associate State. The problem is that even with the best intentions, the decision to respond together will take time. Moreover, each country itself determines the scope of the aid.
There is besides a request to constantly convince allies – especially those who have a lower sense of danger or traditionally good relations with Russia – that the threat is real. The deficiency of a clear, fast consequence may lead to a failure of credibility of the Alliance and thereby weaken its ability to deter Russia, but besides another possible opponents curious in changing the current global order.
A possible aggressor knows NATO's political realities. Already today, it strengthens fears and fuels doubts in associate States' societies, trying to discourage them from acting together. In the event of a conflict, these actions will be intensified, with the aim of undermining the applicable dimension of the Treaty of solidarity right where it will be crucial: on a real battlefield. There are many tools, and the weaknesses of the societies of the allied states are well recognized by him.
Nor should we forget Article 3 of the Treaty, which clearly indicates that each NATO country has a work to make its own capacity to defy armed assault. This means that there is simply a request for a real hazard assessment and preparation for a situation where the first attack will should be effectively countered. Working with allies is simply a foundation, but it cannot replace its own preparations. erstwhile we number on help, we should be ready for the worst.
Faith in alliances does not relieve the work of readiness – it is self- determination, the ability to last the first strike and the innovation advantage are present the most safe line of defense.
Challenges increase demography. The army needs more and more soldiers, but adulthood is becoming little numerous. Advanced weapons systems require long, costly training – especially in the case of specialised positions specified as fighter pilots, which lasts years and costs millions.
Therefore, it is essential to look for asymmetries, or solutions to circumvent our own limitations and strengthen our fighting abilities in a way that the opponent does not know the answer to. These can be even widely developed drone systems today, but the scope of possibilities is much wider. The key question is: will we find the will to go through technological and organisational innovation with full determination – without losing conventional military capabilities?
New war – old trenches, fresh technologies
Ukrainian military experts specify the ongoing conflict as the intersection of planet War I and III – a classical position war conducted in trenches, while utilizing modern, constantly improved weapons. Although the North Atlantic Alliance has existed for decades and has invested tremendous resources in military development, in its premise it has always been a defensive alliance, has never led a full-scale, symmetrical war. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has shown that the decisive importance is frequently not very expensive, technologically advanced equipment, but this cheap, easy accessible – possible to produce in immense quantities.
W Polish defence communities are debating how much the possible NATO conflict with Russia would be akin to the war fought present in Ukraine. The key argument behind a different script is air defence capabilities – which Ukraine barely has, and NATO theoretically maintains an advantage in this area. At the same time, there is no uncertainty that the spread of drones has changed the way of reasoning about the modern battlefield – radically and irreversibly.
The war in Ukraine exposed the specifics of modern conflict: not the 1 with the most costly equipment, but the 1 who can produce it quickly, flexibly usage it and constantly change tactics.
The question remains: where would a possible war take place – in whose territory? Will we accept the script of accepting the first strike and conducting a defensive war in our own territory, or will we decide to act actively in the territory of our opponent? Each of these options carries another risks – including the possible usage of tactical atomic weapons.
Does Poland learn from the war in Ukraine? Yes – we gather experience. Are we utilizing them fully? It's different. As a associate of NATO, we request to build our defence capabilities in specified a way that they are compatible with the possible of the full Alliance – which, in the case of specified an extended structure, does not always foster fast adaptation to the changing reality of the battlefield.
Poland as an architect of regional safety
The hard geopolitical position, the size of the territory, the cognition of the opponent and the advanced investment in defence are the unquestionable assets of Poland, which predestinate us to play a key function in global safety policy. Poland has a full mandate to actively co-create a European deterrence policy, to effectively support Ukraine in the fight for sovereignty and to build broad support for these actions within the European Union.
An effective safety policy present requires a 360-degree position – from the Baltic to the Pacific, from Brussels to Seoul – with readiness to build alliances besides where we have not yet made them.
The current challenges require a fresh approach – greater vigilance, flexibility and ability to see the dangers of a diverse nature. This means seeking alliances besides where we have not yet sought them – besides in seemingly exotic relations. We request a 360-degree approach: different directions, different intensity, different priorities. Each partner has different fears, another interests and another resources – our function is to admit these differences and build complementary, flexible forms of cooperation.
For Poland, the natural direction of improvement is besides connected with the democratic states of Indo-Pacific – South Korea, Japan, Australia or fresh Zealand. Although they are looking at threats from a different position than Europe, they clearly signal their willingness to cooperate with the European Union and Poland. These contacts should be developed – consciously, strategically and with openness.
Wartime medicine – the invisible front of preparations
The list of issues to be discussed present in the context of safety is long. Surprisingly, however, the question which should be referred to as wartime medicine – with peculiar emphasis on field medicine.
Currently, the attention of the Ministry of Defence, General Staff and Command focuses primarily on the acquisition of weapons and training soldiers to service it. Meanwhile, war is not just equipment – they are primarily people. Direct conflict besides means injured: those in request of immediate assistance, evacuation, care, treatment, followed by physical and intellectual rehabilitation. Only then can 1 talk about restoring combat capability.
The experience gained from the war in Ukraine clearly shows that the way of organizing medical care must be reconsidered. Under conditions of mass usage of drones, field hospitals can no longer be located in tents – they must operate in underground infrastructure. Ambulances, which transport respective injured at once, become besides easy targets. The function of tiny dispersed means of evacuation is growing.
Already present there are drones capable of transporting wounded from the battlefield, and solutions are being tested to remotely read their life parameters even before evacuation. These technologies change the rules of the game.
War medicine is not a backdrop – it is simply a frontline. Without a modern strategy of care for the injured, you cannot effectively fight or win peace.
Consequently, civilian medicine must besides adapt to the fresh reality – fresh groups of patients will emerge, with completely different types of injuries and intellectual problems. This requires cooperation, exchange of experience and close links between the military and civilian systems. It is crucial to learn from Ukrainian partners – taking into account contextal differences, i.e. without copying their solutions directly.
Finally, 1 thing remains clear: the better we prepare for a possible conflict – besides from the medical side – the greater the chance that it will never happen.
