Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia focus on developing the arms manufacture and retrofitting the army. Like Poland, they fortify their borders with the Russian Federation and Belarus and fight against the Cremovian propaganda. Tadeusz Wróbel talks about the military situation of the Baltic States with Filip Bryjka, a hybrid threat specialist.
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are experiencing strong political and military force from the Kremlin and are so trying to strengthen their defence. 1 of the moves of the Baltic States is to fortify borders with Belarus and Russia. Why have the Baltics chosen specified a solution?
Creating border fortifications is simply a reaction to Russia's revolutionary and militaristic policy that creates fresh military units close the Baltic States and Finland. Estonia began its first construction, which experienced various provocations from Russia, including shifting border buoys on the river Narwie delimiting part of the Estonian-Russian border. specified actions show that Russia has territorial claims against the erstwhile russian republics. Therefore, the emerging Baltic Defence Line is an crucial military move. due to their size and location, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are deprived of the alleged strategical depth that would let them to defend their territory at certain points with the ability to retreat part of their forces to the facilities and make further defence lines in the country. A tiny geographical area of these countries makes them forced to defend their territory in rule from border posts. Therefore, they decided to make a strategy of fortifications composed of anti-tank ditches, dams, shelters that are primarily intended to impede the opponent's attack, limit his ability to lead a maneuvering war and thus give the defence side an advantage. Besides, defeating specified fortifications would require greater force. So erstwhile Russia concentrated its troops to execute any kind of seizure operation, specified a decision would be identified in time even by satellite designation system and it would be known that it is preparing to attack. From a political perspective, the situation would be easier to measure for all NATO allies.
Do the Baltic States coordinate their efforts to fortify borders?
From a method point of view, each country has so far strengthened its borders by utilizing its resources. Cooperation is, on the another hand, visible at political level, due to the fact that the Baltic countries are full in line with the assessment of the military situation and the way Russia responds to the threat.
Similar actions were taken by Poland, starting construction of the east Shields, which will be in contact with the Baltic Line of Defence in a very delicate place for the Alliance, which requires certain Polish-Lithuanian arrangements.
It is clear from the political declarations, specified as Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, that this cooperation and exchange of information has just begun, but I do not know the method details, whether there would be, for example, any integration of Polish and Lithuanian designation systems.
But we know that Poland and the 3 Baltic States have decided to denounce the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, recognising minefields as an crucial component of border reinforcements.
It was a common political statement. Latvia appears to be the most advanced in the legislative procedure for exiting the Ottawa Convention. Its denunciation does not mean that minefields will shortly appear at the borders with Russia and Belarus, due to the fact that each country, after formally announcing its exit from the Convention for six months, must respect its provisions. It besides takes time to produce or buy these weapons abroad. It must besides be remembered that, for humanitarian reasons, mines will not be utilized to defend borders during peacetime. The point is that the specified anticipation of utilizing both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, which confirmed their effectiveness in the war in Ukraine, is to act as a deterrent to the possible aggressor. Their real usage is only expected if the armed conflict becomes highly probable or inevitable.
Anti-personnel mines are a comparatively inexpensive and simple weapon in production, but not the most important. What capacity does the defence manufacture of the Baltic States have and what production is considered priority?
The capacity of arms production in each of these countries is limited. precedence the ability to manufacture ammunition, including artillery. In Latvia, the production of wheeled armoured transporters of the Finnish company Patria has already been launched, and Estonia has achieved in terms of unmanned systems. Nevertheless, the Baltics intend to invest in arms development, as the planning phase of the improvement of the armed forces has established that at least 1 3rd of the financial expenditure is directed to the national defence industry.
What are the most crucial directions for the modernisation of the method forces of the Baltic States?
The improvement of rocket and air defence systems is surely a priority. Estonia and Latvia saw German short-range IRIS-T rocket systems, and Lithuania ordered further NASAMS kits in Norway. The Latvians besides late signed a contract for the Swedish strategy of very short scope RBS 70NG. The air defence of the 3 Baltic states was besides reinforced by Polish portable Grom and Lightning sets. The second precedence area is the improvement of combat capabilities of land troops, which is reflected in the procurement of armored equipment and artillery systems.
The Baltics almost all these advanced weapons gotta buy abroad. What are the Baltic States' defence efforts today?
The Estonians will spend 3.4% of gross home product in defence this year, but they have already achieved an inter-party consensus, and from 2026 it will be 5%, and political talks are underway to increase defence spending to 6% of GDP in the following years. In Latvia this year's defence budget represents 3.65% of GDP. Next year, it is expected to be 4%, and yet 5% of GDP. A akin growth trend is besides in Lithuania, which this year decided to devote 3.93% of GDP to the defence. In turn, between 2026 and 2030, it wants to earmark 5–6% of GDP. In absolute figures, this is not a stunning amount, as this year's defence budgets of the Baltic triple scope from over EUR 1.5 billion to around EUR 3.2 billion, but it is crucial to appreciate their efforts from the position of changing the approach to strategical issues. They are worth your attention and follow by another NATO associate Statessome of which inactive have a problem defending up to 2% of GDP.
The size of these countries has an impact on defence budgets. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have only 6 million inhabitants. How large a safety problem is limited human resources?
Very serious, due to the fact that there are many vacancies in all these countries in different uniform structures, not only in the military, but besides in the Border Guard. Thus, the approach to the draft service, for example, is changing. And so, in March 2025, the commander of the Estonian Defence Force General Andrus Merilo announced that from 2027 the primary service would be 12 months alternatively of the present 8-11 months. There is besides a debate in all the Baltic States about extending the collection to women, as well as offering various volunteer forms of military service in which training would be shorter. The thought is to build the resilience of the state and to affect the full public in defence. Unfortunately, regardless of all this, limited human resources will be a constant problem for the Baltics.
The power of the state is not only the military, but besides interior cohesion, which is affected by the presence of a Russian number in the Baltic States. To what degree does the fresh generation of this community feel related to Russia?
On the basis of my discussions with experts from the Baltic countries or representatives of the authorities there, the conclusions are alternatively clear – that no Donbas, no Crimea in their case would have happened, due to the fact that the attitude of the Russian-speaking community in these countries is completely different than in the east of Ukraine. These people see her as many benefits of being even stateless. Despite the deficiency of citizenship of the Baltic State, for example, they can travel freely around the European Union. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic States took action to restrict access to Russian-speaking media, which caused a reaction reluctant to the authorities, but did not origin serious incidents. However, this does not change the fact that Russia can inactive instrumentalise the issue of minorities.
So under certain circumstances, this number can be utilized by Russia?
Yeah. Therefore, for example, the Latvian authorities are making migration policy very tight and in the yearly intelligence reports that have late been made public, it was pointed out that 1119 people were prevented from coming to the country due to concerns about subversive activities. There have been various sabotage incidents, airport reconnaissance or infiltration of military units in all Baltic states. Who does this? Very frequently they are people who have Russian, Belarusian or Ukrainian origins, but besides served in the army or safety services of the USSR, for example, are their descendants, i.e. the environment, where sentiment until russian times is strongest.
Under these circumstances, the Baltics request the support of NATO allies. What can they number on?
In the most comfortable situation there are Lithuanians who managed to make their country stationed on 1 April 2025 German 45th Brigade – the first German brigade stationed permanently outside the country since planet War II. Initially, 1 combat battalion was to be deployed in Lithuania, and the another 2 were to be deployed in Germany and moved if necessary. The problem was a limited base of barracks and groundbreaking. The signals that now flow indicate that the Lithuanians will prepare the infrastructure in specified a way that the full brigade can be deployed in Lithuania. We can conclude that the German unit will be highly oriented defence of the Suwałki Pass, so the location of her troops should be comparatively close to this strategical area.
The situation of Latvia, where NATO's combat group is led by Canada, is not as good as Lithuania, as Ottawa has a problem with organizing an expeditionary brigade. That is why it is crucial in this situation announcement of an increase in the Polish Army quota deployed in Latvia.
From Canada's perspective, the military presence in Latvia is in fact the most crucial global military commitment, albeit comparatively small. It is besides the main abroad direction of sending troops since there is no mission in Afghanistan. However, maintaining the quota in Latvia proves to be a major challenge, as Canadian land troops are consequently fewer and unequipped for many years of policy. Canadians, like Europeans, hoped that Americans would defend them forever. It so seems to me that paradoxically president Donald Trump can be the godfather not only of the awakening of Europe, surely in the defence sector, but possibly besides of the change in Canadian policy in this area.
What about the situation in Estonia, where the United Kingdom leads the Natovian forces?
Well, the British have more soldiers than Canada, and they have many obligations in different places around the world. London must besides reckon with limited financial resources, but it inactive tries to be militarily active in the Baltic region. For example, military engineering units aid make the Shields of the East.
The shields of the East and the Baltic Defence Line are to extend along the border with the royal circuit, for years being a heavy militarized Russian enclave, which separates the already mentioned sluice from Belarus. His occupation, in the event of war, by the Russians would cut off the land connection of the Baltic States from my ally with NATO. What is the condition of the troops in the royal circuit, where were many soldiers sent to the Ukrainian war?
According to autumn 2024, the state of completion of the units there was 30–40% due to the fact that the remainder of the military is active in Ukraine. The situation seems comparatively comfortable for the Baltic States, but they fear, for example, any ceasefire in Ukraine, which would let Russia to transfer as many as 300,000 soldiers to the western strategical direction. This would make a very serious threat to the Baltics. However, it seems to me that Russia, even with the current possible at its disposal, would be able to carry out an attack operation which would not be aimed at occupying the full state, but at mastering a tiny condition of the territory. For example, the Estonian city of Narwa or the Latvian region of Latgalia, or places where a large proportion of the population are Russians. Moscow may carry out specified a limited military operation to undermine the credibility of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. She would number on Western European votes that no 1 would fight the Russians for a fewer villages or a tiny town. In my opinion, however, Russia will not decide on a major conflict with NATO, as long as the Alliance is comparatively politically coherent and has a clear assessment of the threat.
The Baltics are not only waiting for aid with NATO and are increasingly engaged in regional political-military initiatives, not only with the Nordic countries, but besides with Poland. Why have we been rather passive in the Baltic area before?
On the 1 hand, I believe that this was due to our focus on strategical partnership with the United States. On the another hand, the Baltic and Scandinavian states did not want Poland to dominate these formats due to its size. In fresh years, however, political-military realities have changed significantly: there has been a full-scale war in Ukraine, there has been an increase in Russia's aggression in the Baltic Sea and uncertainty about the future support of the United States, so in a situation of danger we have become a desirable partner. However, these existing forms of cooperation in the Baltic region concern the political sphere, and strictly military issues, operational plans are not subject to them. So there are discussions on whether to modify existing ones or to make fresh ones.
Is not the deficiency of certain movements due to concern that the over-surgent strengthening of regional cooperation can contribute to the deterioration of cohesion within NATO, due to the fact that it could be perceived as a willingness to dismiss Americans?
Indeed, this could be interpreted as an expression of distrust towards the Alliance. Therefore, fresh military initiatives should be consistent with what is in NATO's regional plans agreed with the United States. However, the Baltic states are afraid that the signals from president Donald Trump's surroundings about the fact that the Americans will reduce their military presence in Europe can prove themselves. It is so expanding the awareness that regional cooperation needs to be deepened and more spent on defence, but with the continuation of military-technical cooperation with the Americans, due to the fact that almost all the countries in the region have made crucial purchases of arms outside the Atlantic in fresh years.
