Cursed soldiers (unbreakable soldiers) – a national disaster, its genesis, the effects and way of political exploitation of their story to the detriment of the Polish nation

Introduction

We present to the reader another text comprehensively addressing the problem of illness of Polish attitudes and Polish consciousness. Diseases we discuss on an example January Uprising, unfortunately they grew into the nation's cultural code and resulted in a number of grades. The Polish mentality and the Polish imagination of service to the nation are liable not only for historical circumstances, but besides for centuries the work of the enemies of the Polish nation, consisting in vacating attitudes that, under favorable circumstances, will lead to national tragedies and massacres of Poles – and the demolition of all actions aimed at repairing national awareness and attitudes of Poles. Text borrowed from the blog world.video.blogwhere it has been published under the title ‘“Cursed” “unbreakable” – what they are from the point of view of nationalistic political thought, where they came from and what geopolitical function their worship presently plays, according to the terms of the Author – without interference with the content. The publication contains a clique of unnecessary pinches for various known people, which could be overlooked. However, the text is intellectually valuable, it incorporates many threads usually overlooked in the debate about the alleged Cursed Soldiers and is highly well documented for the publicist text. We highly urge text November Uprising – cult of political errors, false heroes and its effects.

We want you a reflection reading.
Editorial of Polish National Thought

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1. Nation and nationalist policy and armed struggle
2. Sanitation and emigration policies in the light of nationalist guidelines for armed combat
3. Anti-communist underground as a tragic consequence of the irrational political actions of the London government and the underground authorities
4. The function of the inter-war generation mentality and of "underground" and "london" propaganda
5. How the foolishness of the London government and its delegations drove people into the forest – and what ended
6. National doctrine of carrying out armed actions and “unbreakable” – “cursed”
7. Footnotes

Nation and nationalist policy and armed struggle

Before discussing the anti-communist partisanism in the Polish People's Republic (i.e. the alleged "cursed" / "unbreakable"), it is essential to familiarize the reader with the theoretical foundations of conducting National politics¹ By military action.

Armed actions the nation does not lead to satisfaction national emotional needs (defence of “honor”, “demonstration of opposition”, “demonstration of heroism”, “revenge”, “giving vent to anger” — how many wars and uprisings were justified in these ways? 1830, 1848, 1863, 1939, 1944 – monuments of romance and stupidity), but to accomplish specific, measurable and sustainable Political benefits (including territorial benefits, but only cultural territories should be annexed⁷ – Nationalist doctrine excludes conquests leading to littering the national population with abroad cultural groups and thus conflict with their countries or diasporas), demographic and economic. Of course, it is all the more unacceptable for a nationalist to execution another nation on his land, in order to take over territory (nationalism is not chauvinism—like Nazism or flagism—in which genocide is an acceptable method of taking over land). Sometimes the ‘benefit’ should be understood maintenance of ownership or even just Reduction of losses. What does this mean in practice? We only undertake as a national group the military actions of which durable success is very likely (due to the arrangement of global forces) and the achieved objectives do not initiate processes that will make the benefits gained lost or even outweighed by costs². What can we do if the situation does not supply a chance to accomplish national goals (maintaining the state of ownership) or diplomatic or military? A national policy of minimising losses, understood as:

• minimising demographic losses and harm to the wellness of individual members of the nation,
• minimising the failure of self-determination (internal and external)
• minimising territorial losses,
• minimizing material losses – infrastructure, production assets, movable and immovable property of members of the nation.

The interdependency between the various points in the list above must not be ignored.

The implementation of this policy means openness to negotiations (also seeking these negotiations) "with the devil himself" and very far-reaching flexibility in concessions (until the surrender and the co-operation government – we maximize what can be obtained at the minute from the "devil" alternatively than "stands" unbreakable to the last associate of our nation on the ground of defending our unquestionable “values” or “rights to ...”) due to the fact that the game is about saving the maximum number of compatriots from death, disability and property losses (i.e. to preserve as much of the nation's possible for the future). The global arrangement of forces will change over time and it will be possible to grow its sovereignty, The more strength we can keepinstead of squander them shortsightedly at the incorrect time in advance of losing a fight.

Sanitation and emigration policies in the light of nationalist guidelines for armed combat

It is not hard to note that the actions of both sanatorium authorities until the fall of the Second Polish Republic (which can be dated from the internment of the Sanatorium Government in Romania), the puppet government of Sikorski (I propose that the French familiarize themselves with the scenes of his “election” in place of Wieniawy-Długoszowski) and its London successors, as well as various national conspiracy centres, did not fit into the policy of minimising Polish losses. Sanitation authorities alternatively of safeguarding the Polish people against German crimes (through a suitable capitulation arrangement, which had to be signed in the face of a disaster – alternatively of escaping; the "aliens" would inactive make a "Polish government in exile", due to the fact that they needed formal and legal tools to get Polish cannon meat), deluded that England and France would "soon" defeat Hitler, spent Poles for slaughter. Sikorski's government, alternatively of immediately seeking talks with Stalin about the treatment of Polish interned officers and ethnically Polish people in areas occupied by the USSR, was engaged in the bunchussing of the sword – co-organization of the “Allied” “expedition Corps” which was intended to invade the USSR from Finland³. What price did Polish people pay for this in areas occupied by the USSR and interned Polish officers? possibly the destiny of these Poles was foregone, but the fact is that Polish “power” and Polish “elites” alternatively of doing anything In order to defend the russian Union and in the II Polish area annexed by Stalin, they were active in irritating him, despite the cognition of what the russian Union's repression apparatus could do – as was known from “Polish Operation” from 1937-38.

Stalin, meanwhile, was officially “friended” with Hitler, but from the beginning he was unofficially preparing to “liberate” the full of Europe from Nazi and capitalist occupation, so it was possible to communicate with him and at the time of the economical change (see: invasion of the USSR to Europe or German in the USSR) to establish the Polish ethnically Polish Union of Polish Patriots, in the rhetoric of the Pro-Soviet and pro-Pro-Soviet to the bone. What did Sikorski do erstwhile the global economical situation changed on 22.06.1941? He did not place on Poles specified as Berling, capable of dialog with the russian side and at the same time faithful to the Polish national interest. Let us note here that Berling, in addition to the sense of Polish national interest, was able to show an initiative that someway Polish political elites in the USSR (in the part that lived to 22.06.1941), in the “country” and in London, lacked. Sikorski should even let the creation of an independent Polish pro-Soviet government. Instead, he delegated Anders's Polish armed forces (of which Stalin knew hostile attitude to the USSR). Anders first surrounded himself with akin hard-headed “anti-Soviets” (which, of course, made the full Polish centre unacceptable to the Kremlin), after which he escaped from the USSR with his army (including thousands of Zionist activists).⁸), leaving the remainder of Poles in the USSR to destiny (and Polish-speaking judaic communists), and not in line with the Berling decision Sentenced to death in the past. In the 3rd Polish Republic, the traitor to the Polish national origin Anders is considered a large hero, and the real Polish nationalist (just like this: nationalist⁴) Berling is considered a traitor (with all Poles whom he pulled from GUŁAG to the Polish Army) and his monuments are ruined au Unpunished pseudo-patriot groups (and actually anti-Polish, not belonging to the Polish nation – due to the fact that only specified ones have reasons for motivation race Hating the General; so here it is ostentatious “anticommunism” is all time a screen for protecting anti-Polish activities) provokers.

As you can see, Polish political elites – not only “londy” and “underground” – made a serious strategical mistake during planet War II, namely that not only until the end of the war they attempted to prosecute a policy of "two enemies" based solely on "Western allies" and de facto relying on their favour (and uncertain plans of the russian court to recreate the Second Polish Republic and the full order of Versailles in Central east Europe...), but they besides completely neglected the preparation of any Polish representation in the event of a change in the arrangement of forces and withdrawal of "alians" from projects of war from the USSR (until 22.06.1941 expected, but hypothetical, vide footnote ³, i.e. plans of the Anglo-French invasion of the USSR from ... Finland; see besides Operation Pike). This “hard anti-Soviet” political line of Polish elites ended in a disaster in Tehran, at the time erstwhile the USSR took over the function of reconstructor of Polish statehood. Even if Polish elites considered the war of the Allies from the USSR as a certainty, they were obliged to effort to safe the interests and safety of Poles from the USSR (by the creation of ethnically Polish pro-Soviet government). Unfortunately, Polish elites put the full confrontation of "aliens" from the USSR and ... placed Poles in the first line in this confrontation (which is, of course, highly contrary to the above mentioned. recommendations of a nationalist policy school). It should be stressed that Sikorski's policy of hanging with the handle of England and the US and coquetting Stalin had to end with defeat, i.e. breaking the diplomatic relations of the USSR with its government at the first opportunity⁵ and the emergence of Stalin-controlled squad to take control of the Polish country playing – Stalin did not intend to hand over the London protege of the "west" to control what the "west" had already given him in Tehran (perhaps in the belief that the Red Army would never be able to scope these areas). Sikorski's death (perhaps due to the fact that the "radicals" from his surroundings suspected him of plans for political return and transfer of government to the USSR, as Benesz did – Sikorski was in a sharp conflict with Sanacja, which had strong influences in the emigration army, and presumably she carried out respective well-known modern attempts to assassinate him, possibly Gen. Sosnkowski, was liable for the disaster of "Burza" and the Warsaw Uprising – Okulicki flew into the country with secret instructions from Sosnkowski, a secret cipher known only to him and Sosnkowski¹³ – and ... caused the Warsaw Uprising) did not improve the situation, on the contrary, the London camp after the Tehran conference and the excesses connected first with the “Burza” Action and then the Warsaw Uprising (These were in fact attempts to provoke the US and England – by the London couch and the "underground authority" – to an open conflict with the USSR in defence of the "power" of the Second Polish Republic occupied by the Red Army.) completely lost its importance to the US and England, becoming only a demanding and burdensome petitioner, which yet led to the withdrawal of support for the "powerful" government of Arciszewski (5 July 1945). Of course, the "London government" along with the "delegation" bankrupted politically, driving itself into a blind alley of confrontation with the USSR so far that he was incapable to retreat from it – which led to a national disaster, which was the plan of the "Burza" and its national suicide final in the form of the Warsaw Uprising and then – an anti-communist partisan. Where nationalistic reasoning ordered to avoid confrontation and surrender to the imbalance of forces – the London centre and its national exposition pushed for bloodshed and escalation of panic aimed at the Polish people. That's all – despite Churchill's warnings^911b And simple political reason.

Anti-communist underground as a tragic consequence of the irrational political actions of the London government and the underground authorities

The problem with the Polish underground did not arise from any errors in implementation Reasoned National policy – only from its complete surrealism, beautifully illustrated by the Polish will to participate in the aforementioned invasion of England and France into the USSR by Finland^3c. Politics is simply a search for optimal decisions in the planet with a dynamic changing power system. Nationalist policy optimises decisions from the interests of the nation – not necessarily his elite.. 1 of the most crucial features of global policy is the careful balance of commitment to alliances and Do not close your ways to reverse allianceswhen specified a reversal becomes beneficial or essential for the nation. If individual bothers to read Churchill's transcripts of talks with Nicholas⁹, he will realize that in early 1944. Polish politicians were told openly that the alliance with England was no longer giving the Polish nation nothing but support for Stalin's territorial claims and force on the merger of London puppet regulation with Moscow puppets. You could have Even then supply that territorial compensation in the west at the expense of the 3rd Reich will be torpedoed by the “aliens” due to the fact that the reinforcement of Stalin’s satellite (which became Poland after the Tehran conference) at the expense of Germany, whose destiny had not yet been decided, was no longer in the interest of the “west”¹⁰. Paradoxically Stalin became the only ally of the Polish nation in the game for Polish Western Borders, while the Polish east borders have long been accepted by the "alians" (I besides urge a look at history of the latest concept of “Borders on Oder and Nysa”). As you can see alliancesby myself The Polish nation and Polish elites – as well as Polish masses – did not realise it in time or did not want to accept it.

Of course, in the context of the above political nonsense of acts of panic of the post-AK underground and self-proclaimed "nationals" is indisputable. What did they want – they, armed with gunfire – in a fight against them – Polish-speaking puppets Stalin, and the power of the USSR? After Tehran, then Yalta and yet – after Potsdam, about the form and authority of the Polish state was decided by Józef Stalin, while the “aliens” of the London government did not intend to do anything about Poland, but political release from her in the eyes of her own public opinionwho wanted an end “second war” and no “war”third war" – especially in defence of “some Poland” – she did not want to hear. From here, after conference in Tehran, these constant pressures from Churchill on Nicholas to “some” deal with Stalin⁹ And he stopped bothering the JKM government. The "London Government" after 22.06.1941 was for the rulers of the U.S. and England only a troublesome political ballast. Thus, the “allied” alleged “anti-communist underground” was of interest at the time only as an intelligence network in Stalin’s empire, alternatively than as a “actively militant partisan with the USSR” (then, around 1980, any Afghanistan in the PRL was already in their favor). What the more clever “canapists” of London understood was that only as part of the Agentural Grid can the pot of “Angloss” proceed to function. The end halt of this "political thought" way was so-called. ‘The Bergu affair’ on the 1 hand, and episodes like the sad end rtm. W. Pilecki - from the other.

If we look clearly at the "adventure" of the "London Government" and "underground authorities", It boils down to taking the power of the Polish People's Republic and giving it to the Jews brought by the Red Army, due to the fact that Polish elites, even the most honest ones wishing to join the Polish People's Republic – were suspicious for Stalin. It was due to the “government” of London – first Sikorski, then Mikołajczyk was not executed “Benesh’s maneuver” or another realistic effort to keep power in Poland in Polish hands. It was due to these "amazing" people that Stalinic panic had a judaic head and unnecessarily more bloody face in the "Popular Poland". But this was not the only possible "decision path". It was even possible to divide the government into a “hard-headed” faction that would sit in London and “proradical” that would go to Moscow (remember – initially Stalin demanded “only” the removal of “anti-radical elements” from the government of London, an operation of specified a division as I am writing about at the time was a full possible political act, which would severely limit Stalin’s freedom of manoeuvre – the price was to accept Curzon’s Line, which the “aliens” had already “captured” erstwhile the USSR signed Atlantic Charter – The delegation of the USSR signed it 24.09.1941 with the condition that the borders of the USSR were those from 22.06.1941, that is, with all territorial acquisitions – without any opposition from the US or England) and then – “on russian tanks” returned to the country. At the right time (i.e. somewhere close the Tehran conference) the "national" underground authorities should have recognized the superiority of a more strategically favourable cabinet – "Moscow" or "londyński", depending on whose sphere of influence Poland will enter. 1 can argue, as real and possible, that this would not have worked, due to the fact that Benesz was removed and Stalinism began there. Yes, it has. But much later – and as part of this Stalinism in the Czech Republic, there was no panic of specified a part of the population as in Poland. So many people were not killed there without any benefit – whether through repression or terrorism of "patriots" and armed struggles. There were no “national” troops active in looting on specified a scale (yes, all troops of the alleged “cursed” were forced to live from armed robbery – or to rob Poles indirectly – by robbing state property – or straight – by “requisitioning” in villages food, livestock, clothing, footwear, etc. – of course, as their apologists claim – only in “communists” ... it was comic that, according to modern people, as to Catholic art, the apologists of the “unbreakable” village “communist” robbed, maimed or even killed, it was necessary, especially erstwhile it was “indicted” and in majesty its own, private, ‘practice’ ‘condemned’ ...). Apart from the looting, our “warriors for independent Poland” were inactive dealing with terrorist murders on accidental civilians and, in the best for their “anti-communist” legend of the time, authoritative planktons in the province.

The function of the inter-war generation mentality and of "underground" and "london" propaganda

Of course, political errors of the II Polish elites did not hang in vacuum. In a well-educated national society, all Poles would follow the way Boleslaw Piasecki or Władysław Gomulka (who, erstwhile going from other sides of the political spectrum, equally assessed what was in the interests of the Polish people and what was not – comic that they were thus in the camp hostile ... Primate Wyszynski, present – on dubious grounds – created on a large Polish patriot and almost a statesman ... – even though He praised nonsense killings like the January and Warsaw Uprising, which truly harmed the collective awareness of the Polish people). But, as past has shown – the losing and harmful national conflict was for any reason attractive to any part of the society (in 1945-1946 up to a maximum of 17 1000 people in more than 20 million people, after amnesty this number shrunk to respective 100 people – this is data from the propaganda IPN, so the maximum overestimated¹²). An crucial origin that has determined Moral The primacy among the masses of the concept of suicide and senseless conflict to follow common sense and conduct policies adapted to the realities (the existing global strategy of forces) was the romanticist mentality which Sanacja vaccinated Poles in the framework of, among others, Sanacja. cult of the January Uprising and general perception of responsibilities towards the state and nation in emotional terms: “winkelriedow” or “kmicic” demonstrations. specified a mentality led, for example, to fierce opposition of Westerplatte and Wizna defenders, on the another hand – for example, to the nationally harmful heroism of Major H. Dobrzański "Hubal" (the effect of which was German Retaliatory murders on the population of surrounding villages). From a point of view blood economy⁶ The impulse of a soldier or commander of a regular unit to become a “Polish Leonidas” is of national benefit during the regular defensive war (he makes it importantly hard for the enemy to break the front and increases its losses). Unfortunately, we have a pattern on the second pole of strategizing and romanticist attitudes. Father Pear and ‘Hubala’, which under the conditions of the guerrilla war, or almost complete control of the territory by the enemy, will only make unnecessary losses, caused both by military action and by the panic of the occupier, but will not give the nation none benefits. The utmost implementation of specified attitudes has become (against the intentions of the perpetrators to face the armed forces with the Red Army alternatively than Germany) Warsaw Uprising.

If the “London” and “national” authorities were more responsible, i.e. if they were to lead Policy alternatively of performing theatrical gestures under the "international public", would bring the press under their control and (just in case) prepare society not for desperate, devastating opposition – only for the most peaceful possible transition through a situation in which the government may be forced to compromises painfully for the great-powerful pride of the "Teachers of the Second Republic".

What did the “government” of London and its “underground” associate in the “country” do? alternatively of someway settling relations with Stalin, for years he sloung Polish society on the USSR, building confrontational attitudes erstwhile he should soften them. In fact, he narrowed himself and his subordinate field of political manoeuvre, as certain decisions became unacceptable to the masses raised on romanticist patterns and a great-powerful myth¹⁴. erstwhile the USSR troops began entering Poland (attributed to the USSR in Tehran in December 1943), the “London government” and its “delegation” sent Poles to execute in front of the “Soviets” as hosts, to exposure the structures of the AK and administration and they spoke to the “Soviets” from the position of force they did not have¹⁵¹⁶¹⁷. In numbers of Sosnkowski and Bora-Komorowski These people had cause fight against the Red Army and arrest of representatives of the underground administration, which in turn was expected to force the "aliens" to make a strong message against Stalin and force him (by political force or even ... war) to respect the authority of the London Government and its delegation in the pre-war territory of the Second Republic of Poland. At the same time, no 1 thought to ask the “allied” what Poles could anticipate from them in the event of the described transition of “Polish Underground” to the state of war with the USSR (no little – Churchill, not asked, replied 25.04.1944 – that Poles have the right to commit suicide if they want to.). Questions were not asked due to the fact that they tried to settle the substance above Churchill and Roosevelt's heads – by direct "revocation to the public" of England and the USA, which was to force on these politicians a confrontation with Stalin on the Polish matter. It has only been forgotten that censorship is in place during the war – and the "public opinion" can only learn what Churchill and Roosevelt will let her to learn (then the net was not there – and even in the net age not so easy reached present in various "free" and "democratic" countries to any information).
The final episode “Burza” was evidently attempt to provoke the fighting of the AK with the Red Army in Warsaw in 1944. (See besides text "criminal intent of AK Command") which – in the absence of Hitler's will to cooperate with the "genial" plans of Polish political and military “elite” – ended with the Warsaw Post in which the AK did not shoot itself.

Let us note that Stalin – thanks to the agent in the ranks of the AK, as well as from the ... underground press, knew both the political attitude of the elite of the underground state, as well as the spirit in which these elites raised the underground “act” and Polish society in general for over 4 years. During his talks with Mikołajczyk in August 1944, he was even expected to present the Polish underground press to him and comment on its content, as evidence of the hostility of his administration (London and “delegation”) towards the USSR. What “batiuska” thought about the anticipation of working with these people – it is not hard to guess. The same thing we'd think about sitting in his place.

But on the press and the agent, the case didn't end. Of course, besides various "strategic" reports submitted between Warsaw and London were most likely not abroad to Stalin. Why should we fishy that? due to the fact that broadcasts between Warsaw and London went through English radio stations and English encrypts (JKM government watched over what the London marionettes were posting with the "national" underground), and only then hit the hand of the London government or the national delegation, respectively. As you can see, the number of people between the recipient and the broadcaster was not tiny – either on the English side or on both sides of Poland. Additionally – of course, this and this could be determined from listening (radioelectronic intelligence) and most likely besides from the “Soviet” services.

Propaganda treatment of underground press imposed on a circumstantial strategy of values and individual patterns instilled in the Second Polish Republic resulted in certain decisions of parts of the underground after the end of the war. The decisions which caused the Polish nation additional – unnecessary and avoidable with wiser conduct of politics – losses and suffering.

How the foolishness of the London government and its delegations drove people into the forest – and what ended

Of course, the number of unnecessarily killed and imprisoned Poles is liable not only for propaganda of the Second Polish Republic, but besides for the cult of romanticist (lost-suicide) pseudopatriotic attitudes known from the January Uprising. And not just the propaganda of the underground authorities. It is besides essential to add concrete combat actions that come down to the killing by the AK and the remainder of the "patriotic" and "national" underground communist activists, guerrillas from AL, BCh and Soviet¹², as well as the usage in the political fight against the “communists” of reports on the Gestapo. Case open collaboration not integrated from the AK of the Świętokrzyska Brigade with Germany This is just the most spectacular example. The underground authorities, going to the end of the confrontation with the USSR “wet” a crucial number of people to specified an degree that if they were hit by “communists” long word prison sentences or death punishment for “collaboration with fascists” would be full justified. Neither the London elite nor the national elite have considered what will come of leaving these "outlaws" people in the country. alternatively of organise mass planned evacuation – they left these people alone, which of course filled the forests with desperate for everything and having no return to average life in a fresh Stalinist reality (and another was not possible, as compared to a trade transaction concluded with Stalin by Churchill and Roosevelt in Tehran). These desperate people have drawn others with their example (we remember the romanticist patterns instilled in the Second Polish Republic) or through their authority in conspiracy structures. Of course, the scale and severity of Stalinist repressions, which have embraced thanks to their “hero” of the “patriotic” and “national” attitude of another Poles, did not shrink, but on the contrary – what “doctors” and “professors” from the IPN may seem impossible – increased.

I will briefly mention to the derailed "public debate" around the criminality of various forms of the underground "anti-communist". Today, various "exotic figures" who gain a surviving by giving fairs around various "unbreakable cursed" effort to tell us that this underground "anti-communist" was the consequence of panic alternatively than – panic – the effect of this underground. The panic was determined by the London and national authorities, even a fewer years ahead installation of communist authorities. These “exotic characters” tell it in the same speeches, in which they tell how the “Brigad Świętokrzyska” did not only co-operate with Germany (Marching shoulder-to-shoulder with them during the retreat, and then training at the Wermacht camp in Czechoslovakia ...), but actually followed the orders of the chief commander (gen. Sosnkowski, about the evacuation to the west) who never reached it (yes, it is simply a commentary on a fewer of the “prelections” of prof. Leszek Żebrowski). According to these “exotic figures”, anti-communist guerrillas did not execution or rob anyone (except for “communists”, whom they know to execution and rob slow or even request to), this was exclusively done by a bunch of UB pretenders. So far, IPN and these "exotic past researchers" have failed to identify the top secret UB cells that murdered in Old Puffs, Subsidiaries, Zaniach and Szpakach, Uppers – that I will only take the most “spectacular” “works” of the “unbreakable” anti-communist “heroes”. And erstwhile individual is curious about how “the fight for independent Poland” looked in more “retail” situations, I mention to texts about Joseph Kurasiu and his “happy flock” either Franciszek Olszówka. ‘Glass’, famous for killing Lithuanian women and children in retaliation for the crimes of Lithuanian fascists – alternatively “a hero without fault” is not – and – emotionally toughened by the trial with the Lithuanians and their offspring – he has done many harm to Poles after the war. It is adequate to get an thought of what these people – and very many little "iconic" (various "Lalks" and "Salapats") – become "paralleled". Among anti-communist guerrillas, there are far little repugnant figures than the human-eating "heroes" of the texts listed above, but even the "Professor", the idol of Dr. Ewa Kurek's utmost judeophile, has Polish, poured completely without any sense or benefit to the Polish people, blood on his hands. And it doesn't substance at all what part of the charges it is possible to defend this or any another partisan utilizing various historical machos specified as juggling witness testimony, rejecting uncomfortable papers as fabricated, inventing legends about UB and NKVD provokers, who, in the "replacement" of patriotic guerrillas, were to commit a given crime or given robbery. The thing is that the full phenomenon of anti-communist partisanism was, tragic from the point of view of national interest, political mistake and the effect of a full chain of another political errors. Setting up monuments (literally, but besides understood figuratively) to people whose actions have harmed the nation, regardless of their intentions and ideas about what they do – is incorrect for the interests of the Polish people, due to the fact that it introduces chaos in the minds of Poles in the area of individual patterns, patterns of conduct and ideas. Chaos desired by our enemies – and chaos from which live various cynical publicist parasites.

National doctrine of carrying out armed actions and “unbreakable” – “cursed”

An armed conflict should only be fought if there is simply a chance of victory. This chance is determined by the power ratio and the ability to reproduce forces. These factors have foreshadowed the senselessness of the “cursed” fight.

The fight without a chance of winning generates only unnecessary costs (direct material losses, killings and permanently mutilated, depriving the full nation of what they could produce as surviving and healthy people).

If we want to ask a question – whose side in this conflict was right from the point of view of strategical reasoning in terms of national interest, the answer is clear and obvious. Right was on the side of those Poles who fought on the judaic government side – whether politically or with arms in hand. Why? The anti-communist underground in that geopolitical and military situation had no chance of winning, so it was incapable to implement its political visions. It lived in a planet of fantasy at planet War III. All the forces and resources allocated to his fight were simply a wasteful and foolish demolition of national resources. For this reason, in the interests of the Polish people, then these groups had to be overpowered or destroyed as shortly as possible – in order to minimize the full bloodshed of Polish blood, which would be shed the more, the longer the armed conflict would continue. In that situation, even the passiveness of Poles towards decentralised, real anti-national and increasing demoralized underground activities could only lead to an extension, and so a tiny list of completely unnecessary and futile victims. In the best interests of the Polish people, it was essential to actively support the UB and the CWB in the fight against armed bands – or to aid to decision all those who fought to the conflict – to the “torn west”. This is simply a very hard fact to accept for a parent in a contemporary message, hostile to rationalism (and nationalism), the nationalicidal version of pseudopatriotism. Let us decision this way of reasoning about the “diversification” of the nation's resources to year 1863. If we would like to be equally rational in examining what Poles should have done after a group of agents-controlled traitors and stupid kids triggered the January Uprising – the answer is clear – do not "war to the end" in the woods, like any priest Brzóska, just join the armed confrontation ... on the Tsar side. If Poles with their own hands ended this criminally stupid and anti-Polish uprising after a week, beating up romanticist fools and agents controlling them alongside the tsarist forces – they would be able to push through the improvement of Poland, and could besides gain a position akin to that of Finland. In 1918 we would launch to rebuild our country from a completely different – more favourable level for us. With all the consequences for the geographical form of the state that we would then be able to fight.

What could be achieved in the field of eastern, western and northern borders from 1943 to 1945 with another politics and another nationalistic national awareness of Poles – unfortunately we will never know. But we know with certainty that no individual killed or injured in the fight of the "unbreakable cursed" – on both sides of the conflict – won nothing for the Polish people.

Footnotes

¹ It should be stressed that the policy of the nation (a national state guided by nationalistic doctrine) is diametrically different from that of politics empire (State guided by the interest of the ruling oligarchy, usually multiethnic and not corresponding to the cultural structure of the population of the empire). The elite of the empire treats the full population of the empire as subhumans whose sole intent is to give life and wellness in the name of expanding the state of possession of an oligarchy ruling the empire, with the cultural structure of these slaves being irrelevant to the oligarchy (regardless of the authoritative ideology of the empire). Nationalism is so on the ground utilitarian "anti-imperialist" and "anti-colonial" on a primitive basis – the centre of the nationalistic thought is the sovereignty of all nation in its cultural territory)

² An example of nationally erroneous action (a tiny fast advantage combined with a deterioration of the power strategy in the average and long term) was, for example, the annexation of Zaolzia on the occasion of the demolition of Czechoslovakia, which was part of the chain of events ending with the demolition of the Polish state.

^{3[↑a][↑b][↑c]} The Allied Desant was to number from 13,000 to 17,000 soldiers, and his task was to cut off the Murmanian connection. This plan could not have had a chance of success due to the thinness of the forces sent and yet failed to be realized. The Polish side declared its participation in the Operation of the Podhale firearm Brigade. The “anti-Soviet” operation, which was to end with the defeat of the USSR and the entry into the 3rd Reich of Poland from the east, was to begin with aid to Finland. Foreign aid to Finns and complementary Operation Pike planning.

⁴ For example, Jakub Berman, in an interview with Teresa Toranska, he judges Berling, for dictatorial aspirations, nationalism and anti-Semitism (T., “They”, Ringier Axel Springer Polska, Warsaw 2012, pp. 37-40).
Berling lost the power conflict in PRL to the people of ZPP: A. Lampe and W. Wasilewska, about whom he wrote: “Here is now a renegade, criminal, half-wit and uncouth non-nuk and a rude man making up a screen behind which The elite of the chosen nation: Berman, Zambrowski, Minc and Szyr, takes the control of government in the state into its hands‘ (Berlin Z. "Memoirs: Freedom to tender", Polish Publishing House, Warsaw 1991, p. 383)

⁵ On 16 April 1943, Władysław Sikorski refused to admit the authoritative position of the USSR on the Katyn crime (assigned to the Germans) and demanded the investigation of the global Red Cross, for which he was accused by the USSR of cooperating with the 3rd Reich. On 26 April 1943 the USSR broke diplomatic relations with the government of Sikorski. Stalin, in a confidential correspondence with Churchill, made the restoration of diplomatic relations conditional on the removal of anti-Soviet politicians from the London government, which is de facto he wanted to make his own reconstruction of the government of the Second Republic in exile.

⁶ The "blood economy" should be understood as having specified life and wellness active in the fight (and the non-warning population exposed to death or harm to health) of the people concerned, so that the possible (most likely) benefits of the fight justify (i.e. at least offset) the most likely costs.

⁷ For example, the territories formerly belonging to the Polish state should not be confused with Polish cultural territories (the mistake of many pseudo-patriotic and pseudo-nationalist parties active in popularising the thought of "bouncement" of Kres from Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine). An cultural criterion requires cultural dominance of a given national group in a given territory. In territories inhabited by many nationalities, it is optimal to list the population with the home countries of these nations in order to get a united cultural state. The attachment of slices of territories inhabited by abroad nationalities, having their own states, is unfavorable, as it leads to the emergence of people with ambiguous state loyalty – a possible 5th column. If we let representatives of specified a number to participate equally in the performance of public offices and functions – we hazard serious problems in the event of their agential disloyalty, and if we discriminate against this group – we will make a sense of harm and increase its hostility. 2 nations in 1 country can only be within a federation, where each nation has its own cultural territory over which it exercises sovereignty. Mixing nations by force will end in a conflict for the power of the cultural mafia against the dominant nation in the state. Just like in the 3rd Poland.

⁸ Zionist activists, who, after mass defection from this army, began to organize judaic forces to reflect parts of Palestine from the British hands and establish the State of Israel there – according to popular conspiracy theories, the advocacy problems of Anders' troops and the British offer to decision the sanctioning army to the mediate East were a planned act of diaspora in England and the USSR, oriented to the construction of Israel utilizing Jews from the Second Republic of Poland, but I callback – Stalin had a political interest in getting free of Anders and his group from the country – and had no interest in grooming and feeding the political enemy on his own land. As for the Zionists themselves, I propose reading a text about their connection to Sanjay:
(...) contacts on the line of the Vulcans – the right-wing Zionists did not break out with the outbreak of war. They unexpectedly revived in 1942 erstwhile the army of Władysław Anders arrived in Palestine. It was then – after the general's silent approval – that about 3,000 judaic soldiers were “deserted” from the Polish army, a large part of whom was powered by underground anti-British armed organizations.
One of them was the celebrated Menachem Begin. 1 of the most prominent Zionist-revisionist activists to be Prime Minister of Israel in the future and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. (for Jewish commandos from the Second Republic)

⁹ From the transcripts from Churchill's conversations with Nicholas:

On 16 February 1944, another Polish-British gathering took place at the summit, during which Churchill utilized all of his eloquence to get Mikołajczyk to accept Curzon's line sine qua non a wider Polish-Russian agreement. Churchill's efforts were fruitless again, though he presented reasons for Polish concessions in the most convincing and even drastic way possible. Churchill's lectures could have been utilized by Nicholas as a Realpolitik lesson.

The British Prime Minister asked Mikołajczyk if he should tell Stalin that the agreement was impossible; for Britain it could have been the easiest way out. The Russians rapidly pushed forward and shortly could make a puppet, but widely supported, government in Poland, and then carry out a fake plebiscite. Poland can even be joined by the russian Union. Meanwhile, the Polish Government will inactive be in London, and Poles in the country will think that it was rather comfortable there. However, it will have no effect on the ongoing accidents. “We cannot and do not want,” Churchill said, to halt the march of Russians through Poland against the Germans, who will destruct everything at the time of their retreat.

We will stay in the strictest possible relation with the Russians, and Poland will be nothing more than a origin for complaint and a cry of pain that is loudly echoed. Nothing can be achieved. Poles will not have their fatherhood, they will not receive any compensation from broken Germany, there will be no agreement with Russia. For 1 100 and 50 years Poland was not present, and her “sons were forced to fight against each other” during the dispute between the 3 empires. Today, there was an chance to supply them with shelter, after their sufferings, in a compact country, for which he was prepared to strive as hard as possible. Churchill admitted that if Polish concerns that the Russians were perverse were justified, it was bad for the world, but worst for Poles. The UK has always fought against all tyranny, but its possibilities were limited and could not save Poland alone.

Source: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Coverage of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984., pp 163-164

As a comment to the above, Churchill's aim was to make a government of “national unity” from the Stalinist group and London puppets. He knew that Poland would only be what Stalin wanted to make it – and that all he could accomplish was placing his people on a certain number of government positions agreed with Stalin. Churchill understood that Stalin would increasingly request the appearance of building a Polish “government of national unity” as time passed. Most could be achieved in the winter of 1941/1942 – erstwhile Sikorski chose to stall, alternatively of establishing binding (although hard to swallow for the "patriots" of the Second Republic) boundaries from the USSR. erstwhile the USSR army stood on the Vistula River and Stalin learned the real strength of the Polish underground – the officers of the London couch were already needed only as a fig leaf, precisely the same as Churchill and Roosevelt, who wanted – thanks to this fig leaf – the alleged "Polish matter" out of their heads. As M. Ciechanowski writes: "Churchill (20.01.1944) warned Poles, however, that it was almost impossible for the United Kingdom, let alone the United States, to go to war with Russia on the east borders of Poland. He besides admonished that Though he was now telling them all this confidentially, he would not hesitate to repeat it publically if needed..’ (op.cit. p. 147)

¹⁰ As K. Janicki writes:

The reasoning of Western politicians was simple: if the Republic fell – with their approval – into the snare of the russian Union, it had to be weakened as much as possible. The russian satellite with wide access to the sea and all of Silesia seemed a worse solution than the hull state without simultaneously east lands and any compensation in the west.
...
Winston Churchill (...) insisted not to pass on German cities to Poland He insisted that he was besides defending ours (W.: Polish) the interests of: The compensation should, however, correspond to the loss. Nothing good will come from Poland to gain specified a large amount of additional territory....
He thundered that Russian-dominated Polish government was encouraged to make immense and hurtful annexations at the expense of Germany. Similarly, the U.S. Secretary of State in Harry Truman's office, James Byrnes, who visited Stuttgart in September 1946, speaking aloud against the consolidation of the Polish western border.
...
Chancellor [RFN], Konrad Adenauer, stated in 1951 in the Bundestag: I want to make it clear that for us the lands on the another side of Oder and Nysa are parts of Germany. The reconstruction of the western provinces of Poland was to be the first step after the unification of Germany and East Germany.

While the United Kingdom and the United States did not officially sign specified an action plan, they unofficially considered it as much as possible. Andrzej Leon Sowa writes in his fresh book – ‘Political past of Poland 1944-1991′ – that inactive in September 1953 the United Kingdom prepared a secret task depriving Poland of territory between Nysa Kłodzka and Łużycka in the event of the signing of a peace treaty between the 4 powers and united Germany. ...
Source: Allies? Truman, Marshall and Churchill tried to take distant the West Lands.

¹¹

On April 25, Churchill met (...) With Berezowski, secretary general of SN (...) Berezowski (...) stressed that the country trusted that Britain and Churchill would guarantee Poland's independency and integrity of its borders. Churchill promised to search Poland's independence, But not the integrity of its borders, again advocating Curzon’s line — the dedication of Vilnius and Lviv to Russia — and compensations at the expense of Germany in the west. Berezowski replied that the Polish nation stood firm on the ground of the impermeability of borders and was ready to fight for Vilnius and Lviv. Churchill, without getting into the discussion, said in a serious and even grim way:

‘Probably. The decision of resistance, regardless of the consequences, is the privilege of all nation and cannot be denied even to the weakest."

Source: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Overview of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. p 180

Churchill's message meant more or little that he could not prevent Poles from being mad at the USSR, but they could not number on England in this madness.

¹² The IPN page reads:

... In 1945, around 350 branches of the underground of independency were operating within the borders of Poland. In their ranks fought from 13,000 to 17,000 soldiers.

Half of them belonged to the AK troops, later converted into the Armed Forces Delegation to the Country and then into the Association “Freedom and Independence”. The second largest underground force was the troops of the National Military Organization, the National Armed Forces and the National Military Unity, bringing together 2 700 – 3 600 soldiers. In both of these formations, more than 70 percent of all soldiers (9 300 – 12 300) served – the remainder were soldiers concentrated in regional or independent organizations, No 1 subject to armed forces [W.: simply armed bands] (3,700 – 4,800 soldiers in total). (...) As a consequence of the “forest unloading” action launched in the summertime of 1945 by the AK-DSZ command and the alleged August amnesty announced by the communist authorities, the number of troops decreased. From January 1946 to spring 1947, in the underground ranks, the fighting continued from 6,600 to 8,700 guerrillas. Thus, there was a decline of 50 percent in underground units compared to 1945. The situation changed dramatically after the communists introduced amnesty Spring 1947 After the alleged disclosure in the forest, there were between 1,100 and 1,800 soldiers leftAnd the massive underground is gone.W.: Looking at numbers – in fact it was never mass or influential ...]. At the turn of 1947–1948 the last nationwide conspiracy command was broken up. any regional grids survived until 1951–1952. After 1950 more than 40 guerrilla troops operated, 240 – 400 guerrillas fought in their ranks. In 1953, camera officers managed to destruct the last armed troops, while in the forest they remained hiding alone or in the 2–3-person “last armed” groups who did not fight actively.

Source: IPN, “Plotted reaction dwarfs...” Polish independency Underground 1944–1956, https://zkr.ipn.gov.pl/ , accessed: 25.01.2022

¹³

On 3 June Okulicki was admitted by the AK commander. He was besides appointed general.
But before that, he was briefly in the infirmary where General Kazimierz Sawicki contacted him. Here is the account of these talks: "I had the impression that Okulicki had come with the formal mandate of the Chief Leader (..) The attitude of Gen. Okulicki to the current ultimate Authorities of the AK was even critical – not only regarding the individual qualifications of this team, but besides the direction of the work of the AK. The Okulicki mission was to change things." Further: "He emphasized the mandate received from Gen. Sosnkowski, having close and direct contact with him (special code) and the ability to communicate with London above the heads of authorities in Warsaw". And the final conclusion: "As all this points to it, its task was not to perceive to arguments, but to believe who was able to support the thought of an uprising in Warsaw".

Source: Lech Mażewski, the duo of legionary generals and the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, Nowa Miśl Polska 31/2004
Reprint in: Sidorowicz J., Kulisy of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising disaster. Selected publications and documents, edited by the Informal Group of Warsaw Insurgents, fresh York, Montreal, 2009, p.96

¹⁴

“Despite acts are sometimes inevitable in the lives of nations because of the collective feelings of society, for the political symbolism of these acts and the moral meaning of posterity.

However, I am convinced that the Government would like to consider well the symbolism and meaning of the act of despair under conditions which, contrary to our intentions, could necessarily facilitate, with our help, the fulfilment of the interests of the another occupier. The business would not be defended by russian Russia...”

Letter from the Chief Leader to the Prime Minister, 22 X 1943, L. d. 1420/Op. i.e. A. XII 3/89, IGS.
In: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Coverage of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. p. 255

I would point out that these "collective feelings of society" were decently formed and fueled by the emigration and underground authorities, which themselves drove themselves into a dead end of confrontation with the USSR – and, worse still, "formed" to this Polish public opinion, after Tehran, doomed to defeat. Yes, after the “Polish operation”, after 17.IX.1939, deportations and murders on interned officers, the attitudes of the Polish nation were mostly hostile to “Soviets”, but political reason dictated their mitigation alternatively than fueling.

¹⁵

The inaction of the AK erstwhile the Soviets entered our lands would not be equivalent to the inactivity of the country. The initiative to fight Germany will give the PPR in this case, and a crucial part of society can join this movement. Then the country would actually go to work with the Soviets, by no longer inhibited [...]
It must be added that the situation, despite the fact that our insignificant military conflict can be considered to be cooperation with the Soviets, forces us to act actively and uncover the AK. By giving the Soviets minimum military aid, however, we make a political difficulty. The AK underlines the function of the nation in the pursuit of independence. This forces the Soviets to break our will by force and creates difficulties in dissolving our aspirations from within.
I am aware that our disclosure may endanger to destruct the most perfect component in Poland, but the demolition of this cannot be carried out by the Soviets secretly, and there will should be public rape, which could trigger a protest of friendly allies.
Report 243. Situation study of the AK Commander to the Chief Leader of 14 VII 1944, L, d.o. 6302/44, SPP
In: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Overview of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. p. 263

¹⁶

1. Our russian guerrilla troops on the ground should in no case be hindered from fighting Germany. Avoid clashes with russian troops today. These troops that have already had specified a predicament and could not so decently establish relations with russian troops should be moved to another areas. Only self-defense is allowed on our side.

2. The trend of the population in east areas to flee west from the Russian danger should be addressed. Especially the mass departure of Polish regions, where it creates clearly Polish clusters, would be equivalent to the elimination of the Polish state of possession in these areas.

3. In the face of our regular Russian army entering the land, we will act as host. The aim should be to guarantee that the Polish commander, who had a fight with Germany and as a consequence the best rights of the host, is in front of the russian troops entering. In far more hard conditions in relation to Russians, there will be a commander and the Polish population, whose release from the Germans will be made only by Russians. The local Polish commander should study to the commander of the russian troops with a typical of the civilian administrative authority and comply with his wishes, remembering:

(a) that the separation from the chief Polish authorities is only temporary and that they, alternatively than the Russians, stay in any case the competent superior authority and that the nature and scope of the russian regulation should be determined for the Polish citizen by the legal authorities of Rzplitej;

(b) that all attempts to integrate Polish troops into Russian troops or Berling's troops are rape and must be powerfully opposed...“

Order of the AK Commander of 20 XI 1943, L. d. 2100, SPP.
In: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Coverage of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. p. 265-266

¹⁷

The Chief Leader, emphasizing the clearly anti-Soviet aspects of “Burza”, inspired her national authors to defy the Russians in the event of their repression of the AK. He imposed on the AK commander his own explanation of "Burza":

You anticipate instructions from me whether your troops — wrote to Bora-Komorowski — which will come out in accordance with your own decision, are to make a categorical request from the Soviets to lay down their weapons or to put up armed resistance.

It can, of course, be argued that it is the Chief Leader's work to issue the appropriate orders, although your question derives from the self-change of instructions dated 27 X 43. I don't rather realize you. On the 1 hand, your orders rightly exclude armed combat from 2 fronts, and on the another you declare that they do not exclude armed self-defense. Whether armed self-defense is not an armed struggle, or do you think self-defense will not happen. We're all shutting down the armed conflict on 2 fronts, if it's up to us. However, this fight may be imposed on us by the Soviets.

In your command [...] you order that any effort to include Polish troops in the Red Army or in Berling's troops is simply a rape which must be powerfully opposed. I'm asking what it means for a military force to stand firm against rape. Do you hope that without a political agreement, russian command will tolerate Polish troops under the legal authorities of the Republic? You talk in your order about armed self-defense against Russian terror, and at the same time you ask whether your troops are to lay down weapons at the request of the Soviets. Is self-defense without weapons possible? [...]

Chief Chief can't give orders to lay down arms against rape and violence. erstwhile again, until the limits of human capabilities, an open fight against the Soviets must be avoided. Everything that could be said in this case is in rule self-defense, as determined by the Government and confirmed in your command as the natural law of all man. Regardless of the wording, in the face of the evil will of the Soviets, the applicable effect will always be the same, if the real intent of disclosure is to paper our sovereign rights throughout the territory of the Republic of Poland — [under mine — J.M.C.].

Chief Chief to Commander AK, 12 II 1944, L. d. 1217/tjn./ /44, SPP.

The intent of the Chief Leader was obvious. In a typical way, without resorting to military commissions, he encouraged Bora-Komorowski to take up a fight with the Russians, in case they wanted to disarm the exposed AK troops. Sosnkowski mentally prepared his subordinates in the country for the inevitable fight against the Red Army, in his opinion.

...
In the opinion of the Chief Leader, the AK commander, at this "breaking moment", had the choice of "two roads" — both based on the presumption of an uncompromising fight against Germany:

1) The first is to strictly follow the instructions of 27 X 43. This instruction stands by our laws despite everything and against everything — [under mine — J.M.C.].

Under the force of allies, our Government is as if to any degree weakened — most of all, it wants to take from your own decision as asumpt to justify the policy of gradual concessions, or at least to abandon the basic position of the Instruction of 27 X. that without a political agreement we will not cooperate with the Soviets.

2. The second is to give way to Russian pressures, now not hampered, but alternatively supported by the policies of the Anglo-Saxon states. There are, indeed, those who believe that this is the only way to save the biological substance of the Nation and realize the imagination of shifting the borders of western Poland towards the Chrobry trails. Those who think so have the illusion that the current Polish authorities may be partners of Russia — in a function to which Moscow predestinates another actors, namely the Patriots' Union, Vasilewska, Berling, PPR, etc. 1 cannot imagine that this road does not lead to the Sovietization of Poland.

I am a firm supporter of the first road — and I do not consider the 3rd theoretical alternative. I mean the slippery and dangerous way of Wallenrodism of unconspired troops.”

The chief chief was not limited to theoretical and academic considerations, but recommended the commanders of the AK:

1) According to the limits you can follow the instructions dated 27 X 43.

2. Avoid armed clashes with Russia, limiting them to self-defense and opposition to russian rape.

3) In the event of arrests, rapes, and demolitions, you can ban your presence in another areas, and you can retreat at risk.

First of all, you request to settle the fundamental question: — whether military cooperation with the Soviets is possible and desirable without prior political agreement, since in this case cooperation means submitting to the orders of the Red Commanders and, consequently, most likely becoming part of the russian Army or Berling troops. A political agreement, if at all possible, would, in the current situation, mean agreeing to the territorial demands of the Soviets.

My position on this is consistently negative. But I'm not certain there'll be any government. supporters of cooperation in any case, who will trust on British opinion and operate as an argument by your order to disclose branches — [under mine — J.M.C.].

My individual opinion: you gotta defy and last everything, completing on our part the most meticulous soldierly responsibilities allied. The Anglo-Saxon states must not be relieved of their moral and political obligations towards us, and they must be helped to save their faces at the expense of our concessions and our honor.

Source: Chief Commander's Post to Commander AK, 12 II 1944, L. d. 1217/tjn./ /44, SPP.

In: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Coverage of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. pp. 283-286

¹⁸

‘In general, Information on the cases of the National Army interacting with the partisan or russian Army — Chief Leader wrote to Bora-Komorowski on 17 April — leads to specified confusion of the image, where it will be hard or even impossible to convince the local opinion [W.: England and USA] that the crucial reason for russian panic is Moscow's possessive policy. It should be taken into account that further our sacrifices resulting from disclosure may be fruitless from the point of view of defending our territorial and political rights.

It can even be feared that the facts of disclosure will be exploited by russian propaganda as proof that we are not determined to ruthlessly defend the east ends, because we do not draw any consequences from the possessive policy of the Soviets, expressed not only in panic attacks, but besides in political-administrative activities, specified as conscription and deportations.

It should be considered excluded that the English or the Americans effort to get russian approval to send Allied missions to the east ends considered by Moscow to belong to it without appeal.”

Source: Chief Leader's Post to Commander AK, 8 April 1944, L. d. 2880/tjn./ /44, SPP. In: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Summary of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. p. 311-312

The concerns and concerns of the Chief Leader fell on susceptible ground in Warsaw. On 19 April, Bór-Komorowski, for the first time, full revealed to Sosnkowski his actual intentions and plans and full agreed with his assessment of Polish-Russian relations. AK commander wrote:

“I justice the attitude of the Soviets towards us with all realism. We anticipate nothing good from that side, nor do we delude ourselves with their possible loyalty in cooperation with independent Polish factors.

We agree in knowing the full issue and in knowing the individual passages of it with the General.

Forced by circumstances to show our attitude towards the entering Soviets, we consider it essential that all step of ours should be a sign of the sovereign rights of the Republic and the sovereignty of its ultimate Power over us. From here My instructions to the Volyn territory Chief included a word that the Soviets would most likely not tolerate..

In this case I ordered Commandant Volyn to break into the back of the Germans, into the area under my direct orders [...]

Source: AK Commander-in-Chief, 19IV 1944, L. d. 3418, SPP.
In: J.M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Coverage of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. p. 312

J. M. Ciechanowski, Warsaw Uprising. Summary of Political and Diplomatic Grounds, State Publishing Institute, Warsaw 1984. p. 311-312

If individual reads Sosnkowski's correspondence with Komorowski, it will become clear that both gentlemen were pushing for an armed confrontation of the AK from the USSR – a minimum in the form of individual "incidents". The motivation was double. Firstly, the aim was to show to the US and England authorities – on the way of armed clashes with the USSR – the AK's deficiency of consent to the Tehran resolutions. Secondly, in order to conflict “aliens” with the USSR, force them – through force from “public opinion”, agitated by “Soviet rapes” (which, as we can see, were to be intentionally provoked by the actions of the Polish side) – to face the USSR on Polish matter.