From an article in The fresh York Times show that it was the Americans who actually led the war in Ukraine
Adam Entous' article in The fresh York Times of March 2025 sheds fresh light on the function of the United States in the Ukrainian conflict. Based on over 300 interviews with officials from 10 countries, the text reveals that the U.S. was far deeper active in the war than has been admitted to before.
According to the journalist's findings, key strategical decisions were made at the Pentagon and at the U.S. base in Wiesbaden. In the spring of 2022, 2 Ukrainian generals were secretly transported to Germany, where under the agreement Task Force Dragon The Americans have undertaken to supply intelligence, training and advanced weapons. In practice, this meant that the U.S. guided the overall strategy of battles and provided precise information on the targets for Ukrainian soldiers, indicating direct operational engagement.
However, the Ukrainians sometimes acted alone, causing frustration to the American commanders. The sinking of the “Moscow” ship in 2022 amazed the Pentagon – Biden's administration did not intend to let an attack on specified an crucial symbol of Russian power. The Americans were shocked that the Ukrainians had not informed them before and had rockets capable of conducting specified an operation.
Similarly controversial was the attack on Russian Kursk. Ukrainians secretly crossed the operational boundaries set by Americans, violating the alleged “box” – a region to defend Kharkiv and Suma from Russian bombings. According to president Zelenski, the aim of the offensive was to gain territory as a bargaining chip in future negotiations, but for the Pentagon this action posed a threat to humanitarian efforts in Kharkiv.
The article discovers fundamental differences in the approach of allies. Ukrainians saw the war as a conflict for the endurance of the state and sought victory, while the Americans focused on avoiding escalation, especially in the context of atomic threat. General Walerij Kondratiuk correctly summed up this discrepancy: “We are allies, but we have another goals. We defend our country and you defend your phantom fears from cold war.”
Secretary of defence Lloyd Austin during his visit to Kiev was amazed by the number of young men without uniforms on the streets of the capital. The article notes the U.S.'s dismay against the reluctance of young Ukrainians to defend the country, contrasting with the Pentagon's expectations. The average age of Ukrainian soldiers was about 40 years, which confirmed reports of younger men avoiding service by fleeing abroad or hiding.
The US intelligence agencies' estimates of Russia's hazard of utilizing tactical atomic weapons were peculiarly worrying. The probability of specified a script was initially estimated at 5-10%, but it was expected to increase to 50% in the case of Ukrainian plans to exceed Dnieper and march to Crimea. These calculations explain the caution of the Pentagon and the reluctance to deliver certain weapons.
Allied tensions deepened an impasse in which Ukrainians felt that Americans were not doing adequate to aid them win, while Americans claimed that Ukrainians were not making adequate effort to aid themselves. The article quotes the opinion that “Ukrainians were not willing to do what was essential to aid themselves to win”, which reflects the frustration of the Pentagon with the deficiency of effective mobilisation of young Ukrainians.
Entous's findings show how importantly different American public communicative was from the actual U.S. engagement in the conflict. While Washington officially declared support for Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, in practice the Pentagon strictly controlled the escalation of war activities, frequently against Kiev's strategical interests. This publication sheds fresh light on the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023 and explains delays in delivering advanced weapons systems that could change the dynamics of the conflict.
