This article is the last chapter of a fresh book Deutschland und Polen. Die Geschichte der amtlichen Beziehungen. (Germany and Poland. past of authoritative relations.)
This book on the long past of authoritative relations between Poland and Germany ends with a chapter completely different from the others. The author not only examines the file, but besides writes as an active associate about its stage, which took place in the late 20th century – its finale meant that both countries managed to give their relations a completely fresh form and thus give a fresh form to Europe[1].
After the German assault on 1 September 1939, Poland survived hell – after war, business and unimaginable crimes more than 5 million Polish citizens lost their lives. The Hitler–Stalin Pact of August 23, 1939, which actually marks the 4th Polish demolition, was a trauma that continues until present and whose Russian assault on Ukraine provides fresh media. Although Poles besides fought in all Allied armies and together with them in 1945 freed Germany from national socialism, as only a fewer people know and are not decently appreciated in Germany, Poland has remained under the domination of the russian Union in part of Europe dominated by communists in the following decades. abruptly – within the limits shifted west – she and Germans found herself in the russian business region and in a forced alliance with the russian Union. Stalin retained this part, which he had taken under the pact with Hitler, while Poland received German lands east of Oder and Nysa. More than 12 million Germans fled the Red Army and could no longer return or had to leave Poland – in both German countries they constituted a crucial part of the population, which was besides politically active in the democratic west. The russian Union wanted peace in this own alliance, and so both the Poles and the GDR ruled by communists were to recognise their boundaries – "the border of peace on Oder and Nysa", as in the GDR we learned about it in school. This act of her designation sealed the 1950 Zgorzelecki Pact. The Western part of Germany, the national Republic, the reflection on German guilt and responsibility, and the designation of post-war order in Europe have come with large difficulty for decades.
It is simply a peculiar merit of this book – unfortunately to this day in no way apparent – that Polish-German relations were presented in it as tripartite relations. The authors are aware at all times that German past in the second half of the 20th century is simply a divided past and that each of the 2 German states had its own relations with Poland – these in turn besides afraid the second 1 each time.
The past of 1989–90, which is to be told here from the position of German-Polish relations, collides simultaneously with German historiography, and this 1 has inactive not been able to describe the German way to unity as a "unity negotiated". The GDR became the aftermath of the Peaceful Revolution, after the transitional period of the circular Table, and yet after the free elections of March 1990, a democratic state. This process was closely connected with events in Poland and Hungary. In 1989, in Poland, a kind of "negotiated revolution" was carried out, started by the circular Table gathering from February to April – so it was a peaceful revolution. As a result, after partially free elections in June, Poland had the first non-communist Prime Minister since the Second planet War in the individual of Tadeusz Mazowiecki in late August. A peaceful revolution in the GDR involves these events – which I call the Central European Revolution. With the triumph of freedom and democracy, democratic states were created in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. So the GDR did not fall, but democratized. The German union – which the vast majority of Germans from the GDR wanted – was so a negotiation process between equally democratically legitimized states and legally ended the accession of the GDR to the national Republic, conducted democratically on the basis of negotiated agreements. Unfortunately present only the layout 2 + 4 is examined, but this bilateral negotiation process has not been historically developed even in preliminary assumptions. This besides applies to parts of German-Polish relations closely related to German unification in 1990: designation of the Polish western border. It was on this point that both German states represented fundamentally different positions.
Helmut Kohl, after taking over the regulation in 1982, confirmed the east agreements, and thus besides the Warsaw agreement of 1970, but in 1990 the next elections to the Bundestag were coming, and so wanted to postpone the final designation of the Polish western border in time after these elections. For he feared how the exiled would vote, who rejected specified approval, or who wanted to associate it with conditions. Kohl wasn't ready to take any chances here, so accept the possible failure of votes.
We in the GDR, on the another hand, advocated the fast and unconditional final designation of the border. It meant a lot to us. For me personally, it was crucial to start parliamentary activity after the free elections in March 1990 from the declaration in which we assumed the work of history, which was on us as on the national Republic, and which was a consequence of our past burdened with the crimes of national socialism. The declaration, passed later on 12 April 1990 by the People's Chamber with 21 abstentions, was proposed and agreed as SPD in coalition talks. It undertook various topics and initiatives and reminded German guilt towards Jews, the russian Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland, while pointing to circumstantial political challenges and initiatives. Among another things, the declaration stated: “In the times of national socialism Germany caused unimaginable suffering to the nations of the world. Nationalism and madness of racism led to genocide, which was mainly done on Jews from all countries of Europe, the russian Union nations, the Polish people and the Sinti and Roma people. This guilt must never be forgotten. It besides brings out our work for the future."
The Communist GDR has always refused to accept guilt and responsibility. In her own conviction she always stood on the side of the glorified russian Union, the side of the winners of the Second planet War and the side and progress. In the GDR, a conscious accounting of the times of national socialism was never carried out – 1 that would encompass the full society and include a reflection on the work of the individual. Only in the Evangelical churches and various opposition groups did this historical guilt. For the Democratic GDR, this confession of 12 April 1990 was to be an essential basis for its policy. While erstwhile relations with European neighbours were marked by communist ideology and belonging in the conflict between the West and the East to the russian sphere of influence, they were now to be both spiritually and politically embedded on the fresh foundation and built again. Especially for relations with the east neighbours, who together with us suffered under the communist dictatorship and in which memory besides powerfully influenced the tendency of the GDR to forget history, this declaration was of peculiar importance.
It was besides crucial that we did not effort to make the impression that we were referring straight to postwar times. We knew that not only the Nazi times must not be suppressed from memory – besides the communist times' faults were now to become the subject of conscious accounting. This dimension played an crucial function not only in relations with the judaic people and Israel, but besides in relations with Czechoslovakia. At first, the resolution called for work towards the judaic people. For SED – likewise as for the russian Union – Shoah, the Holocaust has always been just a sideline of the past of national socialism. The People's Chamber has now asked for forgiveness for "the hypocrisy and hostility of the authoritative policy of the GDR towards the State of Israel and for the persecution and humiliation of judaic fellow citizens in our country besides after 1945". The concrete political consequence of this was to support and defend judaic religion and culture and preserve and cultivate cemeteries, synagogues and memorial sites. Although German unification was already in perspective, for symbolic reasons discussions were besides to begin on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the GDR and Israel. The persecuted Jews were to be granted asylum in East Germany[2]. We rapidly translated this into the language of practice. The national government tried initially to prevent this – he wanted to avoid any impression that the national Republic was an open country for immigration. But erstwhile he found strong opposition among us, he tried to prevent it from happening. However, at the beginning of October 1990, and thus at the time of the union of both states, 2 to 3 1000 judaic immigrants were already in the GDR and many others were to join them. After the unification, the national government saw no anticipation of withdrawing this process and in 1991 regulated the question of alleged quota refugees, thus creating a fresh legal basis for continuing this action. In this way, as the Democratic GDR, we opened the way for crucial immigration of Jews from the countries of the erstwhile russian Union – in the end, their number exceeded much 200,000. This immigration has led to a vital and diverse judaic activity in Germany, for which we can only be grateful.
However, in the context of German unification, relations with Poland were peculiarly important. Even if opposition and opposition existed in the countries of east and central Europe in all decades of communist rule, Polish opposition has been the most common and profoundly rooted in society since the 1970s. In order to prevent its transfer to the GDR society, the SED did not hesitate to fuel anti-Polish sentiments, but in the GDR, with large sympathy were referred to the independent association "Solidarity" which caused any communist government to first waver as a consequence of social opposition. Even more crucial than this historical bond was the eventual designation of the German-Polish border on Oder and Nysa. The People’s Chamber confirmed it without any conditions: “Especially the Polish people should know that their right to live within safe limits we Germany will neither now nor in the future question by making territorial claims. We confirm the integrity of the border with the Republic of Poland on Oder and Nysa as the foundation of the peaceful coexistence of our peoples in a common European home. The future German-wide parliament should confirm this on a treaty basis."
The fact that in the German unification process the final character of the Polish western border had to be confirmed by the treaty was due to the post-war regulations of the Allies. In connection with the Warsaw Agreement of 1970, the national Constitutional Court pointed out the temporary nature of all forms of designation of the border until the final settlement of this issue in the peace treaty, which would only then make Germany a sovereign state. The designation of the western border of Poland by the Brandt/Scheel government in 1970 was only an act of political will and encountered violent opposition from the Union. This reluctant position was inactive alive in 1990 in the CDU and CSU environment and in the reactionary circles of western Germany.
As early as February 1990, Tadeusz Mazowiecki presented his ideas of a procedure that would supply Poland with the essential security: both German states were to make and first with the Polish border system. This agreement was then to be signed and ratified immediately after the unification. He submitted this proposal to Helmut Kohl and accepted that it was only the united Germany that would be able to make legally binding and effective global recognition. Hans-Dietrich Genscher welcomed this proposal and the FDP explicitly considered it to be in line with its own position. However, on 2 March Helmut Kohl one more time poured fuel into the fire, tying designation of the border with further moving demands. Poland was to declare that it remained in force declared by the communist government in 1953 resignation from war reparations. Secondly, the rights of the German number were to be strengthened.
These additional demands led to violent debates in the Bundestag on 8 March 1990 and sparked lively public debate. The dispute besides tightened inside the coalition. In the end, however, a consensus was found, and no of the coalition partners wanted to put the government at risk. Kohl accepted the plan that both German parliaments – already elected in the free elections of the People's Chamber and the Bundestag – would pass a unanimous resolution. The following passage was to be found there, containing the wording utilized by Genscher at the United Nations: "The Polish people should know that his rights to life within safe limits we Germany will not be questioned either now or in the future by making territorial claims."
However, since specified confirmation of political will was not binding under global law, the Polish side's declaration, which is understandable, was not sufficient. Helmut Kohl came to the conclusion that since the way he proposed was considered inadequate, this meant questioning his individual credibility and reacting with irritation, and even felt personally offended.[3]. Nor did he express his willingness to conclude the applicable treaty before or even to prepare it. Although at the latest since the March 1990 People's home election, it was apparent that he would besides win the Bundestag election, he did not want to quit the part of the electorate that in Germany was inactive unwilling to recognise the border on Oder and Nysa.
I was at the time and I am inactive convinced that Helmut Kohl's attitude was primarily dependent on electoral tactics. However, any doubts arise in me a fragment of his letter to Tadeusz Mazowiecki, which I read only much later. In this letter, he writes: “I realize the totally political and intellectual situation in Poland – and your situation is not easy. At the same time, however, delight besides realize the sensitivity of my fellow countrymen, from whom a bitter final resignation is demanded in the hr of German unification. I can’t and don’t want to get over these feelings.”[4]. Did Helmut Kohl truly think that designation of the border was inactive a "bitter final resignation" in 1990? And if he thought so, how different is this attitude from the attitude he took towards Poland Willy Brandt in 1970. And he just risked a lot. Helmut Kohl was not ready to take on even a very tiny hazard during the Bundestag election.
When the fresh government in East Germany began office in April 1990, and I became abroad Minister, all of this had already happened. Hans-Dietrich Genscher told me about this on his first visit to his home. As East German social democrats, we spoke very early and clearly for the designation of the border: already in the first SPD declaration of 3 December 1989, this position was expressed unequivocally. In fact, there was full compliance with the Western SPD. At the time, we were already critical of the fact that Helmut Kohl did not address this issue in his ten-point declaration in the Bundestag. In the GDR, there were no differences in relations with the Hans Modrow government or with the Bloc parties, the coalition agreement left no uncertainty here, and the Declaration of the People's Chamber of 12 April 1990 placed the substance in a broader political context.
For me personally, this position was not only a political obvious, but besides an important, profoundly felt message. In my household home, I received discussions about the memorandum of the east Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD), and the image of Willa Brandt kneeling in Warsaw in 1970 was an crucial component of my political identity. Even in my youth, it was a certainty to me: the failure of German east areas was the consequence of the German criminal war under Hitler. Accepting this fact was part of our work for European peace. The designation of this border in the German union process was not a fresh resignation, but a fulfilment of this responsibility. Poland and all European neighbours were to gain assurance that we are aware of this work and will be aware of it in the future. This was precisely the intent of the declaration adopted by the People's Chamber on 12 April 1990.
It was crucial for me to emphasise that we Germans do not gotta wait for individual to tell us where our country is. We wanted to carry out a procedure for recognising this border in a legally binding way as clearly, as clearly and as rapidly as possible, without any external reminders. This was the only way we could anticipate our neighbors to welcome German unification with joy and that we could calm down more or little hidden fears, inactive present in Polish society. The designation of the border was to take place – so we thought – completely voluntarily. Any impression that we were obliged by the Germans to do so was considered harmful. The maturity of the Germans was to be revealed in designation of the territorial integrity of their neighbours.
Therefore, I besides considered it highly problematic to talk about the designation of the border as the price of German unity, which Helmut Kohl and another CDU politicians utilized at the time. There was no fresh price to pay, only to admit the consequences of the war we were liable for. In Poland and among another neighbours specified a phrase about the price of German unity could be understood in specified a way that – erstwhile Germany achieves this unity – it will be possible to open a discussion about whether this price was besides high. I was convinced that specified trust could not be built, which we thought was crucial for the future of united Germany.
In order to express the importance of this issue and our relation with Poland, my first abroad journey as Minister decided to take place in Warsaw. It took effect on April 23, 1990. Only a day later was the first authoritative gathering with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, however, we had already met privately at his home under Bonn. In Warsaw, I held talks with the most crucial representatives of the fresh Polish state – Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, abroad Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski and president Wojciech Jaruzelski. Another crucial event for me was the visit to the grave of Fr Jerzy Popieluszko murdered in 1984. This execution shook me in time as a politically active pastor in Mecklenburg. The gathering with a typical of the Catholic Church was besides to be an component of this instant visit. He played an crucial function in overcoming communism, thanks to Pope John Paul II throughout Europe. And so I met with Bishop Jerzy Dąbrowski, the acting secretary of the Polish Episcopal. The talks, especially with Mazowieckie and Skubiszewski, took place in a warm atmosphere, as we yet represented 2 democratic governments that grew out of the triumph of freedom and democracy in 1989. It was Mazowiecki who was not only a witness to these events, but besides 1 of their co-writers, whose meaning went far beyond the borders of Poland.
The Polish partners welcomed with joy the declaration of the People's Chamber of 12 April 1990 and advocated the Mazovia plan, which I supported not only personally. I could have told them that we besides included this in the coalition agreement. In addition, they confirmed their willingness to participate in talks 2 + 4, concerning both the border and another matters related to Poland's security. I besides supported this request. Mazowiecki, who had been active in the German-Polish reconciliation process for 2 decades and maintained contacts with the Action Sign of Repentance in the GDR, besides mentioned the essential initiatives in the field of German-Polish and Polish-Russian reconciliation. He besides advocated the future German membership of NATO. Skubiszewski, in turn, pointed out another problematic areas which had to be discussed within the framework of the process of unification – especially the issue of the basic law: after the unification, Article 23 was to be deleted and German citizenship would besides be a problem for Poles. The problem of compensation for Polish forced workers was besides inactive unresolved. For this peculiar case I personally had quite a few understanding, but within my mandate I could not make any promises. This first authoritative visit to Warsaw was of large importance to me. I was connected to Tadeusz Mazowiecki until his death by a relation marked by large respect and deep bond. I gave him my laudation twice in honor of his awards in Germany.[5].
During the first preparatory gathering on 14 March 1990, the deadline for tripartite discussions at the level of the expert delegation between the German and Polish countries was agreed. These talks began in Warsaw on 3 May, shortly before the first gathering of abroad ministers in expression 2 + 4 in Bonn. On that day in 1791, the first constitution in Europe was adopted in Poland, in which 3 divisions of authorities were recorded. During the meeting, the various positions of the Polish and Western German delegations were clearly visible. Poland wanted to discuss its draft agreement, sent a fewer days earlier to both German countries and the Allies, while the West German side only submitted a draft of the resolutions of both German parliaments. We stated that we wanted to support the Polish project, in principle, which besides dealt with topics that go beyond the border issue, but we proposed that the border treaty and the treaty governing the foundations of future relations be clearly separated. This issue was to gain importance later. Minister Skubiszewski insisted on concluding an global treaty before the union. The Parliament's declaration was in his opinion an crucial step on this road, but in no way a adequate step[6]. During the next 2 trialogue meetings in May and June, various drafts of the procedure and content of the border agreement were discussed – however, this is what Helmut Kohl did not want, which caused these talks to be broken up by the national government, although Poles and we considered them sensible. On June 21, 1990, a resolution was passed in parallel in the People's Chamber and the Bundestag recognising the Polish western border. It was a strong public and global signal – but the Polish side, as I mentioned earlier, considered it insufficient.
I met with Krzysztof Skubiszewski in Frankfurt nad Oder at the celebrations on the 40th anniversary of the 1950 Zgorzelec Agreement. It was then that the GDR – under the force of the russian Union – recognized the Polish western border. On July 4, 1990, we met at Schönefeld Airport, had another long talk there in the peculiar check-in building, and then went together with my car to Frankfurt and back[7]. I tried to convince him that the border treaty should be separated from the planned fundamental treaty (hereinafter referred to as the ‘good neighbourhood Treaty’). For very different reasons, both the national government and the Polish side were not in favour of this. Helmut Kohl, and in peculiar CSU, have been in favour of putting everything in a single treaty for a long time, as this has allowed the Chancellor to postpone the designation of the border, as specified comprehensive negotiations would take longer. Poland, on the another hand, was inclined to deal with all problems, including those going beyond border issues, as shortly as possible. I had the impression that it was impossible to do this at the same time and that the first-class Polish interest had to be to enter the border strategy as shortly as possible. Later Poland besides accepted this position in negotiations.
The decisive provisions were then made in Paris during the 3rd circular of talks of abroad ministers, held in format 2 + 4, 17 July 1990. straight before, Gorbachev accepted the main topics of the negotiations in the Caucasus, in peculiar the issues of united freedoms Germany in deciding to belong to alliances, which besides meant their membership of NATO. It caused large euphoria.
The Paris circular of negotiations besides brought a breakthrough on the border. The settlement is summarised in 5 points:
- Germany was to cover the areas of the national Republic, the GDR and all of Berlin: the external borders of the united Germany would have a final character with the entry into force of Treaty 2 + 4. They would be an crucial component of the peace order in Europe.
- The United Germany and Poland were to confirm their existing borders in a treaty binding under global law.
- The United States will not make any territorial claims against another countries now or in the future.
- There will be no wording in the Constitution of the United States of Germany that would be incompatible with these principles
- All 4 Powers accept the intention to enter into a bilateral border strategy and declare that the final nature of the bounds of the united Germany will be confirmed with its entry into force[8].
As shortly as possible after the unification – and the restoration of full sovereignty of Germany – the border agreement was to be signed and ratified by the German-wide Parliament. In formal terms, Helmut Kohl was able to bet on his own: before the union there was no initialling of the already negotiated border system. As far as the substance is concerned, however, the Polish western border has been guaranteed according to common belief – and thus Poland's want to get something binding before the union. Poland got what it wanted: the western border was certain, and the Allies guaranteed it[9]. However, the drama of the Paris negotiations and the conclusion of the talks in expression 2 + 4 in September is not yet over. On 13 July, in a letter to Mazowiecki, Kohl proposed that the border treaty be concluded within 3 months of the unification. Meanwhile, in Paris, it was decided that the agreement would be signed "as shortly as possible" and submitted for ratification to the common German Parliament. This was addressed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his answer to Helmut Kohl on 25 July. He pushed for talks to prepare the deal in September[10]. Helmut Kohl opposed it. The gathering with Mazowiecki, which the second sought, took place only on November 8, 1990, 5 weeks after the unification. If we take into account that Mazowiecki was under large force in Poland during these weeks, in the midst of the election campaign, and so urgently needed any success in abroad policy, then the choice of that word was at least a sign of deficiency of empathy and solidarity! In a press release at the end of the negotiations in expression 2 + 4, released on 13 September 1990, I requested that the border agreement be signed and ratified immediately after the unification.
Much more problematic than delaying the gathering was Helmut Kohl's announcement that the border agreement would be signed, but it would only be ratified with the basic agreement on relationship to be negotiated soon. Thus, the fast conclusion of the border strategy in Paris was actually to be postponed again. The unions expelled were thus given 3 weeks by the elections to the Bundestag to realize that designation of the border would be granted global legal sanctions only if they themselves had the chance to introduce their demands to Poland in subsequent treaty negotiations with Poland. I must confess that this declaration has made me stunned. It was another slap for Tadeusz Mazowiecki and a manifestation of ruthless electoral struggle.
On June 17, 1991, an agreement was signed on the German-Polish neighbourhood, an agreement between 2 countries that had not previously been: on the 1 hand, a young democratic Polish state, which freedom and democracy won itself, on the another hand Germany, which united 45 years after the horrors of the Second planet War, caused to neighboring nations and Poland, experienced the happiest hours in the 20th century. This fresh beginning unleashed incredible forces and energies. There was a wide field of cooperation between the 2 countries – social, political and economic. In particular, Germany – both the Kohl government and Schröder's cabinet since 1998 – then supported Poland's warm want to become a associate of the European Union and NATO. For many years it has been repeated constantly that German-Polish relations are as good as ever. And all this time, it was true.
The fact that later things took a different turn has many reasons that we will no longer consider here. 1 sign of this was the fact that Poland under the Law and Justice Government, after many years of preparation and multiple calculations, demanded reparation from Germany. The Mazovia government was accused of not taking the issue again in the process of unifying Germany. On this charge, it was suggested that the Mazovia government did not defend Poland's interests sufficiently. It is impossible to discuss this subject extensively, but I would like to powerfully argue this allegation, pointing out only 1 argument: in February 1990, it was decided in Ottawa that, as regards the global dimension of German unification, negotiations would not be conducted with all erstwhile opponents, but only between the 2 German states and the Allies, the winners of the Second planet War, who inactive had the right to decide "about Germany as a whole", both German states were not full sovereign until then, and this sovereignty of united Germany had to be restored. Different countries criticized this decision, due to the fact that many of them suffered from Nazi Germany and suffered various harms from them. Only Poland, thanks to the intense efforts of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, pushed this initiative and became a associate in the main treaty on German unity – and this is solely on the basis of the argument that in the global dimension the Polish border remained as open as the German issue. Both had to be explained bindingly and permanently – and this could only have been done with the participation of Poland. However, Poland only had a chance to do so if it focused solely on the border. No another country had specified a problem – and everyone recognized it.
If Poland were to effort to re-examine the subject of reparations – a subject which many another countries were besides curious in – it would thus call into question the uniqueness of its role, giving it the right to participate in talks 2 + 4, due to the issue of the border and solely due to it. In this sense, the limitation to this case was to the highest degree the Polish national interest, as any extension of the subject of talks would put the happy ending of the final legal designation of the Polish Western border at risk.
In October 2023, after 8 years of PiS rule, he lost the election. Donald Tusk became Prime Minister again, supported by the coalition, which again became 1 of the players in Europe and which advocates a fresh start in German-Polish relations. However, this does not close the issue of German work for crimes committed during planet War II and during the years of German occupation. Germany continues to face the challenge of considering redress. so it would be crucial to do something for the last surviving Polish victims in their late old age. Another area would be financial participation in the maintenance of memorial sites in the erstwhile German extermination camps in Poland, specified as Treblinka, as already happened in the case of Auschwitz. The next year is the 60th anniversary of 2 large initiatives in the past of German-Polish reconciliation, and these were: a memorandum of the east Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) published in 1965, which advocated designation of the border on Oder and Nysa and a letter of Polish Catholic bishops, published a fewer weeks later, containing celebrated words "we forgive and ask for forgiveness". For example, a generously supported task by Israeli artist Yvell Gabriel should be financed, with the intention of placing 3 stained glass windows called “the windows of forgiveness and peace” in the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Sand. Kominek was the initiator and mostly the author of this letter of bishops. Wrocław would be a good place to remind each another of these crucial events, and so besides the past of reconciliation that has lasted for respective decades, astounding and setting a good example in the face of terrible events from the past.
In bilateral relations, it would be crucial to resolve 1 of the last problems of the war, which is inactive the origin of disputes between Poland and Germany. This problem is the place of retention of German cultural goods, exported during the Second War, which, with the decision of Poland to the west, was in her possession. Common solutions should be adopted in a spirit of openness, although discussions on this subject in the 1990s have failed. There are inactive many Polish cultural goods robbed during the war which should return to Poland.
In cross-border cooperation, too, there is simply a wide scope of possibilities for a stronger interlocking of the full area with a network of links and making it a common surviving space over the Oder and Nysa.
However, the main challenges are those in the field of partnership for Europe and common safety within NATO. The reconstruction of Ukraine and its integration with the European institutions is simply a broad field for strategical cooperation. However, besides where Poland and Germany follow different ways, as in the field of atomic energy, strict agreement and appropriate communication will be necessary.
Strengthening NATO's east flank together with the Baltic States and Romania is an crucial task which Poland is prepared to undertake. Participation in and joint initiatives will be of large importance. For example, joint arms projects, close military cooperation, for example in the field of training, and the formation of any truly capable combative German-Polish military unit.
Translated by Tadeusz Zatorski
[1] See on this my memories: Markus Meckel, Zu vandeln die Zeiten, Leipzig 2020.
[2] The impulse to do so has come from the circular Table. The Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte (IFM) applied there on February 12, 1990 for “the admission of russian Jews in East Germany”. This request was a consequence to the appropriate call from the judaic Cultural Association and was unanimously accepted on the same day. (Dok Rd. Tisch 12. Hatzung, Vorlage 12/33). We read: “For weeks now we have heard of the threats of anti - judaic pogroms in various russian cities. Anti-Semitic and nationalist forces organized and threatened the lives of Jews. These events are not only a danger to human life, but they call into question Pierestroika's success in the russian Union."
[3] See Horst Teltschik’s note erstwhile Francois Mitterand, after visiting Mazowiecki in Paris, will stand on the border side of his Polish guest and support his position: “Kohl is clearly annoyed and disappointed. The limits of relationship become visible to me.” (Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage — Innenansichten der Einigung, Berlin 1991, p. 171.
[4]Documents of zur Deutschlandpolitik. Deutsche Einheit, München 1998, p. 1008.
[5] 7 November 1999 on the occasion of giving him the Lothar Kreyssig Prize at St John's Church in Magdeburg; in: Markus Meckel, Selbstbewusst in die Deutsche Einheit, Berlin 2001, pp. 237–244, and 30 November 2009 in connection with the awarding of the Viadrina Award at the University of Viadrina in Frankfurt am Oder.
[6] See on this subject the Western German Ambassador Johannes Bauch in: Die Einheit – Das Auswärtige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und der Zwei-plus-Vier-Prozess, Göttingen 2015, pp. 453–458.
[7] See Depositum Markus Meckel in Archiv der Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, folder 622; see besides Ibid. Depositum Ulrich AlbrechtNo. 9.
[8] Weidenfeld, Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheitp. 503. The French Presidency recommended that it be noted: "Four Powers declare that the nature of the German borders cannot be questioned following any external circumstances or events". “This is how the French Embassy 23.7.90, cf. Hans Misselwitz, handed it over, In Verantwortung für den Osten – Die Außenpolitik der letzten DDR-Regierung und ihre Rolle bei den „Zwei-plus-Vier“-Verhandlungen; in: Elke Bruck/ Peter M. Wagner (Hrsg.), Wege zum “2+4“-Vertrag – Die äußeren Aspecte der deutschen Einheit, p. 63.
[9] And that was the key point of this solution. Hans-Dietrich Genscher was besides aware of this, who insisted that Poland should agree to evidence that the Allied should not be understood as guaranteeing the border. In a letter dated 31 July 1990 Skubiszewski thanked me for my commitment to Polish postulates. At the same time, he again justified his position in Paris. See Depositum Markus Meckel, file 622.
[10] Correspondence in: Documents of zur Deutschlandpolitik. Deutsche Einheit, pp. 1339 n. and 1418–1421.
