Access to the sea is crucial for Ukraine, both for political and economical reasons. Despite the ongoing war with Russia, Kiev is working on a concept of developing its own naval forces, which will let it to safe its interests in the Black Sea. It is not only systems based on land launchers and drones, but besides larger ships: corvettes and frigates and submarines. Only large water vessels are able to guarantee the safety of shipping, especially where grain and another goods are exported.
After the declaration of independency (24 August 1991) and the dissolution of the russian Union in late 1991 Ukraine received part of the units and infrastructure previously owned by the Black Sea Fleet of the ZSRS. A large part of the ships were already obsolete at the time, and their maintenance exceeded Ukraine's financial capacity, so many of them were withdrawn from service. The main bases of the Ukrainian fleet were located on the Crimean Peninsula: therefore, after its occupation in 2014 by alleged green men (Russian soldiers operating without discrimination and nationality markings), most units were seized by the Russians.
Most of the activities in the Russian-Ukrainian War after 2014 were carried out on land: sea aquenes (Black Sea and Azov Sea) remained on the margins. In view of the limited resources, including financial resources, Ukraine has at that time focused on the improvement of land-based rocket systems (thus the Neptune strategy was created) and tiny vessels – artillery and patrol boats, capable of operating in a coastal region or even larger rivers specified as Dniepr.
Faced a full-scale war that began on February 24, 2022small units failed. Most of them did not go into action at all: they were seized by Russian forces entering port cities specified as Berdiansk. The only larger ship remaining in the Ukrainian fleet – the frigate "Hetman Sahajdaczny" – was sunk in the shipyard in Mikołajów by the Ukrainians themselves in March 2022 in fear of being taken over by the Russians (which was a decision to grow up, as the city was not occupied by the Russian army; the ship was then being upgraded, and so did not present a combat value).
The Neptune strategy worked much better: in April 2022 launched by 1 of the rocket launchers hit and sunk the Russian cruiser "Moscow", the flagship unit of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In fear of the usage of further missiles (both Ukrainian structures and Westernly supplied missiles maneuvering Storm Shadow and SCAPP) and in time besides to the implementation of further submarines by Ukraine, Russian units were forced to reduce their activity initially in the western part and over time throughout the Black Sea. These fears proved to be right: respective units, including 2 large landing ships and a trawler, were sunk, and many others (including 2 frigates: “Admiral Essen” and “Admiral Makarov”, a Kilo class submarine “Rost over the Don” and 1 Bujan-M class rocket corvette; all capable of firing Kalibr’s maneuvering missiles) were severely damaged at sea or in ports. The Russian fleet was forced to retreat its units from the main base in Sevastopol, Crimea, to fresh Russian.
Large units at price
Despite the success of the marine unmanneds, developments in the Black Sea show that neither they nor the tiny units that Ukraine had previously built are able to execute all the tasks that could safe economical interests on this watershed. Moreover, most of the losses suffered by the Russian Black Sea Fleet were caused with maneuvering and anti-ship missiles.
The problem with the export of grain by sea is now becoming an increasingly serious problem for Kiev: rocket attacks on ports and commercial units have caused a real halt to export. The problem is besides the activity of Russian seamanns and mines.
That is why Ukraine needs the reconstruction of naval forces – not only systems based on land launchers and drones, but besides larger ships: corvettes and frigates and submarines. Only large water units – specified as frigates, akin parameters to those built in Poland within the framework the “Meaner” programme – are able to guarantee the safety of shipping in the Black Sea, especially where grain and another goods are exported. This applies both to defence against attacks by watercraft (including drones), as well as anti-aircraft and rocket defense. In the long term, it is besides a substance of time to defend against underwater threats, as Russia has extended submarine forces. any of these tasks may besides be carried out by smaller units, including corvettes, provided that adequate equipment is provided.
The process of changes in the Ukrainian Navy has already begun – in Turkey, the first 2 units ordered in 2020 by Ukraine ("Hetman Ivan Mazepa" and "Hetman Ivan Wyhowski") were launched, and in 2024 a contract was signed for the construction of 2 more. These are Class Ada corvettes, which have both artillery weapons and anti-aircraft rocket launchers and torpedoes, as well as the ability to conduct operations (including the ZOP – combating submarines) utilizing a chopper or unmanned aircraft. All units are to be built by 2030, although their entry into service and agenda of work will surely depend on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian War.
Chance besides for Polish industry
No little crucial problem for Ukraine is – and will besides be after the end of the active phase of the war – the mines of the sea, mass-used by Russia. The United Kingdom has transferred to Ukraine 2 Sandown class trawlers withdrawn from service: in view of ongoing war activities and the current Montreaux Convention, both units stay in the United Kingdom. Regardless, Ukraine will request more modern ships of this class: this creates opportunities besides for the Polish shipbuilding industry, which could in future offer the Ukrainian Navy the destroyers of the Kormoran II class mines (three units are already in service in the Polish Navy, 3 more during construction).
In the long term, after the war with Russia ended, Ukraine's naval forces will be waiting for further investments, including in units specified as frigates or submarines. This will consequence from both the circumstances of the Black Sea situation and possible allied commitments – especially if Ukraine becomes a NATO member. While the unmanned component will proceed to gain importance, it will require investment in large units in the interests of Kiev in the Black Sea and beyond.

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