If he caught an average Pole on the street and asked him who supported Ukraine in the fight against Russia, he would most likely respond without hesitation: “Poland and the USA!”. And who's the biggest brake on this aid? “Germany!” Do you agree? most likely more or less.
Now, why don't you sit in the chair and perceive to what he said any time ago after gathering O. Scholz, W. Zelenski. He described Germany, among others, as a "real friend" of Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. He besides confirmed that Berlin is the second the largest providing assistance to Kiev (in US).
In our opinion, this shows that in Warsaw the attitude to Polish-Ukrainian relations is overly simplistic and emotional. Meanwhile, behind the scenes of the theatre of gestures and emotions there is simply a tough game of business.
So whether we translate the support granted to the neighbour into real benefits will depend not on the level of solidarity between Poles and Ukraine, but on the efficiency of our state administration. And this aspect of the country's functioning unfortunately leaves much to be desired...
At the same time, we would like to emphasize that erstwhile you read this text, you see our words in the right perspective. erstwhile we joined the ministry, we wanted to “make a difference”. This meant the gradual elimination of crime, the improvement of military capabilities, or the conduct of effective service operations.
All these tiny elements, were part of our heads of a larger puzzle leading to strengthening Poland's resilience and expanding its position on the global stage. Our ambition is so to make the state, not to be content with what is.
Returning to Ukraine – do we so witness the disaster of Polish politics in this direction? Definitely not. Warsaw will stay an crucial partner of Kiev. Will it be key an ally and will usage the current circumstances to improve Poland's global position?
I don't think so either. The state apparatus is in a state of deep stagnation (and possibly even regression). This prevents Poland from beating favorable circumstances into long-term successes. This state diagnosis is reflected in the texts appearing on the blog safety and Strategy.
What kind of cards did Poles have before the war in Ukraine?
Okay, let's start by mentioning the assets that Poland had before the war in Ukraine. These were in particular:
- Solidarity existing between Polish and Ukrainian society.
- Relations with the United States. We know that before the war broke out there were ups and downs. However, Russian aggression made safety issues a precedence in relations between Warsaw and Washington. This exposed Poland as a regional partner of the United States.
- EU membership. Here, too, we realize that in fresh years, to say the least... there was no ‘chemistry’ This does not change the fact that in Ukraine Poland is seen as a affirmative example of the post-Soviet country, which managed to enter Western alliance structures.
- Geographical location, predestining Poland to be a natural logistical base of Ukraine.
- Economic possible of Poland.
- Weapons supplies that could have been passed on to the neighbor.
Polish-Ukrainian solidarity
Ukrainians now have a large sentiment for Poles. It is due to a common sense of danger on the part of Russia, a cultural proximity which unites both nations, as well as assistance which it gave to the east neighbour after February 2022.
It is hard for us to imagine that akin ties can be built in Ukraine by Germany or by the French. However, it is worth remembering the state of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the period before the Russian invasion.
In 2015 – 2022, it was not known in Warsaw what policy should be pursued towards Kiev. Euromaidan generated a immense amount of sympathy for Poland. It was revealed, among another things, that the Ukrainians were much more willing to cooperate with our country.
This facilitated services and diplomacy, generated abroad investment opportunities and opened the door to joint political initiatives. Unfortunately, Poland did not have a wider plan to increase its own influence in Ukraine and to counter threats from Russia.
The first enthusiasm associated with the Euromaidan detonation has thus evolved over time into marazm. The MFA notes mainly revolved around historical issues, and peculiar services adapted their work to what they perceived as a request "from above":
- Hey, there's a chance of taking X's bets.
– Mmm... don't we have something to beat the nationalists?
- Okay, I'll bury it. How about we take a look at the situation on Donbas? The Russians are inactive firing...
– No, you'd better compose a note about who might have been behind the last “acre” in the cemetery in Lviv.
That was the climate.
A affirmative sentiment is just the foundation for policy building
So let us remember that the affirmative sentiment towards Poland only creates a susceptible ground for building close relations with Ukraine. But you inactive should be able to make it specific. Especially as in Poland we tend to identify gestures with real politics.
An example of this is In2008 Russian-Georgian community, which in public consciousness is remembered especially by the prism of the courageous motion which the president of Poland made.
On 12 August Lech Kaczyński spoke in Tbilisi together with the heads of the Baltic States, and the assembled crowd chanted "Poland, Poland". It was not meaningless, but the real policy was then done by the president of France – N. Sarkozy. He's the 1 who negotiated with M. A Saakashvil truce that ended the war with Russia.
Past errors limit the current maneuvering field
Another of the above mentioned assets of Poland were relations with the USA. Unfortunately, due to the chronic weakness of our diplomacy and intelligence, Poland was mostly amazed by the outbreak of the war beyond the east border.
Meanwhile, a 2014 lesson was done in Washington. The Americans did not want a repeat of the shocking business of Crimea. Thus, the invasion of 2022 felt for months ahead and prepared for different options for the improvement of the situation.
Poland's function in the pre-war game was marginal. Since then, Polish policy has been mostly reactive. Americans say that it is essential to deliver this and this to Kiev, and Warsaw is trying to best fulfill the task assigned to it by Washington.
This should not surprise anyone who has learned the reality of the Polish administration. Even if the intelligence has been alerting for months about the upcoming Russian invasion, it is doubtful whether Warsaw would be able to make and implement a coordinated policy that responds to this threat.
Despite the reactive attitude of Polish institutions, developments in 2022 and 2023, and above all the effective opposition of Ukraine, brought tangible benefits to Poland. The most valuable could be the permanent push of Russia from Europe, which would be a immense success of the Polish Republic.
However, errors made in 2015 – 2022 limit the available area for manoeuvre for the current Polish policy in the Ukrainian direction. They can besides reduce the impact of our country on the postwar safety order.
Does Kiev see Warsaw as a key partner?
If the Americans had not done a gigantic diplomatic and investigative work before the invasion of Russia, the current geopolitical situation of Poland could have been much more difficult. Moreover, Ukrainians seem to realize the quasi-clientistic nature of Poland-US relations.
So they know that if they convince Washington of any idea, Warsaw's support is almost certain. Conversely, Poland will not take any crucial initiative without US approval.
From Ukraine's perspective, therefore, the best policy is to make a “special” relation with the United States, like those on the Israel-US line. Especially as American aid has an existential character for Kiev.
This forcefully imposes a "glass ceiling" in Poland's relations with Ukraine. By arranging relations with Washington individually (Washington – Warsaw, Washington – Kiev, etc.) the countries of Central east Europe besides have much little chances of redirecting US policies to the tracks, which would be even more coincident with the interests of the region.
The state apparatus of the Polish Republic seems incapable to conduct a more sophisticated policy. This could consist, for example, of trying to convince Americans that China in Asia cannot be defeated without an earlier complete defeat of Russia in Europe.
So far, Washington dominates However, the argument that the longer the war continues in Ukraine, the more this restricts the US's ability to compete with China. Therefore, Kiev has not received support so far allowing it to gain a full triumph over Moscow.
Poland’s “gate” to the EU?
Poland is besides sometimes seen in Ukraine as a ‘gate’ to the EU. In order to actually be one, however, our country would gotta have a much stronger position in the Union. In particular, there are 2 aspects – political position and organization legitimacy.
The first is mostly global relations. In order to influence the strategical decisions to which the enlargement of the EU belongs, care must be taken at least to guarantee a correct relation with all major players – Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Rome and Madrid.
This in turn requires resources, long-term reasoning and effective diplomacy. 1 cannot, for example, be "punished" on migration issues from areas of Africa or anti-terrorism activities in erstwhile colonies and then anticipate EU countries to unite with us against Russia's threat.
Another request essential to accomplish a strong position in the EU is the Polish elite to scope a consensus on the main principles of the Polish abroad policy. Otherwise, we are rolling from 1 utmost to another, which undermines the negotiating efficiency of our country.
Many citizens are so profoundly active in the organization dispute that they do not see that, for example, Germany is thinking, “Oh, now that we have a government that is highly unfavorable to us, we will wait 4 years for the 1 with whom we do not even gotta work.”
Depending on where the mark group is targeted, the same ineffectiveness of diplomacy can be presented as "inconsistency with the EU" or "expression of good relations with the Union".
In fresh months, however, the actions of the Presidential Palace have been seen as a origin of optimism about safety policy. However, coordination at national level is needed.
To this day, despite the tremendous contribution to providing assistance to Kiev, Warsaw has limited participation in talks during which the future of Western relations with Ukraine is clarified.
Institutional legitimacy of Poland in the EU
The position of the Polish Republic in the EU besides depends on its individual attachment to Brussels structures. This means, in particular, how many Poles execute various functions in the EU institutions, how crucial these positions are, and to what degree our countrymen care about national interest.
In this respect, it is very hard for us to compete with countries specified as Germany and France. Take Frontex, the European Border and Coast defender Agency, as an example. Many Poles service there. However, they work there as private officers.
In akin positions it is vain to look for Germans and French for it. But if we look at the steering level, we know. We besides hear more and more frequently from colleagues in the circles of diplomacy that they are far more "concealed" in these blocks, e.g. representatives of Romania or Lithuania.
At the same time, we can't get the impression that we shoot “suicides” ourselves besides often. In particular, the strategy of staff selection for ministry, service and another sectors of administration fails. Moreover, the promotion policy in public institutions is poorly functioning.
This makes it uncommon that the most competent people in Brussels represent us. And erstwhile that happens, it will most frequently not last the “new hand” due to the fact that the Polish authoritative does not simply represent his country, but is “our” or “yours”.
Personal wars between officials and institutions are besides widespread. They include, for example, the fact that a public officer does not receive approval to take the post desired for the interests of the Polish Republic, due to the fact that he is associated with individual there.
Sometimes it takes the degree of pathology, due to the fact that after time it turns out that individual there has detected irregularities in the institution in the past. These were swept under the carpet, and those who had alerted them were found to be “guilty”. Life in the Polish administration...
Foreign positions are besides frequently treated as synecuries
Too often, abroad positions in administration are besides treated as synequors. So if we consider that our current precedence is our relation with Ukraine, it will be hard for us to throw the biggest “gossacks” on this direction. This is for 2 reasons.
Firstly, specified persons may not be allowed to leave their superiors. Secondly, the "system" is constructed in specified a way that seldom do the institutions that appear to be the most attractive to officials are indeed the most needed ones from the point of view of the state.
So good results at the embassy in Kiev are not, for example, a pass for professional promotion. There are no additional benefits to going to this place.
It is not surprising, then, that officials are more curious in going to Japan, Portugal, or Indonesia, alternatively than in more crucial directions from the position of the interests of Poland, but little attractive "touristly".
Ideally erstwhile you inactive manage to "seal" the best "chat" at the expense of the state and a warm occupation for your wife Thus, the funds of the payer who supports the Polish-Ukrainian alliance are not necessarily directed towards building its foundations.
So we gotta answer the following question: how do we want to win the competition for interests with countries that are stronger than us now, if we are not even able to "play" the strongest team?
As long as the changes do not take place, we will have small to offer Ukraine to accelerate its accession to the EU. And this is now 1 of Kiev's policy priorities.
In the next part we will talk about the function of the geographical location of the Polish Republic as an instrument of force in abroad policy, the usage of the economical possible of the Polish Republic, the military support of Ukraine, and how east politics are implemented by Germany, Italy or the English.
