What does the upcoming presidential elections in Poland mean for Europe? What are the main topics and key differences between candidates that appear during the ongoing campaign? And how will the election consequence affect the current government and its policies? Leszek Jażdżewski (Fundacja Liberte!) talks to Adam Jasser, an economical and political analyst with 30 years of professional experience as a journalist, editor and politician. He is presently the vice-director of TVP planet and host the publicist program "On the Record".
Leszek Jażdżewski (LJ): Who will be the next Polish president after 1 June? And why is this applicable in a European context?
Adam Jasser (AJ): I don't have my crystal ball on me, but I can relate to what I see in public opinion and polls. These data show that Rafał Trzaskowski – the current president of Warsaw, the centre-right candidate or the centre-right candidate is in the lead. How large is this margin of advantage and whether this dynamics will change before the second circular of elections is not entirely clear, but it seems improbable that it could lose the upcoming presidential election.
LJ: What is truly going on in the upcoming presidential election? What topics are discussed? And what are the key actors in an ongoing campaign?
AJ: In addition to Rafał Trzaskowski, who represents the pro-European mainstream parties and directs his message to pro-European mainstream voters, his main rival is Karol Nawrocki, who represents the conservative (or right-wing) Eurosceptic Law and Justice party. This is simply a organization that ruled Poland for 8 years before the current government took power in early 2024. Karol Nawrocki is the main challenge for the ruling majority behind Rafał Trzaskowski.
Therefore, in a sense these elections can be interpreted as an early plebiscite or referendum on the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Rafał Trzaskowski and the full coalition they represent. But it's just 1 dimension. The second dimension is that it is again a rivalry between political forces, which see Poland at the heart of Europe, an active associate of the community, and at the same time effort to presume the function of leader in this community. Of course, in proportion to Polish GDP and the overall position of the country. Together with France, Germany and possibly Italy, Poland wants to sit at the main table. And we have seen any evidence that the current coalition and Rafał Trzaskowski will be able to service in Europe.
Meanwhile, Karol Nawrocki and the Law and Justice represent the Eurosceptic branch of European policy. In 8 years of power, they have fundamentally managed to alienate all European partners – with any insignificant exceptions specified as Viktor Orban. But even in this case, differences in the issue of Ukraine yet made Law and Justice and their government rather isolated in Europe. In another words, they were incapable to usage the real strong economic, political and defence position of Poland to push Polish interests.
Therefore, if Rafał Trzaskowski wins, we can presume that Poland's place in the centre of European policy will stay in its place – and it will even be strengthened. If Karol Nawrocki wins, of course this position will be challenged. Moreover, the deficiency of interior cohesion in Poland, which is likely to consequence from his taking over the presidency, will make Poland likely to be little effective on the European stage.
LJ: The president of Poland is mainly liable for abroad policy and defence, although it is the government that truly shapes this policy. Therefore, to what degree do you think Donald Trump's election as president of the United States played a function in the Polish presidential election? And are safety issues related to the Ukrainian agenda applicable to this campaign?
AJ: The president is elected in Poland in direct elections, so he has a very strong social mandate. At the same time, however, its function in policy-making is truly limited. any commentators call it “a negative authority”. This means that the president can veto laws, hold nominations and mostly hinder the life of the parliamentary majority. However, it is inactive not that the president can truly change the course of politics unless he blocks certain things – which is besides a form of policy change.
Therefore, unfortunately, the Polish constitutional order makes the president either acting as a consensus, seeking consensus, trying to bring about a compromise and stabilising the political situation, or the only another function of the president is to be a negative power – veto government and request change in politics, which the very frequently ruling majority in the parliament will not necessarily follow. And to overthrow the presidential veto it takes 3 fifths of the vote in the Polish parliament (which is very hard to obtain).
In another words, the president is the head of state. Yes, he's the commander-in-chief. However, in reality, defence policy and key decisions are made by the Ministry of National Defence. Therefore, much depends on the personality of the individual who performs this function and on the knowing of the function of the president – in spirit rights, not letters Right. So far, Poland has not been happy about this issue. I think the only president who succeeded in being a consensus-building figure and trying to be comparatively neutral towards all political parties was Aleksander Kwasniewski – a erstwhile communist and later social democratic president who held power for 2 consecutive terms from 1995 to 2005.
Kwasniewski managed to make an aura of a peculiar kind of father for the nation and service as an arbiter. Although he did not hide his leftist sympathies, he could besides look through another prisms and search consensus on many issues. Later presidents, specified as Lech Kaczyński (brother of the current leader of PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński), were definitely party. Although there was a short, four-year period later erstwhile there was another president, who was possibly a bit more compromised, he was inactive clearly associated with the ruling organization at the time.
Then for the last decade we had Andrzej Duda, who was very biased. He was fundamentally a hostage to the Law and Justice and their policies. He is mostly liable for any constitutional problems and disputes concerning the regulation of law in Poland over the last 8 years.
This is why it is truly crucial to realize that either Poland will elect a president who will adhere to constitutional principles and effort to overcome existing divisions and polarizations (and I believe that Rafał Trzaskowski will effort to do so), or we will face a continuation of the current confrontational co-habitation (if Karol Nawrocki wins, or possibly individual even more to the right, due to the fact that there is besides a 3rd individual in the race who has small chance of moving to the second round).
Cohabitation is the key word here. If the President, the Prime Minister and the majority of Parliament are from opposing camps, it is highly hard to push through government and a improvement programme that would guarantee crucial political decisions.
As regards the impact of Donald Trump's election on the president of the United States and, in general, the MAGA movement on the Polish elections, it seems that for right-wing or conservative voters in Poland it is clear that Karol Nawrocki is close to MAGA ideology. At the same time, however, we could observe that support from Donald Trump or his supporters, specified as JD Vance or Elon Musk, does not necessarily aid to increase the number of votes. Therefore, in a sense it is like convincing the already convinced. And although Karol Nawrocki took a image of Donald Trump in the Oval Office, it seems that in itself it did not make that much difference – due to the fact that it should not.
LJ: Is it possible that we will have any problems with the legality of the presidential election? After all, this has just happened late in Romania. Or do we have nothing to worry about?
AJ: Overall, I am not very afraid about this due to the fact that it is simply a universal vote and no 1 questions the integrity of the electoral process as such. It will be hard for any actor to effort to undermine the result on the basis of certain question marks concerning the legality of the Constitutional Court, which must verify the outcome. It would be suicide if these officials tried to nullify the real elections, unless, of course, there are solid grounds for it. However, I do not think the situation is comparable to Romania. Therefore, in general, the result of the elections will be respected.
Of course, we can face a situation where the difference of vote is so marginal that we can anticipate a recalculation of votes and protests that may drag on. However, it is crucial to remember that even if for any reason legal doubts arise about this process, president Andrzej Duda must leave office by August, no substance what happens. His word of office expires. He can't proceed as president. In this case, the talker of the Sejm, who is simply a associate of the ruling coalition, enters and acts as interim president with full authority. This means that whatever falls under the present strategy or tries to shake the system, the ruling coalition in this situation, in my opinion, will be able to prevail and reconstruct constitutional order. Therefore, since this is commonly known, I do not anticipate any attempts to topple the result.
LJ: What should we anticipate after the 18th of May (election day) and before the 1st of June, erstwhile we enter 2 weeks of a very intense run of only 2 candidates (most likely Rafał Trzaskowski and Karol Nawrocki)? What happens then? How will the candidates then effort to address the voters who did not vote for them?
AJ: It should be mentioned that Karol Nawrocki has late been active in a scandal that casts a shadow on his character and integrity. Namely, the media discovered that he could extort an flat from an aged person, which Nawrocki denied. He stated that he acted in of good faith. It's a beautiful complex story, and I don't think we gotta go into the details. Nevertheless, in the last fewer days, we have seen a decline in his numbers. Currently, the difference between Karol Nawrocki and Rafał Trzaskowski increased to 8-10 percent points – and this is the difference that will be very hard for the erstwhile to overcome.
Regardless of the decline in the popularity of Karol Nawrocki, script A assumes that both candidates will decision on to the second circular of voting after 18 May. So what happens in these crucial 2 weeks? On the 1 hand, there will be an component of reset, all the another insignificant candidates will be dropped. In this context, it will be as if the race started again. However, at the beginning of this race, Karol Nawrocki will lose up to 10 percent points. So if he does not find a fresh narrative, if there are no events that will change the course of this campaign, he will race with time to make up for losses against Rafał Trzaskowski.
Meanwhile, the challenge for Rafał Trzaskowski will be to convince him that he is simply a consensus individual and individual who will effort to fill the gap that has been created in Poland in the last 10 years (or possibly longer) between the far right, Eurosceptic electorate and even more centrer and average – which is simply a Polish paradox, due to the fact that there are 2 main opposing forces here: in general, it is simply a centre-right versus right or utmost right. Therefore, he will gotta convince the undecided voters that he is simply a individual who can reunite Poland. Moreover, it besides faces the challenge of getting the support of another insignificant candidates – especially those from the left who seem to have polls of around 10% today, which is crucial – and whether it will manage to drag them to its side.
Finally, the last origin that will be crucial is how the Confederation will behave. most likely in 1 way or another they will be more favored by Charles Nawrock, due to the fact that they are ideologically closer to each other. However, in fresh days we have seen that they have tried to build any distance between themselves and Karol Nawrocki due to the scandal. Moreover, in the long word they seem to care about replacing Law and Justice as the main force on the right wing. Therefore, they will not necessarily be pleased with Karol Nawrocki's triumph in the election, as this will clearly strengthen the position of the Law and Justice organization on the political phase in Poland. In this context, Rafał Trzaskowski must find a way to make it easier for the Confederates at least to stay neutral in this race.
LJ: Can the deficiency of a more progressive programme (and so any issues focusing on young people or women) origin problem for Rafał Trzaskowski between the first and second circular of elections – especially if his support in the first circular is lower than expected?
AJ: The fact that Rafał Trzaskowski tried not to appear besides progressive may be problematic for him. However, in the end, if more centre-left or left-wing voters are confronted with Karol Nawrocki (who is definitely not on their side) and Rafał Trzaskowski (who is 50 percent on their side), I think they will rationalize this and give their voice possibly without enthusiasm but being a calculated decision to support the latter. That's 1 thing.
The second point is that, ultimately, any of these centre and leftist parties are members of the ruling coalition. Therefore, the deficiency of support for Rafał Trzaskowski may endanger their position in the ruling coalition at a later time. due to the fact that 1 can imagine a script in which Trzaskowski wins – even with a tiny advantage – in which Prime Minister Tusk abruptly has a much greater impact on the full political spectrum. In this case, it would be highly risky for the left or 3rd Way. It would be hard not to support Trzaskowski and not call on his constituents to support him.
So, yes, there will be any friction among the voters of candidates who will not go to the second round. However, Rafał Trzaskowski has a decent possible to mobilise these voters.
LJ: In the most likely script in which Trzaskowski wins, Donald Tusk's power will be further consolidated. How will this fact affect the Polish interior agenda? How will this affect the future of the current government?
AJ: Donald Tusk must become bolder if Rafał Trzaskowski truly provides himself with a presidency – due to the fact that so far the government has not made any crucial changes in the policy that Poland needs to boost economical growth, consolidate public finances and address a number of another issues. Prime Minister Tusk has the right instincts, but there are interior divisions – and then there was a presidential veto.
There is simply a hazard that the presidential veto utilized in the past by president Duda was a small excuse to not do besides much. If Rafał Trzaskowski becomes President, this excuse will disappear, and the ruling coalition should truly get to work.
To give 1 example, at the minute there seems to be no real centre of government economical policy. There are different ministers with crucial portfolios, but 1 cannot identify the individual in the government who truly coordinates economical policy-making. It seems that any of them are not truly based on evidence or analysis, and are more or little random.
I hope (but it is not certain) that Prime Minister Tusk will act truly rapidly so that in the autumn he can either reshuffle the government, or revive the coalition again to present a number of concrete political changes that will sustain the Polish economy, make defence spending sustainable and yet end any of the blockades in widely understood law enforcement, justice and human rights.
LJ: Do you believe that nationalisation, which Prime Minister Tusk spoke of at the European fresh Forum The thought a fewer weeks ago, can it become the fresh economical policy that we can anticipate from the government? Or was it just "campan talk"?
AJ: No, I think that erstwhile we see what is happening in the world, with the emergence in protectionism, industrial policy returns. She returned in the days of president Joe Biden. She returned to Poland for Tusk's erstwhile government. It surely existed during the regulation of law and justice – even though any of them ended up with decisions that were arbitrary, very frequently contrary to business logic.
Either way, industrial policy is coming back. This kind of nationalist economical policy exists, not only in Poland. It is simply part of the departure from globalisation that we have known. At the end of the day, however, there are simple measures of success. Is economical growth accelerating? Are investments going up? Does corporate order get better? Will companies be better managed, more productive, expansionally in terms of appropriate marketplace expansion? These are hard to implement policies, so it is easy to declare an industrial policy or a more nationalist approach to the economy.
Nevertheless, the Devil is in the details and in the circumstantial regulations and measures that are being taken. I believe Prime Minister Tusk understands this, and any of the ministers he has gathered around him are fundamentally people who follow marketplace principles. This is so more a question of uncovering a balance between rigorous industrial policy and state support and maintaining marketplace principles, competition and state neutrality in terms of competition on the market. And this is very frequently forgotten in these discussions.
For Prime Minister Tusk and his coalitions, it will be crucial that industrial policy does not distort competition and marketplace forces. It's not clear if they're gonna make it.
LJ: It seems that Poland can now face a hard choice, given that it has always been the most transatlantic voice in Europe. On the 1 hand, Poland has become rather powerful and crucial in the European Union and in Europe in general. On the another hand, it is unclear whether it can inactive number on the United States. What safety options will be available, especially after the upcoming presidential elections?
AJ: If Rafał Trzaskowski wins and Prime Minister Tusk takes a small breath erstwhile it comes to interior and global policies, he will most likely proceed his global policy, which I would describe as "insecure." He surely wants to keep American commitment to Poland and Europe. He is not besides inclined to say, "Well, let's quit America, we'll manage ourselves." Poland will never do this – and in this respect Tusk and the Law and Justice are very similar. They will be the last to say, "We must divorce America."
Prime Minister Tusk besides protects himself, or Poland, due to the fact that he tries to strengthen his ties especially with France. Moreover, it is besides worth mentioning that he seems to be a large enthusiast of deeper cooperation with the Nordic countries – namely Sweden and Finland. These 2 countries have late joined NATO, which is simply a paradigm shift in which Poland can act with them. Earlier this safety dimension was missing, or could not truly be full. Now, not only do these countries see the threat from Russia, but both Sweden and Finland are besides crucial military forces.
There is simply a community of interests between the Nordic countries and Poland. Donald Tusk mentioned in his first speech in Parliament that building this kind of regional cooperation within the EU (without giving up the EU and surely without giving up NATO) would be his priority. However, he is besides aware of the importance of various areas in which he can advance the interests of Poland and its security.
This is not entirely clear, and Prime Minister Tusk avoids this issue. On the contrary, it ridicules any European dimension of Poland's security. In this light he focuses on 1 horse: the United States. This is the final dimension – that is what this presidential race is about, erstwhile it comes to abroad policy and Poland's place in Europe. It will depend on how much Poland will be able to further strengthen its position in building these regional alliances. On the another hand, it may not take full advantage of this possible and alternatively focus on maintaining the American commitment to Poland's safety issues.
This podcast was produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with the Movieno Liberal Social and the Liberté Foundation!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are liable for the content of the podcast nor for any way of utilizing it.
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Dr. Olga Łabendowicz translated from English
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