"I was on the right side," said Colonel Ryszard Kukliński. In the early 1970s, this esteemed officer of the General Staff of the HR established cooperation with the CIA. Reason? Deep conviction that only Americans could save Poland from atomic destruction. On May 23, 1984, he was sentenced to death for his activity.
The Kukliński investigation lasted almost 3 years. For a long time, military prosecutors have been in the dark. Eventually, the indictment was based on unprecise intelligence and counterintelligence reports. "The reports of the Polish peculiar Services indicate that Colonel Kukliński at the CIA Center in Virginia close Washington... revealed all information about defence and safety of the Polish People's Republic, the doctrine of war and the strategy of the states – the parties to the Warsaw Pact, which he knew for his service in the General Staff. He is presently an advisor to the Pentagon for east Europe," they stressed. Enigmatic wording was supported... by a translation of the text from the American weekly Newsweek. The author described the past of the Colonel, who during his service in the General Staff stole papers concerning the martial law and alleged Polish Front, after which he and his household were evacuated to the West. Kukliński's name in the article does not fall, but many of the facts cited may point to him.
Anyway, the evidence gathered against the colonel was not 1 of the strongest. However, the trial did not last long. On May 23, 1984, after only 2 trials, the Court of the Warsaw Military territory issued a judgment. Kukliński was found guilty of treason and desertion and sentenced to death punishment and property forfeiture. However, the verdict was simply symbolic. Kukliński was not in Poland. 1 November 1981, he just vanished into thin air.
“I am a Polish Viking”
"Dear Lord, I apologize for my English. I'm an officer from the communist state. I would like to meet (in secret) an officer of the American armed forces (in the rank of lieutenant colonel, colonel). 17 or 18, August 19 I will be in Amsterdam, or 21, 22 in Ostend. I don't have much time. I'm with my comrades and they can't know. In Amsterdam, I will call the American embassy (military attaché). P.V.’. On August 13, 1972, a letter of this content reached the US embassy in Bonn. CIA specialists, analyzing lame English, concluded that the author was a Pole. Although they could not regulation out that the letter was a provocation of communist services, they decided to hazard it. 2 agents, Henry Morton and Walter Lang, went to the Netherlands. They waited a fewer days. Finally, the embassy telephone rang. They set up a meeting. It occurred to him at the Amsterdam train station, where the Americans transported an officer to the CIA's conspiratorial apartment. A visitor said: “My name is Ryszard Kukliński and I am an officer of the Polish General Staff.” The conversation in Russian lasted an hr and a half. The agents later mentioned that the Pole "appeared to be revived and excited, but seemed to be a strong man." In his farewell, Lang asked him what P.V. initials meant, which he utilized in his letter to the embassy. The visitor smiled: “I am a Polish Viking.” shortly it became clear that this "wiking" is 1 of the most valuable acquisitions in the past of American intelligence.
To his decision Kukliński matured for years. In the Polish army, he had a superb career. In 1963, he went to the General Staff, where he was included in the planning of the exercises – with time on an expanding scale. His superiors were in awe. Gen. Wojciech Barański, Deputy Chief of Staff, wrote of him in his authoritative opinion: “Punctual, urgent, hardworking, they cared for the appropriate culture of the papers being made, in which the improvement of which puts quite a few creative innovation... He has a large amount of general knowledge, which he systematically deepens." The colonel's work was shortly appreciated by the Soviets. He started going to Moscow. He became more and more aware of the mechanisms of functioning of the Warsaw Pact, and he became more aware of its objectives and consequences. And these may have been peculiarly severe for Poland.
"The strategy of the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact was only offensive. All military maneuvers began with the presumption that they were a consequence to the NATO attack. However, Kukliński, who prepared them, knew that the plans were intended to be the first mass hit by the Russians and the Warsaw Pact," writes Benjamin Weiser, the colonel's biographer. With a view to The future war The Polish army was to form a separate front and then force 600 1000 soldiers to decision to northern Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. However, the attack on conventional forces by the Soviets intended to advance a massive atomic strike on Western centres. At the same time, it should have been assumed that NATO would respond in a akin way, and that Poland would be the primary mark of their Alliance. First, atomic charges detonated between the Oder and the Vistula will let the march of the Second Red Army to be halted. Secondly, no of the superpowers will want to attack the opponent straight in his territory to avoid identical retaliation. According to the warplay material “Szaniec ’79” cited by Sławomir Cenckiewicz, it was only in the first phase of the NATO conflict that it was planned to carry out about 300–400 atomic strikes in Poland. In the second – another 100–300. After years, Kukliński confessed to his friend Maria Nurowska: “In the summers I taped the symbols of the atomic mushroom, blue, where the impacts would fall from the West, red, where ours would fall. It was my peculiar assignment. Others cared about uniforms, shoes, sausage, tank repair. And I couldn’t think what those mushrooms meant.” The case seemed clear – if war broke out, Poland would change the radioactive desert in a flash.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the colonel repeated that the only rescue he saw in the Americans at the time. He believed that if they learned the secret of the Warsaw Pact, they would keep the Soviets in check and there would be no confrontation. As a trusted General Staff officer, he had approval to sail to Western European ports. Each specified expedition was a reconnaissance mission. Kukliński and his companions photographed the ports, researched the depth of selected waters. Among the superiors, the escapades did not rise any suspicions. As it turned out, wrong. It was during 1 of them that the colonel sat over a part of paper and supported by a Polish-English dictionary, he began to write: “Dear Lord... I am an officer from a communist state...’.
“The leak...”
Initially Kukliński wanted to establish an anti-Soviet conspiracy in the army. However, the Americans convinced him that it did not make much sense, due to the fact that specified a group would be detected sooner than he thought. They suggested sharing cognition from inside the Warsaw Pact. The Colonel has agreed to specified a solution. The CIA gave him nicknames “The Seagull” and “Jack Strong”. Over the next 9 years, he provided them with photocopies of priceless documents, as well as sketches and notes made on them – a full of 42 1000 pages. These included, among others, communication systems, a key weapon for the Soviets – the T-72 tank and the Striel-2 rockets, the deployment of Red Army units in Poland and the GDR, atomic impact simulation exercises on Western European countries. He delivered materials to Americans utilizing lockers located in Warsaw and surrounding forests, and later besides utilizing a pioneering electronic device called "Skra".
At the same time for its superiors Kukliński was beyond any suspicion. In 1973, he was promoted to the position of Deputy Head of the Operations Board of the General Staff, and his commitment and skills made him very frequently entrusted with tasks beyond his responsibilities. “The superiors pointed straight at him as the contractor of the task. They simply told him to send him and ordered him to work," General Wacław Szklarski, head of the Operations Board, recalled later.
The heat around Kukliński started only in the fall of 1981. The colonel then worked on a plan for the operation of the martial law in Poland. He sent information to the Americans. About the same time, the manager of the CIA visited the Vatican. "William Casey most likely mentioned to John Paul II about an agent located in the General Staff of the HR. (...) was to mention to a circumstantial paper coming straight from Kukliński" – he explains in his book Cenckiewicz. The message rapidly reached Poland. According to the historian, this could have been done by 1 of the priests next to the pope who was besides a safety agent.
On November 2, Kukliński was called to his boss's office. There were respective another advanced military ranks sitting behind a long table. Gen. Szklarski was able to look at the gathered people for longer, stopping at Colonel. “There has been a catastrophic leak. The act of betrayal," he measured. Kukliński then recalled: “I was not shaking due to the fact that I was completely walled. I felt like my heart had stopped, and for the first time in my life I felt that any liquid was leaking out of my hands. It was not sweat, it was virtually water.” In a fraction of a second, he decided to confess to espionage. He got up and started babbling. Szklarski brutally interrupted him in half a word. "I am not with SB to scan you! The investigation will be carried out by the appropriate organ!”
Kukliński knew that exposing him was a substance of the coming days, possibly weeks. In the evening, he revealed the fact about his activities to his wife and 2 sons, and sent an urgent request for evacuation to the Americans utilizing the Spark. Eventually, Kuklinski left Poland on Sunday morning on 8 November 1981. How? Here are 2 versions. According to the more common ones, they were packed into crates, which the U.S. embassy's car carried from Warsaw to West Berlin. From there the colonel and his loved ones flew to the United States. Kukliński himself told a different story. He was convinced that he had taken a cruise plane from Warsaw utilizing a passport from a British man. Before that, he had been decently re-arranged. Thus, he reached London, and then West Germany, where his household had already been waiting for him at the U.S. Army base. The wife and sons were to leave the country on diplomatic passports of the United States.
‘In a state of higher necessity’
W The General Staff was initially unaware that Kukliński had disappeared. On Monday, November 9, colleagues and superiors were convinced that he had come to work as usual, only went to a organization cell meeting. Then they speculated that he might not have returned from Wałbrzych, where he paid his parent - in - law a visit. His absence began to origin anxiety only after a fewer hours. The next day the militia ordered his search. shortly the counterintelligence besides received the first information that indicated that the colonel could leave the country. The WSW initiated the action “Renegat” during which the Kukliński flat was searched. An investigation into desertion and espionage shortly began. 3 years later, this case was brought to justice. Kukliński was sentenced to death penalty. After the fall of communism, however, the ultimate Court Military Chamber repealed the sentence. The D.A. one more time launched an investigation that yet ended with a bail. Investigators concluded that the colonel was "acting in a state of higher necessity". His mission was to service Poland, and he did not collect money for his activity.
After 1989, Kukliński's erstwhile superiors attempted to depreciate his meaning as a staff associate and CIA associate. In 1 of the books, Gen. Szklarski stated that it was a “paper story figure”. However, the Americans had no doubt. “No 1 in the planet has harmed communism in the last 40 years as this Pole has. At hazard of large danger, Kukliński consistently provided highly valuable, highly classified information about the russian Army, the plans for operations and intentions of the russian Union, thus contributing in an unprecedented way to maintaining peace," emphasized William Casey, in the 1980s CIA chief.
While writing, I utilized the following publications:
Benjamin Weiser, “Ryszard Kukliński. A life of top secret”, Warsaw 2004; Sławomir Cenckiewicz, “Atom spy. Ryszard Kukliński and the War of Interviews”, Warsaw 2014; Maria Nurowska, “My friend of the traitor”, Warsaw 2004; Krzysztof Dubinski, “Ryszard Kukliński. Hero or traitor", Warsaw 2014; James Risen, "Ryszard Kuklinski, 73, Spy in Poland in Cold War, Dies", "New York Times", 12.02.2004.
