For more than 3 decades the Polish state has been reformed in the logic of “the end of history”. It was dominated by the belief that the major geopolitical threats were in the past and that the country's safety would be a lasting consequence of anchoring in western political, economical and military structures. In this perspective, the main task of the state was to improve the procedures, regulations and control mechanisms, not to make the capacity to act in conditions of crisis, conflict or war.
This model – mostly imported from the West – corresponded to the realities of the late 20th century. It ensured stableness of systemic transformation, limited the arbitraryity of power and fostered integration into the European Union. Today, however, it is more and more evident that it does not adhere to the conditions of a planet in which war, geopolitical pressure, technological competition and conflict over resources have again become permanent elements of the global order.
A state designed in the logic of “the end of history” perfect procedures, but neglects the ability to act in situations of crisis and war. In the planet of return, geopolitics and conflicts, specified a model ceases to supply real security.
Regulated State and failure of ability to act
A crucial part of today's legislation, especially in the area of administration, safety and defence, was created in the 1990s and early 21st century. The Act on Government Administration, civilian Service, Public Procurement, individual Data Protection, Confidential Information Protection or Access to Public Information reflected the priorities of the time: transparency, formal legality and minimisation of the hazard of fraud.
In time, however, the strategy developed besides much. Subsequent amendments, detailed implementation of the EU directives and a increasing number of sectoral regulations led to overregulation and bureaucracy. Paradoxically, mechanisms designed in the name of freedom and transparency began to restrict the real freedom of public institutions and economical operators.
This has resulted in permanent regulatory volatility, frequently referred to as "legislative poles", and has besides been associated with continuous structural changes in administration. Under specified conditions, it is hard to build sustainable organization memory, decision-making work and a culture of innovation. With the comparatively low salaries of public administration workers and the advanced level of formalisation of procedures, the risk-taking readiness has disappeared, and cover and formal avoidance have become a rational strategy of endurance in the state apparatus of various levels – both civilian and military service.
State of law and... powerlessness
The experience of fresh years has further shown that the formal safeguards of the regulation of law are not equivalent to its resilience. As it turned out, an extended strategy of procedures and institutions can be comparatively easy circumvented if there is adequate political determination and instruments of personnel and financial pressure. It is not only the Polish specificity, the akin erosion of the strategy of fuses guaranteeing democracy, the 3 divisions of power and freedom of speech we see in the United States.
Regulations created in the name of transparency and legalism have evolved over time into a strategy that limits our ability. Overregulation and instability have weakened organization memory, decision-making and risk-taking. A country based on the "end of history" model no longer protects liberal standards and weakens its ability to act in emergency situations.
When violent perpetuity is linked to a strategy of promotions and material benefits for the political base, and the redistributive function of the state is utilized for political agitation (e.g. a tool for rewarding or "punishing" local authorities or NGOs), the foundations of democracy are denied. Citizens or politicians who effort to do so are opposed – e.g. by appeals against decisions or control, stay the only shield ineffective and amazingly helpless against the logic of "defense force" – democratic tools and institutions. This is the basic paradox of the "end of history" model: not only does it not effectively defend liberal-democratic standards, it still, in fact, paralyzes the state's ability to act in emergency situations. Paradoxically, the long-term adaptation of the administration to the action "consistent with the quality" results in mimicry and a state without the properties. Citizens do not feel the care of specified a country, do not take the state as something of value, their own and (as public opinion polls show) are mostly unwilling to defend it.
The war in Ukraine clearly confirmed the return of the war as a tool of global policy. The absence of a fundamental change in the functioning of the administration, the arms manufacture and the defence strategy should be considered strategical negligence. The state is inactive responding to fresh threats in the logic of the past era.
Return of war as a strategical fact
The full-scale war in Ukraine yet undermined the assumptions on which the existing reasoning on safety was based. The communicative not only did not end, but returned in the most violent form, in which political goals are pursued by military force and border states operate under permanent pressure.
Despite 4 years of war behind the east border, the functioning of the Polish administration and order strategy for the army has not changed substantially. We lack, for example, greater flexibility and procedural efficiency to carry out key investments in a direct mode of threat and urgent priorities of the state in place of the erstwhile bureaucratic logic based on tenders and tenders (this solution may be transparent but not efficient even in peacetime). In rigid procedures we are besides incapable to enter the sovereign criterion – while the choice of circumstantial equipment or software with military usage or dual-use it should take this into account and thus have a certain margin of recognition.
Also, the state-owned arms manufacture has not been full converted to pre-war mode and its production capacity remains limited. An example is both the insufficient capacity in the production of the Krab cannonhaubic as well as the unresolved problem of national production of 155 mm caliber ammunition and serious problems in securing supply chains of key natural materials, intermediates or strategically crucial components. The deficiencies in the national production of 155 mm ammunition and a larger caliber, despite the ongoing war in Ukraine for 4 years, are evidence of the permanent inability of the Polish state-owned weaponry to independently fill the ammunition warehouses of the Polish army within the foreseeable time limit.
It is equally crucial to see with considerable hold the importance of unmanned and anti-drone systems. And despite the fact that Ukrainian experience clearly indicates their key function in the modern battlefield, right from the beginning of the conflict behind our east border.
Sovereignty as Dependency Management Capacity
Under these conditions, it is essential to revise the concept of sovereignty itself. As Dr. Jan Szomburg aptly notes1 "for a country of average and front-end sovereignty is not a declaration of self-sufficiency, but a declaration of ability to act under conditions of pressure, uncertainty and conflict of interest. Its real strength is determined not by the deficiency of dependence on external partners, but by the ability to consciously form and reconfigure them."
Such sovereignty implies close cooperation within European political, economical and military networks – especially with Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the Baltic Sea countries – while at the same time realistically looking at the variability of US policies. Alliances stay an essential component of security, but they cannot replace their own strategical capacity and, above all, their autonomous ability to carry out defence operations.
Defence manufacture and client logic of purchasing
One of the key areas for change is the policy of arms purchases. In this regard, for decades there has been a precedence for abroad purchases, which has systematically set Poland in its subjective function as a client dependent on external supplies, services, certification and logistics. In the long term, this brings not only crucial financial outflows outside Poland, but besides a serious simplification in the ability to respond autonomously in crisis situations. ‘Customer’, which selects the goods needed from a differentiated offer, should not be confused with the function of ‘customer’, which must buy from 1 monopolist.
The policy of purchasing based on arms import perpetuates the function of the state as a client alternatively than an entity capable of autonomous operation. Without shifting the investment burden towards national production capacity, defence spending will not translate into sustainable strategical resilience.
What is more, we have so far conducted these costly investments in the modernisation of the army by heavy borrowing on terms akin to commercial terms. It's an highly negative model. It must be all the more surprising, therefore, that any political groups are criticised for the fresh European support instruments that would give access not only to "cheaper money", but could besides strengthen national and European defence industries, including the private sector. Without a fundamental return to the construction of home and European production capacities, defence spending will mostly stay a transfer of funds abroad, not an investment in real state resilience. Government procurement should make the improvement of the Polish private defence industry.
Technological sovereignty and digital dependence
The technological dimension of sovereignty is peculiarly crucial today. A country that does not control its digital infrastructure, data, standards and cyber-operational capabilities is exposed to paralysis without the usage of classical military or economical means. In this sense cyberspace becomes a fresh battlefield for sovereignty.
Defensive planning makes no sense erstwhile it fails to keep up with changes in the strategical environment and the experience of real war. The papers then become an administrative ritual, not a tool for building the defence capabilities of the state.
Poland, despite increasing expertise, remains mostly a user of solutions provided by global corporations from the USA and China. State's digital strategies are increasingly complementary to the sales policies of large technology suppliers, and the digital coercion towards citizens strengthens marketplace position bigtechs. In this logic, the State resigns as admin for the function of the user, resulting in the failure of real control over critical systems. This is 1 of the most crucial threats to our safety.
Dependence on U.S. weapons would not be dangerous if the Polish side had access to origin codes and had the chance to recompile systems to direct this (so-called) weapon. The terms of existing contracts with suppliers should be radically changed and the Polonisation of technologies obtained from abroad purchases should be implemented. It is even worth taking the hazard of losing all kinds of warranty of the maker if it is at stake to regain the Polish jurisdiction over the military capabilities that the equipment was to give, or if we would thus gain independency in the usage of equipment and weapons.
It is essential to return to the concept of a military-civil technology competence centre, which was created more than 10 years ago in the MON, but whose work has been discontinued... We request specified a centre, so that the Polish military regains jurisdiction over arms and has the ability to measure and analyse the acquired software. These days it's better not to buy something we don't have jurisdiction over. This means the request to revise both the contracts already concluded and to otherwise formulate conditions in fresh contracts. This must be a full fresh approach. We're an crucial marketplace that should be understood by most hardware dealers. It's better not to have weapons that we can't usage without the supplier's permission, and which, although they look good on defilades, creates a dangerous illusion of military power. This dangerous illusion of the power of our army should not be confused with real military capabilities.
Cryptology and cybersecurity are besides a key component of technological sovereignty. Without its own competence in this area, the modernisation of the armed forces loses its meaning due to the fact that alternatively of safety it generates fresh vulnerability – from dependence on abroad ciphers to deficiency of jurisdiction over key systems2.
Defense Planning as a Ritual
A separate problem is an anachronistic defence planning system. The existing strategy papers do not take full account of geopolitical changes or experiences of full-scale war in Ukraine. The deficiency of ability to update them and to agree between key centres of power undermines the full planning hierarchy – from doctrines to lower-level operational plans.
As a result, planning becomes an administrative ritual alternatively than a tool for real state preparation for defence. The papers are formally valid but do not translate into operational capacity or investment decisions.
Ability to asymmetrical reaction and full defense
In the face of demographic constraints and the advantage of possible opponents of defence preparation, they must be based on the improvement of asymmetric capacity and the widespread engagement of the public.
Why must we be prepared to respond asymmetrically? due to the fact that both the historical experience and the current war effort of Russia in Ukraine are examples of the ruthlessness and brutality of a possible aggressor. Since our most likely opponent has no inhibitions (including against the civilian population), we must presume that in the event of a direct confrontation he will want to kill as many of our citizens as possible and destruct as much of our country's infrastructure as possible. nevertheless socially shocking, it is better to face this fact in a time of peace than to experience it at the time of trial. Our safety depends on whether we will be able to inflict serious, massive losses on the territory of the opponent, not only on the effective defence of our borders.
However, in order for an asymmetrical consequence to be possible at all, we must have well-recognized “sensitive points” of the possible opponent, as well as adequate material resources for war. We see that Russia does not care about the failure of its citizens. What would be a severe blow to Western civilized societies would not should be an unrepentant failure to Russia. On the another hand, we can see how nervously the Putin administration reacts to the customs attacks of Ukraine in the "pearl in the crown" (ships, fighters, etc.) whose value is calculated in hundreds of millions of dollars and hard to hide from the public (even with full media control). In a reasonably tight government of sanctions, specified a failure is besides not easy for Russia to rebuild ( western production components). Similarly, Ukraine's severe consequence was the attacks on oil processing plants that cut Russia off for weeks or months from earning. In an asymmetric response, cleverness and the usage of inexpensive but mass-produced weapon elements are very frequently crucial (on site, in the country attacked).
Such a function in the long-range strategy could be played by mass drone solutions, on land, water and air, e.g. drones comparable in class to the Shahed models presently utilized in Ukraine. Drones of this class could assemble and even produce (in large numbers) Polish companies. Any drone could be a missile, a rocket, a fighter or a torpedo. If military orders are directed to the Polish private industry, we can begin to make our army at the rate of respective 100 1000 drones per year.
Under conditions of demographic constraints and military pressure, the state's resilience must be based on asymmetric capacity and the general public's commitment. Without systemic civilian defence and long-term defence education, safety remains only an illusion.
On the another hand, Polish space manufacture could successfully make (based on government orders) the production of Polish low-orbit constellations. We request an autonomous and comparatively inexpensive strategy of communication and depiction independent of American Starlins.
In order to make the ability to respond asymmetrically, it is besides essential to make native capabilities to destruct enemy satellites from the Earth (the key to disintegrating satellite-controlled drone attacks) and to build capacity to respond adequately to Russian GPS interference. Radio-electronic warfare should be a priority. In this respect, many years of delays should be broken. The method capabilities already exist, it is adequate to multiply and improve them, creating the anticipation of disrupting the Russian global satellite navigation strategy GLONAS in Körywiec or Belarus.
No little crucial deterrent to aggression against Poland will be the advanced level of civilian preparations for war. civilian defence, military training and defence education should have a systemic and long-term character alternatively than a casual character. An example is the implementation of the Government civilian Protection Programme. The tens of years of civilian protection negligence will not, of course, be resolved in 2 years, but it is hoped that civilian protection will be importantly strengthened to address this objective.
Without the reconstruction of defence culture and the ability to mobilise civilian resources, it is hard to talk of the real resilience of the state in the conditions of the escalation of the hybrid war, and even more so, of the long-term conflict. The primary task of the authorities and political forces of all options is to build social resilience and appropriate patriotic motivation. Polish citizens must be immune to misinformation and manipulation from the East.
Today Poland faces a choice between a further drift in the logic of the state "end of history" and a deep institutional, legal and intellectual reconstruction. It is not about rejecting alliances, the marketplace or legal standards, but about subjecting them to the overarching nonsubjective of endurance and action in a planet of permanent uncertainty. Without specified a change, sovereignty will stay an empty declaration and safety – an costly illusion.
1 See Jan Szomburg, New model of Polish sovereignty.
2 See K. Bondaryk for more information, How to rebuild the digital sovereignty of Poland?, ‘Pomeranian Thinkletter’ No 2(21)/2025.
