European Commission plan to decision distant from imports of Russian energy natural materials

On 6 May 2025, the EC announced a roadmap in which it proposed action to lead to a complete departure of the EU from imports of energy natural materials from Russia. According to the plan, EU countries would end buying oil, gas and uranium from this country in a coordinated, safe and gradual manner by the end of 2027. This would be due, among others, to:

• the prohibition on the conclusion of place contracts and fresh Russian gas contracts from the end of 2025 and the import of this natural material under long-term contracts from the end of 2027;
• the ban on the extension of contracts for Russian uranium raw, enriched and atomic materials and the signing of fresh ones, and the implementation of trade instruments limiting the profitability of imports from Russia;
• finalising the departure from Russian oil imports by the countries that inactive bring it (Slovakia and Hungary) by the end of 2027 and expanding the effectiveness of sanctions.

The process should be supported by greater transparency and availability of data, detailed plans by associate States to decision distant from imports of energy natural materials from Russia, increase intra-EU self-sufficiency (e.g. by expanding production of biomethane and medical radioisotopes), better usage of existing infrastructure and instruments (such as AggregateEU) and cooperation with the European Commission and associate States (see Annex more).

The plan, although announced with a fewer months hold (and 3 years after the publication of the flagship strategy of the erstwhile Commission – REPowerEU, to respond to Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine), is an crucial political signal confirming the EU's determination to end cooperation and dependence on Russia in the strategical natural materials sector. It besides approximates the accomplishment of 1 of the key objectives of the Polish Presidency in the EU Council. At the same time, its actual effects will depend, firstly, on concrete legislative proposals allowing the implementation of the EC's ideas (to be presented in June), and secondly, on their acceptance and the way associate States implement them.

Comment

• The roadmap shows the EC's determination to full diverge from the dependence of EU countries on energy resources from Russia (see alsoUnfinished derussification. Residues of EU energy links to Russia) – in spite of the changing global situation and the emerging discussions about the possible increase in imports after the war. It is the same crucial political signal, especially in the case of the proposed measures to halt Russian gas (including LNG) completely by means of circumstantial binding restrictions. This kind of action, although de facto considered since the beginning of the invasion, has been hard to agree on in all EU countries, resulting in a deficiency of sanctions on Russian gas imported into the common market. It presently flows to a twelve EU countries (both pipelines and liquefied form) and its volume, although much lower than before aggression, increased by around 20% in 2024 compared to the erstwhile year (see IP/10/27).EU gas marketplace in 2025: Russian natural material, fresh US policy and strategical uncertainty). It is besides crucial to propose measures to reduce Russia's function in the EU atomic energy sector not yet sanctioned. In the case of oil, however, we are dealing primarily with the demands of sealing previously agreed restrictions.
• In order to measure the feasibility of the EC Plan, it is essential to know the detailed legal arrangements to be published in June. In addition, they will should be accepted (and possibly may be amended) by both the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. In particular, it is unclear whether the proposed instruments would actually let a complete departure from imports of Russian natural materials, including gas, and how they would limit the re-export or swap options of 3rd countries specified as Azerbaijan or Turkey. A considerable challenge may be the alleged request to break/disclosure existing contracts (e.g. for Slovakia, the contract is valid until 2034 and Hungary until 2036). Finally, it is not known whether it will be possible to adopt the solutions planned by the Commission despite the opposition of individual countries (which has already been announced by Budapest and Bratislava in consequence to the road map) and thus the request for unanimity is not to be adopted. There are comments suggesting that the EC will effort to circumvent it, based on the EU's competence in the interior marketplace and energy, which, according to any interpretations, may make it hard for companies to trust on force majeure for existing long-term contracts.
• The implementation of the plan and the determination of EU countries to full diverge from natural materials from Russia will be crucial to its effectiveness. These are the individual capitals, not the European Commission, who will be liable for ending this dependency. It is unclear whether delays in implementation or the deficiency of implementation of the road map recommendations will have consequences. It will so be crucial to be able, willing and supportive to overcome the various challenges (such as the supply of atomic fuel to Slovakia or Hungary, which do not take any another than polling diversification measures in this area). As a result, the plan, future government and accompanying actions will be applicable to everything that will encourage and respond to peculiarly skeptical countries. This seems to be the case with the proposal to gradually become independent and fit its shape, pace and instruments to the needs of each country. At the same time, however, the plan does not respond to all identified risks: it may entail an increase in import costs, and so prices (especially in the gas market, in the case of inland countries, which will hit, among another things, the interests of both Bratislava and Budapest), entail increased bureaucracy and the request for cooperation with the EC (through further national plans), it is besides sober erstwhile it comes to investments in fresh gas capacity (although point-pointed in the transport infrastructure needed in Central and South-Eastern Europe, but besides in support of expanding the production of gases another than biomethane and biogas).
• The challenge for the effectiveness of the proposed action can be a dynamic global situation, including the future of the war in Ukraine and a suggested chance to resume US cooperation with Russia in the energy field. The ensuing discussions on the possible acquisition of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline or the control of Ukrainian buses by US investors rise questions among marketplace participants not so much about the end of imports from Russia, but alternatively about the anticipation and principles of expanding supply in the future. This is fueled by reports of talks by Washington and Moscow about ways to resume Russian gas exports to the EU. An additional problem may besides be the deficiency of an expected EU political agreement with the US on larger deliveries of US LNG, although European companies are signing further import contracts for this natural material (see IP/10/06).NextDecade strikes LNG supply deal with TotalEnergies for 1.5 million tons). At the same time, the EC plan, if well-designed, can besides service as an instrument to encourage associate States to take action to diversify and decision distant from Russian natural materials. It can besides strengthen intra-EU unity and, despite changes in Washington's policy, hinder, at least at political or formal level, possible efforts to reactivate the energy cooperation between associate States and Russia, for example, the launch of the surviving Nord Stream 2 thread.

ANNEX

As part of the roadmap announced on 6 May 2025 to end imports of Russian energy natural materials by EU countries The European Commission has proposed 9 actions.

The first 4 concern Russian gas imports. In his case, the EC proposes:

1. increase transparency of data on supplies from Russia to the Union marketplace by requiring associate States to disclose part of the information on Russian gas contracts, but besides data from customs offices and another institutions;
2. introduce mandatory national exit plans from gas imports from Russia. The first should be submitted by associate States before the end of 2025. They are to diagnose the current state of dependence and its contractual conditions, present the timetable and stages of departure from Russian natural material and circumstantial options and diversification possibilities. Cooperation with the EC, within the framework of the Gas Coordination Group, providing advisory services on safety of gas supply matters, and regional, is crucial in preparing plans and concrete actions;
3. implement legal instruments to end imports from Russia. The EC plans to ban Russian gas imports:

• no later than the end of 2025 on the basis of place contracts and any fresh contracts;
• no later than the end of 2027, on the basis of existing long-term contracts for natural material supplied by pipelines and liquefied form (LNG);

Whereas the Commission assumes that, in view of the import restrictions already achieved and the instruments and alternatives developed, and due to the planned gradual further departure and diversification, these prohibitions will only have a insignificant impact on prices and safety of supply;

4. continue/increase support for diversification of imports. The EC proposes to proceed utilizing AggregateEU's request aggregation instrument to diversify gas supply, but besides to advance trade in low- and zero-emission gases specified as biomethane. He besides wants to increase biogas and biomethane production. In addition, the EC aims to minimise problems in the usage of existing regional infrastructure in Central and east Europe through cooperation between the countries of the region and members of the Energy Community within the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity Group (CESEC; coordinating regional actions to facilitate the construction and operation of energy cross-border infrastructure in the region).

In terms of EU dependence on Russia in atomic fuel cycle The EC suggests:

5. support for gradual departure from imports of Russian uranium, enriched uranium and another atomic materials. Whereas the Commission is to propose commercial instruments which should contribute to reducing the cost-effectiveness of imports from Russia and prohibit the extension of existing and the conclusion of fresh contracts for Russian uranium, enriched uranium or another atomic materials, co-signed by the Euratom Supply Agency;
6. introduce a diversification work and national exit plans from Russia. Whereas the EC is to propose circumstantial objectives for 5 associate States dependent on imports from Russia utilizing VVER reactors (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary), allowing for a gradual departure from these supplies and providing alternatives to them - including by launching European fuel production capable of supplying VVER reactors;
7. The creation of a European Radioisotope Valley: expanding its own production in order to reduce import dependency (mainly from Russia) and safe the supply of medical radioisotopes needed by EU countries.

Finally, the EC besides wants to end EU dependence on imports of Russian oil by:

8. obliging 2 inactive importing associate States (Slovakia and Hungary) to submit detailed national plans mapping the current level of dependency and indicating the way of departure from it by the end of 2027. They are intended to be analogous to, or may even be part of, plans to abandon gas imports;
9. increase the effectiveness of sanctions and reduce their circumvention.