Will Russia respond forcefully to Finnish efforts to NATO? – Safety in the Baltic [ANALYZA]

krzysztofwojczal.pl 3 years ago

The Kremlin authorities have accustomed us to the fact that 1 of the iron principles of Russian abroad policy is to respond to any initiative incompatible with the Russians that could affect Russia's geopolitical situation. Just remind: Georgia 2008, Syria since 2013, Ukraine 2014, Libya 2020, Kazakhstan and yet Ukraine 2022. Why should it be different if Finland and Sweden were to effort to enter NATO? Especially since the Finns' entry into NATO would represent a immense change in terms of the boundaries of the North Atlantic Pact with the Russian Federation. It is all the more amazing that the subject of a possible Russian reaction has not yet been given due attention.

It is worth reminding that the Finnish government, before the February invasion of Ukraine, warned the Kremlin authorities that if Russia attacks, then Helsinki will apply for NATO. seemingly this kind of announcement was ignored by Moscow. No wonder Putin expected Ukraine to be taken over in a fewer days, which would not give the Finns or another states time to respond politically. If the Kremlin's decision-makers had succeeded, then the Russians could not only deploy an additional army and 2 army corps at the NATO border (mainly with Poland), but besides shift appropriate forces to the Finnish direction. specified a threat could deter Helsinki authorities from taking steps against Vladimir Putin's will. However, the “operation in Ukraine” has been taking 4 months. All forces and resources are active in the war and Finland, rather rightly, has decided to take advantage of this convenient minute and to guarantee its security. The Finns were besides followed by Swedes. specified a script was to be expected, and even the request for specified action was outlined in the second day of the war: “What should be done to save Ukraine and beat Putin?”. In this context Vladimir Putin noted an apparent defeat, as the deficiency of military success in Ukraine could lead to adverse settlements for Russia in the north. Scandinavia and the Baltic.

For many years – until February 24, 2022 – many commentators of global politics have been delighted with Vladimir Putin's diplomatic skills and the Cremlin elites as such. We have frequently been persuaded that Moscow can manipulate politicians from the West and lead them by the nose. Geopolitical realpolitik The Putin – Lavrow duet was to lead the Russian Federation to an highly beneficial agreement with the United States. The agreement, which by any was called the "second reset" (Dr. L. Sikulski), by others "returned Nixon" (Dr. J. Bartosiak), and in utmost cases any referred to the "second Yalta" (e.g. the population community of the Confederate). specified a script was expected to be an inevitable consequence of the fact that the main rival of the US is presently the People's Republic of China. This is considered to be the strongest competitor so far among those who challenged the Americans. Accordingly, the Washington decision-makers, according to the communicative presented, had no choice but to yet agree to Moscow's terms in order to get Russians as a partner or as an ally. By the way, leaving Poland on ice or betraying it straight (which any think is simply a feature of Anglo-Saxons always and everywhere). Therefore, whenever there was a change of president (the triumph of D. Trump or Joe Biden) the agreement with Russia was to be a substance of time. It was expected in July 2018 before the gathering of D. Trump with W. Putin in Helsinki, and then before the June gathering with 2021 Biden-Putin in Geneva. But no of this happened. Why? For years I have described this issue in the blog, as well as being explained in the 3rd Decade.

It is worth noting that since 2012, the Kremlin authorities have been conducting a disastrous abroad policy for Russia. At the same time, recognizing its negative effects (apparently without reflection on the causes), Russian rulers effort to repair their problems, which frequently characterized authoritarian (especially Moscow) governments. It all resembles the movements of an elephant in a porcelain store. Each action causes the next demolition of previously achieved results with difficulty. This is clearly seen in Sweden and Finland. These neutral states have so far expressed their willingness to join NATO. In another words, Russia, in order to safe its buffer zones (the bordering states) attacked Ukraine, which not only did not let (for what) the intended goal to be achieved, but even created problems in the fresh section (Skandinavia), and could consequence in a complete collapse of Russian spheres of influence in the mediate East (Syria and Kurdov), the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is worth first sacrificing respective paragraphs.

Autosabotage of Russian abroad policy

The origin of the Kremlin government's policy problems is the fact that the Russians, in their attitude to the effects in the short term, conduct a abroad policy contrary to the long-term national interest of the Russian Federation. Active and aggressive abroad policy towards the neighbours, but besides further partners were to force the European Union, NATO ruling the West as specified to accept Russian conditions. These were rather clear and afraid various levels:

on a political level, the Kremlin authorities sought:

regaining control of Ukraine,
the annexation of Belarus,
to get the acceptance of Americans on the axis of cooperation on the Berlin-Moscow line, and to further agree to the construction of a power centre independent of Washington in the form of EuRussia from Lisbon to Vladivostok,
Maintaining its own sphere of influence in the mediate East, which included Syria as well as cooperation with Iran (building control on the north-south line, so that Moscow and Tehran could jointly dictate the conditions on the fresh Silk Shale – that is, land communication threads between China and the mediate East and beyond Europe),
maintaining control of the Caucasus and Central Asia,
safeguarding interests in the Arctic area;

at economical level:

increasing the dependence of the European Union on Russian natural gas and oil,
raising capital from the sale of natural materials,
maintaining energy control over Central Europe,
increasing the dependence of China on Russian energy natural materials,
increasing the marketplace share of LNG,

at the technological level, the following were sought:

access to Western technologies for mining natural materials in the Arctic region,
technological cooperation in the arms sector,
cooperation in the space sector.

It is worth remembering that almost all of Vladimir Putin's aforementioned points negotiated at the table with president Barack Obama, who additionally – as part of the celebrated 2009 reset – agreed to liquidate the 2nd U.S. Navy Fleet (responsible for the North Atlantic and control of the Russian North Fleet) as well as resigning from the rocket shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Americans had already made a return in politics with Russia in the context of a peg on the Pacific, which was officially presented in 2012 by then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. In exchange for many concessions, Washington expected mostly 2 things. Support from Brussels and Moscow in the context of the threat of the Chinese (long-term target) and acceptance of the refurbishment of North Africa and the mediate East, which was to take account of the overthrow of Bashar Assad, or possibly even the Ajatollah government in Tehran.

For the first 3 years since the American-Russian reset, the agreement seemed to work. However, in 2013, the Russians felt that their partnership with Germany was strong adequate to completely displace the Americans from Europe and make for Washington not support – but competition. This overestimation of Berlin's independency from Washington and the underestimation of the American influence on Central Europe (including Poland), prompted Putin to play va bank. He decided to save influence in Syria, acting against the Americans. Reset conditions are no longer in force. In response, Washington supported Ukrainian efforts to break out of the Russian sphere of influence and besides began to regain its position in Central Europe (with Poland at the head). Ukrainians who received the wind in the sails towards the pro-western direction called protests for majana in Kiev. The Russians alternatively of pass and return to talks with the US, raised the stakes. In early 2014, the Russian Federation attacked Ukraine by taking her Crimea and a large part of Donbas. shortly the pressures on Lukashenko began and after a fewer returns of action, the Minsk authorities were yet subjugated. Finally, in 2022 a full-scale military strike against Kiev was decided.

Such a abroad policy has made Moscow the architect of American successes, and at the same time has completely destroyed all the diplomatic-political achievements of the Kremlin:

EuRussia's task collapsed and even Germany must now distance itself from Moscow,
“soft” influences in Ukraine have been lost, and so far favored Russia, Ukrainian society has become an enemy of everything Russian,
political control of Kiev has been lost,
as a consequence of the “return” of Americans, the influences in Central Europe, including Poland, which were shared with Germany, were lost,
Central European countries have started investing in independency from Russian gas (vide Baltic Pipe, extension of the LNG gas port in Świnoujście, gasoport in Klaipeda, gasoport task in Croatia),
Russia has become an isolated country on a political and partially economical level, as well as technology in the West,
Given the hard situation of Moscow and the fact that Russia has become the main opponent of the US, China has gained a negotiating advantage, which Beijing has ruthlessly utilized erstwhile concluding investment agreements (gas pipeline Power Siberia) and gas supply,
The Nord Stream II construction task was torpedoed by the US, which increased the cost of its construction by the Russian side and besides importantly delayed the implementation of the project, finally, erstwhile it was created, it turned out that there would be a problem with its real use,
After the invasion of 2022, the European Union intensified efforts to accomplish energy independency from Russia and began to restrict imports of Russian energy natural materials,
Russia has fallen into conflict with Turkey, due to the taking over of the protection of the Kurds after the Americans, which has weakened Moscow's position in the mediate East,
The situation in the Transcaucasia became uncertain, as the Azers, with the support of Turkey and even Israel, decided to resume military action against Armenia, in which the Russians have strong influence. Although the Armenians had previously started drifting towards the West, and the Azera attack had made them aware of how much they depend on Moscow, at the same time Ankara strengthened its position in the Transcaucasia by beginning a land connection with Baku, which actually weakened the Russian position.
The People's Republic of China gained more freedom to act in Central Asia, at the expense of the influence of Russia, which engaged all its attention in Ukraine.
Finally, Finland and Sweden, so far neutral, have decided to join NATO, complicating Russia's situation in the Baltic Sea and creating another front on which Russia must guarantee its own safety (potential extension of the NATO-Russia border).

This article is intended to give an overview of the possible consequences of this fresh safety event in the Baltic Sea.

Situation in the Baltic

On the news that the full of Scandinavia could become part of NATO, there was a communicative in Poland that then Polish interests in the Baltic and our coast would be completely secured. Thus, according to this theory, investments in the construction of the naval fleet have allegedly become even more unnecessary (yet more – skeptics had previously challenged the sense of strengthening the Navy).

This kind of communicative is, of course, incorrect and even contrary to the reality and interests and safety of the 3rd Polish Republic. present – erstwhile we become almost 100% dependent on the supply of energy natural materials from maritime routes Poland needs a fleet as never before. What I wrote in the article: “Why do we request the Navy?”. And entering NATO through Sweden and Finland does not change that, but on the contrary, the modern and decently strong Navy can be an excellent political tool in relations with the Swedes. But if there was a war, the anticipation of coordinating with the Swedes would increase the strength of our fleet. If we had this, of course, due to the fact that multiplying zeros always gives a zero. The floating museum, which presently serves in the MW, does not offer a chance to multiply potential.

However, in order to realize that Sweden and Finland joining NATO does not change much in terms of Polish needs as regards the Navy, it is essential to analyse the possible of Sweden and Finland fleets and to identify their possible for impact in the Baltic Sea.

The Swedish king of the Baltic?

In terms of the military possible of Swedes in the Baltic Sea – especially in the context of the war with the Russian Federation – the possible of aviation and the Navy must be summed up. Swedes do not have a land border with Russia, so their aviation forces could focus on securing the air region on the Baltic and even support the defence of the Baltic States.

Swedish Air Force have, among another things, close to a 100 SAAB JAS 39 Gripen multi-purpose fighters (with the anticipation of firing RBS 15 anti-ship missiles) and 4 early informing aircraft which are highly crucial for air-sea combat. The Swedish air fleet is so rather large and can successfully dispel the Russians from the Baltic, especially since for Russian aviation the Baltic is 1 of the very many possible fronts, which does not necessarily should be a priority. An obstacle to the Swedes, in terms of gaining dominance over the northern part of the Baltic and air support to the Baltic States, could be Russian Baltic Fleet ships equipped with anti-aircraft systems and supported by Russian aviation. The Russians are outnumbered by the number of marine units, but it should be remembered that in the event of the war, the Baltic Fleet would gotta carry out a number of activities at different locations in the reservoir. In situations of geopolitical and geographical disadvantage. The port in Kronsztad is located in an easy to close Gulf of Finland, while the Baltic is located in the Russian enclave in the form of the NATO-circular Kaliningrad Oblast (which creates a supply problem).

The Swedish problemMarinen is the fact that it has only 5 modern Visby-type corvettes with a displacement of 640 tonnes, and 2 older Goteborg-type corvettes with a displacement of about 400 tonnes. Both types of craft are tiny and fast ships dedicated to circumstantial tasks. 4 Visby were created to fight submarines, and only 1 of the fleet's equipment was armed (like the older ones) Goteborgi) in 8 anti-ship rocket launchers. In another words, the Swedish fleet has only 3 (including 2 old) ships to fight enemy submarines... The disadvantage of these tiny corvettes is in rule the deficiency of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence (the shield is provided only by the cannon), which was late spotted by Swedes. Consequently, their fleet cannot operate far from its own coast in isolation from air support. In addition, the ship's dimensions and their possible let for virtually 1 limited rocket impact on the enemy fleet, after which a fast retreat must be made to overload the launcher. The deficiency of multi-layered air defence makes ships susceptible to attack. To minimize the hazard of drowning, the Swedes chose speed, maneuverability and technology stealth. This does not change the fact that Swedish corvettes have large restrictions on operating in bad weather (large waves) and are not suitable for long region defence. They are alternatively fast consequence forces, with small autonomy of action, which are designed to hit a previously discovered opponent and withdraw. Which in turn makes it impossible for them, especially by operating alone, to distance themselves from their own ports.

The Swedes besides have 4 submarines, 3 newer types Gotland (A19) and 1 elder Sodermanland (A17). The second is to be replaced by A26 ships built. Interestingly, the Swedish A19 are considered to be 1 of the most modern vessels in the planet in the class of classic-powered ships. Ships are hard to detect, they were designed to operate in the Baltic Sea, and their air-independent drive provides mutement. adequate to say that a ship of this kind on maneuvers with US Navy was able to undetected sail under cover of the aircraft carrier's full strike squad and carry out a training torpedo attack.

It is crucial that Sweden has small, very fast units of kind Stridsbat 90, which act as patrol ships, which can besides set seamines, fight submarines or service for the fast transport of infantry. The units are small, they are only 15 metres long erstwhile submerged little than 1 metre long. However, Swedes have close to 150 Strb 90 in different options, making it easier to control the long Swedish coast.

Unsinkable aircraft carriers – geography

In the event of a possible conflict with the Russian Federation, while belonging to NATO structures, The Swedes could have given up on any of the directions. For example, the Danish Straits, to which the Danes would defend, and possibly Germany. Sending ships to the Gulf of Botnicka wouldn't make much sense either. Both from the position of Sweden and Russia. The waterfront is sparsely populated, there are no major ports there, strategically crucial targets, and at the same time access to the bay can be easy blocked by Swedes and Finns. As a result, the most crucial region for Swedes in the context of defence is the north-eastern part of the Baltic Sea, which is the exit for the routes from the aforementioned Gulf of Bothnia, but besides the bays of Finland and Riga. In this part of the Baltic Sea, Swedes can safe the capital: Stockholm, and besides located in a key location in the Baltic Sea of Gotland (at least from the north-east).

Only the second most crucial area is the western part of the Baltic, where the confederate coasts belong to Poland and Russia (the Kaliningrad Oblast). The Swedes, however, do not gotta attain their regulation there, just operate close to their own coasts. Moreover, cooperation with the Danish can be crucial here and let limited engagement of Swedes, mainly in the context of the cover of Karlskrona, Kalmar and Gotland.

Taking into account geographical conditions, the assumptions of a possible opponent's war, as well as its own military potential, it can be argued that the Swedish fleet's size corresponds to minimum requirements for fulfilling its tasks stricte defensive. The 2 fleets of vessels with limited capabilities and autonomy are incapable to take offensive or even defensive action at a greater distance from sea bases (e.g. to block the Gulf of Finland or the Gulf of Gdańsk independently).

Operating from the ports of Karlskron and Muskö (K. Stockholm), the Swedish submarine fleet is designed to bring comparatively short hits to targets detected by radars, sonars or aviation. Baltic aircraft carriers in the form of the islands of Åland, Oland, Gotland and Danish Bornholm are liable for the permanent and stationary defence of the very long Swedish coast.This allowed Swedes to save on the construction of larger ships, as part of the installation, i.e. radars, anti-aircraft systems, airports, supply bases (ports), could be built on islands. These are natural bases extending the operational scope of tiny corvettes and even smaller ones Strb 90. They supply shelter, safe supplies, and to any degree defend selected areas of the Baltic Sea from aerial assault (especially Gotland).

The Swedes besides corrected their mistake of eliminating coastal rocket artillery by restoring specified weapons to service. Which has a profound effect on their safety. For the deployment on unsinkable aircraft carriers of mark detection and targeting systems, anti-aircraft and rocket defence, as well as anti-ship launchers, creates any kind of deep-sea bastions defending Swedish coasts. At the same time, they represent a dangerous obstacle to the free operation of enemy marine and aviation units.

In the context of possible offensive actions Swedes, on the another hand, can usage their fleet of submarines, which has the possible (under appropriate circumstances) to even block the Russian port in the Baltic (the Gulf of Gdańsk is rather deep and suitable for OP operations). Nevertheless, it may turn out that Swedish submarines will gotta carry out a different kind of task (in the north-eastern part of the Baltic Sea or close their own coasts).

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The possible of Finland

In the context of the Baltic safety considerations, it should be pointed out that the Finns have a very long (1340 km) land border with the Russian Federation. Although terrain conditions, mediocre population and climatic conditions restrict the ability to operate large armies in this area, the air region is different. In order to neutralize the Russians' air advantage over so much space, The Finns gotta put up the right force. And indeed the Helsinki government took care of this by contracting in early 2022 the acquisition of 64 multitasking 5 generation F-35 fighters. These machines are to replace those already utilized F/A-18 Hornet and this in a relation almost 1 to 1 (now Finns have 61 Hornets plays). The precedence for the Finnish Air Force is to defend the airspace over Finland and to control the Gulf of Finland. Consequently, it is impossible to calculate the Finns in the Baltic Sea. In the context of air and sea clashes.

The Finnish submarine is based on 8 tiny – not the latest – rocket ships with a displacement of only 250 tonnes. In the context of the possible blockade of the Gulf of Finland, 5 units intended to set mines and 3 modern trawlers play a key role. Importantly, the Finns started their own “Meaner” programme, which is to lead to the construction and introduction to the fleet of 4 multi-tasking vessels of nearly 4,000 tonnes and about 105 metres in length. Although these ships are formally called corvettes, they are de facto units with frigate characteristics. Both size and multitasking leave no illusion as to the actual classification of units. What's more, The Helsinki authorities have decided to acquisition specified large units despite the fact that the main area of operation of the Finnish fleet is the narrow waters of the Gulf of Finland, which is many times smaller than the Baltic Sea. In fact, the Finns will gotta invest quite a few money in infrastructure, as they do not have specified large ships and do not have adequate port wharfs to operate them.

The Finns decided to build a solid fleet for respective reasons. Firstly, in the event of war, almost all support could scope Finland by sea. Transports by land from Sweden would of course be possible and even highly important, but at the same time alternatively problematic, little efficient and more time-consuming. The shortest routes lead through the Baltic, while in terms of oil supply, this is the only option. At the same time, the Finns must fear possible landing operations on the Gulf of Finland coast. However, even if not, the Russian Baltic Fleet could effort to establish a complete blockade of Helsinki and even hinder access to the Finnish port in Turku. In the context of limited opportunities for Swedish aid (both political and real capacity issues) The Finns must be prepared to shut down the Gulf of Finland alone for Russians operating from the port of Kronsztad (K. Petersburg). In order to do so, they should have not only units capable of laying a mine dam, but besides ships which will cover the mines against attack from sea or air. Ships that, in cooperation with aviation, would increase the chances of gaining an air advantage over the Gulf of Finland and at the same time would deter enemy submarines as well as submarines.

Furthermore, having larger ships will give the Finns more freedom and opportunities to influence further distances from their own territorial waters. In order to keep the safety of maritime routes through the Baltic to bases in Turku or Helsinki, the Finns must have at least the Ryska Bay and the Estonian islands Hiuma and Sarama under control. Especially in the event of the Russian Federation taking Latvia and Estonia. In specified a situation, larger ships could control the exits from the Bay of Riga to the Baltic and at the same time would offer possible to defend a possible landing operation. Own or shared with the Swedes, whose goal would be to occupy the Estonian islands before the Russians would do so.

For these reasons, there is no uncertainty that in the air-sea domain, the precedence of Finland will be to safe the Gulf of Finland. However, only the frigates built will give Finland possible to influence the north-eastern part of the Baltic off the coast of Estonia. This will extend not only Finnish hands Merivoimat, But it will besides fill the safety gap in a place where it would be hard to scope the Royal Swedish Navy.

Conclusions for Poland

The entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO should be considered as strengthening NATO, but does not importantly change safety from the position of Poland and its coast. While in the North Atlantic Pact, the Finns would be liable for taking action in a completely different area. Meanwhile, the Swedish fleet is besides modest and has besides small autonomy to execute the Polish Navy in the western part of the Baltic Sea and in the Gulf of Gdańsk. Swedes request to defender the strategical port in Karlskrona, Gotland and the vicinity of Stockholm. Especially in the context of the threat from submarines. They should besides bear in head the anticipation for the Russians to carry out landing operations on Gotland, both from the sea and from the air. As a result, it would be naive to anticipate that Swedes would delegate any force to safe Polish interests in the Baltic if the Polish Navy did not have the right possible and if the joint operation were not to bring safety benefits to both partners (such an operation could be an effort to close the Baltic Fleet in the Baltic port). most likely even then, aid from Svenska Marinen It would be limited to 1 or 2 submarines.

Moreover, it is expected that, in a situation of war or strong tension on the NATO-Russia line, Swedish aviation will be heavy active in the north-east of the Baltic. possibly Gripen pilots would be given the task of supporting Latvians and Estonians, or possibly besides Finns.

In this case, too, the assistance of the Swedes would have its limits, as Stockholm would not have been inclined to send pilots over territory that lacked protection from allied air defence. And here the initiative lies on the side of the Baltic States.

Lithuania invests in air defense, e.g. in NASAMS short-range systems. However, Estonia was inactive reluctant to borrow in December 2021 to acquisition short or average scope systems. Latvia does not have any either. This makes the situation much more complicated, especially since the Baltics do not have their own fighters. It will so be essential to make appropriate investments in order to make the right environment and conditions, enabling and supporting alliance presence in the region.

This kind of conclusion besides applies to Poland. Poland, which could number on cooperation with the Danish. For the second in the face of danger should shift a large condition of their fleet to the western part of the Baltic to defend Bornholm and surrounding trade routes. 3 modern Danish frigates and 2 support vessels (i.e. 5 units with a displacement of more than 6,000 tonnes) would be an important, and in fact the largest naval force in the Baltic exposed by the Scandinavians.

However, in order for Denmark to decision even a part of its forces in the Gulf of Gdańsk (in order to block Kaliningrad), it would should be certain that Poland would be liable for coordinating its activities (although it would be due to its better knowledge). At the same time, the Navy of the 3rd Republic of Poland would should be able to take on the burden of carrying out the designated operations. The Danish would service as support here and would require Poles to make the right conditions for allies.

For these reasons, it is very crucial to start the “Meaner” programme. Without ships with adequate capabilities (provide anti-aircraft, anti-missile, anti-ship) it will be impossible to get local allies to deploy even a fewer ships in our Baltic region. Safety in the Polish coasts must be ensured by maritime units, as the precedence for aviation will be to support land troops and to safe the Polish territory. Therefore, they must be large adequate to have appropriate radar systems (detection + tracking) as well as anti-aircraft and rocket systems. In addition, a key characteristic for Polish units is the autonomy of ships. Since we do not have islands that could service as unsinkable bastions (and port bases), Polish ships must have the ability to carry out long missions (several days, possibly weeks) even in highly unfavourable weather conditions. The ability to place its own anti-access bubble in the Baltic would make it easier to convince allies to supply support and increase the impact team, which could operate in the western Baltic Sea region and even close the Gulf of Gdańsk – putting a naval blockade on the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Imagine a fleet of combined Polish-Swedish-Danish forces composed of:

three Polish frigates,
two Danish frigates,
one Danish support vessel,
two Polish submarines,
two Swedish submarines,

supported by:

even tiny flight teams from Poland (F-35), Denmark (F-35) and Sweden (Gripenes + reconnaissance aircraft),
land-based anti-ship missiles (Poland and Sweden).

Such a group of modern ships, supported from land and air, with a possible of wide application in different planes, would surely be an crucial force on the western part of the Baltic. But Germany could join... (Marine It has 10 frigates, 5 Corvettes and 4 submarines, which makes it the largest NATO player in the Baltic.

All this could be arranged almost ad hoc in cooperation with the countries of the region. In addition, we could number on the fast arrival of ships from 1 of 2 groups of NATO's Permanent Maritime Forces. 4 frigates usually operate as part of specified a group. However, it should be remembered that SNMG can be utilized for another tasks (e.g. in the Mediterranean Sea, M. Black Sea or M. Norwegian Sea), so we should take care of our own interests erstwhile reasoning about the safety of the Baltic Sea.

Of course, it should be remembered that the Russian Baltic Fleet has about 30 ships + auxiliary units (about 60). That is why, among others, Swedes and Danes urge Anglo-Saxons to have more of their fleets in the Baltic (especially as it is hard to number on the Polish Navy as an essential force for the time being). And it was in the context of the threat from Russia and the war in Ukraine that the Americans sent a BALTOPS 2022 landing ship to maneuver USS Kearsage with a displacement of more than 40,000 tonnes (as many as a French atomic aircraft carrier: Charles de Gaulle). American WASP (war-class amphibious assault ship) takes on board about 20 vertical take-off aircraft and about 40 helicopters. As if it were not enough, the British sent 1 of their 2 new, full-fledged carriers to the above maneuvers HMS Prince of Wales about the buoyancy of about 65,000 tonnes (although inactive without F-35 fighters, for which the English are inactive waiting).

This is proof that the Anglo-Saxons are not afraid to swim in the Baltic. In fact, they send their largest and most valuable ships to this water. seemingly no 1 in US Navy and Royal Navy He hasn't heard the communicative that ships larger than corvette scrub the keel after the bottom of the besides shallow Baltic Sea.

Would Anglo-Saxons operate in the Baltic during the war? Of course, this is highly doubtful (although I began to wonder myself, was it? Exercises and maneuvers have a goal, not only political but besides about learning about the watershed or working with local allies). Moreover, if the Swedes joined NATO, there would not even be specified a request (it is possible to operate fighters from Swedish airports). On the another hand, many NATO naval maneuvers that have been taking place in the Baltic for respective years show that the Anglo-Saxons are besides ready to undertake combat missions in the Baltic Sea (e.g. smaller units, i.e. destroyers and frigates).

At the same time, while sacrificing a condition of the aforementioned Baltic Fleet, despite its large numbers, the Russians should not be overestimated. Their units are highly susceptible to airborne rocket attacks. Anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses are liable for old, heavy utilized (about 30 years in service and technologically derived from the 1980s): a destroyer kind Soviet and 2 frigates of kind Fearless. With only 3 ships with outdated air defence and antimissile, the remainder of the submarine fleet (c. 26 corvets) is simply susceptible to attack and sinking. As a result, even with a numerical advantage in the course of the naval battle, it may turn out that the Russians will not penetrate enemy defence systems, but themselves will be sunk with a comparatively tiny amount of missiles (no adequate defence). In another words, an aviation-supported smaller squad of modern Western multi-purpose ships with a good rocket defence and anti-ship launchers can pose a deadly danger to a much larger Russian fleet. The problem is that so far neither Finns nor Swedes nor Poles have specified units... Hence specified a large cry for assistance from regional capitals directed towards London and Washington. The dependence of the above-mentioned safety nations on Anglo-Saxon fleets is unfortunately very clear here.

Which does not change the fact that stories about the closure of the Baltic Fleet of the Danish Straits should be inserted between fairy tales. The deficiency of adequate air defence leads to the conclusion that Russian ships could easy be sunk if they were far from their bases in Kaliningrad at the time of the war. Even if the Russians someway managed to occupy Bornholm (and yet the preparation and grouping of the fleet – including the landing fleet – would be visible to NATO and would meet with the appropriate consequence and strengthening of the island's defence), they would not be able to keep it. The Baltic fleet would be forced to retreat (due to: aviation + land-based rocket + NATO fleet) and the solitary Russian land forces cut off from the supply would not simply have a chance of defending themselves.

In another words, even at the time of the war, The Baltic would most likely become crucial for Poland to keep gas, oil and supply by sea. Especially to the ports in Świnoujście and Szczecin (there would be a request for infrastructure for collecting oil tankers).

Russian consequence to Finnish NATO flirtation

Although the Russians included little or greater hazard of involving Sweden or even Finland on the NATO side in the war plans, if these countries were actually in the Pact, then the Russian comfort region would shrink considerably. So is feeling safe. For NATO's permanent bases in the territory of the abovementioned states, and even only a rotational presence, would pose a crucial threat from the position of the Russian Federation. 1 thing to do is to calculate that Finland, which lacked offensive capacity, would support NATO somewhat after the outbreak of the war, and otherwise, if many NATO aviation squadrons, land and sea forces (even close Kronsztad) were to hit the Finnish territory before the war. Then the theatre of action on the 1st day of war from a reasonably distant Baltic could decision straight to Russia. Finland in NATO is simply a real problem for Russia.

In view of the above, leaving as crucial a substance as the eventual accession of Finns to NATO would be a immense omission from the position of the Russian political elite. And although it seems obvious, the unusual thing is that there was no debate among global experts about another Russian movement. And this will surely happen, especially since the Russian side itself on 13 May She threatened to make the right ones. steps, including "technical-military" whatever that means. It was besides rather a proposition that Finland's effort to join NATO would not only break bilateral relations on the Helsinki-Moscow line, but would endanger the safety and stableness of the region in the north of Europe.

And yet on the same day Vladimir Putin stated that Sweden and Finland had joined NATO not For the Russian Federation the problem – until there are NATO installations and bases there – it can be assumed, however, that these words were directed more for interior use. After all, it cannot be found that the policies of the Kremlin authorities have led to adverse political decisions, and that would be the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Pact. At the same time, any logic should be indicated. If the accession of the states to NATO is not a problem, but the deployment of additional military bases and infrastructure in their territories is, then erstwhile should the Russians possibly counter the second scenario? erstwhile it is besides late and Helsinki and Stockholm are protected by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact, or before the Finns and Swedes become members of the North Atlantic Pact?

Finns under a Russian drip

Thus, it can be concluded from the above that the Moscow decision-makers will indeed respond. Just how, erstwhile and where? It is easiest to answer this last question, due to the fact that Russia may not be peculiarly threatening Sweden. Of course, 1 can imagine e.g. a landing on Gotland, but the scale and complexity of specified an operation could go beyond the capabilities of the Russians in the Baltic. Furthermore, the Swedes are independent of the Russian Federation in terms of energy resources. They have no land border with Russia.

It's not Finland. This until late was dependent 100% on Russian gas supplies and 90% on Russian oil. However, thanks to the fresh investments Finland – Baltic States – Poland was created a pipeline connection, thanks to which the Finns gained a connection with the EU network. On May 1, 2022, the Polish-Lithuania gas interconnector was launched, which was the last link. The full gas pipeline to Finland is expected to be full capacityed as early as October 2022. In another words, it looks like the Finns will make it, and the Russian thread amputation operation will run almost painlessly. In particular, it is besides planned that Finland acquires a floating LNG terminal to be placed on the confederate coast of Finland. Pending the improvement of the essential infrastructure to enable the usage of specified an entity, Finland intends to benefit from cooperation with Estonia, which could accept gas carriers in the port of Paldiski (near the exit from the Gulf of Finland).

In terms of dependence on Russian oil, The Finns have been making crucial advancement for respective years. This is linked to the strategy for the improvement of Finnish renewable energy. This led to a simplification of imports of Russian oil by about 1⁄4 in the stock by 2020 in 2021. At the same time, Russian oil can be replaced by shipping supplies.

Moreover, by 2023 the Finns intend to complete the construction of the Olkiluoto atomic power plant, which will supply them with complete self-sufficiency in the supply of electricity.

In conclusion, Finland may shortly become completely insensitive to Russian energy blackmail. It is so crucial to consider whether the Russians will decide on a force variant, even if very limited?

Russia will usage force?

Unfortunately for Finland, the Russians have a very wide field to show for a possible hybrid war or, for example, trespassing and occupying a part of Finnish territory. The Finnish-Russian border is over 1,300 km long and extends through difficult-accessed forest areas crossed by many watercourses and lakes. In fact, a shallow crossing on a selected section of the border in Finnish territory and its mastery would not be a problem for the Russians. This is technically feasible, and NATO would have a alternatively serious dilemma. Do you accept a country whose territory, even a tiny one, is occupied? Of course, if it was a part of forest, possibly no 1 would care. Worse if the Russians occupied a border town or even a few.

It would besides be possible to carry out a landing on the Finnish islands located in the Gulf of Finland. This would besides bring any tactical benefits to the Russians. For example, it would be beneficial to control W. Haapasaari from the point of view of securing the way through the Gulf of Finland to St. Petersburg and Kronsztad, while facilitating the blockade of the Finnish port in Kotka. With an advantage over the Finnish fleet, the Russians could go even further and effort to master 1 of the islands close Helsinki (although that would be risky already). To make it easier for yourself to block the sea from the Finnish capital. The impact on islands would require maintaining supply by sea to keep the positions occupied, but on the another hand, defending these islands in the long word could be much easier. Deprived of allies and yet rather weak Finland could have a major problem to deal with the reflection of occupied territories. And that would complicate the question of joining NATO.

An obstacle to the Russian landing or to the supply of supplies for the acquired islands are, among others, the Finnish RBS 15 anti-ship rocket launchers (the same ones that are utilized by Poles in the Marine Rocket Unit) placed on trucks. Their task is to defend the Finnish coast. However, 2 things should be remembered:

The Russians would have a chance to hide from missiles utilizing a veil in the form of an archipelago.
Finnish islets in the Gulf of Finland are very small, and thus manageable by comparatively tiny forces. The kind to transport tiny boats alternatively of larger landing ships. In particular, the characteristics of the Gulf of Finland, as well as the proximity to the Russian islands, i.e. Gogland, would let for a amazing and fast air-deforestation action utilizing elite peculiar forces. So with air (propellers flying at low altitude) as well as water (motor boats, being besides tiny targets for RBS 15 rocket launchers).

Of course, with an open front in Ukraine, the Russians will not be willing to start another war. On the another hand, if it were possible to hit the Finns at no cost to check their global situation possibly for years, Moscow could be tempted to do so.

Thus, it should not be automatically assumed that since the Russians inactive cannot cope with Ukraine, they are besides incapable to carry out hybrid actions in another directions. 1 of the most crucial factors in specified actions is the surprise effect. If the Finns had slept, they could have woken up with a alternatively serious problem that could have undermined their efforts to enter NATO.

Russia, despite large problems, has not yet said its last word, and we have inactive not reached the point of solstice in Washington-Moscow relations. Therefore, it is entirely possible and even probable that the Kremlin decision-makers will proceed to increase the stakes. They have an effective safety valve for atomic weapons, so they feel safe, can and will attack and destabilize everyone around them. Knowing that Russian territory is inviolable. This makes the Russians inactive willing to take risks, which should be apparent after February 24, 2022.

Of course, the above considerations should not be taken as a certainty as to the future steps taken by the Russians. However, the text is an effort to answer the question of what else might Russia surprise us about? Even if our actions against Finland and Sweden were pointless from the point of view of our logic, it should be remembered that the Russians think differently. That's why they hit Ukraine in February 2022, erstwhile from a Western analyst's point of view specified a step would be wrong.

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Krzysztof Wojchal

geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog

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