German journalists “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” in an breathtaking political study uncover the ties of German politicians to Putinian government and show how the biggest mistake in German abroad policy occurred after 1945 (from matt. ed.).
We thank the Western Institute for sharing a part for publication. We encourage you to read the full book.
5. Illusion of Partnership
Policy towards Russia 1998–2013
Putin and Operation Schröder
[...] It will tie Schröder and Putin even more to condemn the war on Iraq. Schröder stands up against the war crusade of American president George W. Bush and declares a "German road". From the alleged danger of German participation in the U.S. military action, he makes the subject of his election run in summertime and autumn 2002, which surely importantly affects the triumph of the red-green coalition in the election. In early 2003, Schröder points out that Germany will not support the United Nations safety Council resolution on American military intervention in Iraq. "Don't number on Germany to vote for a resolution legitimizing the war," he declares in Goslar during the run to the Lower Saxony national parliament. After Al Qaeda's attacks on the US, Schröder declared "unlimited solidarity" with American allies, he pushed through the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan in his red-green coalition. Now he has good arguments to argue Bush's war with Iraq and his uniteraryism. The decision as specified is appropriate even if Schröder uses it for the election campaign. However, in 1 effort it means breaking up with the German abroad policy so far, abandoning the alliance with the United States, as well as with a partner in NATO – large Britain. Schröder thus embarks on a German separate road he supposedly wanted to avoid in relations with Russia.
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Join us!It is good that French president Jacques Chirac besides rejects the war of the United States, which in March attacks Iraq. Germany does not stand alone against Washington and London, but joins the French imagination of a Europe demarcation from the US. erstwhile Putin joins them, the German-French alliance gains importance, opposes the Washington-created "coalition of willing".
The 3 leaders are seeing trilateral consultations. And so on 11 April 2003 they benefit from the Conference of the Peterson dialog in the hometown of Putina. They then meet in August 2004 in Sochi, Russia, in mid-March 2005 in Paris and yet in July 2005 to celebrate the 750th anniversary of the erstwhile Königsberg (Kingewiec), now Russian Kaliningrad. Putin makes it clear that he does not intend to break up with George W. Bush, and the axis of the 3 partners is alternatively symbolic, it will not grow into a common safety policy of the countries involved.
However, Schröder does not only shift the basic principles of German abroad policy, but besides brings closer links with Putin, strengthened by the common position in abroad policy.
The Russian-German axle becomes problematic for another reason. fresh democracies in Central and east Europe do not want to follow the German-French tandem; in turn, they strengthen ties with Washington, which better represents their safety interests than Berlin. Schröder one more time ignores smaller countries in the east of Europe. The Chancellor does not care that in peculiar Poland and the Baltic states are mistrustful of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis. He believes – as he says in interviews – that partnership with Moscow does not take place at the expense of another countries.
The Chancellor shows no knowing for countries with completely different historical experiences with Russia and the russian Union.
In addition, Schröder, a customized of many German politicians, puts a sign of equality between Russia and the russian Union on the issue of historical responsibility. As a consequence of the 60th anniversary of the end of the war in May 2005, he says, for example, that during planet War II 20 million "Russians" died, not – citizens of the russian Union. The fact that according to planet War II estimates only cost Ukraine 8 million deaths, the Chancellor omits.
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Ukraine is the reason why close relations with Putin's government will one more time be tested. This is due to the Orange Revolution in late 2004, which erupts after the falsification of the November presidential election in favour of Moscow-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych. Supporters of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko are taking to the streets and demanding that the elections be repeated. In September, Yushchenko will be poisoned with a toxin that is not then produced in Ukraine, but is available, among others, in Russia; treatment in Vienna infirmary saves his life. During the investigation the main fishy manages to flee to Russia, which for Ukrainians is evidence of Moscow's guilt.
Schröder repeatedly calls Putin about the protests, publically justifies Russia's interests in Ukraine and stresses that the events in Ukraine do not in any event question the strategical partnership with Russia. According to Putin, Americans are behind the demonstrations against falsifying elections and pro-Western Yushchenka – as in 2003 behind the Rose Revolution in Georgia. In any case, the fear of “colour revolutions” grows in the Kremlin. Their actual causes should be sought in that demonstrators want a functioning regulation of law and a democratic society alternatively of a corrupt and paternalist oligarchic system. For this reason, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators are taking to the streets in Ukraine. Putin concludes that he should strangle all opposition movement in his own country. However, after Schröder's intervention, he agrees to repeat the elections in Ukraine. In December 2004, Yushchenko won the election.
At the heart of Schröder's policy towards Russia is the economy, especially energy policy.
The German energy economy is undergoing major reconstruction in these years. It is based on European and national efforts to liberalise energy markets, beginning with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The regulatory environment is becoming opaque as a consequence of liberalisation, and the pace of change is so advanced that even the experienced gas manager, then head of Ruhrgas Burckhard Bergmann, admits in his notes that there is “more questions than answers” and “we respond more than we act”[5]. It is known that the old planet of demarcation lines has gone into the past, but it is inactive unknown what will follow.
The answer, which increasingly comes at the time of Gerhard Schröder's office, is the bigger, the better. For the SPD-led national government, the goal of liberalisation is not to activate competence in the country, but, on the contrary, to make national champions more capable of competing in planet markets. So there's a wave of large mergers. In 2000, the 2 previously state-controlled mixed companies VIAG and VEBA formed Eon. The recently formed giant in the German electricity marketplace rapidly takes on the appetite of the German gas marketplace giant, Ruhrgas. Economist Martin Hellwig, at the time president of the independent monopoly committee, looking back, concludes that Eon's acquisition of Ruhrgas marks the beginning of a policy for which "security of supply" is spelled G-A-Z-P-R-O-M", and "the actions of those liable are characterized by a deficiency of respect for the applicable law"[6].
You can add a 3rd point: The merger of Eon and Ruhrgas illustrates Schröder's way of doing economical policy.
First, at the beginning of 2002, the national Anti-Monopoly Office banned acquisitions. The competitiveness guards argue that the electricity marketplace will face the threat of the duople of Eon and RWE, and the gas marketplace – the duople of Eon/Ruhrgas and Wingasu, the daughter company of Gazprom and Wintershall. Eon so asks the red-green national government to break anti-trust policy with a ministerial permit. The company argues that creating a German energy giant means greater bargaining power in negotiations with abroad suppliers and greater energy security. However, the independent monopoly committee is on the side of the national Antitrust Office. Experts say that energy safety can be improved alternatively by "accessing its own sources of supply, diversifying supply, beginning markets, retention capacity"[7]. The planned merger will not contribute to any of these points, on the contrary, preventing the desired competition. Since Schröder's economical policy has nothing to do with regulation, it puts the state's active industrial policy at stake, these concerns will simply be ignored. The opposition of the Greens and officials from the Ministry of Economy will besides be omitted. Economist Hellwig speaks of “the dedication of the “expert” policy to large companies.”
The SPD government has a serious problem. It is not just that the press, before the decision of anti-monopoly officials, reports on Schröder's promise of a political solution to high-ranking managers. The Minister of Economy Werner Müller, liable for the case, is facing a bias charge.
Footnotes:
[5] Bleidick. p. 441.
[6] Martin Hellwig, Gazprom, ein Sündenfall und die Folgen, FAZ, 29.04.2022.
[7] Quot: Hellwig, Gazprom.
