Poland, taking into account all the orders submitted, grows into a state whose Armed Forces may in a fewer years constitute a real fighting force and let in the event of a war with Russia to defend not on the Vistula line, but from the border itself. In terms of armored capacity, Poland can become a power on a European scale.
As a result, a possible defensive war would not come down to only delaying the Russians in the hope that allies would come to the aid, and our country could be strong adequate that there would be no request for war at all. War – let us add – does not seem real.
The point is that this optimistic assessment may become obsolete in a fewer years.
Long buying List
After years of dryness, erstwhile the military was in increasingly mediocre condition, Poland ordered 32 F-35 aircraft, 250 fresh M1A2 SEP v.3 Abrams tanks, 116 utilized but profoundly upgraded M1A1 Abrams tanks, 8 Patriot anti-aircraft and rocket defence batteries, 18 M142 HIMARS rocket launchers, and respective 100 JASSM-ER long-range missiles.
In South Korea, 180 K2 tanks were purchased (the framework agreement assumes a full supply of 1,000 cars), 290 K239 Chumnoo rocket launchers, 364 Haubice K9 and 48 FA-50 aircraft.
Radek Pietruszka / PAPK2 tanks at the parade on the occasion of the Polish army festival (15.08.20123)
Against the background of Korean and American contracts, orders in Europe are very modest. The only comparable contracts were the supply of 32 AW-149 helicopters and 4 AW-101s produced by the Italian-British concern Leonardo, 24 batteries of the British short-range CAMM anti-aircraft defence strategy and 2 aircraft early informing production of the Swedish Saaba.
In turn, the Polish arms manufacture is to supply 3 frigates for the Navy as part of the Sword, 96 haubic Krab program, 122 self-propelled mortars Cancer, 24 vehicles of Baobab overhead mines and very short scope anti-aircraft defence systems under the Pilica programme. The chance for the arms manufacture is besides the production of Borsuk combat infantry wagons — in this case no concrete agreements have yet been signed, but only the alleged framework agreements, which can inactive be withdrawn.
After the change of government, the ambitious arms programme is fortunately continued, as demonstrated by signing (negotiated during the PiS regime) contract for the supply of 96 Ah-64 Apache impact helicopters and a contract for deep modernization (so-called Mid-Life Upgrade) 48 F-16 fighters owned by our country. Another 58 Rosomak armored transporters were besides contracted.
In the close future, the orders of the South Korean K2 tanks, another 32 fighters and 3 submarines are expected (now Poland has only 1 russian production of the Kilo class vessel, which is in mediocre method condition).
Launched during the reign of the Law and continued by the current government, the arms programme means that in the span of respective years, Poland will become a real European power, at least in terms of land forces.
Policy matters
Shopping in arms is always more or little a political decision. An example of the importance of policy in deciding on the choice of arms is the past of competition between the Korean K2 tank and the German Leopard 2A7 in the competition in Norway.
Oslo chose to supply a tank from Germany, although according to the Norwegian media in K2 tests it did the same or even better than its German competitor. According to media reports, the choice of the German car was decided by the fact that Leopard 2, although in older versions, is already equipped with the armed forces of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Above all, however, the point was that, in the government's belief in Oslo, the acquisition of tanks in Germany strengthens Norway's political ties with Berlin.
PHILIPP SCHULZE / PAPLeopard 2A7 tank
Simple (over the years) choice of Poland
In the case of Poland, the political choice was always apparent and so most of the orders were always sent to the United States. The question we're going to gotta face is, is, for Donald Trump's presidency, would you order more weapons in Washington to keep US support through arms orders? Or do precisely the other and subsequent orders redirect to European arms companies? The same question will apply not only to arms purchases, but besides to the construction of atomic power plants and the acquisition of fresh aircraft for PLL LOT.
The question is whether we would have a chance – thanks to possible orders made, for example, in France or in the UK – to stronger treaty bonds in terms of security, but besides strict military ones. Including possibly even the dislocation of the armed forces of these countries on our east border. From the point of view of Poland's security, it is good to have as many forces of our Western allies stationed in our territory. The problem is that the answer to this question is not apparent at all.
In the case of relations with the United States, the hope that by means of arms purchases it would be possible to "buy" political decisions was an illusion for years, but Polish politicians lived independently of political options. Under the regulation of PO-PSL, arms contracts in the US did not lead, contrary to their hopes, to the departure of Americans from the policy of very limited increase of military presence in Poland. Under the Law and Justice, at which time the Americans went to Poland in more numbers, it was besides revealed that orders for weapons did not lead to the creation of "Fort Trump". They besides failed to cover up the assassination of independent media.
Learning from the past makes us think carefully about ideas of utilizing arms purchases as a political tool. This should not be ruled out, but it must not be guided by something that may prove to be false again.
The Choices That Are Waiting for Us
The choice of circumstantial equipment is always highly difficult. In the context of political competition, there are additional considerations, including, in particular, the issue of price, possible transportation rates, the readiness to transfer technology and industrial cooperation. The differences between the types of equipment offered to us are besides essential.
Example: Poland, choosing another organization of fighters, has another American F-35, the latest version of American F-16 (in V version), British-German-Italian-Spanish Eurofighter Typhoon and American F-15EX. The aircraft, which is barely mentioned at all in turn, is the French Dassault Rafale, which, given France's typical policy of connecting political issues with commercial issues, will most likely besides appear among candidates.
KEIZO MORI / PAPFighter of French production Dassault Rafale
From the logistics point of view, it is of course better to have less different types of aircraft, which would theoretically narrow the choice to F-16 or F-35. The fact that the F-35 is built in stealth technology (meaning reduced detection by the opponent) would indicate this aircraft. In turn, the ability to carry much more weapons would point to F-15EX. Political reasons do not in turn let Typhoon and Rafale to be excluded, which besides have their method advantages.
The choice of submarine maker will be politically simpler. In the case of Polish contracts, American shipyards do not participate. The U.S. has for many years been not launching any conventional-powered submarines, but only nuclear-powered ships, which are not included in our country. As a result, European and Korean shipyards search contracts. This in turn causes that, given that the vast majority of orders so far submitted to the United States and South Korea, it would be politically advisable to choose a European supplier.
Necessity of tenders
The thing is, that in order for a possible contract to be not just a motion that would give us political benefits and become a real tool – e.g. erstwhile negotiating a fresh treaty with France, which in the intention of the Polish authorities is to contain as many safety records as possible – there must be a correlation of diplomatic talks and defence programs. This one, to put it mildly, is not very good.
In the past Poland has not been able politically to consume the tremendous resources we spend for respective reasons. Apart from the fact that we have spent besides small for years to be at all visible from the position of the powers, the problem was that the existing tendering procedures prevented the making of binding promises to order the equipment.
The PiS, as we know, has departed from the tendering procedures. Contrary to appearances, the above should be maintained. Tenders in situations of specified technological complexity are in fact fiction. In fact, their settlement is determined by how many points will be awarded for a given item (you can give more or little points per price or, for example, scope or lift), alternatively than the tender itself. At the same time, however, the absence of tenders should not mean that decisions are taken in a completely arbitrary and voluntary manner without any parliamentary supervision.
Offset
Another component that was abandoned during the times of the Law and Justice was the offset, i.e. compensating for part of the acquisition costs by placing investments in the country ordering the equipment. The problem is that offset is the most costly form of technology acquisition and the least effective method of raising capital.
Worse still, it not only increases the cost of the equipment purchased, but besides makes it hard to calculate its real price. The offset should therefore, in principle, be abandoned, as should the tenders.
Price present and cost for years
The key is, beyond politics, besides price. In the case of specified advanced constructions as fighter aircraft (but besides combat helicopters) 1 must remember not only the acquisition price, but besides the cost of ground logistics, maintenance of equipment, their modernization and, of course, weapons.
In order to realise the scale of spending, it is worth to mention the message of the Air Force Inspector General Ireneusz Nowak, who in an interview with the monthly magazine "New Military Technology" stated that the cost of the aforementioned modernization (Mid-Life Upgrade) held by Poland by F-16 will be around 90 million dollars per piece, which is simply a full of about 17 billion PLN.
Jakub Kaczmarczyk / PAPPolish F-16 fighter
Of course, the issue of price is besides a derivative of politics. In a situation where we bought weapons from 1 direction only over the years, it was hard to anticipate suppliers to effort especially for our market. Nor did it aid our negotiators ostentatiously submit Polish politicians to the United States. Diversification of buying directions besides makes sense and due to the fact that it forces the equipment offering us to make as good offers as possible.
The problem is besides the issue of the remuneration of people liable for multi-billion-dollar contracts. The situation, erstwhile other the well-remunerated representatives of large arms companies and the top law firms working for them, sits low-paid in the case of Polish Armed Forces officers and scandalously low in the case of civilian military workers salaries, even though they ignore the corruption risk, do not strain optimistically.
Supply rate
The supply rate is always a origin taken into account erstwhile purchasing arms. In the case of supply of tanks to Norway, the Koreans offered to deliver them in a much faster time than the limited production capacity of KNDS, the Leopard manufacturer.
In the case of Poland, given the pace of delivery, the most sensible are purchases in South Korea. The Koreans have broken all records in this respect, which is demonstrated by the transportation of a full of 84 K2 tanks to our country within little than a year and a half from the signing of the contract (the remaining 96 are expected to scope Poland by the end of 2025).
The amazing and different pace of transportation besides applies to the Haubic K9, but besides to the FA-50 aircraft, the first 12 of which were delivered to Poland, allocating to our country air carriers, which were already on the assembly line at the time of the signing of the contract and were to enter the military aviation of South Korea.
For Seoul, agreements with Poland were highly important, as they meant breaking through with their own weapons production to an elite club of states supplying arms to NATO states. Thus, while there are as many arguments for continuing purchasing policy mainly in the United States as there are for more procurement in Europe, the Korean producers seem likely to be the best partner in terms of pace.
Technology transfer and crisis of the Polish arms industry
Another issue to be taken into account erstwhile ordering for Polish armed forces is the willingness of partners to transfer technology. In this case, as Onetu's MON interviewers say, Korea besides seems to be a good partner.
The problem, however, is that the transfer of technology beyond the readiness of a given state technology to transfer it requires the ability of the national manufacture to absorb advanced technologies. According to the Onetu interviewers in the Polish case, and especially in the case of state-owned arms companies, the above is actually a bigger problem than how far our partners are prepared to go in technological cooperation.
The challenge is besides the question of philosophy, which we adopt on the occasion of the possible implementation of arms production. erstwhile asked about the road that the Korean arms manufacture went through, the high-ranking typical of the Korean land force equipment company explained that it was actually the same road that the Korean automotive manufacture went through.
In another words, in the first stage, it is essential to master the licensing production, or 1 which is mostly based on alien technology, in order to make the staff and make logistics chains over time, to make modifications or upgrades of the equipment concerned, and only in a further phase to engage in the independent construction of advanced products.
This lesson of humility is very essential in Poland, due to the fact that many of the skills and competences that we have had in the past 35 years (and given the crisis of the 1980s — in fact 45 years) have actually lost. Not only due to the fact that the technologies you have are shot down, but besides due to the fact that the engineering staff has mostly died out, retired, or changed jobs and the sector in which you work. In terms of many types of weapons, Poland is actually building the armament manufacture from scratch.
Worse still, in the case of the state industry, he is, as onetu's MON interviewer states, inefficient to the limits of absurdity, to the ground of social relations, and is governed by little effective managers, and more frequently denominations attached to this or another party, or faction in peculiar services.
When asked about the solution, Onetu states that the only 1 that would give real results would be the privatisation of the Polish arms industry. The measurement of its condition and whether the state can or cannot effectively manage it is that Polish arms exports have been scrubbing after the bottom for years, and well on abroad markets are actually mainly private producers and private arms companies.
Fantists
Another issue that should be addressed erstwhile discussing buying is the impact on the direction of improvement of the Armed Forces, which are full amateurs of publicists and politicians. In fresh years, a wave of publications passed through Poland, according to which a light and tiny army should be built, that in the war of the future only light, mobile units and drones will count, and the era of tanks is just ending. Preaching specified theories, despite the deficiency of any experience in military matters, were invited to debate even by the b. Chief of the General Staff.
Ukraine all the above mentioned fantasymagories ridiculed, putting on a mass army, expanding armored forces and artillery. The war in Ukraine showed that in the modern war – yes – it is about satellite reconnaissance, safe communication, efficient command strategy or more widely known C4I complex (Command, Control, Communication, Computing And Intelligence, namely command, control, communications, data processing and reconnaissance), and in the hardware sense, e.g. drones, but at the same time, that classical armoured groups, effective artillery and, above all, ammunition stocks are besides crucial in the war.
Modernisation
Ukraine has become an example of how to combine modern warfare and at the same time usage old equipment. The last 1 is frequently forgotten in Poland, which results in the fact that we are by far besides seldom upgrading existing equipment. Meanwhile, Ukraine has just shown that deep-modernized old equipment can inactive have considerable combat value.
Lobbyists and black PR
Much more dangerous than fantasy are lobbyists acting more discreetly and in the background, but successfully applying alleged black PR. An example of a acquisition that can be discussed, of course, but which has become the object of classical black PR, is the order of Korean FA-50 fighters. In this case, there were claims that instead, another F-16 utilized (which was not on the market) or fresh F-16 or F-35 should be purchased. The problem is that the cost of the second would be many times higher than the FA-50 and the waiting time would be much longer.
Over time, there was an argument that the FA-50 is simply a "light fighter" and as specified cannot replace the full fighter, which is inactive owned by Poland by russian MiG-29. The problem is that the FA-50 capacity is little than F-16, but 500 kg bigger than MIG-29.
Przemysław Piątkowski / PAPKorean FA-50 fighter
Another argument was that Poland bought aircraft which presently have no air-to-air combat weapons. The second is true, but the deficiency of weapon ammunition is due to the fact that Poland did not take care of its purchase, not that the Korean aircraft uses any highly rare, nowhere else in the world, unused ammunition.
The fact that we bought aircraft to which we do not have air-to-air rockets short-range is besides the failure of Poland, not the defect of the aircraft (Poland has Sidewidner rockets utilized by the FA-50, but in a newer version, and did not buy older ones).
Another widely utilized argument was the 1 in which the FA-50 already supplied was compared with alternate structures with medium-distance combat capabilities without adding that the first FA-50 was delivered in the version utilized by South Korea's military aviation and another 36 is to be delivered in a mid-range version already equipped with mid-range rockets, with the first 12 aircraft besides to be upgraded and added to the mark configuration.
The past of black PR, the victim of which has become the acquisition of the FA-50, is an example of the fact that, with specified large resources as those utilized for arms purchases, fair grips are not always applied.
Conclusion
The military is built for years, and modern equipment cannot be bought from hand. That is precisely why Poland must proceed to invest in the expansion of the army. buying so far, although impressive, does not exhaust the list of needs. Among another things, there is simply a request to buy more anti-aircraft batteries, fighters, combat infantry cars and tanks.
Political calculations on arms purchases are inevitable. However, the decisive criterion erstwhile ordering weapons should be how much enemy equipment can be destroyed and enemy soldiers killed for a certain amount of money spent.
