The level of safety and resilience of Poland depends on many factors. We have no or very limited influence on any of them. This concerns, for example, the geopolitical position, climate or the formation of our country's borders. However, we have a decisive influence as a nation and a state on another factors that form our security.
It is most likely right that tiny and medium-sized countries base their safety mainly on diplomacy, alliances and the activity of intelligence services. For European standards, Poland is more than a average country. Only erstwhile it comes to the strength of the economy, we're inactive on track. As a large country and – crucially – located on the east flank of Europe, we must (and can) trust on our own military possible more than others. There are many factors that co-determine the real anticipation of building a strong modern army. I'll just mention a few.
Financial defence foundations
In order to have something to build and keep an army – quite a few money is needed. That, to a large extent, is done. It began in 2001, erstwhile I was Minister of National Defence in the government of Jerzy Buzek. Most – if not all – of the Western states then lowered their defence budgets, despite being full aware that Russia was gradually expanding its military budget. Poland, with its historical experience, could not afford a akin deficiency of reaction.
Not everything depends on us – but those safety factors on which we are affected should be thought out and consistently, based on real possible and capabilities, strive to improve our situation.
I then passed 2 fundamentally crucial laws through the government and parliament, linked to the Six-Year Plan for the Modernization of the Armed Forces.
These were then signed by president Aleksandr Kwasniewski and obtained acceptance of the then Secretary-General of NATO. The most crucial change was the introduction of the rule of the rigid contribution of MON to the breakdown of the state budget – at 2% of GDP. It proved to be happy for the armed forces, as economical growth in Poland continues to proceed until now. This mechanics has allowed the defence budget to truly be multiplied. Currently, the contribution of the MON to the state budget is almost 5% of GDP.
It is worth noting the ongoing link between the size of the defence budget and the economical growth of Poland. If we want to devote large and increasing resources to defence, we must guarantee that this is not at the expense of economical growth, but within it. Unfortunately, the known fact says that the more money in the military cash register, the easier it is for financial carelessness erstwhile spending it – and the greater the hazard of unthought-out decisions, both at the phase of planning the improvement of the armed forces, as well as erstwhile purchasing arms or equipment.
Stable defence backing is simply a essential but not adequate condition – it is equally crucial to consider spending these funds, a coherent modernisation strategy and opposition to the temptation of political demonstration of force.
Big money is besides a large temptation to defend the needs of propaganda, not the real needs of defence. Unfortunately, in fresh years, erstwhile the authorities held the erstwhile government many orders of equipment were subject to the interests of organization propaganda. As a result, it was most desirable to sign arms contracts that impressed the public, neglecting issues related to ammunition, spare parts, as well as garage, retention and servicing of this equipment.
Human deficit, excess structures
The ability to make your own effective defensive force requires people. And this situation is at least difficult. The demographic crisis is ongoing. A fewer months ago, the Chief of General Staff acknowledged that there might be no military service. So it is worth asking: where were the military planners erstwhile decisions about the formation of fresh divisions were made? How can the improvement of the armed forces be planned without taking into account demographic forecasts?
Without people there is no army – deficiency of staff and long-term planning will not compensate for either the number of divisions or the scale of equipment purchases.
People are besides military personnel. The effects of staff cleaning from the time of Minister Antoni Macierewicz inactive seem to be felt. And it is not just about removing dozens of high-ranking commanders with experience gained in NATO structures and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Equally crucial are the consequences of accelerated and sometimes even exotic officer promotions – motivated by a political evaluation, alternatively than a real professional gain and competence of an officer.
Equipment without strategy
It takes time to build a strong modern army. It's hard to tell how much we have. I am certain that adequate hazard assessment is ongoing. However, I know that the strategical papers, which form the basis, among others, for planning the improvement of the armed forces, were highly delayed despite the ongoing war in Ukraine. This most likely means that multi-billion-dollar arms contracts were concluded as a consequence of political-propagand decisions separated from each another alternatively than as part of a coherent, logical plan. That's worrying due to the fact that you should be aware that we're buying weapons for the army present for decades. We besides know that many of the contracts concluded present will only be realised in the next 3 to six years in terms of transportation alone.
Shopping for weapons without strategy is an investment in chaos – an effective army needs not only equipment, but besides a thoughtful plan for its usage and maintenance.
It is besides worrying that the erstwhile government, erstwhile breaking European contracts, decided for many years about a circumstantial American monopoly – not only for equipment, but besides for ammunition, spare parts, etc. It is besides amazing not only the scowl of armored equipment, but besides the deficiency of clarity as to the prospects of its modernization or the way it was renovated in the event of war. It seems that the erstwhile government consciously made the Polish army dependent on 1 ally. There was a different regulation earlier: erstwhile we were associated with the United States as the most crucial and strongest NATO country, at the same time we took care of developing cooperation with European allies.
A strong army begins with a strong spirit – without social cohesion it is impossible to build resilience either on the front or in the state.
Morale as a Political Challenge
The issue of morale is an crucial component for Polish safety and resilience. This applies to both the military and the full society. And with this it is not good – there can be no strong morale in the nation, in which there is simply a deep political division all day and there is simply a sharp interior conflict.
The state of morale cannot be solely a concern of the Minister of National Defence. It is simply a challenge and a task for everyone – or perhaps, above all, for the fresh President.
