Eastern European trauma

That is why American military presence with membership in the North Atlantic Alliance is considered a circumstantial insurance policy. It becomes more important, the more hard the safety conditions are and the more the military threat from the main opponent – Russia – increases. The attack on Ukraine in 2022 deprived illusions almost everyone, and Russian intentions and long-term plans became rather clear. The Russian Federation seeks to rebuild its sphere of influence, understood as an area in which it can take any action, including military interventions, without reckoning with the consequences. While the main nonsubjective of these intentions is the post-Soviet countries not members of NATO (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova or the countries of the Caucasus or Central Asia), the countries of Central and east Europe cannot recognise that nothing is happening and the Russian expansion policy does not concern them.

American and European Interests: a Protocol of Divergentness

The safety interests of most NATO countries stay convergent, but this does not mean that they are identical at all point. For the countries of Central and east Europe – the alleged east flank of NATO – the main safety threat was, is and will long be Russia. A somewhat different perception of reality and threats lies with countries on the Mediterranean coast: illegal migration, terrorism and conflicts in African countries, which at least indirectly affect the situation of European countries, stay the main problems. Another point of view is that of the United States, for which Europe is only (and at the same time) 1 of respective possible theatres of war and not necessarily the most important. Starting with Barack Obama's presidency, Washington is increasingly accentuating its interest in the situation in Southeast Asia, where there is competition for resources and control of sea basins. Its participants are the USA and their allies (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia), and on the another hand China, aspiring to the function of the second superpower. From the point of view of Central and east Europe and its problems, it is simply a peripheral area – although important, it is not essential for security, especially in the purely military sphere.

The United States, although having the top military possible in the world, is incapable to realise their military presence anytime and everywhere. Therefore, changing the priorities of the American political activity strategy and the associated military presence besides forces the relocation of selected units. Hence changes and planned simplification of US military presence in Romania (probably about 800-1000 soldiers), as well as Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary.

American soldiers on the ground,in Swift consequence exercises, Lithuania, 2025.

What is worth noting, so far the changes do not apply to countries bordering Russia: Poland and the Baltic States, but to those located as if "in the second line" – which are not straight threatened by Russia. It is actual that in Romania (as in Poland) incidents involving Russian airspace-infringing drones, but this is not a threat that the Romanian armed forces could not cope with, especially as they besides have the support of European allies (e.g. Germany).

Solution: own capabilities

The simplification of U.S. military presence will not importantly affect the military situation in the region of Central and east Europe, at least not in the close future (talk about the time horizon of respective years). The threat of an open armed conflict with Russia on a large scale is presently limited – both in view of the continued Russian engagement in the fighting in Ukraine, as well as the losses suffered by the Russian armed forces in this war after the start of a full-scale invasion in 2022. Their reconstruction will take at least a fewer years after the end of the war with Ukraine and will be essential if Moscow intends to proceed its aggressive policy against NATO as well. This is not an impossible scenario, but inactive unlikely.

Despite this, the ongoing challenge for the region and east countries of the Alliance's flank remains the threat of Russian hybrid actions specified as drone incursions or diversions, and another operations below the war threshold and under the alleged false flag, implemented so that it is not possible or at least very hard to identify perpetrators.

The U.S. engagement in activities in another theatres than the European 1 can encourage Russia to test the defence capabilities of the European part of NATO – only the military capabilities of the Alliance countries can prevent this from being extended. In order to minimise the effects of this and possible further reductions in the U.S. military presence, European countries should besides aim to maximise their military capabilities. NATO is based on the collective defence and commitment of all allies, but the Washington Treaty does not specify precisely erstwhile and in what form this assistance is to be provided. This requires each of the allies to maximise their efforts to defend themselves and build their armed forces. Especially that even with allies involved, any military assistance takes time, even with prior information on the threat of aggression. Only expansion of your own strong army and backroom, as well as widely understood resilience of the economy and society can supply adequate level of defence against current and future threats.