Introduction
On 30 June, Poland ended the six-month rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union (Council of the EU), during which it implemented a programme based on the fundamental slogan: “Safety, Europo!”. The priorities of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU were based on 7 pillars of widely understood security: 1) Ability to defend, 2) Protection of people and borders, 3) opposition to alien interference and misinformation, 4) Ensuring safety and freedom of business, 5) Energy transformation, 6) Competitive and resilient agriculture, 7) wellness safety[1].
Second always Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (first held in 2011), she has a very demanding time. The ongoing war in Ukraine, the global geopolitical instability and the expanding threats to democratic foundations were backgrounds for Polish leadership. However, the evaluations of this Presidency are divided[2]. For some, it was a breakthrough which forced the European Union to abandon its illusions of lasting peace on the continent. For others, invisible, ineffective and full of unused opportunities. How, then, should the Polish Presidency be assessed? What prevails in her balance sheet: successes or disappointments? Let us look at the most crucial initiative.
Balance sheet of the Polish Presidency
Since the beginning of its Presidency, Poland has declared a clear objective: strengthening Europe's safety in 7 key dimensions: external, internal, information, economic, energy, food and health[3]. The programme of the Polish Presidency was based on a comprehensive approach to safety as a basis for stableness and improvement of the full Community.
For six months Poland has led the work of the Council of the European Union, taking initiatives and negotiations within the 7 designated pillars. This section will analyse the implementation of each of these priorities, both in the light of the results achieved and of unused opportunities. This balance is not clear, but allows to capture the scale of ambition, determination and limitations faced by Poland as president.
Defence capability
One of the most significant, if not the most important, accomplishment of the Polish Presidency in the EU Council was the adoption of a groundbreaking programme to increase EU defence spending: Security Action for Europe (SAFE). Within just 71 days of the legislative proposal, an agreement was reached and the instrument was approved, which provides for EUR 150 billion to support the defence manufacture of the associate States. According to estimates by the Ministry of Defence, Poland may be among the largest beneficiaries of this programme, which is an crucial impetus not only for the national arms sector, but besides for the full European safety architecture. peculiar attention is paid to the fast pace of legislative work. As the Minister for the European Union and Government spokesperson Adam Szpiek noted – usually these kinds of things go through respective presidencies[4].
Mechanism Security Action for Europe (SAFE) is based on lending secured by the European Union budget. Their maximum full ceiling will be EUR 150 billion, with a repayment period of up to 45 years. Importantly, SAFE projects will be exempt from VAT, which further increases the attractiveness of the strategy for possible beneficiaries. SAFE is intended to respond to 2 strategical challenges: the request to strengthen the European defence sector and the request to rapidly address the capacity gaps resulting from the intensive support of Ukraine[5]. Although the full balance between these objectives has not been achieved, the solutions adopted offer crucial compromises. 1 key provision is to limit the participation of components originating outside the European Union, the European economical Area, EFTA and Ukraine[6]. The value of specified components in the final product shall not exceed 35%. This means that a minimum of 65% of the value of each task must be based on components manufactured in Europe or Ukraine[7]. However, certain exceptions to this regulation are provided. Financing of projects where a non-EU/EEA/EFTA/Ukraine subcontractor is liable for 15-35% of the contract value will be acceptable provided that the contract was concluded before the entry into force of the Regulation or the beneficiary demonstrates that the task without the participation of an external partner would be impossible[8]. This solution is crucial especially for countries whose arms industries are powerfully linked to partners outside the Union, specified as Poland.
In addition, in the summary of the six-month presidency, the Polish government stressed that it was during which the European Commission presented 2 strategical papers setting out fresh guidelines for European defence policy: The White Paper on Defence "Gotality 2030" and the ReArm Europe Plan. The 2030 Preparedness Paper aims to strengthen the European Union's capacity to respond to military threats, better coordination of defence investments and to accelerate the modernisation of associate States' armed forces[9].
It is besides worth noting that thanks to the active engagement of Poland as president of the Council of the EU, the existing sanctions on the Russian Federation were extended, introducing a 16th and 17th package of sanctions. It contains further restrictions on trade, including fresh restrictions in the energy sector. In addition, the EU list included further entities active in Russian oil exports, as well as an additional 189 vessels belonging to the alleged Russian shadow fleet.[10].
Protection of people and borders
In this area, it's hard to find operating systems. The Polish Presidency has set itself the task “[...] we will jointly show the consequence to the challenges of migration and safety of the EU's external borders, we will work towards reducing illegal migration and strengthening the effectiveness of return.[...] we will work towards an adequate EU consequence to hybrid threats, in peculiar the instrumentisation of migration. We will face the challenges of ensuring the appropriate functioning of the Schengen area[...]”[11]. The current migration crises at borders, including those in Polish-German, show that it is in vain to look for mechanisms enabling effective return to migrants from the European Union.
This is worth mentioning, especially in the context of the Common European Return strategy proposed by the European Commission on 11 March. This initiative aims to strengthen the common migration policy by adopting a fresh legal framework for alleged return, i.e. procedures requiring third-country nationals to leave the territory of the European Union if they are present illegally[12]. Currently, only about 20% of the people covered by the return decision actually leave the Union. 1 of the main problems is the fragmentation of legislation, each associate State implements procedures according to its own rules, leading to a systemic gap and possible for abuse[13]. The fresh rules introduce harmonised, simplified and accelerated procedures to guarantee that the return process is not only more effective but besides more transparent and secure. It is crucial to keep full respect for the fundamental rights of persons subject to the return procedure. The fresh legal framework besides strengthens cooperation between associate States and provides them with the essential legal instruments for a more consistent enforcement of decisions to expel foreigners residing illegally in the EU[14]. The initiative ended at the presentation.
On 19 May, the Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on the gradual launch of the entry/exit strategy (Entry/Exit System – EES). It is simply a modern IT strategy to replace the conventional stamping of passports at the external borders of the Union. The EES will evidence digitally the dates of entry and departure, passport data, fingerprints and pictures of third-country nationals travelling to the Schengen area for a short stay. This will enable EU associate States to have real-time access to biometric data and non-EU travellers, making it possible to enforce visa rules more effectively and monitor compliance with the permitted period of residence. This strategy is besides crucial for interior security, as it will let faster detection of possible threats and abuses associated with illegal migration. However, we must bear in head that the start of the strategy is not planned until October 2025[15♪[16].
However, erstwhile examining the current situation and the kind of migration force at the border, it can be concluded that we do not have full operational mechanisms, and whether the initiatives presented during the Polish Presidency (the Common European Return strategy and the EES) will actually work, will not come to be evaluated for a while. At present, the solution to the problem is not, for example, the ongoing “cross-border movement of migrants” or controls at the interior borders of EU countries – this was not the main presumption of the Schengen area.
Resistance to alien interference and disinformation
At the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council, EU associate States adopted a common framework for responding to cybersecurity crises. We are talking about the Cyber Blueprint system, which is simply a set of non-binding but detailed guidelines, which aim to increase the effectiveness of consequence to incidents and cyber crises across the European Union[17].
“EU Cyber Blueprint was designed for national authorities liable for crisis management, but besides for private entities cooperating with the public sector. In a simple and understandable way, it explains what the crisis in cyberspace is, what action should be taken and what the cooperation of actors at EU level looks like.
Blueprint is not legally binding, but contains applicable guidelines for action at each phase of the crisis: from preparation, detection and consequence to reconstruction and analysis. It is based on key principles of cooperation: proportionality, subsidiarity, complementarity and confidentiality of information”[18]. – we can read on the website of the Ministry of Digital Affairs
Change was necessary. Since 2017, the Commission's advice on a coordinated consequence to cybersecurity incidents has been in force, but a clear change in the safety environment, especially following the 2020 invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, fresh cybersecurity challenges have forced the recommendations to be updated[19].
At this stage, it is not possible to find whether the updated advice will be applicable or what its actual effects in terms of strengthening cybersecurity in the European Union will be.
Ensuring the safety and freedom of business
In this context, it is surely worth mentioning deregulations within the Omnibus 5 simplification packages. Packages adopted during the Polish Presidency aim to debureaucraticise and simplify the functioning of various sectors of the EU economy. They foresee little reporting obligations, easier access to investment finance and more flexible rules for agriculture, defence and SMEs. In the area of sustainable development, the rule has been introduced Stop-the-clock, i.e. the temporary suspension of certain reporting obligations, as well as the provisions on the border carbon taxation (CBAM). The facilitations besides included procedures in the InvestEU programme to improve the implementation of investment projects. Farmers have gained a number of simplifications and tiny and medium-sized enterprises will be able to benefit from fresh support solutions by reducing the qualifying thresholds. crucial changes were besides introduced in the defence sector, facilitating cooperation and financing of arms projects[20].
Energy transformation
One of the main objectives of the Polish Presidency was to strengthen the energy safety of the European Union by speeding up the departure from imports of Russian energy natural materials[21]. Therefore, it is worth mentioning the road map announced by the European Commission for the departure from Russian fossil fuels: RePowerEU. The plan involves a gradual simplification and then a complete cessation of Russian fuel imports by 2027. In practice, this means that as early as 2025, associate States are to complete the conclusion of fresh contracts and terminate the current short-term contracts to then terminate those long-term contracts[22].
Opponents point to a deficiency of action to halt ETS2 on emissions trading. They besides item the deficiency of action to revise Green Deal policy. They claim that the government has been persuaded to accomplish more ambitious climate targets, specified as a 90% simplification in CO2 by 2040[23].
Competitive and resilient agriculture
During the Polish Presidency, the associate States of the European Union reached an agreement on strengthening the position of farmers in the food supply chain. Changes in the common organisation of agricultural markets were agreed and fresh rules were adopted to limit unfair commercial practices (UTPs) in cross-border relations. The fresh regulations are intended to increase transparency and fairness in trade, protecting farmers from force from stronger players on the market. The Polish Presidency besides contributed to the agreement of the rule "pipe proofing‘that all future initiatives of the European Union should take into account the needs and interests of agrarian residents[24]. This is simply a step towards a more balanced and equitable improvement of EU policy.
However, opponents object to the inactivity of the Polish Presidency in the context of the revision of the Green Deal policy and the effort to block the European Union-Mercosur trade agreement[25].
Health safety
Under this priority, a compromise on the Pharmaceutical Package has been reached, breaking the 20-year deadlock in the improvement of the pharmaceutical sector. The fresh legislative package aims to increase the availability of cheaper generic medicines for patients and, at the same time, to make more favourable improvement conditions for European pharmaceutical companies to strengthen their competitiveness in global markets[26].
Summary
The past six months is surely a time for increased work, but from the second untapped chances. It is besides worth taking into account the temporal context of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU, which was held during the ongoing war in Ukraine, the expanding tensions in the mediate East, as well as the dynamic changes on the US political scene, including Donald Trump's return to the White House.
The evaluations of the Polish Presidency stay mixed. Supporters item successes in peculiar by the fact that the slogan “Safety, Europo!” has penetrated the mainstream of the EU agenda. They besides mention the achievements of SAFE, omnibuses and sanctions on Russia as the most crucial ones. On the another hand, critics consider the Polish leadership to be “bespomish” without distinguishing elements in practice. They claim inactivity in cases specified as the Green Deal, the EU-Mercosur agreement or ETS2 standards. They besides item the deficiency of visual presence of Poland (also confirmed by the polls).
So can our six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union be regarded as a success or possibly a failure? Citizens can ask themselves questions – How these changes affect our lives? What did the Presidency bring or bring for Poland? There is no uncertainty that we have any successes in our account that we can boast about, but in parallel to them there are any missed opportunities.
On 1 July, the Presidency of the Council of the EU took over Denmark, whose motto is "A strong Europe in a changing worldIt’s okay. ” The first announcements indicate that the Danes intend to proceed the direction pursued during the Polish Presidency. As long as this can be accomplished, it will only be achieved in time. It is worth remembering that the full Presidency of the Council of the EU, as part of the alleged trio, lasts 18 months. After Denmark, Cyprus will be chaired, adding a joint 18-month work programme. Only then will it be possible to full measure the effects and impact of this Presidency, both of the successes and of the areas that remained unchanged.
Bibliography
[1]Priorities of the Polish Presidency, Polish Presidency, https://polish-priority.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/priority-presidencies/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[2]Achievements of the Polish Presidency, Polish Presidency, https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/program/achievement-Polish-presidencies/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Poland ends the EU Council Presidency. Government key success of investment in defence, XYZ.pl, https://xyz.pl/jeje-sie/Polish-final-presidencies-in-Council-Ue-government-key-success-investment-in-defence-3252, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[5]Imperfect balance. EU defence debt mechanics SAFE, Center for east Studies, https://www.osw.waw.pl/publications/analysis/2025-05-28/inadequate-diversity-EU-loan-mechanism-on-defence-safe, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[6]Ibid.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Commission presents White Paper on European Defence and ReArm Europe/Votality 2030the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorn/detail/en/ip_25_793, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[10]Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU: If it weren't for this Hungary..., Euractiv.pl, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/internal policy-ue/news/Polish-presidence-in-Council-ue-if-not-te-Hungarian/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[11]Priorities of the Polish Presidency, Polish Presidency, https://polish-priority.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/priority-presidencies/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[12]New Common European strategy for Returns, the European Commission, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/new-common-european-system-returns-2025-03-11_en?prefLang=en, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Ibid.
[15]Border management: Agreement on the gradual launch of the Entry/Exit System, Polish Presidency, https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/border management-agreement-in-progress-start-out system/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[16]Council and European Parliament strike agreement on progressive launch of Entry/Exit System, Consilium.europa.eu, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/19/border-management-Council-and-european-parliament-strike-agreement-about-progressive-launch-of-entryexit-system/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[17]EU Cyber Blueprint adopted at the formal TTE Council. The fresh plan sets out cooperation across the Union in the event of cybersecurity crises, Ministry of Digital Affairs, https://www.gov.pl/web/digitalisation/eu-cyber-blueprint-adopted during-formal-rady-tte-new-plan-for-life-in-all-Union-in-accident-crisis-cybersecurity, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[18]Ibid.
[19]Member States have adopted EU Cyber Blueprint. What does that mean?, Cyberdefence24.en, https://cyberdefence24.pl/cybersecurity/Member States-friendly-eu-cyber-blueprint-co-to-means, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[20]Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU: If it weren't for this Hungary..., Euractiv.pl, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/internal policy-ue/news/Polish-presidence-in-Council-ue-if-not-te-Hungarian/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[21]Priorities of the Polish Presidency, Polish Presidency, https://polish-priority.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/priority-presidencies/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[22]Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU: If it weren't for this Hungary..., Euractiv.pl, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/internal policy-ue/news/Polish-presidence-in-Council-ue-if-not-te-Hungarian/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[23]The Polish Government praises the successes of the EU Presidency, the opposition criticises as “bespomish”Euronews Poland, https://en.eurnews.com/europa/2025/07/03/government-Polish-chwali-successes-presidencies-ue-opposition-criticise-as-becompletion, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[24]Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU: If it weren't for this Hungary..., Euractiv.pl, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/internal policy-ue/news/Polish-presidence-in-Council-ue-if-not-te-Hungarian/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[25]The Polish Government praises the successes of the EU Presidency, the opposition criticises as “bespomish”Euronews Poland, https://en.eurnews.com/europa/2025/07/03/government-Polish-chwali-successes-presidencies-ue-opposition-criticise-as-becompletion, accessed: 03.07.2025.
[26]Achievements of the Polish Presidency, Polish Presidency, https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/program/achievement-Polish-presidencies/, accessed: 03.07.2025.
Photo: gov.pl
