- 3-4.VII – 24th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Astana
The 24th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SZO) summit took place on 3-4 July in Astana. This global organization brings together China, Russia, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and from 2024 besides Belarus. A series of meetings between the leaders of the associate States and the observer countries, specified as Turkey, took place in the framework of the SCHOW Summit. Members cooperate mainly in combating terrorism, separatistism or extremism.
The Russian Federation sees in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation an effective mechanics of cooperation with China in key areas from Moscow's perspective, specified as Central Asia.
Russia tried to give the organization a much more "anti-Western" character, especially after 2022. For Beijing, however, it was most crucial to intensify economical cooperation between members. The organization brings together members with frequently different, or even opposite, interests (although India and Pakistan) and besides lacks a unified political direction, so the ShoW is not an effective "anti-Western" block.
The final declaration itself is not a novelty in the policy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but simply a confirmation of the current direction. The declaration calls for respect for global law, non-interference in the interior affairs of members or peaceful coexistence.
For Russia, the key component of the Astana summit was to show that Western attempts to isolate the FR head were ineffective. This was to be served by many bilateral meetings during the event, including the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation itself analysed Mr Wozniak in depth in the text Quo vadis, Shanghai Cooperation Organization?, published on the website of the Institute of fresh Europe.
- 13.VII – Russia and its game in the Balkans
In July this year the U.S. Department of State reportedthat Russia seeks to fuel cultural tensions in the Balkans and consequently to destabilise the region. The main points of inflammation are (i) Kosovo, especially in the context of the northern part inhabited by the Serbian number and (ii) the Republic of Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The problem of national tensions translates into a safety situation in the region. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is worth noting that its multi-national character has a crucial impact on the course of the state's abroad policy.
Many years of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik stressed the anti-Western and pro-Russian nature of his policy. He stood in opposition to the pro-western aspirations of any of the Bosnian authorities, which has been a candidate for the European Union since 2016.
At the same time, the Russian Federation itself is active in the Balkans, an example of which is cooperation with Serbia. In addition to the centuries-old traditions of the Moscow alliance with Belgrade, Russian companies are presently active in Serbia, headed by Gazprom. It is the energy sphere that is 1 of the main fields of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Belgrade.
At the same time, Belgrade itself has a multi-vector policy that balances between Brussels, Beijing and Moscow. In any of the statements of the current president of Serbia, it is actual that there are accents to the position Kosovo or denying Serbian war crimes, but Serbia's abroad policy is not strictly anti-Western. It is worth noting here that Belgrade was ready to sale artillery ammunition, including Spain, the Czech Republic and the United States, which was intended to hit Ukraine. Belgrade has had the position of a candidate for the European Union since 2012, and Serbian society has been burning up the issue of consent for Western consortia to extract lithium from Serbian deposits in fresh weeks.
Nevertheless, Russia's function in Serbian abroad policy is important, but mainly for interior and propaganda reasons. "The Slavic fraternity" is simply a card in the politics of the ruling organization that underlines Serbia's willingness to keep good relations with Russia and the most crucial players in planet politics. Without clear determination of his position.
Russian influences in the Western Balkans are not as strong as Moscow would have wanted, but this region has been at the centre of its optics for centuries. Although the main military or diplomatic efforts of the Russian Federation are concentrated around Ukraine, Russia does not stay passive in the Balkans. For example, stop In late July of this year, 2 agents of the Russian abroad Intelligence Service in Slovenia, or close personnel relations of W. Putin and A. Vucica.
The political presence of the Russian Federation in the Balkans is simply a challenge for the collective west. In particular, for the European Union, which has been making an increased effort for many years towards the integration of the countries of the region. The complex ethnic-national mosaic in the Balkans remains a major challenge for Western diplomacy. This is peculiarly the case in the context of Russian actions aimed at escalating cultural tensions and, consequently, destabilising the region.
- 17.VII – OSCE , The decolonization of Russia is necessary”
Between 29 June and 3 July, a summit of the Organisation for safety and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was held in Bucharest. The invitations were not received by politicians from Russia or Belarus, and in the declaration ending the summit – in addition to calls for the end of the war in Ukraine – were besides called for the decolonization of the Russian Federation.
In consequence to the deficiency of invitation, shortly after the summit ended Russia issued a communication, in which it informed about the suspension of the OSCE membership. It is worth noting that the Russian Federation has not participated in the last 4 OSCE summits since 2022.
In Chapter 47 ,Security and geopolitical challenges in the OSCE region: 10 years of armed aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine" We read that,Whereas the systemic policy of human rights and peoples' rights in the Russian Federation is deemed to be colonial and in violation of the basic declarations of the United Nations and, on the basis of European Parliament Resolution 2024/2579 of 29 February 2024 and the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2540/2024 of 17 April 2024, considers that the decolonization of the Russian Federation is an essential condition for lasting peace;It’s okay. ”
The point is simply a novum in politics towards Russia, as the OSCE is 1 of the first organizations to recognise the Russian Federation as a state of an openly colonial character. She recognized the non-Russian population in Russia as the victim of Moscow's rusification and colonization policy. The OSCE besides stressed that the start of the decolonization of the Russian Federation will be a key component for peace in Europe.
At the same time, the specified message of the request for decolonisation raises a number of questions and threats.
First, how to realize the process of decolonization itself. Is there talk about the efforts to complete or partial independency of republics from the authorities in Moscow, like the trials of Tatarstan and Chechnya in the early 1990s? Or about the request to build a fresh national strategy in the Russian Federation, which will be a confederation or give greater prerogatives to the Russian state?
Secondly, the possible decolonization process implies a simplification in the region's dependence on Moscow. This can lead to a revival of national tensions, especially in the North Caucasus. A simplification in the function of Moscow as «supervisor» of the region can lead to the beginning of attempts to review the borders between republics, which could become the start of civilian war.
Thirdly, the nationality origin should not be overestimated for possible decolonisation. It remains highly crucial to ask whether local elites are inclined to possibly separate from Moscow. For any regions, including Ingushetia or Dagestan, national subsidies from the Kremlin have a crucial impact on the economy and overall economical situation. Nor should all protests, with a smaller or greater nationality, be interpreted as trying to separate from Moscow (e.g. protests in Bashkortostan in January this year). The importance of local elites, who benefit financially and politically from cooperation with the Kremlin, is crucial.
Fourth, how much the local population is ready for possible attempts to separate from the Federation and what is the popularity of the thought of separation. It is worth noting that in the west there are organizations calling for the decolonization of Russia, e.g.,Forum of Free Russia NationsIt’s okay. ” However, they are alternatively an effort to build an academic discourse on the form of the Russian Federation and have a deeper translation into the situation within Russia.
Nor should it be forgotten that the current political strategy of the Russian Federation with a strict centralist character allows the Kremlin to influence regional policy in depth. The governors are completely subordinate to Moscow and, in case of doubt, are recalled.
The full text of the OSCE Summit Declaration in Bucharest is available under this link.
- 20.VII – Protests in Krasnodar
July 20th this year. local media reported protests by the inhabitants of Krasnodar over the deficiency of water and electricity supply. The streets were allegedly from 200 to 300 inhabitants of the city, and the protest itself had a peaceful course. The problems with access to electricity affect not only residents of the capital of Krasnodarsk country, but besides the full confederate Russian Federation. The main reason for power outages are allegedly weather conditions. In July, a heat wave of more than 40 degrees Celsius swept across Russia’s confederate regions.
High temperatures are not the only origin of energy problems for residents of the Krasnodar Region. On 16 July, there was a temporary halt at the Rostov atomic power plant due to false reports of a threat to the safety of the power plant.
Ukrainian attacks on critical infrastructure besides impose on Russian energy problems. Most of them mark refineries and another oil processing centres, but besides endanger the infrastructure liable for electricity production and transmission.
The problems of Russian energy infrastructure in the south of the country may shortly increase, which will undoubtedly translate into social sentiment in this part of the Federation. This is simply a possible challenge for the national authorities to which the public imposes an work to supply electricity or water, especially in the context of the largest cities in the region specified as Krasnodar or Rostov.
- 24.VII – Slovakia, Hungary and Łukoil: problems of Budapest and Bratislava with fuel
In July this year, Łukoil, 1 of the largest oil producers and another fuels in the Russian Federation, was added to the list of companies subject to Ukrainian sanctions. The inclusion of Łukoil on this list importantly affected the fuel situation in Central and east Europe. The main customers of the Russian consortium are Hungary and Slovakia, which further complicated the already hard relations between Bratislava, Budapest and Kiev.
According to the data cited by,Bloomberg“ Russian oil imports into Hungary are about 2 million barrels, or 1⁄3 of the country’s demand. For Slovakia, however, it is 2.5 million barrels, which cover 45% of the Slovak request for this natural material.
The blocking of imports of Russian oil products by Ukraine represents a major challenge for the economies of Hungary and Slovakia. The repercussions of this decision are seen in already tense relations between Hungary and Ukraine as well as between Bratislava and Kiev.
The Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico in an interview with his Ukrainian counterpart stated that,Slovakia cannot be a hostage to Ukrainian-Russian relations”.
In turn, the Hungarian authorities decided to talk to the Ukrainian side during the European Commission's mediation. At the same time, Hungarian abroad Minister Peter Szijjarto statedthat Hungary will block all aid packages for Ukraine until the situation with the transit of Russian fuel to Hungary is resolved.
It is worth noting that the ban on Russian fuel imports to EU countries has been in force since December 2022, but it is bypassing part of the «Best» pipeline. At the request of Slovakia and Hungary, the EU sanctions covering Russian energy companies contain a licence to export oil to Hungary and Slovakia.
The situation around Łukoil indicates the short-sighted policy of Slovakia and Hungary. Countries have not decided for almost 2 years to further diversify their oil import sources for their refineries. They did not do so even in the face of further sanctions packages and the fact that the «Best» pipeline runs through the territory of Ukraine, which is at war with Russia, or its owner.
At the same time, the Łukoil case as in the lens focuses the problems of relations in the Hungarian-Slovakia-Ukraine triangle. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Budapest has led an ambivalent or frequently cool policy towards Kiev. An example of this was e.g. Hungarian veto attempts within the EU to integrate Ukraine with EU structures, as well as to block any aid packages for Kiev. Nevertheless, 2024 brought any warming in relations on the Hungarian-Ukraine line, the symbol of which was W. Orban's visit to Kiev in July 2024.
In the case of Slovakia, the change of courses towards Ukraine occurred after the change of power erstwhile Robert Fica's SMER organization won the election in September 2023. Current government led by Fici repeatedly criticized erstwhile Slovak authorities for providing Ukraine with key elements of the Slovak army, specified as KUB anti-aircraft defence kits or MiG-29 fighter jets.
The addition of Łukoil to the list of companies covered by Ukrainian sanctions and associated repercussions in relations between countries of the region pose a serious challenge for EU diplomacy. It must balance the views of associate States' authorities and the needs of Kiev, which, in the course of the ongoing war and possible reconstruction of the state, will only increase.
- 26.VII – Arrests at the Russian Ministry of Defence
26 July this year, Russian Federation Investigative Committee reported on the detention of erstwhile Deputy Minister of MONu in the vertical logistics. Dimitrij Błkugow held office from 2008 to 2022.
The reason for the detention is allegations of large-scale corruption and financial embezzlement. Bulgakov was liable for tendering for armies in which contracts included low quality products purchased at overpriced costs. The procedure afraid food rations among others.
The case of Bulgakov is not isolated. Since the beginning of this year, the FR law enforcement authorities have detained a number of generals and ministers, mainly on charges of receiving bribes and of acting in corruption groups. Russian portal ,Jellyfish“ reported stopping: (i) Timura Ivanova, erstwhile Deputy Defence Minister from 2016 to 2024, (ii) Yuri Kuzniecova, Head of the General Management Board of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, (iii) Wadima Shamarina, erstwhile Deputy Chief of General Staff, and (iv) Ivana PopowaFormer Commander 58. Army.
The charges were made by the highest ranking members of the Russian army. At the same time, a circumstantial symbol of discontent with the situation in the Russian army was the cancellation of the position of head of the MON Sergei Szojgu in May 2024. The Szojgu itself was not formally accused of corruption, but the aforementioned members of the Russian army were frequently closely associated with the erstwhile Minister of Defence. This gives emergence to suspicions that S. Szojgu may have known about many years of corruption.
Without doubt, the scale of financial embezzlement within the Russian army has a severe impact on the combat capabilities and non-war FR forces. Corruption allegedly touched all sphere of the Russian army, including rations for soldiers. They were to get poultry and pork alternatively of contracted more costly beef.
- 31.VII – Hungary facilitates the Russian and Belarusian stay in the European Union
In July this year, Budapest simplified the procedure to legalise the stay and work of Russians and Belarusians in Hungary. Citizens of the Russian Federation and Belarus do not request to undergo an extended process of legalising security-related residence. The rules for granting rights to work and live in Hungary to families applying for a residence licence were besides simplified.
One reason for specified a decision of Budapest is the expansion of the atomic power plant in Hungary by the Russian company Rosatom. In 2014, an agreement was signed between the Russian atomic consortium and the government in Budapest on the Russian participation in the expansion of the power plant and the financing of the project. After 24 February 2022, despite the tense relation between the European Union and Russia, Hungary reiterated the decision to participate in the planned extension of EJ Paks.
Budapest's decision met with criticism of European politicians who considered Hungary's actions to be striking interior safety of the community. In an interview with,Current Times“ Rasa Jukneviciene, erstwhile Minister of Defence of Lithuania, and now a Euro-Parliamentarian, assessed Viktor Orban's actions as another component of the demolition of the European community from within by Hungary. She noted that The patience of European decision-makers will end sooner or later".
It is worth noting that this year Victor Orban visited Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, and his visit was described as "a peace mission". He was widely criticized for it within the European Parliament, which he adopted criticism resolution Orban's abroad policy as straight hitting the European strategy towards Russia.
News from the front
- 11.VII – An effort to assassinate Chief Rheinmetall was unsuccessful
In early July, CNN reported a thwarted assassination effort on Armin Papperger, the head of the German Rheinmetall arms consortium. She detected him and thwarted the CIA in cooperation with her German counterpart.
Russia was to be behind the attempted execution of the head of Rheinmetall, which this year prepared a series of assassinations on the most crucial individuals associated with the Western armaments.
From the position of the ongoing conflict, Reihnmetall is 1 of the main companies supplying Ukraine with ammunition and equipment. In addition to the production of 155mm and Leopard tanks, the German armoured giant announced the readiness to intensify cooperation with Ukraine. In the territory of Ukraine, an armored weapons mill is to be established thanks to the deepening of cooperation between Reihnmetall and Ukrainian Ukroboronprom.
The attack has been thwarted, but attempts have been made in Western Europe in fresh months to destabilise the interior situation through Moscow-inspired assassination attempts.
In March this year, erstwhile co-worker Alexey Navalny was attacked at Vilnius. The perpetrators of the attack on Leonid Volkov were to be 2 Polish citizens, who were recruited by Russian intelligence. The fire of the Warsaw buying centre on Maryvilska Street was besides to be Russian, which He suggested Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
Russian services were besides to respond for attempts to disrupt the GPS signal in Estonia's airspace, causing a direct threat to civilian aviation. At the same time, Russian services are not limited to Central and east Europe alone. At the end of February 2024 in Spain He was murdered. Maxim Kuzminow, a Russian pilot who escaped in Mi-8 chopper to Ukraine. The execution of Kuzminov was to be followed by Russian specialities.
The expanding threats of hybrid nature pose challenges for intelligence, but besides for the local services of NATO states. The mark of Russian terrorist attacks may frequently be not strictly military but besides civil. specified acts of panic are intended to origin social unrest and destabilise the situation within the state. An additional challenge for the Nattian specialities is the issue of identifying possible leaders who are frequently citizens of these countries. Cooperation between NATO intelligence is crucial here to combat the threat already at the recruitment stage.
- 26.VII – Transfer of frozen Russian funds by the EU
On 26 July this year, the European Commission's head Ursula von der Leyen announced that previously frozen Russian assets worth EUR 1.5 billion would go to Ukraine.
"There is no better symbol or better usage of Kremlin money than making Ukraine and Europe a safer place to live"– so the head of the EC commented on platform X the decision to transfer Russian assets. The process of transferring frozen assets required the approval of members of the European Union and Budapest's attitude was called into question. The EC excluded Hungary from voting on the transfer of Russian funds. It was argued that Budapest had previously abstained on the Ukrainian Aid Fund (FFU).
There were besides voices that confiscating Russian funds would harm the credibility of the Western financial system. Investors from the People's Republic of China or the Gulf States could consider withdrawing their assets and investments from the Western collective states due to the hazard of failure of funds caused by the EC decision.
Nevertheless, Russian funds donated to Ukraine constitute a drop in the sea of Kiev's needs. planet Bank in report on the financial resources needed to rebuild the destroyed manufacture and cities estimates that Ukraine needs around $500 billion for this purpose.
- 28.VII – Wagner Group losses in Mali
At the end of July this year, Vainners clashed with the Tuaregs, resulting in Wagner's group having suffered the biggest losses in 1 conflict since the beginning of their presence in Mali (2021).
We don't know the exact number of Vamners killed, but according to data 54 Wagner group mercenaries were killed in combat. In turn any sources, including Russian BBC branch, propose the death of over 80 mercenaries.
In an ambush set by the Tuaregs, the author of the "Grey Zone" channel was killed: Nikita Fedjanin. More than 560,000 users watched its channel on Telegram. Among the dead He was besides meant to be Anton Elizarov, who after the death of Evgeni Prigozhyn and Dimitri Utkin became a key figure of the Wagner Group.
In addition to individual losses in fighting, the Russians besides lost dense equipment, including the Mi-24 helicopter.
In the clash with local rebels, there is besides a Ukrainian trace. A fewer days after the Tuareg ambush, Mali broke diplomatic relations with Kiev, saying that Ukraine has greatly helped the rebels with intelligence. That's what makes Bamako sovereign.
Sami Tuareg They denied alleged support from Ukrainians, but online published photograph of the rebels with the Ukrainian flag, which emphasize solidarity with the Ukrainian people.
It is worth noting that in Sudan there are Ukrainian ,,specialists” who fight Vainners. Not only does it prove photosbut besides provision Head of Ukrainian Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov, who argues that the fight against Wagner Group is not only in Ukraine.
Currently in Mali there are clashes of rebel groups (including Tuaregs) with government forces from Bamako. At the same time, created in 2021 after the withdrawal of the French, a vacuum" seeks to make Russia, which deepens its presence in Africa. Wagner Group operates in Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya or Mozambique.
Russian engagement in Africa is not limited to Vainner troops. In January this year in Burkina Faso deployed The first 100 soldiers, the African Corps, is simply a volunteer formation modeled on Wagner's disbanded Group.
Russia is building its presence in Africa at the expense of Western states' influence. In the optics of the authorities of parts of African states, Moscow is not marked by a card of colonialism, which affects its image in the region.
In the case of actions by the Russian Federation in Africa, the return of Russian influences in this region of the planet should be mentioned. Moscow was highly active here during the Cold War.
- 29.VII – Another aid package from Washington and the moods of American society towards the war in Ukraine
On 29 July this year, the United States announced another aid package for Ukraine. The amount of the July financial tranche is $1.7 billion. Washington will supply Kiev with ammunition for HIMARS rocket systems, anti-aircraft defenses and anti-tank kits, including the infamous Javelins.
There is simply a consensus among the rulers about the assistance of the fighting Ukraine, but the American public disagrees.
W Pew investigation Center study 49% of Americans stated that the United States has no work to support Ukraine. 48% of respondents disagreed. This division is even more visible between democrats and Republicans. 63% of Democratic organization voters believe it is the US's work to support the fighting Ukraine, but this percent is only 36% among Republican supporters. The voters of both parties, on the another hand, are afraid about the possible spill-over of the conflict to neighbouring countries. 60% of Democrats and 42% of Republicans expressed concern about Russia's possible to attack another countries in the region.
Meanwhile, US support for Ukraine is simply a key issue in the ongoing war.
From 24 February 2024 to 9 August this year Washington transferred Ukraine over $55.4 billion in military equipment. At the same time, NATO itself sees a greater commitment of US forces to the alleged east flank of the alliance.
The size and pace of support for Ukraine depend on Washington's abroad policy. It is not known how the U.S. approach to the ongoing conflict will change after the U.S. presidential elections.
