Strong, charismatic, dominant leadership over others is frequently put on pedestals, even in democracy. It is besides uncommon to appreciate a different approach, which is naturally developed in a context of consensus democracy, known from countries with deep socio-political divisions and besides chronic even organization fragmentation, specified as the countries of Scandinavia and Benelux. However, in the realities of controlling large structures of global organisations, where conflicts of interest and the tenacity of the leaders of the associate States make situations of highly timid dynamics, which triggers a fresh crisis, it is the conciliatory and emotionless leadership kind that is forecasting best. In a period of deep crisis in the North Atlantic Pact, which revealed itself in the form of a decline in trust on the U.S.-Europe line and in connection with France's independent road in the first half of the 1960s, this was the kind of leading the test of the highest effort that Dirk Stikker had the chance to submit.
Stikker was born in Groningen state in 1897, in a household powerfully associated with various types of business. Among his ancestors, he had farmers and masters on his property, and shipowners. His father, on the another hand, was a banker, and Dirk was the 1 who made the first steps of his professional career shortly after he obtained his diploma as a lawyer at the University of Groningen. After a year of work, however, he won a position at the larger Twentsche Bank, and after respective years he changed the manufacture and in 1935 became manager in the world-famous Heineken Brewery.
Stikker was born and raised in the Netherlands, whose social reality regulated the strategy of pilarization. People were citizens of 1 country, but they utilized the common "apartheid", based not on racial, but on religious-ideological criteria. There were 3 well-organized "philars" (Catholic, Protestant and socialist) and the fourth, much more certifiable "pillar" liberal, to which the Stikker household belonged. The Dutch avoided contact with abroad members of the “philar” – “mixed” marriages were not tolerated, the same newspapers were not read, the same schools were not attended, there were “protestant restaurants”, “socialist bars”, “Catholic hairdressers” and “liberal taxis”. common avoidance was viewed as the only way to defend the state from decay.
Of course, each “pillar” besides had its political parties, which, however, sometimes included a coalition, Only at this level were the “pillars” allowed to approach each other. In these realities, the culture of extinguishing the temperature of political disputes, negotiations “to collapse”, seeking even minimum consensus and conducting as many political processes as possible behind closed doors. The results and arrangements were presented only to the public as something given – of course all organization of its public opinion.
Dirk Stikker was by all means influenced by this mentality – almost cultural shock caused him to observe the violentness and unpretentious aggression of the American electoral run in 1932 between Roosevelt and Hoover. In his view of the world, business and later politics, the fundamental values were cooperation, conciliation, compromise and distrust of all ego hypertrophy. Stikker, however, was besides among the first public individuals to decide to take a step forward and, on the basis of a conciliative idea, search for planes to go beyond pilarization. During the Nazi occupation, he prepared, and in 1945 he founded the "Labour Foundation", which was expected to be a forum for dialog and cooperation between trade unions and employers' associations, i.e. people usually belonging to various "philars". In her founding declaration, Stikker wrote that "the common experience of suffering, which the German occupier has given, will origin the erstwhile [Dutch-Dutch] antagonisms to disappear, the walls of segregation will be overthrown." This was foresight, but besides excessive optimism – “pillarisation” then had 2 decades to go.
Stikker's initiative, however, opened the way for him to politics. Together with a group of politicians of the pre-war “pro-state” party, he founded the Freedom Party, which after the co-optation of a group of centre-left liberals turned into the People's organization for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) – present 1 of the largest political forces in the Netherlands. After the 1948 election, VVD entered the government coalition and Stikker assumed the post of chief of diplomacy, who held until 1952 (when VVD reported a motion of distrust towards the government due to colonial policy in fresh Guinea and withdrew its ministers). During this period, the Netherlands played an active function in both shaping NATO and establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.
Stikker thus added crucial business experiences to his business experiences credentials in global politics. This was the way he was to follow for the remainder of his public career: he was the ambassador of the Netherlands to London, a typical to the OECD predecessor, yet in the North Atlantic Council. Especially in this second function he established numerous, close contacts, including with Dean Acheson, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, and General Laurien Norstad. Despite the distrust and opposition of France de Gaulle, Dirk Stikker assumed the position of Secretary General of NATO in 1961. In the mediate of increasing friction in the bosom of the alliance.
There was a political change in Washington, D.C., and Kennedy's Democrats were pushing a change in the strategical concept of “cold war”. The Eisenhower doctrine of "mass retaliation" was replaced by the doctrine of "flexible response". In principle, the correct transition from the imagination of immediately throwing an full atomic arsenal on the USSR to the imagination of many consequence options depending on the gravity of the situation (including the option to limit the usage of conventional weapons only to limit escalation) raised concerns in Europe about the possible withdrawal of the US from its obligations and to make the "old continent" again the only field of the fresh conventional planet War III. The European capitals, especially in Paris, besides saw a revised approach of the fresh administration, which treated NATO not as an equal alliance but as 1 of the many tools of American defence policy.
Stikker understood both the request to refresh the US strategy and the concerns of Europeans. He considered the issue of NATO's credibility to be crucial, which had no de facto control over the atomic arsenal of its associate States. Full control, including decisions to usage or not usage these arsenals, lay in the hands of governments in Washington, London and Paris. This meant that the atomic war could have erupted at any time without NATO's formal decision, but besides that despite the majority of its members' decision, this arsenal would not have been utilized in a given crisis if the 3 capitals had a different opinion. Stikker wanted any "limited reactions" in the doctrine of "flexible response" to be decided on in the NATO Council, and even suggested the establishment (known present from the European Council in the EU) of a weighted vote model. Of course, he was aware that specified persuasions would not come to favour in Washington.
He was besides incapable to prevent Paris' decision to retreat from NATO's military structures. Despite Stikker's taking the doctrine of position closer to Europeans, Paris considered the secretary-general of the alliance to be an excessively "pro-Atlantic" or pro-American policy. Stikker was given a ricochet for permanent French-Dutch clashes in all the European Communities, where Dutch diplomacy in fact had a doctrinal practice at the time almost always to vote against the French position. But the ears of de Gaulle himself most likely did not escape the unfavorable comments of Stikker, whom he occasionally sued as an ambassador at a facility in London (where Francophobia of course opened any English doors). After taking office, Stikker had to wait a fewer months for an “audience” from the megalomaniac president of France (he was yet given it only thanks to Adenauer's intervention). Also, the gathering itself was utilized by the French to give Stikker the thought that he was not an unduly welcome guest at the Elysée Palace.
Both in specified circumstances and in the failed yet constantly repeated attempts at dialog with Kennedy's people on the structure of NATO decision-making, Stikker never lost his resonation, never got angry, and never let go of any emotions. Degraded in Paris, he himself acted blamelessly according to protocol. He knew that no of these situations took place due to him, so he didn't take it personally. He saw the context, tension and conflicts of interest in NATO. He showed patience, in rule “Dutch”. He acted in accordance with the presumption that no refusal to proceed dialogue, no door closes forever, the compromise always remains a far-reaching possibility, and the pride or honor and annoyance of human relationships with any decision-maker is stupid, pointless, unproductive and distracting.
Three years led by NATO – Stikker resigned in 1964 due to reasonably serious wellness problems – were not a large success. However, the stratification of disputes in a crucial way then threatened to disintegrate the alliance. Meanwhile, Stikker was not only able to channel the French volt to the level of de facto only a formal change (he said that he was in fact incapable to implement his atomic defence strategy on his own, and in the event of a real threat of escalation "returned in a blink of an eye", but, despite serious interior crises, he retained NATO's intact image as a real force and threat to the USSR. Until the end of the Cold War, NATO has successfully implemented a deterrent strategy against the Kremlin. besides in the first half of the 1960s, erstwhile the guidelines of the “death watch” were closest to the twelfth hour.
Since 1963. Stikker was described in media and behind-the-clock gossip as a man severely ill. Indeed, as NATO's chief, he has undergone major operations. Yet, he was given a reasonably long pension. He died in Wassernaar in 1979.
