Yesterday, November 11th, Ukrainian troops entered Chersonia. Entering cities, Ukrainian columns were greeted by crowds of happy residents who spent the last 8 months under Russian occupation. The Russians retreated for Dniepr. But this is not the end of the war.
War on Destruction
It's crucial to realize why the Russians lost under Cherson. They lost not in direct combat, but for logistical reasons. This is not an allegation towards the Ukrainians, or an effort to diminish the success of the ZSU, but an crucial observation, which is crucial in analysing further developments in Ukraine.
We request to make this clear. The Khersonhead was badly communicated with another Russian positions.
There were only 3 permanent crossings on Dniepra: 2 bridges in Kherson (roads and railways) and a bridge on the dam in Nowa Kachówka. Additionally, the Khersonhead itself was divided by the Ingulec River.
In July, Ukrainians began methodically attacking permanent crossings on the Dniepodra and on the Ingulc. As a result, supplying the bridgehead in Khersonszczyń became a logistical nightmare for the Russians. After respective attacks, the bridges in Kherson were decommissioned and Russian logistics became dependent on the bridge in Nowa Kachowka and temporary crossings created by Russian engineers – pontoon bridges and ferries.
As early as the end of July, I pointed out that logistical problems would force the Russians to make tough decisions – either to retreat for Dniepr or to make another effort to attack the Nicolas and to reject the Ukrainians from Dnieper adequate so that crossings for the sake of the Ukrainian artillery – in peculiar the HIMARS, which became a nuisance to Russian logistics.
In the area around 20 August, the Russians were actually trying to widen the front and again approach the Nicholas and the Krzywy Horn, but – after first successes – their attack collapsed in a fewer days.
Since the end of August, the Russians have no more major successes in Chersonish. Ukrainian positions were besides strong, and Russian logistics problems began to make Ukrainians methodically start pushing Russians towards Dnieper.
So, as we can see, the Ukrainians won under Cherson not in a direct fight, but alternatively by dispelling Russian logistics. The Ukrainians had akin success here to that of Kiev, where they besides won by destroying Russian logistics.
Southern direction secured
The Russians' retreat for Dniepr means complete safety of the confederate front. As long as the Russians held the Kherson bay, it was not possible to exclude further Russian attempts to approach the Corner Curve, the Santas, or further under Odessa. There's no specified threat now.
After the Russians withdraw, the confederate front is likely to stabilize on the Dnieper line. Dniepr is simply a wide and hard river to push. Personally, I do not anticipate Ukrainians or Russians to effort to cross the river – apart from tiny groups of diversions.
Unfortunately, this is most likely not the end of hard times for the people of Kherson. Cherson, who was already robbed by the Russians during the business and retreat, will now become a front city. In the following weeks you can anticipate intense Russian attacks on Kherson – utilizing artillery and drones. Gen. Surowikin (leader of the Russian forces in Ukraine) will do anything to guarantee that average life does not return to the city.
Effective retreat?
As early as mid-October, Gen. Surowikin, who was then appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian invasive forces, claimed that the situation in Chersonians was hard and did not exclude "hard decisions". At the turn of October and November, reports began to appear suggesting that the Russians actually made this "hard decision" – Russian military equipment was to be withdrawn for Dniepr, and Cherson was to be systematically looted by Russian soldiers.
Wednesday, November 9th, the Russians publically announced a retreat from Kherson. On Russian television, a recording was shown from the gathering of Defence Minister Sergei Szojgu and Gen. Sorowikin. Surowikin argued that further supply of the Kherson's cape is impossible and that Russian troops should be evacuated. The Shoigu agreed.
The next day, November 10, Ukrainians began rallying deep into the front lines, attempting to break up the retreating Russian forces. However, the ZSU was incapable to capture the Russian ariergard (backguard). The next villages where the Ukrainians entered were already free of Russian troops, and the Ukrainians had to focus only on miners – the Russians left quite a few mines behind, but most frequently located in a alternatively sloppy way.
Recordings and photos from liberated areas propose that the Russians conducted a retreat in a very organized way, leaving behind very tiny amounts of equipment. The situation with people is akin – the overwhelming majority of Russian soldiers were able to evacuate to the another side of Dnieper. Although there are reports of Russians left on the "Ukrainian side", there is small evidence of specified situations that this must be treated as a curiosity alternatively than a wider phenomenon.
At this point, it seems that erstwhile Russian tv reported the evacuation of the Kherson's cape on 9 November, the vast majority of Russian troops and equipment were already on the "safe shore".
I am consciously writing “for this moment” due to the fact that on November 10 the Ukrainians conducted a massive blast of crossings in the area of Nowa Kachowka. possibly they managed to inflict any greater losses on the Russians retreating there, but at this point we do not know this – Ukrainian troops have not yet reached the Nowoka dam.
Gen. Surowikin (left) and Minister of the Shojgu (right)Political Disaster
Even if the evacuation of the Khersonhead ended – from a military position – with the success of the Russians, the political implications of the decision to retreat from Kherson are hard to overestimate.
Just 30 September, Putin signed a decree to include 4 Ukrainian circuits (including the Kherson circuit) into Russia. As Russian propaganda billboards preached, Russia was to stay in Kherson "forever". The annexation act was besides accompanied by speculation that – in order to defend Chersonia – Putin may choose to usage atomic weapons.
Eventually, however, atomic threats were not realised and the Russians simply left Cherson. This causes immense political problems, and that is at many levels.
Above all, Ukraine has shown that thanks to supplies of western equipment it is able to reflect lost territory. True, already in September, under Kharkiv, the Ukrainians have recovered crucial areas of land, but the triumph under Cherson is simply a better proof of the effectiveness of Western supplies. The U.S. HIMARS launchers played a key function in the spread of Russian logistics under Cherson, thanks to which Ukrainians were able to destruct crossings on Dnieper.
Ukrainian success under Cherson so encourages western partners to keep the current arms supply scale for Kiev – or even to increase them! This occurs at a crucial minute erstwhile in the West you could feel any fatigue of war, and any Western analysts began lobbying for forcing Ukrainians to negociate with Russia.
The retreat from Chersonia besides leads to major problems in Russia itself, radicalizing the alleged war party, which claims that Russia does not exploit its full possible in Ukraine and allows itself to be humiliated again and again. From the position of the war party, the retreat from Chersonia is simply a betrayal of Russia, and the responsibility lies with the chief command and Putin.
One of the HIMARS transferred to the Ukrainian ArmyAfter Cherson
Before retreating from the Kherson's cape, the Russians had about 20,000 soldiers there. Most of these soldiers will now most likely hit Zaporozhye, where there is simply a wide, steppe front that is hard to place fully. These soldiers will be destined to erect field fortifications and prepare for the Ukrainian strike – for respective months there has been talk of Ukrainian offensively on Melitopol or Mariupol.
Probably any part of the soldiers who have fought under Cherson so far will be assigned to operations close Wuhledar, close Donetsk, where the Russians are trying to widen the Crimea-Donbas land corridor. safety of this area is crucial for Russian logistics. After removing the Crimean bridge from use, Crimea is mainly supplied with land transport – however, it is only a temporary solution that generates advanced costs.
Several months ago, the Russians captured a railway line connecting Crimea to Russian Tagangrog (a town located under Rostov). However, on any sections, the front line only runs 10 km from the railway line, preventing regular train running. For respective weeks the Russians have been trying to push the Ukrainians back to the railway line (around Wuhledar), nevertheless – so far – without major successes.
The withdrawal of units from Chersonia is likely to besides facilitate Russian training of late mobilized recruits. The Russians complained that most of the individuals on which the mobilization improvement could be conducted are active in dense fighting under Cherson or in Donbasa.
However, it should be remembered that the end of the Khersonic cape releases not only large Russian forces, but besides Ukrainian forces. It is estimated that up to 30-35 1000 ZSU soldiers were active in this episode so far. This is simply a very large group that can be successfully used, for example, to force Russians in Zaporozh.
Current situation in Ukraine, source: militaryland.netUntil spring
I personally believe that Gen. Surowikin will focus mainly on stabilising the current front line – at the same time trying to safe the Crimea-Taganrog railway line. Russian forces now seem incapable to carry out larger offensive operations in Ukraine. This will surely proceed until the end of the year, possibly even until spring. At this moment, mobilization does not produce the results that the Kremlin hoped for – although additional recruits were patched up most of the holes on the fronts*, mobilization did not translate into expanding the offensive capabilities of the Russian army.
*mobilization was never a solution to the problems that affected Russians under Cherson, due to the fact that here Russia did not endure from besides fewer soldiers, and due to logistical problems
Intensification of Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure facilities, in peculiar on power plants, is simply a certainty. It is about depriving Ukrainians of electricity in winter and expanding losses to Ukrainian economy. Russian command, in peculiar Gen. Surowikin, seems to believe that systematic demolition of the Ukrainian economy will force the West to search a peaceful solution.
According to estimates of the global Monetary Fund, Ukraine will request around $3-4 billion per period in 2023 to finance the state's activities. In total, this amounts to about $36-48 billion. The Ukrainian economy is expected to shrink by 35% in 2022 and inflation is expected to scope 40% at the end of the year.
In 2022. Ukraine managed to get assurances from western partners with financial support of $35 billion* – but only any of these announcements were implemented. The EU's aid is the weakest. The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen, called on the EU to increase its financial assistance in October, pointing out that, despite its promises to contribute EUR 11 billion, the EU yet only donated EUR 3 billion.
In consequence to Yellen's calls, Ursula von der Leyen promised that in 2023 EU financial assistance would amount to around EUR 18 billion, but it is hard to believe these announcements erstwhile the EU inactive did not implement half of the aid plan for 2022.
* Financial assistance only – so excluding arms and humanitarian aid
From left: Janet Yellen and Ursula von der LeyenCrack
Despite failing and failing to meet its strategical objectives, The Russians seem determined to proceed the invasion of Ukraine. Personally, I don't believe that after the defeat at Cherson, there will be any reflection in the Kremlin and Putin decides to ask for peace. The Russians seem to anticipate that yet systematically destroying the Ukrainian economy and generating expanding abroad backing needs on the side of Kiev, they will force the West to search a peaceful solution that will let Russia to meet at least part of its targets in Ukraine.
However, specified an approach may prove deceptive. Russian economy besides suffers losses – related to Western sanctions. Moreover, prolonged war can lead to a boil in Russia itself. In addition, the global situation is not conducive to Russia either. Let's just look at last week's U.S. election.
The U.S. legislature elections, which were to end with a certain Republican triumph and pave Trump's return to the White House, proved to be a failure. Republicans – despite expanding the state of possession in the legislature – will not get the majority there. They may be able to gain the majority in the home of Representatives – to shed tears, but this is not yet established. A weak Republican score is besides accompanied by a increasing rivalry between Trump and Ron DeSantis, politician of Florida, who may want to run in the upcoming presidential election.
I have not so far proved to be Russian energy blackmail – this year's winter in Europe promises to be record-warm, and China does not retreat from zero covid policy (and thus have little energy request than usual).
Since February everything has gone incorrect with the Russians – both in Ukrainian battlefields and internationally.
