“Rzeczpospolita” reported that behind the arson of the OBI buying centre in Warsaw there was a spy who claimed to be a exile fleeing political persecution in Belarus. The day before the fire, he spilled an easy-fired liquid in the store and left a device there that triggered the fire remotely. The recording then hit Russian propaganda portals.
"The prosecutor announced to Stepan K. the charge of committing a abroad sabotage intelligence and a terrorist offence involving the deliberate triggering of the fire," said the Metropolitan Police.
This is 1 of the many events that we have encountered late in Poland and, according to experts, are not present in this case.
Three waves. After them, Russia changed its methods
— There is no uncertainty that we are faced with an absolutely fresh phenomenon, the sources of which date back to 2016, says Colonel Grzegorz Małecki, erstwhile head of the Intelligence Agency.
He adds that then American activities related to the regulation of conventional activity of peculiar services from Russia began. This was done through a wave of expulsions of Russian diplomats identified as intelligence officers.
— The second specified wave occurred in 2018. After the assassination of Sergei Skripal in British Salisbury, and the 3rd in 2022 after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. The 3rd had the largest scale, as it afraid a full of respective 100 diplomats from various Western countries, including Poland," added the expert.
He explains that under war conditions, the activity of peculiar services is expanding by nature, and since the Russians have mostly lost these conventional “cover positions”, or diplomatic missions, it was apparent that they would begin to invent fresh ways of acting.
— We are already proceeding about alleged disposable spies, i.e. those who do not really know that they are spies, due to the fact that they are hired for a one-losing mission, which in effect assumes the anticipation of their missteps, says Colonel Małecki.
“The second form we are observing is the sabotage-diversity activities utilizing people from the criminal world, that is to say: criminals. This is simply a fresh quality, which poses a very serious challenge for counterintelligence services utilized to deal with conventional forms, namely monitoring and developing diplomatic activities. And here you gotta leave the comfort region and look for fresh forms of recognition of people who are being utilized by Russian services – he emphasizes.
— We cannot say that these are spies, due to the fact that spying is about obtaining classified information, which is crucial for the safety of the state. On the another hand, here we are dealing with a situation in which Russian services attract people not for intelligence, but for sabotage-diversity activities," she notes.
“It is never so that you can catch everyone”
The erstwhile Deputy Head of Military Counterintelligence Colonel Maciej Matysiak draws attention to akin aspects and difficulties in preventing specified situations.
“Poland is now supporting Ukraine, so it is the direct mark of an attack on Russian services, which are taking increased action in this direction. On the another hand, the situation is unusual, that the recruitment of people for comparatively simple diversion activities, specified as arson, takes place online and does not require a staff worker. It is adequate that the liaison contact with a given service will send a distant order: "Burn the Maryvil Hall," he explains.
— Therefore, there is simply a greater problem with identifying specified persons. Even if we know any of the officers of abroad services operating on our territory, specified persons carrying out diversionary activities are outside of this haul, which is ad hoc for money. Therefore, the services gotta shift any of their efforts, specified as prevention, into this area of threats," he adds.
— Of course, it's never like we can catch everybody. The function of our services, on the another hand, is to make maximum difficulties and disclosures of the maximum number of specified situations, which will force abroad service to allocate more forces and resources and to start from the beginning of the typing, recruitment, etc. The point is to cut specified cooperation at the earliest possible stage," the expert points out.
"We may gotta hit more serious objects"
Colonel Grzegorz Małecki explains that this situation requires a fresh approach and poses a serious challenge for counterintelligence services.
“In this context, close cooperation with police services will be crucial, which have the best intelligence in the criminal environment, where counterintelligence is not recognized due to the fact that it does not function in this environment,” he says.
In turn, Colonel Maciej Matysiak points out the importance of cooperation with services of another countries.
— These groups inspired by Belarusian or Russian services are not only active in Poland, but besides in another countries. In addition, it can be coordinated by officers from facilities that are not in our country – he argues.
— I am referring to both recruiting and securing these groups, specified as transporting any funds needed to act or even making a transfer. Then jurisdiction lies on the side of this service, in which country it happens. Therefore, cooperation and exchange of information must take place in this area,” he adds.
Colonel Małecki besides explains that what is happening should be viewed in a broader context.
— Of course, specified actions are calculated in the short word on the sowing of confusion and anxiety. If Ukrainian citizens, for example, are recruited to do so, there is an aspect of strengthening hatred and anti-Ukrainian attitudes. However, there is besides an component of investigating any solutions for the future," he notes.
— specified situations besides aim to prepare infrastructure, methodology and people to act in the event of war operations. So that you gotta number on the fact that at any minute we may be dealing with hitting more serious objects. This is simply a very large challenge for you, and I do not mean only peculiar services, but the full safety apparatus of all formations – he points out.
Tomasz Pietrzyk / Wyborcza.pl Agency Suspects of espionage and diversions led by ABW to an arrest gathering in Wrocław. 28.05.2024
"This is the key to crisis prevention"
Experts agree that the most crucial in this context is to make appropriate prevention mechanisms.
— The aim is to make appropriate coordination mechanisms for close cooperation towards prevention, due to the fact that the most crucial aspect is to prevent crisis situations. This is simply a question of the safety of all critical infrastructure, as well as facilities which from the point of view of the safety of the state do not have use, but may pose a possible threat erstwhile attacked. So, for example, any factories, where there are chemicals that could endanger people's wellness and origin contamination of the environment – explains Colonel Grzegorz Małecki.
“This is where the question of the civilian protection and civilian protection strategy arises, that is, the non-military component of a state that is connected with safety but not specified a force. This is the key to crisis prevention. Training, gathering information, maintaining direct channels of communication with all objects that I may be possible targets for attacks. This is all a immense challenge for the state present – he argues.
Colonel Maciej Matysiak notes that any steps have been taken in this direction.
— I believe that the thought of universal defence training announced by the Prime Minister implies not only that, colloquially speaking, learning to fire a rifle, but to a large degree the education of competence that strengthens the state's resilience and safety system. From the ability to give first aid to the awareness of how to respond to certain threats, he explains.
“ Minister Kosiniak-Kamish said in many interviews that this is not just about defensive training, but besides about those that enter the area governed by the civilian Protection Act. So not only physical but besides cognitive, or strengthening opposition to misinformation, the discipline of critical thinking, etc., continues.
— The point is that if a citizen notices, for example, at a railway station something that disturbs him and could possibly be any kind of negative action, he will pass it on to the applicable services, and this will in turn become a origin for more detection and elimination of specified activities, the expert concludes.
