A Europe of 2 games. Will Poland combine safety with development?

This article has been published On 21 August 2026, in the paper “Rzeczpospolita”.

The debate on the future of the European Union is usually conducted in a zero-one manner. any inform against the dominance of Germany and France and the submission of weaker EU members to them. Others say that only a stronger, more integrated Europe will be able to compete with the United States and China and defend itself against Russia.

Both sides see part of reality. The problem is that in the coming decade, Europe will run 2 games at the same time, based on 2 different logics.

The first is an external game: defence ability, access to technology, energy, natural materials, capital and markets. In this game, a fragmented Europe is indeed weak. Individual European countries do not have adequate scale to negociate themselves with American technology platforms, compete with Chinese industrial apparatus, or to counter the dangers of the Russian war state.Europe may so request to concentrate resources, a common industrial policy and partial marketplace protection.

The second is an interior game: to share the costs of European investment mobilisation and to own and allocate the fresh economical assets it creates. In this game, associate States do not cease to be competitors, even if they respond jointly to external threats. The way this interior game defines the principles of concentration and modernisation will not be neutral for Poland and another countries outside the "center".

External force is real

The United States remains the main guarantor of Europe's security, but at the same time it has its own, very assertive, not to say aggressive, industrial, technological and energy policies. American business is not the same as European business. Washington wants stronger military allies, but not necessarily a competitor with full technological, financial and weapons autonomy.

Geopolitics has entered economical policy permanently. The return to a model where the marketplace itself determines the optimal location of production is unlikely.

Europe so has a double relation with the United States. America is an essential safety partner, and a centre that attracts European capital, businesses, talents and technologies. Europe can stay militaryly dependent on the US and at the same time lose its economical value on competition with the American strategy of innovation, energy and backing (remaining a "user" alternatively than a real partner).

China is another challenge. They are besides a market, supplier, competitor and possible origin of strategical dependence. The European manufacture has benefited over the years from Chinese request and production, but is now increasingly competing with Chinese companies not only in Asia but besides in its own market. This applies to electrical cars, batteries, renewable energy, electronics, machinery and many segments of average technology industry.

Russia is primarily a origin of military threat, political destabilisation and energy pressure, and an economical competitor to a negligible extent. However, the war against Ukraine showed that safety cannot be permanently separated from industry, infrastructure, energy and mobilization capabilities.

Against all these pressures, Europe will gotta become more assertive. It needs to defend parts of the market, joint investments, weapons production capacity, control of key technologies and reduce dependence in strategical areas.

The return to a model where the marketplace itself determines the optimal location of production is unlikely. Geopolitics has entered economical policy permanently.

Necessary consolidation is not neutral

However, the Polish debate should begin where the general agreement that "Europe must be stronger" ends.

How is this force to be built? Who's going to receive the capital? Where are the fresh factories? Who will hold patents, data, engineering skills and control of supply chains? Will joint mobilisation lead to the creation of fresh growth centres, or will it mainly strengthen the position of the existing core?

The dominant EU enlargement model in the 21st century was based on an unwritten agreement. Western companies gained access to fresh markets, workers and cheaper production facilities. The countries joining the EU received capital, developed infrastructure, gained access to the labour marketplace and could number on technology transfer and convergence funds.

European consolidation may be essential for the competitiveness of the Union as a whole, but it is not neutral for the geographical distribution of capital, technology and benefits.

The relation was asymmetrical, but for a long time it remained mutually beneficial. The fresh associate States grew even faster than the old centre and gradually reduced the improvement distance.

Today this agreement can be redefined. Western Europe needs immense resources to modernise industry, energy transformation, defence, digitalisation and social stability. At the same time, there is no strong political readiness to radically increase the common budget.

There is thus a temptation to shift resources from convergence policy to competitiveness policy: from the improvement of weaker regions to the financing of strategical sectors, large consortia and European champions.

From an external game point of view, this can be functional. Europe needs scale. You can't build dozens of parallel satellite systems, semiconductor factories or artificial intelligence platforms just to keep a perfect geographical balance.

From the point of view of the interior game, however, there is simply a hazard that the full Union will finance instruments whose main beneficiaries will be capital, technology, large companies, renowned universities and administrative ability to rise funds and the impact on Brussels administration (the mercenary may be the casting of European positions – powerfully in favour of the states of the ‘old Union’).

Europeanisation of costs, concentration of benefits

The mechanics does not gotta trust on the formal closure of funds from Central and east Europe. It is adequate that money will be distributed according to the criteria that will reward the scale, technological readiness, co-financing capacity and fast implementation.

The Polish company will be able to participate in a European consortium, but as a supplier. Production can be partially placed in Poland, while intellectual property, strategical decisions, financing and the largest part of the margin will stay in the western headquarters.

Similarly, public aid works. Theoretically, all countries usage the same rules. In practice, the anticipation of supporting businesses depends on the wealth of the national budget. Richer countries can subsidise their manufacture on a scale that is not available to weaker members.

Regulations can besides function double. In the external game, European standards defend the marketplace from products not gathering environmental, technological or data safety requirements. It is simply a rational instrument of defence against competition which uses another production conditions.

The sum of rational national policies can lead to the Europeanisation of costs and geographical concentration of benefits at the centre. Already today, richer EU countries can subsidise their own manufacture on a scale that is not available to weaker members.

In the interior game, the same standards increase operating costs and reward the largest companies with legal departments, capital and impact on the regulatory process. They can besides reduce the influx of products from China and accelerate the concentration of the European marketplace around companies from the old centre.

You don't gotta set up any secret plan to operate the East. It is adequate that France defends its defence manufacture and atomic power, Germany automotive, chemistry and machinery, Italy its own production, and the Commission is looking for projects capable of rapidly demonstrating a European scale.

The sum of rational national policies can lead to the Europeanisation of costs and geographical concentration of benefits at the centre.

Two geography

At the same time, safety geography changes. The most strategically crucial area of the continent moves to a line moving from Scandinavia through the Baltic States and Poland to Ukraine, Romania and the Black Sea.

It is here that the immediate Russian threat, military infrastructure, defence expenditure, logistics, border protection and the future of Ukraine are concentrated, but besides the attractiveness of settlement and investment is decreasing.

However, the Geography of Capital, Technological Property and Corporate office remains western. It is possible to fix 2 different maps of Europe.

The first will be a safety map: north-east, military, infrastructure, bearing the top hazard and the most acute effects of settlement-allocation related to being a "flanka".

The second will stay a improvement map: centered around Germany, France, Benelux, northern Italy and parts of Scandinavia.

The division in which the West provides capital, technology and industrial scale, and the East strategical space, military, logistics and resilience can be functional for a certain period of time in an external game, but for a long time it is an unstable script for Europe.

This division can be functional for a certain time in the external game. The West provides capital, technology and industrial scale, and the East strategical space, military, logistics and resilience.

However, it will be politically unstable in the long term. Countries with the highest safety costs will ask why European economical policy at the same time strengthens their subordinate position in value chains.

Poland between America and Europe

A peculiar dilemma of Poland will be the attitude towards the United States. A close relation with the US remains essential for security. Poland cannot treat European strategical autonomy as a substitute for real American military capabilities which Europe will not be able to recreate for a long time.

Poland needs a double anchor strategy: maintaining a strong military union with the US and building a European and regional industrial entity.

However, this does not mean that it should accept a model in which it remains a client of American military technology and besides a Western European manufacture supplier.

Poland needs a double anchor strategy: maintaining a strong military union with the US and building a European and regional industrial entity. Military purchases should lead to the acquisition of competences, production rights, access to codes, service, modernisation and technological property – to the top technological and defence sovereignty possible.

Security of supply alone is not enough. It is about the ability to co-create and control systems, not just their use.

China and the Temptation of inexpensive Development

In relations with China, Poland should besides not choose between naive openness and mechanical copying of the policy of cutting ties.

Access to Chinese products, components and capital can reduce the costs of our second transformation and make infrastructure. At the same time, excessive dependence can block the improvement of its own industrial capacity.

It is crucial to separate between the imports supporting the modernisation and the long-term imports eliminating the anticipation of national or regional production. A mistake would be both complete cutting off from cheaper (and advanced quality), Chinese products, components, reagents etc. At the same time, we cannot afford a systemic dependency. By overpaying and buying from US, European or nipponese partners we can lose our competitiveness. Being besides dependent on the “large Chinese factory” we hazard advanced susceptibility to geopolitical shocks and closing down the supply of “oxygen” needed for home and European development.

It is clear that Europe will effort to limit Chinese presence in selected sectors. Poland should participate in this policy and effectively guarantee that the protected marketplace is not subsequently divided exclusively between Western European producers.

From our perspective, replacing China's dependency with a lasting dependence on respective companies from the old EU core makes doubtful sense.

Russia and the hazard of Western Reset

Russia has another relation between external and interior games. For Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and Ukraine the Russian threat is existential. For a part of Western Europe, it remains, above all, a costly problem which may be subject to political management and partial standardisation in the future.

If the war is frozen, the temptation of a selective reset can return: a limited recovery of economical relations, a simplification in the costs of sanctions and a transfer of attention to competition with China and interior problems.

Such a reset could be presented as an component of European independency towards the US. For the east flank, however, it would mean a hazard of fixation of Russian ability to re-agree.

Therefore, the countries of the region must build their own capacity to influence European policy towards Russia as well as the impact on abroad policies of the strongest countries (Germany, France). They cannot halt at the function of performers of decisions made between Washington, Berlin and Paris.

Ukraine: part of both games

Ukraine is the place where both logics meet the most.

In an external game, her endurance and anchoring in the West limits Russia's ability to dominate Central and east Europe. Ukrainian war experiences, drone industry, resources, energy and access to the Black Sea can become an crucial component of the strength of Europe as a whole.

However, in the interior game Ukraine will besides be a space of competition for contracts, infrastructure, transport, production (mainly agricultural, but not only), workers and reconstruction funds.

Ukraine is the place where logic erstwhile external and interior are the most obtuse. Cooperation with Ukraine is simply a strategical necessity, but cannot be devoid of economical strategy.

If Poland does not build previously with Ukraine appropriate relations and common capital and industrial instruments, it can incur a crucial part of the cost of its defence and integration, while western companies or investors outside Europe will have the top economical benefits.

Moreover, Ukraine can become a competitor of Poland in the same segments in which Poland has based its improvement so far: production with average added value, logistics, agriculture and comparatively lower labour costs.

Cooperation with Ukraine is so a strategical necessity, but cannot be devoid of economical strategy. Joint ventures, financial vehicles, infrastructure arrangements and division of functions in value chains are needed.

Scandinavia: possible connector

Nordic countries can play a function as a link between the 2 geographical areas of Europe. They are part of the northeast safety space, and at the same time have technologies, capital, energy and strong institutions.

Scandinavia can be a link between the east safety geography and the western geography of capital and technology — but only on the basis of circumstantial common interests.

However, they are not a natural patron of the interests of Central Europe. As advanced economies, they can usage a competitive model of financing and technology-oriented policies. They will argue the dominance of the largest countries and excessive national subsidies, but will not necessarily support maintaining conventional redistributive policies.

Cooperation with Scandinavia should so be based on circumstantial interests: Baltic security, energy, digitisation, defence industry, the protection of the single marketplace and the simplification of the oligopolisation of the European economy.

Three scenarios

It is surely not in Poland's interest to be the EU, which is becoming a large failure of planet power from the current model of globalisation, principles of global law and economical competition. It is so worth trying to accomplish 1 of the affirmative scenarios for Europe.

The first script isWestern consolidation without east subjectivity. Europe is strengthening against China, partially independent of the US and expanding its defence capacity against Russia. Internally, however, capital, technologies and benefits are concentrated in the old center. Poland gains safety and infrastructure investments, but remains a subcontractor.

The second script isA Europe of complementary circles. The West continues to service as a capital and technological hub but at the same time faces the top societal challenges and problems associated with ageing infrastructure. Central and east Europe is permanently entering the function of a safety facility while at the same time seeking its chance in the area dual useusing comparatively modern infrastructure. The confederate countries are becoming a European "window to Africa" and an effective trade bridge with the Merkosur countries, but periodically they are besides forced to act as a buffer against recurring migration waves. The countries of northern Europe are located in part in the first and in part in the second of these circles. In this script Poland would gotta effectively build alliances with variable geometry depending on ad hoc economical and safety objectives.

The 3rd script isPolycentric Europe. Integration serves to build a common force against external powers, but at the same time creates fresh centres of capital, production and technology. The Nordic-Baltic-Polish-Ukrainian-Romanian axis becomes not only a military flank but besides a space of defence industry, energy, logistics and dual-use technology. This 3rd script is most advantageous for Poland, but is not most likely. It requires informed policies, capital, institutions and coalitions capable of translating safety into property rights and technological capabilities.

Polycentric Europe is the most advantageous for Poland, but this script will not happen by itself: we request a conscious policy, capital, institutions and ability to build effective coalitions.

Polish interest is not about weak Europe

Poland should not argue European consolidation simply due to the fact that it can strengthen the old centre. A weak and fragmented Europe would be even more dependent on the US, susceptible to Chinese economical force and susceptible to Russia. Poland, as a medium-sized country, would lose peculiarly much on specified fragmentation.

However, it should besides not identify European forces with automatic strengthening of its own position.

The strategical goal of Poland should be different:participate in building the strength of Europe, but influence, beneficial to itself, the deployment of its centres.

This means fighting for Community and not only national financing of industrial policy; for geographical and resilience criteria; for technology rights for consortium partners; for limiting the concentration of public aid; for locating production on the east flank; and for linking safety spending with industrial improvement of the region.

At the same time, Poland needs 3 directions of action: permanent military anchoring in relations with the US, deep presence in the European economical strategy and building its own regional agreement with Scandinavia, the Baltic States, Ukraine and Romania.

We should not argue European consolidation - a weak and fragmented Europe will depend on the US, susceptible to Chinese force and susceptible to Russia. However, we cannot identify European forces with automatic strengthening of Poland's position. It is crucial to participate in the construction of Europe's strength and to influence, for our benefit, the deployment of its centres.

These are not alternate strategies. Only conducted simultaneously make real subjectivity.

The most crucial dilemma of the decade

Europe must become more capable of external action. Without this, he will be the subject of the game of the United States, China and Russia. However, the more resources it will mobilise, defend the marketplace and support strategical sectors, the more crucial the question of interior benefit sharing becomes.

External European solidarity can coexist with interior competition. There is very strong competition between different regions in China – the rule is multicentred alternatively than geographical monopoly. In Europe too, the common opponent does not remove the difference of interest between the centre and the periphery. On the contrary, large economical and military mobilisation frequently increases the importance of those who already control capital, technologies and institutions.

Being 1 of Europe’s main safety guarantors does not necessarily mean moving to its capital and technology centre — the second requires a strategy.

The Polish elite should learn to think in both logics simultaneously.

Not all concentration of European resources is aimed at Poland. any of it is essential that Europe retains its importance in the planet of powers. But not all policy presented as essential for European competitiveness is neutral for Polish development.

The choice between a strong Union and a strong Poland is not at stake. At stake is simply a model of European force, in which Poland will not be brought to the function of the market, the sub-supplier and the military run.

We can become 1 of Europe's main safety states and at the same time stay the periphery of its capital and technology. We can besides usage the shift of geopolitical centre of gravity to build a fresh industrial pole based on modern technologies (e.g. AI).

The first consequence will be created almost automatically. The second requires a strategy, a fresh organization quality of the state (the "end of history" state's transformation into an armed improvement state) and cooperation between the main political forces.