The text is simply a fragment of the publication: “Clocks in Ukraine 2014-2017” published as part of planet Combat Wozów, nr.4/2017 by Jarosław Wolski and Paweł Przeździecki.
Although the analysis below was written 5 years ago – in 2017 – and presents lessons from the fighting of the first conflict in Ukraine, it is worth recalling the experiences of that time. They are a good introduction to the author's presently preparedoutline of the first conclusions of the fight in Ukraine in 2022 in the context of the improvement of the Polish SZ.
COMPANIES
Specificity of the 2014-2016 conflict.
As a consequence of changes from 2004-2014 SZ Ukraine remained on the eve of the war with the developed 2 armored brigades, six mechanized brigades, a mountain infantry brigade, 4 areomobile brigades, 4 artillery brigades and 3 ground military aviation brigades. This totaled 21 theoretically developed relationships compared to 42 in 2004. It is essential to emphasise that the designation of these units as "developed" is powerfully overgrown due to the fact that their completion had small to do with the mobilization development. In reality, each brigade proved capable of exerting no more than an incomplete tactical battalion group or just a complete company tactical group. Fortunately, Ukraine had a reasonably well-preserved mobilization strategy – it was partially a relic after the times of the USSR and was amazingly not destroyed or importantly truncated in relation to its first capabilities. Despite the massive sale of UiSW, adequate of them have been preserved that they allowed in combination with a efficient mobilization strategy to supplement the dense start of 2014 and 2015 and the exhibition of fresh units. It was yet revealed that the SZ Ukraine is able to exhibit additionally (more than the state of 2013) 3 armoured brigades, 8 mechanized brigades, 4 motorised brigades, 2 mountain infantry brigades, 4 aeromobile brigades, marine infantry brigades, land army aviation brigades, 3 artillery brigades. Thus, the full staff army of 2013 and its mobilization improvement from 2014-2017 counted 46 large units and allowed to scope the states of a decade ago. This is an awesome achievement, but most likely the end of Ukrainian capabilities – mainly due to the depletion of UiSW stocks. The Ukrainian armoured troops on the eve of the war were the main component of the land troops – in total: 2 armored brigades and 6 mechanized brigades. However, the above units were poorly completed, and those capable of taking out into the field turned out to be only about 350 of the "officially" 732 tanks. The equipment held was heavy exploited and with a crucial repair hang. The training of individual crews did not adhere to the standards of Western countries or even Russia. The problem was the deficiency of resources (MPSs, ammunition, free resurses) for conducting classes and the inefficient training system, which in 22 years was re-established even in relation to the times of the USSR. The training of conscripts was fundamentally fiction, as was the individual reserves. The situation somewhat improved the presence of fewer soldiers with rich missionary experience or mobilized officers remembering the times of the USSR and the hired service in the 1990s and 2000s. As demonstrated by later experiences – morale of soldiers and enlisted officers stood on a good level. From the above contrasted the skills and morale of the battalion level commanders and above – time showed that Napoleon Bonaparte's saying that "the army of rams led by the lion is stronger than the army of lions led by the ram" did not lose any news, while the commanders of higher levels were the weakest component of the Ukrainian army. The second critical area was connectivity – a rachitic and bustling company-batalion level and theoretically existing but (as they have shown later experience) easy to destruct at battalion level – higher levels of command. The automation of command (except for a fewer complexes device for artillery) in rule did not be and the "Maneuver" strategy in armored troops was not (according to available sources) utilized in combat. Despite all the weakness, Ukraine's army had respective assets. The first were immense amounts of military weapons and equipment in the mobilisation stock. Together with the remaining demolition (although inactive awesome capabilities) of the mobilization programme, this allowed for a doubling of the number of alleged large units in the process of mobilizing and simultaneously complementing the losses of troops participating in the fighting. The second asset proved to be the availability of many reserves after military training (despite its debateable quality) and the multitude of patriotic volunteers who, as part of the national race, provided reinforcement commissions. Without both, Ukraine's army would have divided the destiny of the Libyan Iraqi or Georgian army in 2014.
The invasion and annexation of Crimea may be considered a gigantic military success of Russia. In fact, with zero starts of their own Russians completely neutralized and then destroyed Ukrainian forces on the peninsula counted 19,000 soldiers. This was done through a well-run hybrid war in which the will to fight and morale of the Ukrainian command in Crimea was destroyed, while a crucial part of the soldiers deserted or turned to the enemy side. The scale of the phenomenon is evidenced by the fact that more than 6,000 soldiers passed to the Russian side and the second as many – they deserted and resigned from the army.
Initially, the fighting script in the east of Ukraine was rather akin to the Crimean – protests of the population and inflowing provocations under public utility buildings completed by taking over them by unspecified paramilitary groups. At the same time, there was a permanent infiltration of the border of east circuits by successive troops of peculiar forces from Russia. Attempts to make mass protests in the east of Ukraine have been moderately successful – mainly due to the fast reaction of the government in Kiev. In particular, it was critical to safe the industrial area around Kharkov, Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk due to the fact that they were the basis for the Ukrainian Army's mobilization base. Its failure would mean disaster, so it is not unusual that fundamentally all available forces were directed to the mentioned cities. Effective pacification allowed for continued undisturbed mobilization but at the same time absorbed most of the available forces and left a large gap in the Donetsk and Lugansk circuits where the rebellion was besides rapidly most successful. 3 large centres (Donieck, Slavic and Lugansk) fell into the hands of the rebels and by 4 (Mariupol) clashes fought on the streets of the city began.
On 13 April 2014, the Kiev government announced the launch of anti-terrorism operation (ATO). Despite the rescue of the base of industrial mobilization of the economy and most UiSW syntaxes, it turned out that the Ukrainian army was unprepared for war in an even worse way. Both armored brigades were able to phase only after 1 incomplete battalion tactical group and 1 (full) company group. Six mechanized brigades were able to phase a full of only six tactical battalion groups, while 4 more brigades (areomobile or mountain infantry) after 1 tactical company group. In real terms, it turned out to be capable of little than 20% of its power in the field of hardware charges. Despite the thinness of their forces, an active phase of action began in May. During it, Ukrainians managed to recapture the airport in Donetsk, pacify Mariupol, capture Jampol and thus environment Slavic along with a large separatist group there. However, they managed to break through the lap ringing on 4-5 July until Kramatorska and then retreat to Donbas. The mobilization of the SZ of Ukraine and the "flow" of subsequent company and battalion tactical groups and recently created paramilitary units continued. As a consequence of the fighting conducted by mid-July, the Ukrainian army recovered Slaviansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol and managed to marry Donieck and Lugansk in this capture Amrosiliwke and scope Sawur Mogiła. This gave any chances to think about the recovery of the full territory occupied by separatists. Unfortunately, the adopted concept was to regain control of the state's borders and cut off supplies to both separatist republics by creating a 150 km long cordon along a border belt extending from Sawur-Mogiła up to the border crossing in Izzarne. There were respective errors in this concept. The first was to presume the comparative inactivity of Russians. The second was that to gain and keep specified a long belt was over-extended by the scant forces of the Border Guard, the subdivisions of the recently formed National Guard, 2 diggers from the 28th and 51st Mechanized Brigade, and a full of 5 incomplete battalion groups from the 72nd and 24th Mechanized Brigade and 79 Areomobile Brigade. To safe the section on which the division would usually operate, there was so an absolutely insufficient force of the order of the ‘half-and-a-half’ brigade. The 3rd mistake, but forced mediocre logistical safety of the operation, was to adopt the concept of occupying the site and creating permanent extended bases (so-called fobs). As a result, the armored forces lost their main asset and became static opposition points effectively avoided by the enemy. These errors were immediately utilized by the Russians/Separatists who first occupied Sawur – Mogiła cutting off the full group trying to block the border and, secondly, started shelling artillery across the Ukrainian FOB border. Since only forces coming out of the fire maneuvered are able to last artillery storms, the effects of attacks corrected by Russia's advanced guidance operators from peculiar forces were devastating. Laser-corrected ammunition was utilized to combat peculiarly crucial targets in respective cases and most losses were caused by comparatively simple means of firing: 120mm mortars, 122mm MLRS Grad and 152mm artillery shells. The effects of more than 60 storms were tragic for Ukrainian troops in static positions – with the cut off of deliveries after the Sawur-Mogiła occupation, the attack by the Ukrainian group by the end of July fundamentally ceased to be and the groups managed to retreat from only 79 brigades. Despite this disaster, however, the Ukrainian forces had 3 major successes on another episodes of the ATO. The first was to capture Debalcev and separate the LRL and DRL. The second was the mastery of Saur-Mogiła after dense fighting by soldiers of the 25th Air-Desant Brigade and 51th Mechanized Brigade. The 3rd was to capture the airport in Lugansk, to clear the airport in Donetsk and to scope the village of Torez and Lowlands located north of the captured Saur-Mogiły and just 20 km from the border. At the same time, the creation of a lap ringing around Lugansk and Donetsk began. At this phase of the fight, it can be considered that the Ukrainians had a real chance to strangle the rebellion – and if it were not for direct engagement in the fight of the SZ of Russia, it would most likely have been so. In the first days of August, the ATO group had already had 32,000 soldiers and about 8,000 in MMA forces, National Guards, and Border Guards. Despite the formation of more than 100 km gap between the captured Sawur-Mogila on the border crossing into Izzarne Command ATO decided to close the lap around Donetsk. For this to be done, it was essential to get the Ilojawsk lying southeast of it. The separate forces counted respective volunteer battalions and territorial defenses supported by a reinforced battalion tactical group from the 51st mechanized brigade. These were so besides fewer forces were rapidly reinforced by a combat group based on the 17th armored brigade and 93th mechanized brigade. Even after this strengthening, however, the full force straight attacking the city did not exceed a 1000 soldiers. The above group became stuck during the fight for Iłojawsk, although temporarily it was able to control half of the city. At the same time, there was no longer on this section of the front that could be thrown away. In retrospect, it appears that ATO's command did not believe in the anticipation of Russian intervention. This was a tragic mistake due to the fact that already on August 24 Russian troops crossed the border south of Sawur Mogiła. The Russian group had about 4,000 soldiers and 20-30 tanks, 90 BWP/BMD supported by rocket and barrel artillery and was exhibited by the 98 and 106th Air-Desant Division, 31 Air-Desant Brigade, and 8 Guarded Mechanized Brigade and 9 Motorised Brigade. As a consequence of the Russian strike, forces of the reinforced battalion group of 51 mechanized brigades were broken down, with 1500 soldiers retreating in disorder towards Donbas. As a result, Ukrainians fighting in Ilojawsk became besieged, and the closure of the lap ringing around their forces was greatly contributed by the desertion of the full territorial defence battalion “Pricarpathy”. The Ukrainian forces in the boiler counted about 1.5 1000 soldiers from the volunteer battalions and subdivisions 28, 93 and 51 mechanized brigades. They fought fiercely for 2 days in the city with separatist forces and Russians who tried to frontalize the Ukrainian forces. During the events described, further battalion groups of Russians hit 2 another strategical directions – Mariupolski and Luganski. Mariupol was hit by a reinforced Russian battalion tactical group with more than 30 tanks (T-72B3 and T-90A) – it defeated the Ukrainian “Azov” regiment in the fight and managed to approach the city. On the Lugansk direction, the situation was inactive a penny – despite the opposition by Ukrainian battalion tactical groups (of the composition of the 24 and 30 mechanized brigades) of respective "Separatist" strikes of 20-22 August, the force of the attack of the battalion's militant group of Russians carried out on 24 August was besides large. The Russians managed to take over the airport while the demolition of both Ukrainian groups prevented a self-sacrificing counterattack of tank companies from 1st armored brigade – it suffered dense losses but allowed the remainder of the forces to withdraw. From 26 to 29 August, a major part of the conflict in the Iłojawski boiler took place. Ukrainians undertook 2 attempts to deblock the town of Komsomolsk by forces of 2 battalion conflict groups. Both ended up with a disaster due to first artillery-missile shelling of march columns and then (while walking out of the fire maneuver) encountering Russian positions who from the distance of the tanks' fire and BWP/BMD were able to completely smash the survivors of both affected troops. As a consequence of the continuation of the lap and the exhaustion of force ammunition in the boiler (1,400 soldiers) they decided to effort to break through on 29 August – after unsuccessful negotiations with the Russians concerning the anticipation of leaving the area of the fight against weapons and "technique" – which the Russians did not want to agree to with the script "Krymski" - means march the soldiers themselves without weapons and dense equipment. An effort to break through the boiler (through 3 Russian lines) at a distance of 25km in the group of 2 parallel marching columns was doomed to failure and ended with a mask of 1 column and a decay into tiny groups of the other. Only 400 Ukrainians reached their own lines – practically without dense equipment. The second so many soldiers were captured, about 460 were killed and missing. Over 480 were injured of which any were evacuated before attempting to break through the boiler. Iłojawsk turned out to be a disaster and with the defeat at Lugansk and the march of Russians on Mariupol – a disaster for the full ATO which forced the general retreat. Ukrainians saved the pressures of the West and the negotiations that ended with the signing of the 5 September ceasefire in Minsk.
The winter run in east Ukraine from the turn of 2014 and 2015 marked a somewhat different nature of fighting. Her apogee was fighting for Debalcevo. The town of Debalcewo and the large railway junction in it is located in the mediate of the M04 road connecting Donetsk and Lugansk. As a consequence of the actions of 2014, the city and the area around it was created by the Ukrainian “bag” with a depth of 40 and a width of up to 19 km separating DRL and ŁRL. Its existence made it hard to consolidate both "people's republics" and at the same time gave hope for a comparatively easy lap of Ukrainian forces stationed there. This was the apparent mark of the attack since September 2014. Therefore, it is astonishing how much after the stepmother ATO command approached to prepare this area for defence. For various reasons, both Russian and Ukrainian propaganda effort to show the bag around Debalcev as an almost second arc of the kurska with a number of well-prepared engineering positions and many troops. However, this image has nothing to do with the truth, and on the 1 hand it is an effort at a convenient excuse explaining the serious losses and slow advancement of the Russians on the another – I mask the embarrassing deficiency of preparation from the ATO command. Ukrainians did not prepare elaborate defensive lines or engineering obstacles. They haven't even prepared a second and 3rd lines of defence or even prepared positions that could be their skeleton. On a very tiny scale mines utilized were shallow and set in apparent places. Most defensive positions were in the form of heavy reinforced but tiny posts and fire points grouping up to 4-6 BTRs or BWPs and to tank platoon. All supported by fewer fire stations for km and ppk and field infantry shelters. Very often, only 2 vehicles (usually tank + armored transporter) and 2-3 units of squad weapons and trenches and shelters for plutonium or 2 infantry were owned by the police. These types of positions were 300-500m distant from the others and formed a given defensive position – without a cleaned and mined forfield, without a fence, without a reserve position for a "technique" that would let to decision from artillery fire to fresh – besides shielded positions. As a result, fewer strong opposition points were the backbone of Ukrainian positions, but they were possible to be flanked after demolition or capture – leaving a teardrop in defence which could not be "fixed" with a second and 3rd line. In tactical terms, this was a regression even compared to the times of the "great country war" but it burdened the ATO command account which could not or did not decently prepare to defend the apparent location of the enemy attack. Again with this impotence contrasts the ingenuity of soldiers who, despite the thinness of their forces, created tiny but well-composed in the field and very well strengthened stations. Another curiosium was the usage of armored weapons in the Debalcevian performance. Again, as in 2014, it had the form of tanks usually assigned sections to individual opposition points. The maximum force was the device platoons. The only change was the crews' desire to cover up the machines from possible ppk fire and to go to reinforced fire stations only at a crucial minute of fighting. There are no known examples of the creation of the sewers in the power of even a company of vehicles capable of moving, maneuvering, defending—again, and not without a shadow of malice, it can be seen that it was a regression even compared to the Wermaht troops moving in the same combat site 70 years earlier. The issue of the deficiency of evidence is another embarrassing substance for the Ukrainians related to the defence of Debalcev – the forces to defend the bag were besides tiny and concentrated east and south of Debalcev. The remainder of the defensive positions were cast besides seldom – in fact, the company had a section of 8-12km(!) while, according to the russian school, the defensive belt of a full battalion is almost twice as small. As a result, the foundation of the "work" was poorly defended – especially the western part. Why Ukrainian officers raised on myths related to the conflict of Kursk Bow did not foretell attempts to strike the base of the bag remains an open question. Ukrainian forces for the full sector counted 13,000 soldiers, 120 tanks, 580 BWP and TO, and 240 artillery measures of over 120mm. The Debalcewski bag contained about 1/4 of these forces and as much as 1/3 of the "technique". In contrast, the separatists managed to gather almost 12,000 tanks supported by more than 200 tanks. As a result, they had a numerical advantage of 3:1 while in selected regions they had a higher advantage. The fights had already begun on 16 January and until 23 January relied on frontal separatist attacks on reinforced Ukrainian positions in the north-eastern area of the sack. This was a well-prepared place to defend so separatist attacks were repulsed after fierce fighting at a distance below 400m. At the same time, DRL forces launched weak attacks on Wuhelirsk located west of Debalceva. On 24-28 January, very fierce fighting was again fought in the northeastern area of the sack base between the 307.5 hill and the village of Sanjarivka. Ukrainian positions held after a series of counterattacks. In combat, separatists lost a full of about a platoon of tanks. As these attacks failed, another mark became Wuhlehirsk attacked and partially captured on January 29-31. The forces utilized to attack were large adequate to destruct Ukrainian positions and then counterattacked, though full control of the city could not be said. At the same time, the leading attacks on the positions defending the "peak" (the village of Ridkodub) of the bag continued - they had a very limited effect and ended with large separatist launches. It was only on 4 February that Wuhlehirsk yet fell until 7 February that the attacking separatists broke Ukrainian positions to the west and south of Debalceva – in the area of the town of Córnuchyne and the village of Ridkodub – but were incapable to grow and exploit both breaches due to advanced own losses. The second crucial success of the separatists was the capture of hills 307.9 in the Sanjarivka area, allowing fire control over 1 of the 2 main drugs leading to Debalcev. Until this point, it can be considered that the attackers did not force themselves on sophisticated tactics – positions of defenders were attempted to destruct artillery storms and attacks of tanks and mechanized infantry. specified operations proved to be very costly and limited in effect. It was most likely realised that the closure of Ukrainian forces in the boiler will require much stronger strokes which DRL and LRL units are incapable to carry out. As a aid in the area of combat, a Russian tactical battalion combat group from the 5th armored brigade of Yakucia was hit – it had T-72B3 tanks in its condition and was to yet lock Ukrainian forces in the boiler.
The further course of the conflict was most likely different if the astonishing fraternity (or even betrayal) of the officers of the sector who allowed the battalion's militant group defending the village of Łogwinowo (which lies on the western base of the "work" on the road from the main Ukrainian positions to Debalceva) to retreat for rest, without replacing the group with another subdivision. In the situation of Wuhlehirska's fall and the force on Debalcevo, it was almost improbable recklessness which resulted in the immediate seizure of the village by the Russian reconnaissance squad. They besides rapidly exploited a situation in which 1 of the most crucial opposition points on the western flank remained... unattended. By 9 February, a strong sub-unit of separatists and separate platoons of the Russian brigade occupied and strengthened in Łogwinów cutting off the main road to Debalcev. The Ukrainian forces remained only 1 paved road east of the occupied artery – unfortunately it was under fire from the acquired hill 307.9. From 10 to 12 February, Ukrainian fierce attacks on Łogwinowo continued and attempted to take back the village and pave the way for Debalceva. This clash is presently the most frequently described in the context of BM Bułat fights with Russian tanks. In the two-day battles for the village Ukrainians lost 3 tanks and respective BWPs and more than a twelve damaged machines. The consequence of this start was to gain partial control of Logvinov. However, all successes were forfeited after the artillery bombardment and the attack of 2 battalion militant groups of Russians and Separatists (tasting the second almost company machines) who expelled Ukrainians from the village. It has become clear to all that the troops of the trizuba have no evidence to let the Debalcev blockade. On February 15, Minsk was given a ceasefire. The Russians had no intention of obeying it, hoping for the final closure of the boiler and forcing the Ukrainians into humiliating surrender. Without looking at their own losses and the fact that the Ukrainians had de facto cut off the only way to supply began the frontal assault of Debaltev supported by artillery storms. At the same time, Ukrainians began rolling defensive lines south of the city. By the evening of February 17, separatists took control of 90% Debalcewa - again at the price of dense losses. At the same time, Bulatas from the 1st armored brigade clashed in a night fight with Russian T-72B3 under Łogwinów. due to the fact that the situation of Ukrainian troops in the bag became a dramatic local command of 128 brigades made the decision to break through from the boiler. This was done against the ATO staff who again showed a complete detachment from the reality of the battlefield. If it had not been for this decision, there would most likely have been a repeat of Ilojanska. On February 18, there was a retreat from the boiler, and it would have ended with tragedy had it not been for the decisive actions of the 2 specnasian regiments, the Areomobile brigade and the Bulgarian company from the 1st brigade. These forces pushed the Russians hard adequate on another sections that prevented the retreating column of troops. Additionally, the Ukrainian artillery worked large – the effectiveness of the fire led by the specialists was sensational and enabled the Russians to “suffocate” while leaving the cat. By 19 February, about 2,500 soldiers and 15 tanks and 50 BWP and TO were released from the lap. Vehicles immobilized in position and disabled were blown up.
Theoretically, the conflict for Debalcevo ended in the defeat of Ukrainians. In fact, however, the substance was much more complicated. The launches were little than 250 killed and 230 wounded and POWs. The remainder of the troops managed to exit the lap. Hardware losses were serious but there was not even a mention of a hecatomb known from 2014. The Ukrainians lost 25 to 30 units between 16 January and 19 February. This constituted almost half of the machines active in the fighting, but due to the "microstrikes" of the platoons and companies did not overpower the failure of any of the fewer tactical unions active in the fighting. Much more serious losses were suffered by attackers – between 30 and 40 tanks, over 700 killed and about 2500 wounded. Real alternatively of a simple replay from Ilojansk, the leading separatist units were passed through the “meat machine” and suffered six and a half times higher individual losses (killed and wounded) than defenders. Starts in the order of 1/4 of the starting states exhausted the forces of both republics and forced the longer operating pause. In the end, we could not even close the Ukrainian units exhausted in the lap and force their surrender. Obtaining Debalcev proved to be a pyrrus triumph possible only by direct engagement of Russian units. It is besides worth noting that the course of combat would be different if the already described criminal deficiency of preparation for the defence and errors of the ATO command.
LESSONS FROM WALK – CONTEXT POLSKI.
With respect to the SZ as a full as such, the following points can be highlighted:
The fact is that the wellness of the SZ is simply a reflection of the expenditure on it and the awareness of political elites and systemic solutions. However, this is the case – neglect of peacetime turns out to be virtually impossible to catch up with at the time of the mobilization and ongoing conflict. From this perspective, it should be considered that the HR is on a downward slope (text written in 2017 – JW.) . The deficiency of consistent and long-term imagination of the SZ, the randomness of structural reforms carried out, the instrumental treatment of the MON by subsequent political teams, the fatal military-industrial cooperation, the emerging defeat of the PMT, the expanding shortcomings in critical areas of the SZ of the Polish Republic, the creation of a WOT which has broken down the staff of many individuals and further drains the MON budget – the full leads to conclusions of gigantic and long-term negligence which importantly reduce, not the highest, theoretical possible of the SZ.
Although the war starts by human resources units, it is ended by mobilized reserves which are able to supplement the resulting losses without return. It appears desirable to keep a postulated stock of equipment of around 40% of the state of "P" (without respect to school units and machinery in the state of industry). This size of the equipment reserve (and personal) should keep the ability to compensate for losses arising during intense full-scale fighting during 30 -90 days. In the case of passenger reserves in Poland, they are as theoretical as the erstwhile Ukrainian reserves, subject to the lower efficiency and efficiency of the national mobilization system. most likely the appearance before the WKU and morale of the mobilized conscripts would not be higher than the Ukrainians, which could mean serious failure of this component of the SZ RP... The national capabilities of the SZ in the scope of the UiSW are respective times lower than the erstwhile Ukrainian and the fact of microscopic existence in comparison with the Ukrainian PMG needs to be stressed. Equipment withdrawn is stored under the cloud or sold out, you do not think about creating UiSW reserves of at least 40% to preserve the ability to play damaged units and exposure fresh ones. fewer affirmative examples are more the work of chance and the elimination of subsequent units/revocation of weapons than long-term planning. The full leads to conclusions of advanced susceptibility to losses and mediocre ability to play them.
It is crucial to have national repair and repair facilities and (optimally) the arms manufacture producing basic types of UiSW. In order to do so, it is essential to have an adequately developed and distributed stock of parts if their imports from abroad are essential or their home production is easy to disrupt. Counting on the ability to rapidly produce or import missing parts, ammunition and full weapon systems under conditions of ongoing conflict is simply a dream. From this point of view, it is simply a affirmative aspect to preserve the home arms industry, especially ammunition, and repair plants. It is besides essential to measure positively the capacity created for repair and playback of Leopards 2 – both in Poznań and Gliwice. It should be stressed, however, that it would be appropriate to prepare within the PMG certain critical components of, for example, ammunition and impossible to rapidly get during the war.
An crucial issue is the combat readiness of the subdivisions – the large refurbishment nawis and deficiencies in individual completion during peacetime consequence in "stages" of forces behind tiny and besides fragmented so that they can operate effectively on a conventional battlefield. Attempts to act with forces smaller than the company seem to be untargeted and risked besides much failure of machinery. In the SZ of Poland, a number of actions have been undertaken after 2014 in both areas – the refurbishment nawis is gradually eliminated and attempts are made to increase completion. Unfortunately, in the second case, as long as the economical situation of the country is good and the salaries of soldiers will not scope the level of about 2 national averages, 1 should consider the problem of obtaining valuable human material for SZ RP. The Polish Army is no longer an attractive employer and this fact seems to be overlooked by embarrassing silence. Unfortunately, this fact does not change, much needed and commendable, the fresh wage increases. It besides seems desirable to introduce a financially attractive 4-6-year contract service to rebuild valuable operational reserves. Both NSR and WOT are not solutions to the problem of besides low completion and fictitiousness of existing reserves.
Training and assembly of subdivisions is crucial – crews must be able to practice in real terms, not only on simulators and platoons on a tactical belt, but above all companies utilizing laser field simulation. Plutons and companies must be a team, while soldiers must know each another and have full assurance in their skills and colleagues. The cognition held by the author of the work does not let for nonsubjective assessment of the state of SZ RP in the above/in the issue. However, it seems that the training collapse of WPIZ from 2006 to 2012 is already behind them.
Traditionally, the issue of appropriate command of troops - both the commanding officer's skills and their morale, as well as the method means to this end, i.e. automated command support systems, appropriate communication, or optimally – full networkocentricity of operating troops. The current model of training and training of personnel in the SZ RP is debated due to the fact that it allows command of troops by officers who first and last saw the tactical belt while studying at the WSOWL. It is worth recalling that ATO command by "sterilely" educated (in isolation from the reality of the fields of training and combat) officers, frequently promoted through connections, proved to be a disaster. possibly it would be reasonable to return to certain requirements regarding the career paths of officers that were required before the reforms from the Millennium area. Although the SR of the Polish Republic spends a year annually on communication and there are OPL and artillery subsystems, it should be considered that the networkocentricity in the WP is inactive a very theoretical construct.
During the fighting in the east of Ukraine there was another confirmation of the fact already known since the operation of the Wehrmacht from the times of II – tanks must be supported by designation and artillery and optimally – a mechanized infantry and aviation. It is unacceptable to call for artillery support erstwhile the company commander has no resources and skills (and even worse possibilities). The full must be rehearsed and integrated already during the period of peace due to the fact that it is crucial to cooperate effectively with troops which must already be possible at company level – a battalion. Theoretically, according to NATO requirements, military cooperation is being practiced in the WP, and the commanders are aware of this. However, you can practically inactive feel any distance from the capabilities and skills of fellow British Army, Armee de Teree, Bundeshwer, or US Army.
Logistics must be prepared for over-normative usage of MPS and ammunition and spare parts with the presumption of non-linear loss. It seems to be an intentional support for the widest possible refurbishment capacity already at brigade level. On this issue, too, in erstwhile years, there have been gradual and slow affirmative changes in the Polish SZ.
Traditionally, it is simply a delicate issue to communicate – at the platoon level its reliability is not as destructive as at company-batalion level or worse, the brigade. Due to the modernisation of means of communication, it can be considered that the SZ of the Republic of Poland was incomparably better prepared than the SZ of Ukraine.
More concrete "fight lessons" can be drawn in terms of the operation of armoured weapons and company-level fighting. The conclusions that arise after studying known sources are as follows:
The psychophysical burden of fighting crews is large adequate that it leads to a very fast decline in their combat value, and in the case of respective weeks of continuous fighting – to almost full loss. This leads to conclusions on the appropriateness of the four-companse solution in the HR. Another, more expensive, but possibly more effective solution would be to have 2 trained crews per vehicle. It is besides worth considering the transfer of logistics and repair capabilities to the lowest levels - up to and including battalion level.
The deficiency of designation for the fighting troops is unacceptable – with the hope of performing it by sections of machinery from the company's warehouse threatening to lose easy on the battlefield. Similarly, the usage of drone targets is risky – they are a very useful tool but their capabilities can be effectively limited by weather conditions and the usage of WRE. Unfortunately, national designation opportunities are inactive being built heavily, although the method measures themselves are already much better than those available to Ukrainians.
The function of artillery as a “king battlefield” is not threatened. Up to 70% of the start in 2014 and 2015 was being fired by rocket and barrel artillery, with highly uncommon precision ammunition being utilized as a symptom. Artillery was dominant at the level of the 1970s and 1980s but supported in the case of Russians by many BSLs and peculiar forces utilized and systems of automated artillery command. The artillery of separatists of quality did not deviate from Ukrainian, but its efficiency was already better thanks to more effective recognition. erstwhile again, it turned out that even well prepared engineeringly fixed defensive positions of infantry and tanks can be destroyed by appropriately concentrated and intense fire. This leads to conclusions on the key function of manoeuvre and make-up as a means of prevention and exit from the artillery storm. In the context of the Polish Army, the programme “Regina”, “Rak”, “Langusta” and “Homar” should be positively assessed – it is essential to build further systems for targeting goals and buying modern ammunition – including “smart” self-targeting. The cost of specified a solution is very advanced but besides the effectiveness in combating armored weapons is highly high. The further introduction of DPICM ammunition in the HR, in peculiar to WR-40, should besides be sought. Assessing the ability to shield their own groups, it seems critical to make the WRE's capabilities to combat drones and defend the gossip of the lower level capable of combating them. It is besides crucial to note the request to strengthen the capabilities of the counter-battery fire of the WP – here I will now breathe a powerful gap in capabilities. It is besides amazing that there is no acquisition and mass usage of pneumatic mock-ups and multispectral camouflage covers for combat vehicles – even though there is simply a national maker with a global level of specified products.
Helicopters not equipped with top defence systems and not cooperating within the integrated field of combating reconnaissance and artillery can be easy neutralized by protecting the gossip of the "bottom floor" – i.e. MANPSD and SHORAD launchers. This besides applies to combat support aircraft from the 1980s. As a result, the fighting armor-mechanized groups are mesmerized to be susceptible to this kind of paralysis (Mi-24, Su-25) with weapons. However, these conclusions should not be rushed to the realities of combating modern machines (AH-64E, Mi-28N, Ka-52) supported by artillery, WRE, and BSL. This concludes the illusory possibilities of native Mi-24. It can be considered that these machines execute "postostatic" functions until the acquisition of their successors. If fresh machines are to be effective, they must have the highest possible capabilities – unfortunately, this besides determines the price and so the number – most likely a maximum of 16 machines. specified a tiny fleet, combined with the efficiency of machines usually oscillating around 60-70%, but each 1 to consider whether alternatively of buying fresh generation assault helicopters it would not be more cost-effective to strengthen artillery programs.
Dedicated anti-tank weapons corresponding to the tank-fighting generation are usually not very effective erstwhile firing vehicles for +/30 from their longitudinal axis. Due to tactical conditions, its effectiveness may be further limited by the appropriate usage of the site and masking agents in the form of TADs, multispectral grenades and smoke ammunition. Dedicated ppanc measures without tandem heads (or costly and advanced alleged optimised warheads with a superfast cumulative stream) are fundamentally ineffective against reactive armour and their chance of effectively defeating the armor of the tank boils down to a chance of hitting areas without shielded ERA or structurally impossible to shield. In fact, this means an effectiveness of about 15% of the fired ppk. However, the effectiveness of the flanking fire of the ppanc means is different – it is usually an effective chance to destruct the vehicle more than 50%. In Polish conditions, it can be considered that the choice of ppk Spike (although accidental) was optimal – the capabilities of NLOS and the directing of via fibre optics and the selection of the point of hit give the chances of effective combat from the front of vehicles besides shielded by effective ERA. Unfortunately, the number of ppk Spike in the WP (except for 6 and 25 brigades) is rather homeopathic – the correct model here is the American ABCT, each of which has 87 ppk Javelin and as many as 122 ppk TOW-2A and TOW-2B mounted in double-charged launchers on vehicles. In total, it gives 209 launchers of modern anti-tank missiles directed at brigade level, while native mechanized brigades have specified measures 10 times less. It should besides be considered that the decision to acquisition a light ppk with a non-tandem head and without the anticipation of attacking in advance with the selection of the hit point will be pointless and in no way will it improve the possible of the ppanc WP.
The anti-tank weapons of the infantry proved equally ineffective. Its effective usage was limited to flanking ambushes for armored vehicles operating without support and recognition. The infantry equipped with light weapon ppanc proved to be powerless against attacking frontal tanks, which forced operations from the prepared positions. However, this did not prevent tanks from approaching below 300m from the infantry position. This repeatedly led in the winter of 2015 to attempts to "run" defensive positions by tanks. This led to the immediate effective usage of the weapon of the amphibious infantry against the sides of vehicles and to the usage of improvised anti-tank agents (fugases, thrown in by open hatches of the vehicles grenades, etc.) which was possible due to the "grey" of the tanks themselves without infantry support. The effectiveness of the pontiff defence conducted at a distance of 100-50m (!) contrasts here with its ineffectiveness at distances of 100-700m, which in the event of appropriate interaction between the attacking infantry and artillery would end tragically for defenders. Currently, the Polish infantry is just as helpless against tanks as their Ukrainian colleagues, unlike the leading NATO countries, it is not planned to buy a dedicated and effective NLAW, Spike-SR, Sraw or PzG-3IT600 guns, alternatively the SZ of the Republic of Poland is to acquisition universal disposable grenade launchers. Paradoxically over the decade, this may prove to be the right choice due to the micre effectiveness of all ppanc grenade launchers against armoured vehicles with active vehicle protection systems installed (ASOP).
Due to a tiny distance of clashes (300-700m), the area turned out to be a “counsel” better able to usage the fighting side. It allowed to compensate for deficiencies in its own SKO (thermal cameras), allowed to reduce the hazard of infection by ppk, but it could besides channel the movement of troops in the area of prepared ambushes of ppanc. The company commander's ability to “work with the map” and to usage the site during operations proved to be crucial. It seems crucial to keep the ability to navigate without utilizing GPS systems, many of which are susceptible to jamming. possibly it would be appropriate to equip company commanders (and preferably platoons) with inertial navigation systems known from artillery systems.
BMP-2 and BMP-1 and BTR-4 and BTR-70/80 have proven to be delicate to palsy with both ppanc and automatic cannon fire. This forced the landing of infantry behind field obstacles or at a considerable distance from the line of fighting. Worse still, the BWP, susceptible to paralysis, had a problem with supporting the infantry during the fight, resulting in their effectiveness or not different from the TO (armoured transporters), which entailed a gigantic decline in the firepower of infantry platoons, or vehicles suffered disproportionately to the strength of the fighting loss. This resulted in frequent “cut off” infantry from attacking tanks at a distance of about 200-300m from the position of defenders. In the case of under-trained separatists, this led to lonely tank charge for the position of the trenched infantry, and in the case of Russian militant groups, to strangle the defenders with artillery and then destruct their position at the expense of carrying greater losses by the infantry operating with the support of the tanks. The above leads to the request for implementation in the WP BWP, which will not swim for this will be equipped with ASOP and effective against 40-57mm automatic-caliber base armor cannons. specified structures (SPz Puma, Namer) already exist.
Vehicles not equipped with thermal cameras in the SKO presently lose their right to be in the battlefield. The deficiency of thermovision of Ukrainian wagons caused that their effective operation was limited only to day and good weather conditions. The deficiency of cameras besides caused serious problems in detecting targets specified as infantry or infantry squad weapons and ppk. In contrast to the above – in fact all fresh vehicles of Polish WPiZ already have thermal cameras in the SKO or weapon sights. An crucial plus would be the introduction of panoramic periscopic instruments in WP cars – due to the fact that specified vehicles presently only have Leopards 2A5.
The ability of tanks to run effective fire is simply a derivative of many components including unexpired ammunition, cannon with minimalized structural clearances and symmetrically spaced resistances, low-end stabilization system, and tower drives in azimuth, a bulk-free tower bearing, an efficient multisensor SKO capable of applying adjustments to cannon movement alternatively than sight grid, etc. In the case of Ukrainian wagons, the closest to the above model were BM Bulat, in the issue of Russian wagons – T-72B3. The remainder of the vehicles – including the mobilized T-64BW and T-72B have a debateable ability to conduct effective fire while moving the vehicle. In the Polish Army only Leopardy 2A4 and 2A5 have real capabilities to conduct customs fire in motion and for moving purposes. Unfortunately, specified PT-91 does not have the capacity, which is why it is essential to upgrade vehicles in service. The proposal presented during this year's MSPO under the name PT-91M2 can be considered a close perfect in the cost-effect relationship. The replacement of cannon, tower bearing, stabilization system, implementation of the fresh SKO, and changes in the charging device shall supply firepower at least equal to the fresh T-72B3. Unfortunately, it is not known whether the Polish MON will yet decide to upgrade the tough ones so needed.
The ability to combat armored vehicles of the opponent requires effective subcalibre ammunition. The Ukrainian tanks did not have specified the latest available ammunition was mentioned 3BM26. The chances of effective demolition of the mark were so limited to hitting the weakened areas of the tower and hull front (from 20 to 40% depending on the kind of tank) and shooting at the side of the vehicles – which was not always allowed by field conditions and, above all, by crew situation awareness. Although both sides had the leading ppk, their usage was epic and did not bring any crucial benefit in the field of combat – the key limitation here was the area and comparatively tiny distance of fighting. In the Polish army there is practically no effective ammunition ppanc 125mm and the next 2 years will not lead to improvement in this issue. The safety situation in APFSDS ammunition for Tough and T-72M1 is simply dramatic and worse even than in the SZ Ukraine. This is all the more scandalous fact that national ammunition with minimally effective performance has already been developed, tested and tested as APFSDS- "Rys" more than 1.5 decades ago. Unfortunately, her purchases were discontinued. There's no better situation with the indigenous 120mm ammunition. The stock of the German DM-33A1 of 1988 was exhausted and the Polish Pz.541 achievements correspond to the German, almost 30 years old, ammunition and is presently not sufficient. Although action to safe modern APFSDS 120mm ammunition has been taken in the SZ of Poland, they are slow and no crucial improvement in the existing condition is expected by the end of the decade. 1 consolation is the existence of a tiny emergency reserve of modern ammunition obtained with Leopards 2A5.
Tank crews should have effective individual protective equipment at the head of ballistic helmets, anti-split vests, and fire-resistant suits. Each crew associate shall have a sub-carabinette with an adequate supply of ammunition and smoke grenades helping to evacuate the vehicle. The army of Ukraine in this respect fundamentally stopped at the times of the USSR and any affirmative changes were due to the bottom-up and irregular purchases of the armory itself. They powerfully contrasted with this thought-out and considered to be 1 of the more successful Russian T-72B3 crews in the planet called "Kowboj". The situation in the Polish WPiZ is here 2 – fresh SOI enter the service but they are not a systemic solution to what is presently in line in the elite Russian units (the mentioned Cowboy) or in the US or Israel. The improvement of a suitable SOI lies entirely within the scope of Polish capabilities and as specified should be started.
Indisputable is the request to equip tanks and BWP with hard-kill protection measures. Ukrainians were incapable to implement them for financial reasons despite their development. The Russians plan mandatory equipment for tanks and BWP next generation. Polish investigation centres carry out interesting work on Polish ASOP but their scope of backing is far insufficient. It is besides unknown whether Polish manufacture can handle specified a complex task. It may be appropriate to get a ready-to-use abroad strategy for parts of vehicles together with a transfer of critical technologies enabling faster and mass introduction of the native ASOP. The introduction of (mass) active hard-kill protection systems seems to be virtually as urgent as acquiring fresh ammunition and more crucial than acquiring fresh vehicles.
THE WORDS:
It should be borne in head that the above description of the main phases of operations and the "fight lessons" relate to the first conflict in Ukraine from 2014 to 2016, the nature of which was substantially different from the current activities, and the most serious difference was the incomparably lower possible of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, it is worth comparing the conclusions drawn by the author 5 years ago (in 2017) with the current state of cognition and with what we are now seeing in the war fought since February 2022. Part 2 is in preparation – it will take the form of an outline of preliminary proposals presented with the transformations of the Polish SZ from 2017. Thus, the first “Ukrainian lessons of AD 2022 fighting ” will become the voice of the Author in the discussion of the direction of the Polish SZ.
JAROSŁAW WOLSKI
The author gives heartfelt thanks Norbert Bączyk for allowing specified a wide autocitulation and at the same time powerfully encourages curious readers to acquisition the full version of the publication on:
