The importance of having autonomous space capabilities was highlighted by Elon Musk's fresh dispute with the Polish abroad Minister. The richest man in the planet pointed out that the Ukrainian front could break down immediately if only he decided to cut Kiev's access to Starlink. Since Poland finances net access for Ukraine, Minister Sikorski stated: “If SpaceX turns out to be an incredible supplier, we will be forced to look for another”. Musk replied to the minister in an unparliamentary way, and then Marco Rubio shared his opinion, ignoring the concerns raised by the Polish diplomat[1]
Indeed, Starlink – a constellation of satellites utilized to supply net access – importantly increased the capabilities of the Ukrainian army[2]. By providing net connectivity to both military and civilian personnel, it supports drone navigation, data transmission, artillery fire management, which proved crucial to preserving Ukraine's independency during the first days of the war. This is confirmed by the statements of Russian officials who condemned Musk’s decision[3] Currently, the Ukrainian strategy of communication and data transmission is based on the good will of the president of SpaceX, which makes Kiev dependent on an external entity to have the capabilities key to the war effort. Starlink's usage in the Russian-Ukrainian War illustrated the strategical importance of space for military operations and the importance of having his own autonomous capabilities in space.
Militaryisation of Space
The usage of space as an environment for military operations is referred to as the militarisation of space[4]. Space was first utilized for war activities with the improvement of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), followed by the improvement of defence systems to detect them[5]. Since then, space weapons have become increasingly technologically advanced. investigation is presently being conducted on technologies specified as: non-chemical lasers, electromagnetic rail cannons (railguns), high-altitude atomic explosions, or discharge from orbit of uranium rods (rods from God)[6]. These concepts are considered to be the weapons of the future, while the improvement of anti-satellite weapons is simply a more urgent and current issue[7]. It allows offensive actions to prevent the opponent from utilizing space-based resources, which reduces the effectiveness of its activities in all military domains. In specified operations, satellites, as well as ground infrastructure and communication signals to control them, are the main target[8].
This is an active way of utilizing space for military purposes — costly and demanding of state-of-the-art technologies. For Poland, a more appropriate approach, adapted to our needs and capabilities, is the passive usage of orbit, where the most crucial aspect is obtaining information utilizing satellites[9]. War in space is characterized by the usage of orbit to collect data, which in turn support actions within all another battlefield domains. The usage of satellites increases intelligence, reflection and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR). The primary nonsubjective of any state wishing to mark its presence in space for military purposes is to get the ability to get information from orbit that is crucial to making the right decisions during the conflict[10]. In open conflict, this page, which can usage the data collected more rapidly and efficiently, gains an advantage over its opponent[11]. This highlights the key function of space in the modern battlefield as a origin of reliable information.
Satellites are the basic tool utilized to collect exploratory data. Their regular operations are frequently intended solely for civilian purposes. However, the tasks carried out by satellites – specified as Earth observation, navigation or communication – closely correspond to the needs of the army in the event of the outbreak of war, making them crucial to the war effort[12]. This feature makes them considered dual-use technology, as they are crucial for both civilians and the army[13] The satellites are essential to keep ,,,ability of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and to exploit the possible of conventional operational demolition measures [...] are the foundations of all military communication and information systems”[14]. In fact, 95% of satellite technology is considered dual-use technology[15]. Due to its close links with national security, this technology is regarded as a precedence and achieving greater proficiency in its usage provides strategical advantage over competitors[16]. The means of bringing satellites into orbit are besides considered dual-use technologies as they affect the improvement of rocket capabilities[17].
Given that space technologies – developed for civilian usage – have an essential military usage to strengthen the military's space capabilities, careful cooperation between the state and the private sector is required[18]. The importance of the commercial space manufacture is expanding in proportion to the decreasing cost of taking objects into orbit, which is falling due to technological progress[19]. This mechanics fosters the improvement of competition and transfers work for creating innovative solutions from the state to the free market. This represents a crucial change to the cold war dominance of governments in the space industry[20]. Therefore, Poland should invest in the national private sector, alternatively of developing space capabilities exclusively through top-down state decisions. It is through the improvement of the private sector that the required military capabilities can be achieved, through the creation of national know-how on dual-use space technologies[21].
In December 2019, NATO officially announced that space had joined land, sea, air and cyberspace as the fifth, separate domain of war effort[22]
As a unique environment, it is simply a sui generis battlefield – with its own features and influence on another domains[23] They can be divided into 3 distinct segments: space itself and its objects, the ground infrastructure essential to handle resources outside the atmosphere and the electromagnetic spectrum that combines these 2 dimensions. In order not to fall behind in the global race to integrate space capabilities with military operations, Poland must mark its presence in space. Given the size and resources of our country, the Polish Republic should focus on developing autonomous capabilities in the field of ISR (intelligence, reflection and reconnaissance) and communication, with the long-term aim of achieving autonomous ability to place satellites in orbit. This requires the improvement of a national satellite manufacturing manufacture and applicable rocket technologies.
Such actions should be given precedence due to the fact that the abovementioned systems are essential in making effective decisions on the battlefield[24]. Achieving independency in this field will let Polish armed forces to avoid dependence on 3rd parties, which could limit Poland's access to key information and communication resources in a crisis situation. This nonsubjective is possible thanks to the improvement of the national private space industry, which is mostly more innovative than the state sector and develops dual-use technologies that meet the current needs of the Polish Army.
Status quo
The year 2012 is simply a cesuria which begins the period of creation of autonomous Polish space capabilities which will later prove crucial to the fulfilment of the current needs of our country[25]. This was the year in which Poland joined the European Space Agency (ESA), whose contracts and resources allowed to build national know-how and launch space ambitions of Poland. The first paper to regulate the policy of the Republic of Poland in this respect was the "Programme for the improvement of Space Technologies[...]" prepared by the Ministry of Economy. Polish companies, which formed after the fall of the communist regime, were incapable to compete with abroad companies due to the deficiency of presence in the European Space Agency, which serves as both a platform for applying for space contracts and a centre for establishing industrial contacts. The way ESA operates is simple: each associate State receives space programme contracts with a value akin to its contribution to the Agency, with additional benefits in terms of access to its resources and support. In 2008, each euro transferred to the ESA generated around 4.5 euro of additional income, making financial considerations the main motivation for joining the Agency[26].
However, the Ministry's programme besides stressed the strategical importance of space sector technology for national interests. In 2012, the main challenge was the deficiency of a coherent government strategy for further improvement of the sector[27]. As a result, 2 years later – in 2014 – the Polish Space Agency (POLSA) was established. Its first tasks included coordinating public sector activities for the improvement and exploitation of key capabilities of the space sector, improving its operations, as well as monitoring and supporting the national space industry[28]. Later in 2017, the Council of Ministers issued a paper entitled "Polish Space Strategy" (PSK), which further detailed Polish space ambitions, based on the fast improvement of the sector after joining the ESA. The main objectives set out in this strategy are to get Earth reflection capability, support for national space companies, make the upstream sector (orbital take-up), increase contributions to ESA, make human resources and make request for space data in public administration[29] – all of these activities are besides applicable and for military purposes due to their dual use. POLSA was then strengthened by giving it a fresh statute[30].
In 2021, a program titled ,,National Space Programme” (KPK) was published, which cemented Polish ambitions in the field of space.
It was the first paper that specifically identified what types of ISR tools should be developed and integrated into the state infrastructure[31]. However, the paper has no legal force, due to the fact that it does not meet certain requirements by law, which in practice forces Poland to trust on the definitions of 2017 – more about it in the second part of this text.
The Polish space sector — defined as production and services related to the removal and operation of space objects — consists of about 300–400 companies and institutions, employing about 12,000 people[32]. Its improvement follows the global trend of increasing availability of space, where private companies are ahead of state-controlled initiatives[33]. Miniaturisation of satellites allows the creation of satellite constellations that are deployed in low Earth orbit (LEO)[34]. This technology benefits from lower operating costs and increased Earth reflection efficiency. Companies competing for ESA contracts are mainly tiny and medium-sized enterprises. Poland specializes in developing and maintaining software for space systems and operating stations on Earth[35].
The home manufacture besides includes the production of satellites and a rudimentary cargo launch program. In this context, the year 2024 proved to be a breakthrough, as “Eagle Eye” — the first satellite to be designed and built entirely in Poland to cover national needs[36] was brought into space. Creotech is liable for this achievement, which seems to be the leading player in the Polish space production market. He wins lucrative and prestigious contracts from both the government in Warsaw and ESA. In the close future, the company is to supply the Polish army with autonomous capabilities of ISR and produce the first civilian Polish telecommunications satellite[37]. Creotech cooperates with various national companies and institutions, but the company now appears to be the most crucial private company. In the first 4th of 2025, Creotech foresees a production capacity of 10 to 20 satellites per year, making it an excellent example of a rapidly developing home market[38]. In addition, Poland is an active associate in the global space sector, being a associate of the Artemis, ESA, EUSST, ISS, UNOOSA agreements[39] and having a signed cooperation agreement with USSPACECOM[40], among others.
Polish rocket capabilities are presently in development. So far only 1 machine, “Bursztyn”, developed by the State Łukasiewicz Institute, has crossed the Kármán line[41]. This year the launch of the Perun rocket, created by the private company Spaceforest, is planned[42]. Both institutions plan to get autonomous satellite launch capabilities for low Earth orbit in the close future[43] [44]. Both projects inactive have a long way to go before their rockets scope the velocity essential to accomplish this goal, which means that Poland is inactive dependent on another entities to access orbit. Nevertheless, thanks to technological advances, only the ability to bring objects into low orbit can prove adequate for the current needs of the Polish Army in the field of ISR and become real in the close future.
Of all the types of Earth orbits, the LEO is the cheapest in operation due to the comparatively tiny amount of energy required to accomplish it, making it the most cost-effective ground space for development[45].
The satellites placed on the LEO offer possibilities comparable to those located in higher orbits and outweigh them in terms of usefulness for delay-sensitive communication[46]. utilizing these abilities is frequently based on utilizing tiny satellites — sometimes the size of Rubik’s ankle. LEO is besides a key place for rocket detection sensors. However, due to the fast orbital movement of satellites in this region, a large number of satellites are needed to guarantee continuous Earth observation, which forces the usage of satellite constellations – a collection of tiny satellites performing a circumstantial task. With tiny size, a large number of these satellites can be carried into space simultaneously, within 1 mission. They are cheap, easy to operate and hard to destroy. These features make LEO a key domain for the future of the modern battlefield and the easiest to accomplish and operate within it for the Polish Army [47] [48].
Problems
Despite many successes, Poland faces problems that request to be solved as shortly as possible to let the further improvement of the space industry. The Polish Space strategy (PSK) provided for the release of the second, implementing paper – the National Space Programme (NCP) (as mentioned in the first part of this text). His goal was to “ Construction of a strategy of advisory, financial and educational support tools for the space sector and implementing and supporting Polish space policy[49]. This paper was to be published by POLSA by the end of 2020; however, the paper submitted by the agency did not meet the required requirements, as it did not specify the sources and methods of financing the Polish Space Strategy, nor the timetable for its implementation[50].
Despite the engagement of the Ministry of National Defence, Ministers of Education and Science, the Minister of Digitization, POLS and the private sector in the improvement of the document, the problems that initially led to the rejection of the National Space Programme were not resolved within a 3.5-year period of work. The reasons were ineffective cooperation between ministries and POLS and the deficiency of a typical of the Ministry of Finance in the working group on this issue. As a result, the proposal of the NCP was never submitted to the Council of Ministers for consideration. This led to a deficiency of diagnosis of promising branches in the Polish space sector and difficulties in implementing ESA contracts by Polish entities[51]
Moreover, it was envisaged to enact provisions concerning the National registry of Space Objects, the creation of which was part of the PSK implementation. This goal has never been achieved. This causes not only bureaucratic chaos regarding the registration of Polish space objects, but besides presents Poland as an unimportant player on the global stage. Although work on this task has been ongoing since 2017, the bill has not been implemented, which makes it hard for POLS to registry space objects placed in orbit by Polish entities. The deficiency of a single strategy has created problems for private operators, delaying their operation – this is simply a consequence of not adopting NCPs. As a result, the space manufacture is developing without a coherent state participation, which harms both the government and the public sector[52].
In 2024 POLSA assessed the implementation of the Polish Space Strategy, summarizing advancement in implementing individual projects and forecasting their improvement by 2030. Although most of the aspects seem to be going well, any of the key projects are falling behind — peculiarly the deficiency of NCPs, the deficiency of expected advancement in rocket technology development, and inadequate support for tiny and medium-sized companies. The probability of not achieving the targets in these areas by 2030 was assessed as advanced — the highest in the scale utilized by POLSA[53].
POLSA mildly assessed the hazard of not introducing NCPs by 2030. The anticipation of failure to fulfil this nonsubjective has been assessed only as ‘probable’. This is simply a very optimistic assessment, given that it has been almost a decade without crucial progress. It was almost a year after the publication of the study of the ultimate Audit Office, criticising the inaction of public administration in this area, and despite this, no action was taken to rapidly enact the NCP. Members' interpellings on the substance stay without a clear answer from the government[54] [55]. The same criticism was expressed in a fresh study by the Association of Polish Space Professionals, which pointed out the besides affirmative assessment of POLS [56].
The rocket manufacture is specifically inhibited by the deficiency of KPK. The State inactive has not defined a policy to support the improvement of this peculiar sector with advanced risks but besides advanced technological benefits — mainly due to the deficiency of a dedicated financial support mechanism.
Until the implementation of the NCPs, a de minimis aid strategy should be established. Another crucial problem of the rocket manufacture is the deficiency of military test-points adapted to the circumstantial needs of the improvement of this technology. Given the existing gap in the European marketplace — the deficiency of micro-rocket technology to carry out micro-satellites[57] “Poland has a chance to occupy this niche, and to usage it as a double – commercially and militarily. Prioritising the improvement of technology for the low orbit of satellite constellations, Poland will implement its decision to get full autonomous intelligence, monitoring and reconnaissance capabilities essential for the needs of the Armed Forces of Poland, offering besides the provision of a well-paid service to entities outside our country. Developing the ability to carry objects into space will besides translate into expanding skills in the production and usage of long-range missiles[58]. In the absence of NCPs, the implementation of this task is very difficult.
Recommendations
- Introduction of the National Space Programme.
Above all, the highest precedence remains the introduction of NCPs, whose importance is barely overestimated. Its deficiency inhibits the possible of home manufacture at many levels. In the context of the interests of the Polish Army, the NCP is key to creating a framework to support the production of satellites and the creation of a strategy of financing of the national rocket sector. In the meantime, there should be de minimis aid to support the ongoing improvement of rocket production.
- Maintain backing for optional ESA programmes.
In order to further support funding, it is essential to keep participation in optional ESA programmes (150%-200% of the mandatory contribution). This nonsubjective is highlighted by all reporting agents on the Polish space manufacture [59] [60] [61] [62]. Although this level was reached this year, the accomplishment of this nonsubjective is delayed by 5 years, which may propose that this was a one-off decision of the government.
- Create a constellation of microsatellites for ISR purposes on the home market.
It is in the interest of the Polish Army that the state should support the improvement of companies active in the production of satellites and systems for their operation. Military activities should focus on acquiring microsatellites suitable for creating constellations on the home market, which will increase ISR capabilities (research, reflection and intelligence) and strengthen the production capacity of Polish companies.
- Maintain close cooperation between the military and the private sector.
With respect to the further operation of the Polish Army, it should keep its existing policy of cooperation with the private sector due to the fact that it has proved fruitful and beneficial for both parties[63]. Thanks to this cooperation, Poland will shortly establish the foundations of its ISR system[64], which should be further developed. The next task is to support the improvement of rocket technologies, especially with respect to the provision of infrastructure.
- Achievement of autonomous satellite launch capabilities through micro-missile technology and the provision of test rigs.
The long-term goal of Poland should be to establish autonomous capabilities for launching satellites into orbit. This can be achieved through the improvement of microrocket technology, adapted to the transport of microsatellites, and thus the creation of constellations. Micro-racite is simply a gap in the European market, which Polish entities could fill, bringing both strategical and financial benefits. The military should be liable for ensuring an adequate training ground for tests that are presently missing. The improvement of the lifting technology translates in a measurable way into the improvement of the long-range rocket system, which is an additional benefit for the Polish Army.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the most crucial problem facing the Polish space sector has remained unchanged since Poland joined the European Space Agency in 2012. The State consistently fails to fulfil its obligations to make a coherent policy to support the national space manufacture and fails to keep pace with the dynamic improvement of the private sector. This systemic failure negatively affects the full national space sector and shifts the burden of achieving the objectives of the Polish Space strategy to individual public institutions specified as the Ministry of National Defence or the Agency for Industrial improvement in an uncoordinated and improvised way. The deficiency of a coherent imagination of government engagement in space policy, coupled with difficulties in interministerial cooperation, remains the foundation of most problems. This is the reason why it stops the improvement of the industry, with large potential, profit-making and prestige, which plays a key function in the defence of the country.
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