In the first part of the article we pointed out that the sentiment existing between Polish and Ukrainian society creates favorable circumstances on the basis of which common relations can be built. However, in itself it does not mean to conclude a Polish-Ukrainian alliance.
All the more reason Warsaw's offer to Kiev is not as strong as it might seem. Moreover, the past of Polish-Ukrainian relations already knows the periods erstwhile it seemed that we were beginning a "completely fresh chapter" in these relations.
And then there was this... alleged ass. Marazm caused by the deficiency of diplomatic maturity and the inability to resolve historical disputes.
In the second part of the text we will consider in turn the impact on relations between Warsaw and Kiev otherof the above mentioned By us assetof Poland. This is primarily a geographical location. It is thanks to him that Poland enters Ukraine's logistics facilities.
We must besides not forget the considerable economical possible of our country, as well as the supply of weapons intended to fight Moscow. After discussing these aspects, we will discuss what Poland can do differently in the future in order to make better usage of its assets.
‘Famous geography...
The value of geographical location is overestimated over the Vistula River as an instrument of force that could be utilized by the Polish Republic in abroad policy. This does not mean that this origin is not important. Without Poland, it would indeed be much harder to arrange deliveries for Ukraine.
But that would not be impossible. Above all, the anticipation of ‘playing’ is limited. Think about it: can we truly endanger Ukraine with a “cut-off” from supply through the territory of Poland?
The fact is, not really, due to the fact that we'd be shooting ourselves in the knee. After all, the better the defence of Kiev, the more we distance the danger from the borders of Poland from Russia and limit its influence in Europe.
It was the attempts to integrate Moscow into continental political and economical relations that have caused the biggest threats to Polish interests in fresh years. The support of Ukraine besides strengthens the strategy of alliances, which depends on the safety of Poland.
So do you imagine that 1 of our “ours” tells Americans, “You will not supply Ukraine through our territory. We're taking out J-Town. And by the way... give more troops to the east flank.” Oh, no.
If any government tried to implement specified a policy, it would most likely lose credibility in the eyes of key allies and could be considered harmful to Poland. Especially as the US would have organised support for Ukraine anyway, only by another channels.
That's why it's easy with the geography. We can scale the degree of engagement of Poland in the fight against the east border, but we cannot completely cut Ukraine off from logistics. In our opinion, it is crucial to usage another opportunities which give Poland its geographical location.
The economical possible of Poland is not decently exploited in relations with Ukraine
In the realities of Central east Europe, Poland has large economical potential. It could be much more used to increase the influence of Poland in the region. However, this is not the case, among others, due to the 3 diseases presently affecting our country.
These are populism, the deficiency of long-term policies in different areas of state action, and putting the good of various interest groups ahead of the general good.
We will show you how it all works in practice on the example of importing grain from Ukraine.
Since 2017, the free trade area agreement has been in force between Ukraine and the European Union. In fact, however, the area was not entirely "free". Customs duties and another charges continued to apply, inter alia, to agricultural products.
Therefore, imports of cereals from Ukraine into the Union markets were made on a very limited scale. The vast majority of production from the east went to planet markets (including Africa and the mediate East). Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea were utilized for export purposes.
In February 2022, however, transport by sea prevented the Russian blockade of the Azov Sea. In the hope of reorienting the supply chains from Ukraine towards the mainland, the EU has so decided to suspend the aforementioned trade barriers for agricultural products from beyond the east border.
This provision besides served as an highly crucial "drip" for the Ukrainian economy. The basis of the economy is auagriculture, which is approx. 20% of GDP and over half values exports from the east. The main burden of the request to absorb grain from Ukraine was on Poland and Romania.
Consequences of grain influx from Ukraine
The beginning of the EU marketplace was 1 of the factors that contributed to the decrease in grain prices in Poland. Data on this issue no are, however, unambiguous. Moreover, it is worth looking at this situation from a broader historical perspective.
In 2023. pricesThe grain in our country actually fell. However, this decline only brought them back to the level recorded before the war. So he was nothing unusual. The revenues of Polish farmers were only depleted in comparison to the period just after the outbreak of the war.
There was a supply crisis then, and there was uncertainty in the market. So prices went up. However, it was hard to anticipate this situation to proceed forever. Nevertheless, farmers began protests.
To appease them, the government decided in April to unilaterally close the border for agricultural goods coming from Ukraine. Bratislava, Sofia and Budapest followed Warsaw. Bucharest, who did not want to overtake Brussels' action on this matter, abstained.
However, the actions of the Polish Government did not solve the fundamental origin of the problem, which is the low competitiveness of Polish agriculture compared to Ukrainian.
The issue of various quality standards which Polish farmers must meet in comparison with their Ukrainian counterparts is besides not addressed due to their membership in the EU. The difference in requirements increases the cost of agricultural production in Poland.
These are already advanced due to the increasing inflation in Poland. This hinders competition with goods coming from the east border.
Foreign policy hostage to upcoming elections?
However, let us now return to the first of the 3 problems previously mentioned which plague Polish abroad policy. It is hard to get free of the impression that in the situation connected with the influx of cereals from Ukraine, the interest of the general public in favour of the interests of farmers was devoted.
The influx of cheaper agricultural products from abroad has been blocked, which could partially offset the inflationary force that Polish society is presently facing.
We'll show you this on an example. Imagine that country X is simply a farm that strives for self-sufficiency. To call on the neighbour to enter into trade, X so corresponds to an even higher fence, separating it from another farms.
“ Hey, why don’t you grow tomatoes? You have better conditions. I'm going to make bread due to the fact that I bought a super oven. And then we'll trade tomatoes for bread, okay?” X says, "I got your bread, I'll make myself a better one."
Only that the production of all the goods needed by the farm is very inefficient and expensive. It would be better if each household focused on producing what's good at. The remainder of the goods needed can be obtained through trade.
As a result, each farm will have access to a more diverse scope and more products. The standard of surviving of individual families will thus increase.
This besides works internationally. The exception is situations where the free marketplace efficiency of trade should be balanced with safety interests. Sometimes it is better to buy more costly gas from respective sources than to stay dependent on the supply of the cheapest natural material.
Cereals do not fall in this category. However, we will buy Polish grain alternatively than Ukrainian, but it will be more expensive. Farmers gain, and the remainder of society loses. For this first group, however, it is most likely a substance of deciding who to vote for in the election, and for the second 1 alternatively not...
A long-term State policy is important, taking into account its economical interests
On the example of grain imports, we besides see that global trade is limited by various barriers (including tariffs), and common competition between countries.
The strength of the most powerful countries in the planet is partially due to the fact that they are able to “configure” the rules governing planet trade in specified a way that it rewards their own interests. This is usually at the expense of expansion opportunities for entrepreneurs from another countries.
Can Poland do this? Not really. Here we find the second problem of the Polish state, which is shortsightedness and action “from fire to fire.”
In order to supply their entrepreneur with the right conditions to face competition on global markets, the Polish institutions must prosecute a long-term and thoughtful policy. This in turn requires a appropriate diagnosis of the current condition.
And this is the following. In the long run, the Polish farmer has no chance of competing in the cereals marketplace with his Ukrainian counterpart. For example, the second has more productive land with more cultivated land. Not to mention lower labour costs.
Ukrainian agriculture is besides very indebted. Western countries usage thisto have an indirect impact on a comparatively tiny number of holdings controlling crucial resources of Ukrainian agricultural land.
All the more so, the government in Kiev began unpopular reforms of the agricultural sector, aiming to liberalise land trade. He did so under the force of Western financial institutions.
Previously, the anticipation of selling land in Ukraine was very limited. shortly before the war began, it became much easier. However, certain restrictions are inactive in force to prevent direct acquisition of land to abroad investors.
So what should Poland do about grain?
The long-wave policy of Poland should take account of the redirection of resources of the Polish agricultural sector towards production with higher margins (e.g. sales of specialized machinery to Ukraine) while guaranteeing the supply of cereals from the east.
Such a warrant would be the gradual accumulation of property rights to Ukrainian black earths in the hands of Polish investors. any of these investments could be obtained from the European improvement and Reconstruction Bank or the European Investment Bank. You just gotta have your people there...
It would then be possible to keep access to the Polish grain marketplace for Ukrainian farmers in exchange for preferential investment conditions on the land marketplace there.
With the right capital, 1 can even be tempted to push in Ukraine to let Polish investors to buy land directly. Only... here comes the 3rd of the problems mentioned earlier by us – populism.
A political race was launched over the Vistula River for which organization will promise more to selected social groups. Currently, it seems to be unstoppable.
However, in the tact of this dance, the debt of Poland is growing, and the capital that could be utilized for strategical investments abroad is being "over-eaten" in order to carry out election promises.
If Poland had utilized the situation related to the import of grain to gain a serious player position in the Ukrainian agricultural sector, then it would indeed be possible to say that Kiev is becoming a strategical partner of Warsaw. And the influence of Poland in the east is increasing.
Such a decision would besides be much better integrated into the declared objectives of Polish abroad policy. After all, in proclaiming the desire to bring Ukraine into the EU, it is crucial to include farmers there in the EU's agricultural policy.
The protectionism of Warsaw is thus incompatible with the support granted to Kiev in connection with its aspirations to enter the Union. Moreover, while protecting the grain market, the Polish Republic lost a very strong bargaining card in relations with Ukraine and hampered the functioning of the country's economy during the war.
Military support for Ukraine
Finally, we left the military lines behind. It is clear that Poland has given Ukraine large military support.
In the long term, the technological backwardness of our army, arms and the modernization of the WP will, however, limit the opportunities for Poland to compete in this field with another Western countries.
Both Polish and Ukrainian troops are post-missive armies. Hence, many of the equipment utilized by these countries was compatible. Thus, it was easier and cheaper to pass beyond the east border T-72 than to set up an full army of our neighbour on Abramsy.
However, if the Ukrainian army is to be able to stand up to Russian, it should be redesigned in the future, following NATO standards. Therefore, Poland – operating on obsolete equipment and striving to modernise it will have little and little to offer Ukraine.
This is well illustrated by the fledgling coalition for the modernisation of Ukrainian aviation. At present, Poland is making a major contribution to sustaining the capabilities of Ukrainian aviation, giving MiGi to its neighbour. In the long term, however, the fleet must be completely upgraded.
The countries that will support this process will be, above all, countries that have already passed on to F-35 and can surrender their F-16 to Ukraine. Poland will so not be a key player of this coalition, but only 1 of respective members, assisting in pilot training.
The problem is besides that our army does not have a weapon that could have a disproportionate effect on the battlefield. For example, the British Storm Shadow missiles are specified an example.
The Russians have already adapted to the usage by Ukrainians of HIMARS and GMLRS systems. However, thanks to the larger than mentioned firing range, the British rocket can proceed to fight key targets in the Russian back room.
This, in turn, is 1 of the conditions for success of the ongoing counteroffensive. In order not to fall to the second series of states supporting Ukraine militarily, Poland will so request to find fresh forms of military aid to its neighbour. For example, increased training opportunities.
Polish-Ukrainian Alliance?
Due to the trends mentioned above, it seems that the burden of relations with Ukraine and its support is gradually moving from Warsaw to London, Rome, Paris and Berlin. The function of Poland can so be reduced to an crucial role, but not a crucial partner of Ukraine.
In another words, we will return to the status-quo that prevailed in Polish-Ukrainian relations before the war. Isn't that how we imagined it? Otherwise, we would not be observing so many debates in our country about "Polish-Ukrainian Soyusz".
However, these discussions should be based on solid foundations. For us, they are awareness of what needs to be improved, so that Poland can make greater usage of its assets.
The debate on abroad policy cannot so ignore issues specified as putting the interests of individual groups above the interests of the full society, the deficiency of a long-term strategy for Ukrainian action, deepening populism or the mediocre efficiency of state administration.
Under specified conditions it is hard to imagine, for example, a situation in which the full political elite puts long-term relations with Ukraine over the fight for farmers' voices in the upcoming elections.
While in our country there is simply a race for who will give more, whose social group, Germany, France, large Britain, or Italy discuss in the privacy of the cabinets the reconstruction plan of Ukraine. Even if we were allowed to do so, further social promises will limit the possibilities of financial engagement of Poland in the East.
For the moment, therefore, we do not have a viable state that could compete for the entry of the countries that decide Europe's fate, just groups of interests that usage it for their purposes.
Blood, sweat and tears...
Remember that the discussion on Polish-Ukrainian relations does not should be zero-one. So it's not that we're either doing everything incorrect or everything great. Regardless of whether Kiev's alliance with Warsaw, e.g. the safety situation of Poland, has already improved significantly.
After all, Russia is on track to be pushed out of Europe permanently. It was the effort to incorporate it into the Old Continent that posed 1 of the biggest threats to the interests of Poland.
Poland is at the same time and will stay an crucial medium-sized country. However, a year is not adequate to become a leading European country, co-decision on post-war governance. For this, we request constant looking to the future, not the past. And quite a few sweat, tears, possibly even a small bit of blood... This is something to remember, not wishful thinking.
But this is not the end! In the 3rd part of the text, we will describe to you what action should be taken to actually become a key partner of Ukraine.
