The end of a war we don't know

As we talk in Krakow, let us remind that the Austro-Hungarian army capitulated on the Albanian Front of planet War I in December 1919. So the army survived the existence of the imperial-king state itself. It's a digression about the paradoxes of history. Returning to planet War II, let us repeat – it ended in September 1945, but given its repercussions, it inactive weighs on the present.

Mr. Professor, I'm going to ask you a direct question: can her repercussions yet vanish due to the conflict in Ukraine?

I would very much like that to be the case, but let us remember that the Soviets have someway protected themselves for the future. Namely, they sought to guarantee that the United Nations Charter did not cover matters which were pulled up under the “strict”: “The elimination of the direct effects of the Second planet War”. This was to concern only the large powers, not the global community, and was, in fact, recognised, for at least a fewer decades after 1945, that there were no specified matters, including the Korean conflict, which could not be brought under this "Limiting the Direct Effects of the Second planet War". So these "direct effects" proceed to hurt us. The best and closest example of this is the existence of a territory of the Royal Russian Federation...

The biggest beneficiary, not to say – the only winner of planet War II was the russian Union and its dictator, Józef Stalin. Does this fact truly reflect the military power of the russian empire, a political genius of a tyrant whose western partners did not match?

Consider here the fact that Stalin was the only 1 among the leaders of the large powers who ruled since the beginning of planet War II and long after it ended. So basically, he was in the game all along, due to the fact that if we consider that this war had begun, and the Chinese are convinced of it, in 1931, or at the time of the nipponese aggression in Manchuria, then even president Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States was not yet in power. And if we accept, as we noted above, that the war ended on September 2, 1945, there was no more mentioned Roosevelt among the surviving and, of course, Führer Adolf Hitler, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had already given power to Clement Attlee. On the another hand, Joseph Stalin was an irreplaceable man due to his circumstantial position in a totalitarian state.

Although the russian Union did not participate in formal terms in planet War II from its first volleys – as we know, its heirs insist that it was neutral until June 22, 1941 – only Stalin had an thought to play this war and the goals he had set himself, and only he – although he was frequently incorrect here – predicted what its course would look like. And finally, he was the only 1 set in this war to accomplish his goals almost entirely.

Gen. Yoshijirō Umezu signs the act of surrender of Japan. At the microphones is General Douglas MacArthur, the battleship USS "Missouri", 2 September 1945.Fig. Public domain

So we can sadly admit that the dictator and totalitarian state is more predestined to triumph in the world's conflict than the leaders of democratic states?

Fortunately, the answer to that question is not so obvious. The builder is the opinion of Stephen E. Ambrose, a biographer of General and president Dwight Eisenhower, primarily known present by the celebrated “Compane of Brothers” that democracies educate the best soldiers. There are any doubts about this statement. However, there are surely areas in which dictators have a clear advantage over democratically ruled societies, although – let us repeat – this is an advantage in any respects only, due to the fact that the madness of dictators, their inability to halt and, above all, their correction of their own mistakes are a burden on them.

The defeat of the 3rd Reich in Europe did not mean the end of the war at all – in Asia it was the best, and its terrible chord was among another things the drop by Americans of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and NagasakiWhat else can I ask you? Here I ask a provocative question: would it not be better if the Americans and the British, alternatively of inviting Stalin to the far east front, armed the Quantum Army and made Manchuria a bastion against communism?

Here are 2 different questions. Firstly, let us consider whether Stalin has gained more in Europe or Asia. Of course, to say colloquially, it depends on the seat point. Let us just note that Stalin surely gained first of all what he had taken thanks to his Red Army in Europe. In the case of Poland, it was frequently stressed that Churchill and Roosevelt did not give him anything in Yalta that he had not had so far. In Asia, however, this cannot be said. There, the Red Army opened the gate wide, offering territories that the Soviets did not have at the moment. Moreover, while most of the border effects of Yalta in Europe have ceased to exist, this is not the case in Asia, and the borders then set are inactive alive.
And the question about the Quantum Army is intellectually interesting, but so suspended in the air, that it might as well be asked whether, in this case, in Europe, a separate peace with III should have been achieved. The Reich in 1943 or 1944, alternatively of announcing the pursuit of her unconditional surrender.

Notice that there have been political and military Allied voices, that this request of unconditional surrender is simply a mistake...

From a certain point of view, yes, due to the fact that it was possible, for example, to put the German generality under a condition: we will talk about peace if you remove Hitler and the NSDAP. Even if this were not a condition of sincerity, he would have introduced the component of uncertainty into the leadership of the enemy group and would have caused interior games at the top of the 3rd Reich. And in the case of the slogan of unconditional surrender, the Nazis could inactive proclaim that the destiny of their organization was inextricably linked to the destiny of the state and nation.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill during an interview with president Franklin Delano Roosevelt aboard the HMS battleship "Prince of Wales", before signing the Atlantic Charter, August 10, 1941. Photo: National Digital Archive

But let's leave this interesting game and get back to the Kwantu Army. Surely, in the spring or summertime of 1945, there was no sense in setting up it, even though there was not much to do. The Quantum Army is simply a giant blow. Even in her top period, in 1940–1941, she was not an equal opponent for the Red Army in the Far East. Remember, however, that the nipponese army's penny fought in China at the time. Yes, there was a minute erstwhile the Quantum Army could play a crucial historical role, here we are talking about the summertime and autumn of 1941, erstwhile its impact on the Soviets could make the situation very hard for them on the front of the war with Germany. And even bring this front down, but as we know, it didn't. In the following years, everything that was possible was pulled out of the Quantum Army and thrown into the Pacific to fight the Americans. Although russian publications, followed by Polish publications from the times of the Polish People's Republic, stressed that in the last months of the war the Red Army defeated the powerful Quantum Army in Manchuria, but it is pure propaganda. At that time, it was patched with the recruiting of underage students of all nipponese schools and settlers of mediocre combat value. In this way, the most powerful Quantum Army in past was created on paper. Notice, for example, that the actual number of its efficient aircraft is... 55 machines. Although present we inactive read that there were about 5,000 planes.

According to prof. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, an American historian of nipponese origin, dropping 2 atomic bombs on nipponese cities did not change the attitude of the nipponese authorities – they wanted to proceed to fight. prof. in the book Racing the Enemy. Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan", written on the basis of an analysis of the American, russian and nipponese archives, proves that the message of the russian Union's declaration of war has only changed the Emperor's and his advisors' views. Prime Minister Kataro Suzuki was to appeal to the emperor: “We must end the war as long as we are dealing with only the United States. If we proceed to wait, Stalin will not only take Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin, but Hokkaido! This will destruct the foundations of Japan." Do you agree with prof. Hasegawa's view?

In answer to this interesting question, I will announcement at the beginning that in a very many American literature "anti-American" (Americans very much like to criticize each other) 2 theories appear mutually exclusive. Well, the first 1 says that Japan was actually defeated in the spring of 1945, and so the dropping of both atomic bombs was simply an anti-humanitarian act. However, according to the second thesis, Japan was not defeated even after both bombs were dropped and was so strong that the russian Red Army had to enter the action.

Feldmarsh. Wilhelm Keitel signing the act of surrender of the Wehrmacht, May 8, 1945. Photo: Public domain

Professor Hasegawa here relies besides heavy on American data, which is simply a kind of paradox, but understandable, given that a large part of nipponese archives have been destroyed after the truce, but even before unconditional surrender. Since the meetings with the emperor could not be recorded, much of the papers are those produced by the American business authorities, and here we are a victim of a story – rather easy understood.

The first bomb was dropped, as is known, on August 6, 1945, and did not consequence in an immediate surrender of the nipponese Army or any authoritative consequence from Tokyo to surrender. Nor was this reaction on August 9, erstwhile the second bomb was dropped and erstwhile the Soviets entered into action. As the nipponese consequence only reached August 10, although besides expressis verbis not talking about surrender, but very clearly signalling, a conclusion on the American side, beginning with president Harry Truman and Chief of the Joint Staff of General George Marshall, was that the second bomb and russian offensive yet caused a breakthrough in the attitude of the nipponese and their unconditional surrender.

It wasn't. In short, after the atomic attack on Hiroshima, which according to nipponese time occurred in the morning, after 4 p.m. Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Suzuki made the decision to surrender. However, they had to force the military to do so. Then there were 2 tense days. The garrison commander in Hiroshima sent an incredible message to Tokyo present that the demolition was not so large again and that there were fundamentally inactive any fighting abilities... Then came the news of the Soviets' declaration of war – late, due to the fact that it was only delivered to nipponese ambassador Sato, who had just been interrupted from the headquarters. On the morning of 9 August, the Emperor convened a gathering that began at 11 a.m., and a fewer minutes later, a message came that a second atomic bomb had been dropped on Nagasaki. There's been a real surrender. There is no uncertainty that it was the first bomb that caused a breakthrough in nipponese political leadership, although it is indeed essential to exclude the military from it – on 15 August an effort of coup was made – many of which inactive wanted to fight to the end, or self-destruction.

"Our armored troops on the streets of Berlin", or Polish landing on russian Sherman. photograph from “Polish Soldier”, 1946. photograph by Piotr Korczyński

Let us besides note that the atomic weapon was not truly realized at the time what it truly was. For example, General Marshall said that if Japan does not surrender, then in Operation "Olympic", or the desanto to the nipponese Isles planned for October 1, 1945, atomic bombs in a tactical sense will be used, meaning that simply American troops will pass through and fight in territory just after the atomic explosion...

In conclusion, prof. Hasegawa is wrong, although in terms of russian intrusion into the home nipponese Isles by the Soviets, the surrender to the Americans themselves must surely have been applicable in discussions in the imperial palace.

And Stalin's reaction to dropping the atomic bomb was as calm as prof. Hasegawa says?

Stalin, as we know, thanks to his spy net installed straight in the Manhattan project, knew about the atomic bomb much more and much earlier than president Truman himself, who, as long as he was vice president, had no thought about the bomb. And erstwhile he talked to Stalin in Potsdam about that bomb, the russian dictator didn't look shocked due to the fact that he knew precisely what was going on. His interest at that point was completely different. Namely, he feared that the Americans would be able to defeat Japan before the Red Army went into action, and that would be a immense problem, due to the fact that the part of the loot promised in Yalta could only gain if they joined the war in Asia. Hence the rush to make the attack at the same time as dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki. This was the point of this game and so the truce was not respected and the offensive in Manchuria continued after 15 August.

Bulgarian War Minister Theodosi Daskalov (in the middle, wrapped in a scarf) adopts a decorative embroidered scarf, a gift of Dobrujah residents, September 30, 1940. Photo: National Digital Archive

Back to the atomic bomb. The fact that Truman did not know much about it – before he became president of a secondary politician from Missouri – contrary to appearances, is not as crucial as the fact that he knew almost nothing about it either, General Douglas MacArthur, after all, the chief, alongside Admiral Nimitz, the American commander in the Pacific. He was informed of it after the first detonation over Hiroshima, and said that "Old Mac" was sad to say that they, generals, would be put to remainder because, here, any lieutenant pressing a button with an atomic launcher would have more meaning than them and could immediately become a five-star general...

This must have stuck to the general's mind, due to the fact that during the war, the koreHe wanted to deal with Chinese “volunteers” with the atomic bomb.

Yes, but here we contact a myth. The man who threatened an atomic bomb during the Korean war to the Soviets and the Chinese was not General MacArthur, but president Truman, and then president Elect Eisenhower appealed to this bogeyman in early 1953. And MacArthur, unlike the 2 politicians above, never spoke an open text about the usage of atomic weapons on the front. He raised this subject, of course, in secret talks with the chiefs of staff, but only in the sense that the radioactive material belt is to be “arranged” across the Korean peninsula.

Finally, let us talk about our situation after 8 May 1945 – we were expected to belong to the winning states, but in fact we were losers in this war. Is this your precedent, or were we part of a wider "club" of losers?

It is with large sadness that I must say that we are indeed an evenant here. You can look for akin precedents in history. any point to any parallels with Yugoslavia. Her war typical in Washington, D.C. Konstantin Fotić published a book entitled “The War in Lost” [The War we lost]. In a sense Yugoslavia, which is the extension of the Kingdom of Serbia, Serbs themselves, monarchy – King Peter II and, above all, his chief of staff and chief chief general Dragoljub Mihailovici, brought the end of the war to the full defeat and betrayal by the Allies. However, Yugoslavia does not cease to exist, although under communist government Josip Broza-Tita, a state as sovereign as possible and playing a large function in global forums, even greater than its real potential.

The second country with which analogues can be drawn here is China Chang Kaj-sheka. We have many shared traumatic experiences, due to the fact that Yalta, the imposition of adverse political solutions by 3rd parties. Besides, these parallels see Chang Kaj-szek himself, and this is evidenced by the fact that he allowed the Polish Government in exile to stay (unofficial of course) in his territory in 1945. However, these similarities end with the existence of the Republic of China in Taiwan. Therefore, Yalta did not put an end to the sovereignty of the Republic of China.

The situation of Poland is so highly exceptional and unhappy in this uniqueness. The editor himself wrote very well in his book “15 seconds. Polish soldiers on the east front”, that the soldier's blood of Lana in the storm of the Pomorskie and Berlin Wall was as crucial as Monte Cassino or Falaise, but erstwhile it comes to officer staff and political leadership, it is no longer the same. We have lost this war more than any Axis states. Let us take here an example of small known and remembered, namely Bulgaria. It is simply a associate of the Axis who emerges from the war with territorial gain. By the grace of the Germans and the Italians, Bulgaria receives confederate Dobrujah in 1940 and the same region inactive wields, although in planet War II it fought on the incorrect side. Of course, the russian business in Bulgaria was a nightmare, members of the government and regents were murdered, but erstwhile it comes to territorial settlements, the fact of profit remains in force.

How about us? The east lands were taken in a completely lawful way in the sense that there was no uncertainty that they no longer belonged to us, and the compensation in the west was given so that, in fact, until the Treaty 2 plus 4 of 1990 there were inactive objections whether we had them legally. Furthermore, it was Stalin's "deed" who deliberately ordered us to keep this state in order to make a gap not to pass between Poland and Germany, and at the same time condemning us to the "eternal embrace" of the russian Union, which guaranteed us the western border – specified a Satanic plan. Could Poland have avoided this fate? Even supporters of specified scenarios admit that it would be difficult, very difficult...

Professor, are we celebrating May 8?

In the sense that we got free of the German occupier, there is no uncertainty about it. Let us remember that this occupation, especially after 1941, was a mortal threat to the existence of our nation – and there is no overstatement in this. However, the General Government is not PRL. For this reason, we have reasons to be content, but specified joy as on November 11, 1918 we cannot have of May 8, 1945.