Sovereignty in a fresh reality – how to become a knot?

The planet in which Poland operates present is undergoing a fundamental change. The era of unchangeable globalisation and clear rules has ended. We are entering a reality that is increasingly referred to as the "new mediate Ages": a polycentric world, full of overlapping dependence, zones of influence and conflict – economic, technological, informational and military. This is simply a change in the logic of the functioning of the global system, with crucial consequences for countries specified as Poland.

In specified a world, the question of the state's strategy takes on a fresh dimension. It is not just about the pace of growth or "catching up with the West." It is about the ability to keep permanence and choose your own way of improvement in conditions of permanent instability.

The End of a Way

Poland has achieved a large deal in 1 generation. We went from the peripheral post-communist economy to the twentieth economy of the world. We have built modern infrastructure, a strong export sector and a comparatively resilient financial system.

On a global scale, however, we stay a average player. We are not a power capable of imposing the rules of the game. We are besides not tiny adequate to “hide” distant from the lines of global confrontation. We are large adequate for others to gotta consider us – especially due to our geographical location – but besides tiny to influence the global order themselves.

This is where the logic of simple catching up with distance ends. And for 2 reasons.

Firstly, we have changed ourselves. GDP per capita, nominally approaching $30,000. We become besides costly to compete only at a price, but inactive besides low-tech to compete and stand out for innovation. The improvement model to date – based on capital and technology absorption, expanding openness, organization convergence and inexpensive work – is exhausted.

Poland has completed the improvement phase based on simple catching up. The current model has exhausted itself both due to the fact that the country has reached the mid-player position and due to the fact that globalisation has ceased to warrant unchangeable growth conditions. In the fresh reality of the importance of the state, not so much the pace of convergence, but its systemic function and the position of global dependence in the network.

Secondly, the planet around us has changed. Globalization, which has worked in our favour for 3 decades, is entering the fragmentation phase. Supply chains are shortening and regionalizing. Trade has become a tool for geopolitical competition. Access to technology, natural materials and capital is no longer guaranteed by marketplace mechanisms themselves – increasingly it requires political position and negotiating capacity. A planet where it was adequate to "do its own" and wait for convergence ceased to exist.

The decay of the planet as we know it is accelerating. economical integration, which was expected to supply peace and common dependence to prevent conflicts, has become a tool of coercion – and even "arms" in the hands of large powers. Customs have ceased to be a purely commercial policy instrument; they are now serving to enforce political concessions and block the improvement of competitors. Control over supply chains has become a form of force – as illustrated by the technological embargo against China or the cut off of Russia from critical components. Access to natural materials and semi-finished products has ceased to be a purely market-based issue, subject to geopolitical calculations.

Economic interdependence was to be a warrant of stability, but in the present reality it has become a origin of shock. Countries that assumed that the trade partnership would halt aggression or safe access to critical resources are convinced that, in moments of tension, these dependence are utilized to blackmail. This is simply a fundamental change in the logic of the global strategy – not to return to rigid blocks, but to enter the planet of liquid coalitions, transient alliances and variable confrontation fields, in which predictability yields to constant uncertainty.

In this fresh reality, the position of the state is determined not only by the pace of growth, but by its systemic function – the place it occupies in the global networks. Not size, but importance to another partners.

Sovereignty as an axle

In this situation, sovereignty becomes a key concept – but understood differently than in classical ideological disputes. Sovereignty is not an autary today, nor is it contrary to global cooperation. It is the ability to make key decisions without external coercion and to consciously choose the dependencies to which the country agrees.

Does that sound abstract? Here's an example. For years, Germany has been building its economical position on the basis of Russian gas – knowingly, hoping that economical interdependence would discourage Russia from aggression. This strategy failed. In February 2022 Germany could not introduce a full embargo, as this would mean manufacture paralysis. They have lost their ability to choose – and this is the failure of sovereignty in its applicable dimension.

So is technology. A State that does not control key IT systems in public administration or critical infrastructure can formally stay independent but in practice loses its ability to act independently at the time of crisis. Sovereignty is not an ideology. It is simply a test: can we act according to our own interests in a situation of tension, or are we paralyzed by relationships that we have not previously considered critical?

Indeed, 1 of the key dimensions of sovereignty in the modern planet is the ability to withstand pressures – economic, political and technological. To preserve it, countries must strive for strategical autonomy in selected key areas: energy, defence, food security, access to critical minerals and finance. This does not mean autarkii – no country can accomplish full self-sufficiency. It is alternatively a conscious build-up of resilience at critical points: where the abrupt blockage of supply, sanctions or external force can paralyze the basic functions of the state.

Sovereignty in the modern planet is not about isolation, but about the ability to choose dependence and to withstand force in times of crisis. Sovereignty should so not be a political slogan but an overriding criterion in order of all areas of public policy.

A country which has its own energy sources or diversified supply chains, unchangeable food reserves, production capacities of key defence components, access to strategical natural materials and an autonomous financial strategy is able to make decisions based on its own interests – even under global tensions. It remains an entity, not an object of the game.

The biggest mistake would be to treat sovereignty as 1 of many areas of public policy – alongside industry, energy or defence. In fact, it should become an overriding criterion that permeates all these areas: setting the limits of compromise, specifying where concessions are acceptable and where red lines run. What can we not quit due to the fact that we will lose our ability to act?

Poland's strategy so far has mostly been based on anchoring in NATO and the European Union, assuming a comparatively unchangeable global order. present this presumption is no longer sufficient. Alliances stay an essential component of our security, but they cannot be its only pillar. We request our own sources of influence – those that make us, for allies, not only a beneficiary of protection, but a partner of real value.

Countries — impact nodes

This is where the key concept arises: countries – nodes of influence.

The State acts as an impact hub erstwhile its systemic importance goes beyond its demographic or economical possible due to the fact that it controls critical points in the networks of dependency – security, technology, energy, logistics or regulation. These countries do not dominate the world. But ignoring them by another actors of global politics is very costly. Their strength is based on centrality, not on scale.

Taiwan is simply a good example of specified a country. A country of 23 million inhabitants, formally unrecognized by most of the global community, operating in the shadow of a powerful neighbor. Yet its function in global value chains – especially in the production of advanced semiconductors – makes Taiwan's safety a strategical challenge for the United States, Japan and the full West.

Medium-sized countries are not building strength present through scale, but through importance in key networks of dependency. Control over "sensitive points" – in the fields of technology, logistics, energy or regulatory – makes them hard to circumvent and strategically necessary. Their real power is not about dominance, but about being an component without which the strategy does not work.

Why? due to the fact that over 90% of the world's most advanced chips are made by 1 company: TSMC. Without them there are no iPhones, no modern rocket systems or advanced military technologies. Taiwan is not protected due to the fact that it is weaker. It's protected due to the fact that it's necessary.

A akin logic – albeit on a smaller scale – is seen in another cases. The Netherlands controls a key component in the global semiconductor production chain: ASML, the sole maker of ultraviolet lithography machines (EUV), without which it is impossible to produce state-of-the-art chips. erstwhile the United States wanted to block China's access to this technology, it had to negociate with the Netherlands – a country nearly sixty times smaller than the US.

Singapore, in turn, built its position as a global financial, logistical and regulatory hub – a place through which key streams of capital, goods and data pass through in the South-East Asia region.

What do these cases have in common? no of these countries are a power in the classical sense. All of them, on the another hand, have consistently built up their position in the global dependency network. They did not effort to be strong in everything – alternatively they identified “sensitive points” and put them at the heart of their strategy.

Poland's influence?

Poland has real possible to besides follow a akin path. Not by copying another people's models, but by utilizing their own strategical assets: geographical location, economical possible and position in European structures.

Security. Poland can become a key integrator of NATO's east flank – not only as a consumer of military equipment, but besides as a co-manufacturer of defence capabilities. present we are the largest recipient of American weapons in Europe. But this is only the beginning.

The war in Ukraine showed that modern armed conflict is not only conventional equipment – tanks or fighters – but mainly ammunition, drones, reconnaissance systems, infrastructure kind dual-use (i.e. 1 that applies to civilian and military) and the ability to rapidly repair and reconstruct equipment. Poland can become a regional service and production hub for NATO: a place for repairs, ammunition storage, staff training and investigating of fresh solutions. A country without which it is impossible to plan the defence of the region is importantly strengthening its negotiating position towards allies.

Energy. Poland has a chance to act as a regional energy stabiliser. We are located at the intersection of the key gas infrastructure (Baltic Pipe, LNG terminals), electricity (interconnectors with Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania and Sweden) and – in position – hydrogen.

The energy crises of 2022 have shown that energy safety has become 1 of the main tools of power. A country that can store gas, balance the electricity strategy and redistribute resources in a situation of tension becomes a critical component of the stableness of the region. This does not require being a maker – control of infrastructure and operational capacity is needed.

Poland can strengthen its position not by imitation power, but by consciously building importance in areas where security, energy, manufacture and regulations cross. A country that becomes an integrator of key capacities and infrastructure of the region gains influence not by scale but by becoming necessary.

Industry and logistics. Poland lies on the main transport axes of East-West and North-South. A increasing stream of goods related to the shortening of supply chains passes through our country (closeshoring, frienddshoring) and in the future with reconstruction of Ukraine. However, it is simply a prerequisite for exploiting this possible to decision distant from the passive model of "assembly" for selective capacity building in strategically crucial areas where the civilian and defence sectors penetrate. The production of components for electrical vehicles, batteries, advanced materials or electronics are areas where we can build our meaning as a node state. However, we must halt reasoning only in terms of low labour costs.

Regulations and standards. In the European Union, real power is increasingly materialised, not in political declarations, but in method standards, standards and regulations. Whoever co-creates these rules shapes the playing conditions for the full market.

Poland has the possible to get out of the function Rule-taker au Rule-maker – however, this requires a conscious investment in organization competences and the ability to build thematic coalitions. Specifically: more presence of Polish officials in key EU method committees, more Polish experts in working groups and active participation of Polish companies in standardisation processes. This does not sound spectacular, but it is there that determines who will be the beneficiary and who will be the victim of future regulations.

Node instruments: institutions, networks and intellectual capital

The construction of impact nodes is not based solely on hard infrastructure or individual investment projects. In the long term, it is decided by institutions and networks – formal and informal – which accumulate knowledge, competences and relationships. They make the State a permanent point of reference, not just a temporary beneficiary of a favourable situation.

In this context, the strategical resource becomes the diaspora. Poland has 1 of the biggest migration potentials in Europe – estimates say 15-20 million Poles and people of Polish origin spread around the world. In the UK, Germany and the United States alone, more than 5 million Poles live. Among them are engineers employed in global technology companies, scientists at leading universities, financial sector specialists and entrepreneurs. It's a huge, mostly unused resource.

Countries specified as Israel, India and Ireland have long treated their diasporas not only as a social phenomenon but as part of a state strategy. Israel builds networks of funds venture capital managed by diaspora, which invest in Israeli start-ups and link them to global markets. India launched the OCI (Overseas Citizen of India) program, offering diaspora to facilitate business and investment – as a result, tens of billions of dollars are transferred to the country all year. Ireland created the Global Irish Network – a formal platform linking influential Irish people around the planet to government and business.

Another crucial component in the construction of nodality is attracting global knowledge hubs. Not only do those countries that act as influence nodes send talent – they besides attract institutions that produce cognition and form debate. This aspect is frequently underestimated and critical for building centrality.

The state's nodes are worth building not only through infrastructure, but besides through institutions, networks and intellectual capital. States are gaining importance in global networks of dependency erstwhile they can attract cognition and people and influence global public debate. In seemingly fewer spectacular networks and bodies, real impact on planet processes is determined.

Vienna is simply a good example. The city with a population comparable to Warsaw is home to more than 40 global organisations – from OSCE and IAEA to many UN agencies. This is not an accident: Austria has consistently built a ‘intermediary’ position, offering infrastructure, financial support and a conducive diplomatic environment. As a result, Vienna has become a gathering place for experts, diplomats and decision makers from around the world, which further strengthens Austria's position as an influence hub.

Geneva plays a akin function – a city with only 200,000 inhabitants, based in the WTO, the WHO, the global Committee of the Red Cross and tens of another global organisations. Switzerland is not a power, but it controls the space where there is simply a global debate on trade, wellness and human rights.

Poland could take a akin path. Warsaw has the possible to become a regional hub of cognition about east Europe, energy safety and economical transformation.

Attracting specified institutions requires not only a competitive financial offer, but besides a coherent communicative explaining why Poland is simply a natural place for this kind of activity. In our case, this communicative is clear: we are a country of successful systemic transformation, present on the front line of the energy transition, closest to the war in Ukraine and at the heart of the debate on the future of NATO and the European Union. However, it is crucial to translate this communicative into concrete organization proposals.

Global presence knowledge hubs must go hand in hand with the improvement of national think tanks and think tanks. Singapore – despite the population of only 6 million inhabitants – has respective leading global think tanks (ISEAS, RSIS). The Netherlands has a renowned Clingendael Institute. These are institutions that form debate not only in their countries but besides in the full regions.

Poland has a increasing expert environment, but it remains besides poorly integrated with decision-making processes and besides small in the global debate. We request institutions capable of long-term, in-depth analytical work, building lasting relations with abroad centres and providing high-quality expertise to decision-makers. This is not about another "government" think tank, but about supporting independent centres with real impact.

State centrality in global networks is not only due to physical infrastructure, but besides to the presence in key bodies, committees and cooperation platforms. It is there that decisions are made on standards, regulations and future investments.

Poland should systematically build its presence in:

• EU method committees (including standardisation, cybersecurity, AI),
• NATO defence cooperation networks (training, logistics, investigation and development),
• energy cooperation platforms (ENTSO-E, regional gas hubs),
• international trade organisations (e.g. SEMI in the semiconductor sector).

It's hard work and not spectacular. But that's where you decide who's at the center of the network and who's gonna stay on its outskirts.

Coalition as a strategical competence

The impact node does not function in isolation. His strength lies in his ability to organize cooperation around his own interests – in specified a way that another states besides see in him the value for themselves. This is fundamentally different from classical diplomacy, which focuses on negotiating in existing formats. Coalition means the ability to make fresh cooperation agreements that respond to the real needs of the group of countries and which place Poland in their centre.

A good example is Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8) – an informal yet highly effective cooperation platform of the Nordic and Baltic countries. It is not based on treaties, large summits or extended bureaucracy. Instead, there are regular consultations at ministerial level, coordinated positions in NATO and the European Union and joint infrastructure projects. The NB8 makes 8 tiny and medium-sized countries have a real impact on European decisions – due to the fact that it acts as a coherent block.

Poland has the possible to build akin coalitions – on its own terms and around its own priorities. Possible directions are several:

• NATO's east flank coalition. Poland, the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria have a common interest in strengthening the Alliance's east flank, but they do not always have a unified position. If Poland initiated a formal coordination platform – like NB8 – this group could jointly negociate deployment, investment in infrastructure dual-use or purchasing priorities. The consequence would be a greater impact on NATO decisions, better terms of defence contracts and a stronger position towards Western allies.

• Central European Energy Coalition. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and the Baltic States face akin challenges: diversification of gas supply, expansion of warehouses, integration of renewable energy sources and recognition of the future function of atomic energy. They can compete for the same sources of backing and the same suppliers – or make a common purchasing and investment platform that will increase their bargaining power towards LNG suppliers, SMR reactor producers or Union funds. specified a coalition could besides jointly negociate with the European Commission the conditions for energy transition.

• The reconstruction hub of Ukraine. The reconstruction of Ukraine is simply a task worth hundreds of billions of dollars, spread over decades. Poland has natural advantages here: geographical proximity, developed logistics infrastructure and experience of economical transformation. However, in order to make real usage of them, it is essential to make a platform linking Polish companies, Ukrainian partners and western funds and financial institutions. This could be a formal institution – like the reconstruction funds created after planet War II – which would not only finance projects but besides coordinate standards, certification, training and cognition transfer. If Poland became a natural hub through which capital, competences and technologies flow to Ukraine, it would automatically increase our centrality in the European system.

• Joint defence orders. Coalitions request not be limited to diplomacy – they can besides be based on joint purchases. Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, and possibly Finland and Sweden, could jointly order air defence systems, ammunition, drones or infrastructure dual-use. A larger scale means lower prices, better conditions for technology transfer and a stronger negotiating position towards producers, especially US producers.

In the context of fragmentation of global governance, the real power of the mediate state builds the ability to effectively initiate and integrate coalitions in which we play a central role.

All these examples combine 1 thing: the Polish impact node cannot trust on dominance, it is the ability to organize cooperation beneficial to all parties – while besides placing Poland as an integrator. A country that can plan and keep specified systems becomes an essential component for the functioning of the system. In this sense, coalition is 1 of the key competences of a sovereign state today.

Technological sovereignty

Building an impact node requires not only control over physical infrastructure, but besides over technologies that are critical to its operation. Without technological sovereignty, centrality becomes illusory – you can be a logistics hub and at the same time lose control of the systems managing this hub; you can act as an energy integrator, but you can stay dependent on another people's solutions to control the network.

Technological sovereignty is now 1 of the key dimensions of state sovereignty in general. It does not mean self-sufficiency – this planet of global value chains remains an illusion – but the ability to control technological "sensitive points" on which the continuity of the state's functioning during periods of tension depends.

The crises of fresh years – pandemic, war, increasing geopolitical tensions – have shown that the deficiency of access to key technologies can shortly paralyze full sectors of the economy and basic functions of administration. Technological sovereignty is not about having everything, but about making informed choices: which competences are critical for maintaining our node position?

In a planet of technological competition, the state retains real sovereignty not erstwhile it tries to be self-sufficient, but erstwhile it controls the key technological "sensitive points" on which its ability to act in moments of crisis depends.

In Polish conditions, 4 areas appear first: digital technologies (artificial intelligence, data processing, cybersecurity), energy technologies, defence technologies and technologies. dual-use. It is in these areas that Poland should build its nodal position – not as inexpensive montownia, but as a co-creator of critical competences.

However, it is crucial that technological sovereignty is not born solely in companies or in universities. It requires a country capable of acting as an ecosystem architect: setting priorities, creating a unchangeable regulatory framework, utilizing public procurement as a tool for improvement and building institutions capable of long-term coordination.

A country that can consciously build its technological sovereignty increases not only interior security. It besides becomes a more attractive partner in alliances, a more influential associate in regulatory processes and a more central component of European networks of interdependence. In a planet of increasing technological competition, it is this ability that increasingly determines the real position of the state.

Our strategical Choice

The planet of increasing fragmentation has brutally exposed the weaknesses of reactive states. Responding to crises alternatively of overtaking them leads to a gradual failure of cause. Today, Poland is faced with a fundamental choice: whether to stay a country responsive to change or become a country able to anticipate and exploit it.

Such a change requires a departure from peripheral thinking. Poland is not sentenced to the function of backroom, nor to the function of passive associate in another people's projects. It has the possible to play a systemic function – as a safety, energy, industry, regulation, as well as cognition and strategical debate in this part of Europe. It is precisely this centrality – based not only on material resources, but besides on intellectual capital and networks of cooperation – that present determines the real strength of average countries.

What does this mean in practice? A prerequisite is to submit improvement policy to the prism of sovereignty – understood not as a symbol or political slogan, but as a applicable measurement of the capacity to act: choice of dependency, protection of key competences and strengthening them in a crisis. Any crucial investment, regulatory or organization decision should pass a simple test: does it strengthen our centrality or distance us from it?

In a planet of permanent uncertainty, the real power of the state builds, not the ability to respond to crises, but the ability to increase its global importance through knotting.

An effective node strategy must not be based on distributed sectoral initiatives or on ad hoc cooperation between institutions. It requires strong central coordination – a centre capable of prioritising, synchronizing actions and accounting for effects in the long term. This is not about operational centralisation, but about the function of an integrator and ecosystem architect, where various stakeholders can operate: public administration, infrastructure companies, financial institutions, the private sector and technological and expert communities.

Development institutions – improvement banks, investment agencies and public funds – play a peculiar function in this process. quasi-public. They have financial instruments, analytical competences and long-term risk-taking capacity. In a node strategy, they can act as leverages – triggering private capital, global projects and public-private partnerships.

Equally crucial is the inclusion of business and expert communities, not at the consultation stage, but co-responsibility for implementation. Building an impact hub requires sustainable cooperation platforms, common agendas and learning mechanisms – a process that must go beyond electoral cycles and the political logic of single term.

The consequences are crucial. In the "new mediate Ages" world, countries that frequently change course rapidly lose credibility – and with it the ability to build a node role. Without a minimum consensus of political and administrative elites, no strategy based on centrality can succeed. This is not about full consent, but about recognising the basic fact: that Poland's position in the fresh global order must be the subject of an informed project, not the consequence of random events.

If a node strategy is to be more than a concept, it needs concrete action. 1 of the first should be the establishment of a Node strategy Council – a coordinating body at Prime Minister level, combining key ministries (defence, energy, industry, digitalisation) with improvement institutions and representatives of business and science. Its task would be to map critical dependencies and to prioritize investments and actions essential to make Poland a real country.

The alternate is simple. Poland can stay a country that responds to another people's decisions and hopes that the resulting drift will not lead it to the ground. It can besides consciously specify its function in the fresh order – as a state of systemic importance for the security, energy and stableness of the region. In a planet without permanent rules, it is centrality, not the size itself, that becomes the most valuable resource which can bring Poland to a completely different league.