Is a distance of nearly 7,000 km adequate to keep the most valuable aircraft safe? To be honest, it's hard to say, but the Russians have no choice. They can no longer hide their strategical bombers from the Ukrainian border. The Anadyr base is located on the east edge of the empire, in the Chukotsky Autonomous Region, “behind the city” are only the United States...
W Moscow is inactive trying to recover from the pogroms that Ukrainian peculiar services have given to Russian strategical aviation. In the attack of June 1, 2025, 8 Tu-95MS long-range bombers were destroyed, or 2 fifths of efficient aircraft of this type. Drones have besides burned down respective another machines – Tu-22M3 average scope bombers and A-50 early informing aircraft – but it is the failure of the "bears" (as in the NATO nomenclature called Tu-95) that hurt the Russians most, as they form the backbone of the aviation condition of the atomic triad. In fact, they were – now the center of gravity moved to Tu-160, whose Russian air force has about 20 (plus respective inoperable copies suitable for modernization or cannibalization). And just 2 specified "tresses" were spotted at the airport of Anadyr.
A base in the town of Anadyr serves the Russians to activities in the ArcticAnd the proximity of the U.S. makes it a base for observing the Northeast flank of NATO. She has so far hosted the Tu-95, besides designed to carry out exploratory missions, but Tu-160 visits were rare. Their arrival should so not be interpreted differently than in the context of the attack of 1 June and the desire to hide the Blackjacks (code name NATO) from the Ukrainians. Anadyr Airport is perfect for this, due to the fact that it is an island in the mediate of nowhere, and a modest network of surrounding roads can easy be controlled (The drone truck shouldn't slip through.). Besides, that these are not just speculations, it is best evidenced by the fact that the previously concentrated mainly in the base of the White Tu-160, dispersed after 5 different airports. Anadyr remains the furthest destination, but they all have the same trait – thousands of kilometres from Ukraine.
Catching up on old negligence
A fewer days after the final of Operation Spider, the media over Vistula announced that the Russians had drawn another lesson from the pogrom. And that they are building shelter hangars, with the intention of hiding the most valuable aircraft under a solid reinforced concrete cover. It's not precisely like that. The brazen nature of the Ukrainian attack has indeed sparked a discussion in Russia about the request to better safe bombers. But the same subject has come to the wallpaper and in the US, where strategical aviation is besides based "under the cloud" – and where the hazard of mass impact of tiny drones, controlled "from behind the fence" has not been seriously considered. And the Russian shelter hangars actually build, for example, in occupied Crimea, that is, in the bases from which tactical, front aviation operates, where bombers do not even approach. These investments have been ongoing for at least 1 year and are the aftermath of erstwhile Ukrainian missile-drone attacks (classic attacks carried out from the territory of Ukraine).
In this context, it is worth noting that in russian times in Ukraine – envisaged as the basis of the future war with the North Atlantic Alliance – a multitude of airports equipped with shelter hangars were built. In communist Poland and another countries of the "demolud" there were besides many of them. But in the russian Union, specified investments were no longer made, assuming a limited scope of Western strokes. present the Russians spit in their beards, aware that the advanced endurance of Ukrainian air forces is due, among others, to the fact that their opponents have a place to hide. So on the Russian side there is the catching up of negligence, but so far this process includes airports located close the theatre of action. Bombers – after “The Spider” – will most likely besides gain “the roof over their head”, but “to this day” is simply a song of the future.
Appearances of Deep Friendship
It is hard to measure how long hands the Ukrainian intelligence, which during this war amazed the best many times, would seem, oriented experts. In any case, the Russians must blow cold, after all, the effects of the Spider operation go far beyond the common (war) relation of Moscow and Kiev. mostly speaking, the Russian Federation inactive retains a large deterrent capacity, but in relation to its main opponent in the "atomic league", the United States, it entered a phase of deeper asymmetry as regards the ability to carry atomic warheads. It is not adequate that “since always” it has had worse aircraft (it faces the effects of technological delay), but now it has physically less than a twelve days ago (and much little than the US).
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of atomic deterrence policy is based on the anticipation of repeatedly duplicating an atomic repost, which is easier with a diverse arsenal. It can be said: “When the enemy destroys our ships, we will inactive have ground launchers, erstwhile they are missing, we will have planes.” This string can be arranged in any configuration, the essence of this reasoning is to draw attention to the request to diversify weaponry. So the Russians have less options now – and Donald Trump's settlement policy does not extinguish their distrust of the United States. However, late revealed material from Russian intelligence clearly indicates that China is besides afraid of the Kremlin, despite real economical and military cooperation and the inactive maintained appearances of deep friendship.
Illustration image - Ukrainian soldiers prepare FPV drones.
Loss of aviation residues
But let us return to Russian-Ukrainian soil. erstwhile the Russians failed to win the air advantage over Ukraine, they were forced to attack it from a distance, from Russia. Tu-95 was good for this, due to the fact that it doesn't substance to the plane and crew whether a suspended rocket carries a atomic or conventional warhead. So they flew bombers for tasks in a "special military operation", while inactive on work as part of strategical forces and strategies of deterrence. And it's mostly 50-year-old machines, long-old, that can be upgraded and repaired to a limited extent. Theoretically, the "tresses" are capable of carrying 8 Ch-101/Ch-555 missiles, but usually, to hit Ukraine, they took from 3 to 5 rockets. Why? The aircraft's handling consumes and, after years of operation, the airframe could not withstand and itself become a falling missile.
What I am mentioning is that after June 1 it will be even more hard for Russians to complete a "strong crew" for long-range air strikes. There is no anticipation of a one-time exhibition of respective “bears”. But – 1 might announcement – there are Tu-160. The Russians have so far utilized them very sparingly – these bombers were active in only 3 missions aimed at Ukraine. Will it change now? Tu-160 is besides a tiny construction, but the Russian manufacture has recreated the anticipation of very limited production of machines of this kind (one part per year, which takes place utilizing already existing hulls). This does not give and hates the hazard of Ukrainian retaliation, which could consequence in Russia losing any remaining strategical aviation.
What will the Ukrainians do?
Looking from the Russians' perspective, it would be appropriate to "get off the stage" of the air triad component and focus on attacks utilizing another media. What seems to be happening now, in fresh strikes yes, respective aircraft took part (including 2 Tu-160), but mostly Russians fired Kalibr missiles, fired from decks of ships, ballistic missiles carried by mobile launchers, and above all sent hundreds of kamikaze drones to Ukraine.
In addition to stating the fact itself, there may besides be any indication of further actions by the Ukrainian peculiar Services and the Army. I presume their precedence will now be ships of the Black Sea Fleet (again...), Iskander launchers and drone factories. In this context, the information obtained by Ukrainian military intelligence HUR, according to which Russia has provided North Korea with all the know-how essential for the production of the Shaheds, is interesting. This can be seen in terms of support for a faithful ally, and the prevention of moving production to a safer place. To a abroad country, thousands of miles from the Ukrainian border...
