Resistance as a safety foundation
Today, the word "resistance" becomes a collective category describing the various dimensions of the deficiency of vulnerability to the attack, both in the military and method sphere, as well as in the social, economical or energy sphere. This kind of resilience strengthens the safety of the state, but cannot be brought to a simple balance of investment in energy or defence1. Not only state structures can be resistant to crises and threats, but the full of society – specified a approach to safety has gained popularity comparatively recently.
In literature, they were strengthened by the discrimination between state systems and flexible and fragile – a concept developed in detail, among others, in Nassim Taleb's works2. Flexibility means the ability of structures and procedures to rapidly return to equilibrium after failure and the ability to creatively adapt to changing conditions, even with limited resources. The other are fragile systems – only seemingly strong ones, thanks to hierarchization, repressiveness towards interior opponents or militarization of the economy and abroad policy. In practice, specified rigidity can lead to an interior breakdown in the face of a non-standard threat or unexpected military return – despite an earlier advantage. In the case of a passive and obedient system, citizens do not make individual and collective solidarity with fellow citizens and their own state. In countries of this type, after a military defeat, usually the community of opposition does not spontaneously develop. Blind obedience to old authority frequently replaces a passive submission to the occupier.
The real resilience of the state is not about the force of coercion, but about the ability of a free society to respond jointly in the face of the crisis – without giving up freedom, openness and human rights.
This does not change the fact that the aggressive power in the immediate vicinity poses a immense challenge for each kind of immunity – both external and internal. And that's the historical situation we're in. Russia and Belarus have been interfering consistently and systematically with Poland's resilience for years, utilizing powerful financial resources and advanced methods of destabilization – including intellectual operations and reflex management3.
As a democracy, we act slower – albeit more effectively in the long word – due to the fact that our strategy is based on pluralistic debate and inclusive decision-making. The key challenge so remains how to strengthen the resilience of the state and society, not giving up openness, human rights and values that make us a resilient community precisely due to the fact that it is free.
Flexible State — Resistant Community
The concept of a flexible state, which is resistant to threats and attacks thanks to the engagement of its citizens, is well aligned with the Polish mentality and historical experience, in which alternatively blind obedience to power was lacking, and the strength of the community was the grassroots initiative. However, the construction of specified a country requires public acceptance and openness to non-standard forms of action.
Inspiring examples come from Ukraine present – not only in the form of the persistence of society and creativity in defence (e.g. drone production), but besides through the intensive engagement of local governments and a fresh category of military volunteers. It is besides worth looking at historical patterns specified as the Polish underground state – based on universal mobilization and social discipline – or the British model of cooperation between the state and the civilian population during planet War II. These examples show that social resilience can be not only the consequence of administrative action, but above all the consequence of informed cooperation between citizens and the state.
Today we request a re-interdisciplinary analysis of the mechanisms that in the past have enabled specified resilience – and at the same time plan new4.
Although local authorities could play a key function in this, their capacity is limited by an insufficient legal framework. In particular, powiats and voivodships – unlike municipalities – cannot benefit from the presumption of competence, which makes it hard for them to implement innovative solutions that increase local resilience. An urgent revision of the statutory directory of tasks is so needed to enable local authorities to take action to respond to the challenges of the fresh era.
Digital copy of the state and the fresh function of civilian protection
The fresh risks associated with the hazard of frontal cyber attacks require reasoning not only about the systemic countering of the cognitive war – including misinformation like Estonia – but besides about creating a "digital copy" of almost the full state, and even about securing it in another country, as a strategical backup. specified solutions have already been implemented in Ukraine, transferring crucial administration systems to servers of democratic states.
However, specified actions should not only take place in crisis and war conditions, they should be thoughtful, planned and implemented in advance. They besides require careful choice of a partner whom the State can trust in specified a crucial matter. At the level of interior relations, the same model should be applied on a local scale: a "digital copy" of the city or district, stored and synchronized with a partner unit (e.g. a twin), could enable residents to settle administrative matters in almost uninterrupted mode – besides in the event of an attack or cyber attack paralysing their own self-government.
Social resilience should be primarily the consequence of informed cooperation between citizens and the state and not of administrative action. Local governments could play a key function in Poland but their capabilities are limited by an insufficient legal framework.
Modern civilian protection – which in conditions of war turns into a civilian defence by law – goes far beyond conventional responsibilities, specified as shelter maintenance or support for territorial defence troops. The title of the fresh law in this respect has not been decently chosen – modern hybrid conflicts blur the border between war and peace, and consequently require long-term and active engagement from residents.
The fresh conservation doctrine must presume wide usage of public-private and public-social partnerships5. The specified separation of the concept of "population protection" – suggesting a passive attitude of society – from "civil defence", activated only at war, no longer adheres to the realities of Europe after 2022.6. Today's experience clearly shows that the safety and resilience of the community must be built on a continuous basis, involving informed and committed citizens.
Partnerships and social energy as a reserve of resilience
Public-private partnership, which has been poorly regulated in Poland for years, remains an unused resource for building resilience. Many safety agencies are a good example, and they could play a fresh crucial function in the safety strategy under conditions of expanding method sabotage. However, there are no clear mechanisms to affect them in the implementation of the tasks of the state, which could be a form of modern corporate social responsibility. In turn, businesses could, as part of local partnerships, supply emergency power to neighbouring districts or villages.
The last 3 decades saw a sharp increase in the number and possible of Polish NGOs. Nevertheless, safety regulations focus almost exclusively on the activities of public administration and the armed forces, neglecting this immense resource of civic readiness. Forms of public-private partnerships are waiting for wider use, while public-social partnerships – cooperation of NGOs with government and local government – inactive require appropriate organization formulas.
The Ukrainian experience clearly shows that the State is not able to effectively defend itself solely through professional armed forces. Therefore, in Poland – alongside the already established Council of opposition at central level – akin councils should be created in each voivodship, with the participation of certified social organizations. Only in this way will the thought of resilience be effectively rooted in local communities.
State resilience starts with anticipation of events and informed citizens – Preparation must be ahead of the crisis, not responding to it. Therefore, it is worth investing in actions that rise social awareness and increase the resilience of administration – e.g. by making digital copies of crucial data sets and systems.
It is besides worth paying attention to the key area of energy security. Poland should make territory energy safety centres – local structures coordinating actions in the event of a failure or a threat of continuity of energy supply.
On the another hand, the central administration should make an effective network of warnings against the alleged destructive information – messages that can origin panic and weaken social solidarity. specified a network should go beyond the powers of the Government safety Centre and NASK, creating a fresh strategy to combat misinformation and strengthen social cohesion in crisis situations7.
Effective state resilience is not based solely on institutions – it requires active engagement in the process of building business security, civilian society and local communities.
Social solidarity as the foundation of resilience
Social solidarity, although formally enshrined in the Constitution, remains 1 of the least appreciated constitutional principles – and at the same time 1 of the most crucial for building the real resilience of the state. Today's threats are no longer purely military – they appear in non-obvious areas: through the interference of the opponent in the higher education system, disinformation activities in social media (especially in migration), influence the training process of military staff, and besides through dangerous wellness misinformation.
The state's resilience gaps are visible and cross-party. There is inactive a negative, demobilising stereotype of a "cardboard state", replicated not only internally but besides by an external opponent. Paradoxically, despite the increasing polarization, the society maintains a advanced level of expectations of the state. This anticipation does not vanish due to the fact that the feeling that the state can act effectively is present 1 of the main sources of collective security.
That is why efficiency and modernisation of central authorities, supported by a thoughtful information campaign, should become a strategical priority.
Discontent with the operation of state institutions is, in addition to the ontological and cultural dissatisfaction, 1 of the 3 main reasons for expanding the influence of utmost groups in Europe, frequently inspired or supported by the Russian Federation.
Free media, while rightly focusing on social problems and inequalities, frequently unwittingly exacerbates the crisis of trust – especially in the era of dominance of electronic media and selective vulnerability to content. Facts – even actual – if presented unilaterally negative and not balanced by a strong affirmative message, lead to social demobilization. The example of Brexit shows that one-sided communicative can permanently change the course of history.
The resilience of the country starts with assurance in the social community and towards the state – without religion in the perniciousness of the institution and without social solidarity, disinformation, polarisation and information war cannot be effectively countered.
Not in the silence of problems – but in uncovering a way to build community informational resilience in deep polarisation conditions, without falling into propaganda.
1M. Piotrowska-Trybull, K. Górska-More (ed.), State, social and economical resilience to threats, Warsaw 2024.
2N. Taleb, Anti-Crossy. How to Live in world We don't understand., Poznań 2023, p.13 and n.
3 A. Etkind, Russia vs. Modernity, Warsaw 2024, pp. 9 and n.
4See results of the Batory Foundation Seminar of 27 March 2025: Ukrainian society against war. Lessons for Poland. Batory.org.pl and conference: Social resilience and solidarity in war conditions: Ukrainian and Polish experiences organized in Kiev 21-22 March 2025.
5Z. The carpenter, Public-private partnerships: public-law issues of contract forms of European administration, Warsaw 2017, "Summary".
6 Cf. Comment on the civilian Protection and civilian Defence Act of 5 December 2024., M. Chervil (ed.), civilian protection and defence civil, Warsaw 2025.
7I. Albrycht, State systemic resilience in the digital era, fresh IK and CYBERSEC report, Warsaw 2022.
