What does Vladimir Putin play? I'm certain he's not looking for a fast end to the war..

polska-zbrojna.pl 1 month ago

A fewer days ago, the largest exchange of prisoners between the parties to the conflict in the East was held so far. The "thousand for a thousand" expression was established in mid-May during the gathering of the delegation of Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. And in fact, this is the only affirmative result of the talks that were then held. The war is at its best, and the prospects for even a fewer weeks of ceasefire are not even seen by the most enduring optimists.

Importantly, unless the situation has changed on the front – the strength of the fighting remains advanced – and the drastic escalation has occurred in the deep back. The Russians are making massive raids on Ukrainian cities, supporting drones with ballistic missiles. The Ukrainians do not stay indebted, the night of a slave over Russia hundreds of unmanned men.

Military and Political Success

The difference in these attacks has a civilizational dimension and is typical of the current course of war. While the first strikes “where it will go”, mostly civilian objects, others effort to undermine targets that are essential from a military point of view. The Russians have consistently implemented a strategy to terrorize civilians, Ukrainians are afraid about further weakening the Russian military-industrial complex. In this way, both sides see the enemy being forced to halt the war, whether by the fall of civilian morale or by cutting off the army from adequate supplies. It is hard to measure on the basis of available data who in this case is closer to achieving their intentions.

RECLAMA

For the sake of clarity, let us be clear – both parties are fighting, but this is the state of affairs imposed by the Russians; they are torpedoing efforts to accomplish a real ceasefire. In truth, this is besides done by the United States. Amazing. Donald Trump's weakness for Putin and Russia “In particular, the deficiency of approval for further sanctions against Moscow and the increase in military aid to Kiev,” they exclaim the Russians, giving them the chance to proceed their war effort. The behaviour of Ukrainians is reactive here, the only right one, after all, the Kremlin excludes compromises and clearly plays for the maximum demolition of the opponent.

Ukrainian soldiers fire from a self-propelled 2S7 Pion cannon in the Russian cemetery in the Donetsk Oblast. photograph by Eastnews.

The far-reaching plans of Russia have not changed – Moscow inactive wants the word of Ukrainian statehood and secondary russification of Ukrainians. At present, the Russians are incapable to accomplish these objectives, so Putin seeks to accomplish indirect solutions which, on the 1 hand, would be a good starting point for a later "general hearing", and on the another hand would satisfy the current needs of propaganda, in peculiar the request to present a "special military operation" as a military and political success achieved here and now, alternatively than in a future that does not specify itself.

The dynamics of Russian pressure

So what are the current plans of the Russian leadership? Putin communicates this directly, officially decreed the creation of a buffer region on the Russian-Ukrainian border. – Our armed forces are in the process of carrying out this task, enemy fire points are actively suppressed, work continues – he assured a fewer days ago, after signing the applicable documents.

The Dictator did not uncover precisely where the buffer region would run or how deep it would go into Ukraine's territory – however, the second intention is obvious. The Russians want to make a buffer – understood as a region saturated with reinforcements and engineering obstacles – not in its own area, but at the expense of its neighbour. This is what the concentration of troops of the Russian army at the border with the Sumic and Kharkiv circuits is expected to serve. These troops will likely be utilized for shallow intrusions and trenches in occupied positions. All to prevent or at least hinder Ukrainians from rallying like a Kursk operation undermining the credibility of Putin's government in the eyes of Russians.

But it's just a "prophylaxis," looking from the Kremel perspective. The invasive forces have a much more serious task to do. Moscow has repeatedly signaled that it will not hold its fire until it takes control of the 4 Ukraine circuits, which in the autumn of 2022 were formally annexed by Russia. 2 of them – Lugansk and Donetsk – can win in battle; the first 1 actually won, after all, only scraps of Lugansk stay under Ukrainian control. The battles for the Donetsk are fierce, and with the steady dynamics of Russian force it is possible that the invaders will regulation the region by the end of the year. But the reconstruction of the Chersonian region, and especially the business of Zaporizhina, including the large capital of the region, remains beyond the capabilities of the Russian army.

Well-oriented fantasies

So how does Putin intend to accomplish his goal of absorbing 4 circuits? possibly he gives himself time to believe that he has adequate to effort to occupy Ukrainian south in the following 2026. But there is another explanation – what?

Let's start with the fact that Ukrainian intelligence has been reporting on the large concentration of enemy forces at the border with the Sumic circuit for a long time. There is now to be more of this army than it needs to pluck out the buffer mentioned earlier. possibly this over-normative mobilization is evidence of the prevention of Russian command, which is aware of the limitations of its own troops. Nominally numerous, actually little valuable. But it cannot be ruled out that the Russians are going to get more than a narrow buffer. That they want to enter deeper and wider, besides into the Chernihov region, and make a physical threat to the Ukrainian capital. They may feel that this is easier than trying to break through the dam steppes, and may presume that the intellectual impact of specified a maneuver would be truly serious. Making space for negotiations “on a Russian note”, on the rule “we will leave northern Ukraine, but you will retreat from the south”.

Russian military bloggers feed on these scenarios. And although it is propaganda, and it is frequently “flying distant in fantasies”, they are besides people well-oriented in the intentions of the Russian army.

Marcin Ogdowski , writer “Polish Armed Forces”, war correspondent, author of the blog unkamuflazu.pl
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