W the first part of the article, which is simply a polemic with the Onet text on the functioning of the ‘BOA’ We wrote, among others, about the deficiency of grounds for formulating a charge concerning the existence of alleged rebellion in the unit. We have besides examined the issue of staff shortages among the operators of the Central Counter-Terrorist Division of the Police.
We have besides pointed out that the reason for the escalation of the individual conflict, which has a negative impact on the reputation of “BOA” in the media, is the management kind of the unit grown by D. Zięba. In the second part of the text, we will first of all address the issue of the promotion of the commander. We're going to divided the issue of promotion into general, from his taking over the formation.
In addition, we will besides decision raised by Onet doubt concerning nepotism in the CPKP, the participation of operators of this unit in the M. Opieła polling spot, as well as the alleged disclosure by D. Zyęba "work secretaries" of the unit. We will besides describe what the unit's training infrastructure looks like.
Finally, we will list any affirmative changes that have taken place in the “BOA” during the period during which the current counter-terrorist superior was in command. The Onetu speakers completely missed this aspect of his word of office.
D. Zięba is the first officer in the past of Polish KT units to receive a nomination for general. Let us have no illusions about it – in our realities, this promotion would not be possible without receiving a affirmative advice from the Chief of Police, as well as appropriate political support.
However, are there grounds for supposing that the professional promotion of the current commander of the ‘BOA’ took place in isolation from substantive bases? In our opinion, no.
Did D. Zięba advance only thanks to “conexions”?
Promotion D. The colds actually occurred in an emergency mode, but active adequate the circumstantial circumstances that we described already on the blog. The current commander of the ‘BOA’ was so not taken in the unit as something peculiarly unusual.
Moreover, D. Zięba is an experienced stormman and 1 cannot deny him that he is acquainted with “work”. In the CPCP has served for many years, holding successively positions at various levels of command. It is besides clear from our cognition that before D. Zięba became the leader of KT's pawns, he had no relation with the Chief Commandant of the Police – J. Szymczyk.
However, due to the natural function now performed, he later developed a relation with him. We besides believe that the rumors about the joint cycling training of the current commander of the ‘BOA’ and the Chief Chief are exaggerated. Why? For a simple reason. D. Zięba is 1 of the “activists” and J. Szymczyk just rides his bike
One more thing is besides worth highlighting. erstwhile KGB – Z. Maj intended to completely destruct the CPCP. D. Zięba disagreed with these plans and fought to keep the unit running. He was helped by the comparatively fast resignation of Z. Maj, who was replaced by J. Szymczyk. He was not a supporter of the "BOA" solution.
The promotion of D. Zięba cannot be considered in isolation from its ongoing command over the individual, improvement of the counter-terrorism system.
The Polish Army has far more generals than the Police
You must know, that in the environment of elder police officers, the conviction that the number of jobs existing in the general formation is besides low compared to the Polish Army. They have arguments in support of this argument.
In ‘green’ There are about a 100 generals., while in "blue" little than 30. The number of both formations is similar. The police so search to rise the number of top-ranking commanders serving in its ranks. 1 component of the KT strategy improvement was so to let the commander of the ‘BOA’ to advance to the general level.
Some high-ranking police officers besides indicate that according to the Police Act, the ‘BOA’ superior is besides the superior of all KT divisions in Poland. This would mean that the equivalent of the commander of the ‘BOA’ is the commander of the peculiar Forces Component in the Polish Army. This, however, serves as a general.
In addition, according to the current Police structure, the CPKP ‘BOA’ is placed in its hierarchy at a akin level to the Provincial Commands. In the case of the commanders of these organizational units, the anticipation of promotion to the general degree is allowed.
In addition, there is inactive a phenomenon in the Polish safety sector in the form of attaching besides much attention to the level of officer/soldier.
‘You're just a colonel? And I am not talking to you...”
Excessive "pumping" of grades translates into the arrogant behaviour of any officers. In the past of the CPKP “BOA” there have already been stories in which any generals from the military were reluctant to talk to the commander of this police unit because...
They found out that he had a rank in the army corresponding “only” to the rank of Colonel. So they will not talk to specified a man. A akin situation besides happened to our colleague, the peculiar Forces Sub-Chief during 1 of the trainings in the US. He decided to have a chat with a high-ranking ally army officer over a meal.
The American saw nothing incorrect with that. But the Polish officers sitting next to the table later commented on the fellow officer’s behaviour: “It must have fallen over. Is he just talking to their officer?”
Approach to safety grades
This phenomenon is more common in the military than in the service. In the second case, the degrees are much little assigned to the posts. Therefore, a junior officer may take a much higher position in the service than in the army. past has even known cases in which junior officers became leaders of the full formation
In the military, however, specified a individual can usually number on being the company commander. And we mostly like the flexibility in the service. We besides believe that akin rules should be slow implemented in the military. Especially in the context of specialist jobs.
In our opinion, there is no point in creating a glass ceiling for the most talented people. If a person's candidacy defends himself in substance, why should we not entrust him with a certain function simply due to the fact that he has a low degree?
Moreover, we believe that a situation in which the leadership of the formation has a combination of “young wolves” and “old eaters” could bring good results. The first are characterised by a fresh look, ambition and motivation. Others, on the another hand, could bring experience and cognition into this puzzle, sometimes reducing the “hot heads” of younger colleagues.
If the command of the unit was taken over by the guest to the level of, for example, the major, we would say, "No problem." Apparently, the peasant is very capable and has gained designation from his superiors.
However, this would require a parallel redevelopment of the full strategy of granting degrees and promotions in the military and services. The criteria of competence, imagination and effectiveness in action would gotta play a key role. Only this would give hope for the "air" of a stiff and rigid way of thinking.
The alternate is to centre policies on the award of promotions to the degree between different formations.
What is the optimal number of generals?
However, an excessive increase in the number of generals does not translate into an increase in the ability to execute effectively the tasks of the formation. It besides obscures decision-making, reduced work for their consequences, and unnecessary expansion of bureaucracy.
In the structure of over-ranking officers, making regular decisions thus turns into complex procedures. It besides promotes the growth of unnecessary levels of command to prolong the circulation of "flowers" and consequently the full decision-making process.
There is besides an unjustified increase in public spending in specified formations. These include advanced salaries of generals, or the request to keep their auxiliary staff.
The Americans had thus already in 2017 warned that besides many generals service in their armed forces. The proportion of top-ranking officers to another soldiers was There. then 1:1,400. In turn now in the US Army serves 291 generals, which gives a origin of about 1:1,600 soldiers.
With a WP of about 110 1000 personnel, the ratio of the number of generals to soldiers is about 1:1,170. In the Police it is about 1: 3,350. On the another hand, during the Second planet War, the same ratio in the U.S. Army was 1:6,000 soldiers. And it worked somehow.
Therefore, the number of generals in the military and in the service must be minimised. The problem is, however, that it is hard to find precisely how many specified officers are needed in relation to the size of the full formation. In our opinion, general degrees should, in principle, be reserved for persons in charge of crucial forces.
The creation of specified a post should besides entail a strategical challenge, which the general should be able to address.
Therefore, general measures should not be granted in situations where they sanction excessive growth of staff structures. A akin mistake is the creation of fresh command, which is not essential at strategical level. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the highest degrees are given to the heads of analytical or legal cells.
‘Express” promotions in service
It can so be discussed whether or not the commander of the ‘BOA’ should service as a general. It is hard to say unanimously whether the minimization of the number by the highest rank of officers should halt at the Police level of twenty, 30 or 50 general posts.
However, military experience teaches that everything above the second should already be considered an excess of commanders leading to an increase in in efficiency in the ministry. It remains to be hoped that raising the rank of commander of the ‘BOA’ was due to the real needs of the Police. We think that it is incorrect to make organizational solutions for a peculiar person.
However, there is no uncertainty that D. Zięba assumed the authority over the CPCP as a consequence of designation for his competence, alternatively than conexion. We will besides tell you any “insider” information: during the period of work on the improvement of the KT strategy in Poland, the current commander of “BOA” was opposed to giving this general rank to the superior.
He feared that this symbolic step could, to a large extent, divert attention from what was at the heart of the substance and prevent organization change. In retrospect, therefore, it must be admitted that D. Zieby's concerns are justified.
Especially since the police themselves have supplied Onet with arguments in the case of the commander of the ‘BOA’, which rise reasonable doubts, extraordinary rate of promotion per step. It falls within the incorrect practice of granting ‘express’ promotions to higher degrees of service to officers who hold advanced positions. due to the fact that it would "fall out."
But it's worth giving D back. It is cold that, unlike at least any another officers, he did not have a “back” to become a general. However, this decision was taken by the Chief of Police in the name of a systemic increase in the rank of commanders of individual organizational units.
The unit is not a private farm.
It is besides actual that the current commander of the CPKP ‘BOA’ has known Czesław Lange for many years, as both gentlemen have been engaged in competitive cycling. The issue of inviting an older colleague to a “hospitable” shooting in the unit should so be clarified in terms of disciplinary responsibility.
We besides confirm Onetu's reports concerning the service of Brother D. Zieby in “BOA”. However, this situation needs to be complemented. Both gentlemen went to the unit many years ago. The younger brother D. Zieby passed the recruitment and then the basic course. This was during a period where the current commander was inactive very low in the formation hierarchy.
For this reason, he could not in any way “help” his brother’s career. Both gentlemen have never served together in the same department. A possible conflict of interest only occurred erstwhile D. Zięba entered the strict management of the ‘BOA’. Then he became his brother's superior.
We believe that in specified situations siblings should be forced to make the following decision. Either D. Zięba refuses to accept the promotion, or accepts it, but this involves transferring his brother to another unit – e.g. to the Warsaw KT division from the Police Headquarters.
Participation of ‘BOA’ operators in the M. Crude
In addition, we agree with the reservations mentioned in the article on the participation of the CPCP operators of the ‘BOA’ in the M. Opieła electoral spot. In addition, we consider the social consequence to this situation to be positive, which led to the fact that this associate had to resign as president of the Committee on peculiar Services.
However, this case should not be considered in isolation from the realities in which high-ranking officers of Polish services and troops operate. And they look like that if D. Zięba had no good relation with M. This fuel is the probability that the Police listed in the Black Hawks' place would decrease.
Unfortunately, the strategy solutions operating in Poland do not give hope of improving the situation of excessive dependence of leaders and heads of service on politicians. This is supported by organization solutions, specified as the close budgetary dependence of individual formations on the goodwill of politicians, or the deficiency of cadency.
The current temperature of political disputes, in which the measurement of a "good" solution is political sympathy, is conducive to allowing individual institutions to be stubborn. All of this makes it possible for high-ranking commanders to enjoy either the sympathy of individual members of the power camp, or... to prove ineffective in managing the formation or even lose their position.
Situations like the 1 involving counter-terrorists in the M-election spot. Oils should not be accepted. However, they are a manifestation of a strategy in which the satisfaction of the needs of a given service is influenced by not rational calculation but good political climate. So let us besides remember that regardless of organization sympathy, we should support the commanders who have just fallen into a “distress”.
Use of ‘BOA’ in women's strike
As regards the usage of the CPCP ‘BOA’ during the alleged women's strike, We wrote already comprehensively in another article. We believe that the message that has entered public opinion has been importantly distorted. So here we will confine ourselves to just a fewer tiny remarks.
Firstly, the disciplinary work for the conduct of BOA officers during the protest would possibly endanger the commander of the sub-operation, in which counter-terrorists served. As the commander of the unit, Mr Zięba could not refuse to comply with the order in the form of approval of the CPCP's own referral to act.
The usage of KT subdivisions to safe demonstrations is not illegal. We agree that "BOA" should not be utilized for specified activities. The predecessors of D. Zieby besides tried to convince the superiors to this point of view. Sometimes it worked and sometimes it didn't.
It is besides actual that according to the information contained in Onetu's article, pulling people out of the crowd was practiced by KT units before the European Football Championships held in Poland. Cooperation with prevention troops was not prepared likewise before the alleged women's strike.
Revealing the secrets of work by D. Zięba and bad organization of accommodation
For us, it is absurd for D. Zięba to “sell” secrets of the work “BOA”. Referring to the fact that the ballistic shield does not defend the legs, the CPCP commander did not say anything that a criminal without a serious defect of sight would not be able to observe himself
The betrayal of delicate details of counter-terrorists' actions would be, for example, if D. Zięba told about the tactics of checking rooms utilizing the said shield or moving around the corridor.
The costume referred to in the Onetu article (presumed to be an IDAS) and intended to supply a “protection” of the legs, according to the interlocutors, does not in fact defend against 7.62 caliber bullet. The protection includes at most the operation of 9mm caliber missiles and possible shrapnels (this can be checked on authoritative sites of manufacturers of this kind of equipment, so we uncover nothing secret :)).
In our opinion, Onetu’s callers bend the facts somewhat to prove the preconceived thesis. They know that the vast majority of readers will not be able to verify the information they provide. The communicative of sleeping “BOA” in tents is true, but also... let us be serious.
We're going to charge the unit commander with breaking the tube and storming into a two-star hotel, not a three-star hotel? Life... We besides remind you that we are talking about operators of a peculiar unit – they truly don't request a comfortable “tush” to sleep
Credits of D. Zięby during the command period ‘BOA’
The onetu article is one-sided in our opinion, among another things, that interlocutors omit affirmative activities of D. Zięba. And these no uncertainty exist. First of all, it has successfully completed the transformation of AT sections and sub-divisions in the SPKP and BOA KGP in the central sub-division of CPKP ‘BOA’.
In addition, during the word of office of the current commander of KT verticals, a peculiar addition (up to PLN 450) was converted into a counter-terrorism supplement, the value of which is 500 PLN, and a maximum of PLN 1500 PLN. This is simply a origin that should translate into the ability to get fresh candidates and retentions of existing operators in the unit.
D. The cold has besides introduced circumstantial provisions for use, including Special usage of weapons. On the advantages of this solution in the case of peculiar units you can Listen in 1 of our podcast episodes.
Another solution implemented in fresh years in the ‘BOA’ was the comprehensive instruction for the usage of helicopters by KT sub-units. It is most likely the only paper of this kind introduced in the service so far. any peculiar Forces formations besides benefit from the cognition there.
It is besides not as bad in the ‘BOA’ with the training infrastructure as could consequence from the Onetu text.
BOA training infrastructure
In fresh times, the instruction relating to shooting training was created in the unit. On this basis, unification activities are conducted with officers of all SCPs. True, COVID pandemic has negatively affected the strength of the training, but this is not a problem only present in the CPCP.
“BOA” is indeed inactive complaining about the deficiency of a range. But it's hard to blame D for that. The cold, due to the fact that it is simply a problem present in the unit for many years. And more importantly, it is now being resolved. There is simply a full fresh shooting scope under construction.
A Time We besides explained that having even the most advanced tactical town adapted to shooting from various calibers of weapons would not solve all infrastructure needs of the "BOA". appropriate training requires training on different modes of transport, and having their own mock-ups is unrealistic.
It is besides costly to meet the needs of the unit in terms of the “models” of buses, metro cars or aircraft on which the CPCP operators would exercise. At the time, for example, the ‘BOA’ had the chance to take over the Boeing, which was landed by the Captain for free. A crow without a chassis. However, it turned out that the transport from Okęcie airport itself would cost more than PLN 1 million.
So much for the fresh plane...
The expanding quality of KT vertical equipment
However, it should be acknowledged that the overall quality of equipment for KT sub-divisions has steadily increased over fresh years.
Only late were purchased in the “BOA” including modular bulletproof vests. They are far from ideal, but are also step towards personalization of equipment under KT operators. In addition, vehicles “Tur”, assault rifles, fresh generation Glock guns, device guns with sound suppressor, and low profile guns were purchased.
The article besides cites the subject “sleeping” of the resurs of ballistic discs. As commander, D. Zięba is of course liable for the operation of the unit. But to do so, he has subordinates who specialize in the respective fields of service so that he does not gotta walk around the warehouse alone and check whether the equipment needs to be replaced/repaired.
It is besides worth noting that the KGB logistics department is liable for the acquisition of equipment. And in the past, there have been cases where the people who served there did not agenda tenders until after the period of usage of the equipment ended. This happened despite the “pain” of logistics colleagues by the “BOA” management.
So what is D. Zięba's commander and should he be cancelled? Just justice for yourself. However, in our view, the criticism contained in the Onetu article is very unilateral. On the systemic level, we hope that the “BOA”-wide media storm will be a lesson to all commanders as to how not to solve conflicts in the unit.
