The first phase of the full-scale war in Ukraine – which began on February 24, 2022 – ended around the turn of March and April. It was then that the Russians withdrew from Ukrainian territory in the north and north-east of the country. At the same time, the second phase of activities mainly located in the south-east of Ukraine began. East of Kharkov, Donbasa and around Mariupola. In this phase, the Russians concentrated forces and resources on selected sections of the front and began a laborious conquest. Obtaining in bloody fights more meters, villages and towns. The search for a solution through successive attempts to wing and shut down Ukrainian defenders in boilers failed. It besides became clear that defeats from the first weeks did not discourage the aggressor, and the Kremlin decision-makers are determined to wage war until victory. At this point, we should ask ourselves, how do Moscow people imagine this victory?
Even before the February invasion, most experts indicated that the mark of the attack would be to capture Donbass and, above all, to break into the Crimean peninsula occupied by the Russians. However, at the first hr of the clash, it became evident that the Kremlin authorities were not curious in limited territorial gains. The main strategical goal proved to be the full of Ukraine, which consequently meant that the Russians had to win the capital of the state – Kiev. The scale of the Russian operation and the direction of the attacks in rule covered 90% of the predictions I had described 3 weeks earlier in the text: "Will Russia invade Ukraine and how can it run?"
One of the graphs made 3 weeks before the invasion, showing 2 directions of impact (north, northeast) and possible course of action. An almost perfect reflection of the actual course of the offensive on this episode.And let's face it, this kind of war goal is the only 1 that can be justified. For the acquisition of another Ukrainian circuit or 2 did not change the situation of the Russian Federation internationally. In fact, starting a war to get another part of territory that Moscow would gotta keep would have made no sense. In peculiar in the context of the advanced hazard of expanding sanctions on Russia, its continued political isolation, and the possible cut-off of Russian energy resources from the European market. Thus, profits from a possible war triumph would should be much greater than possible losses. For these reasons, real – not just propaganda – the success of Russians will be to take control of Kiev and more broadly, the full Ukraine. Then Vladimir Putin could deploy his full army from western districts on the NATO border (including Poland-Ukraine, Romania-Ukraine). The Russian dictator could then put the American people in a dilemma: “or you are fighting a second cold war with us, which will force you to costlyly keep many dense land units in Central Europe, or you will agree to our terms and then you will be able to deal with China.” The territory of Ukraine is so crucial, as it is about gaining 2 more operational directions against Poland and the threat of Moldova, as well as Romania. For the moment, these countries of the region, as well as the Baltic States, would not be prepared to defend specified a broad front on their own. That way Moscow could put force on Washington. At the same time, Ukraine is simply a goal for Russia in itself. Without Kiev, Russia is much weaker and its sphere of influence is pushed firmly east. Moreover, Ukraine seeking the EU and NATO is, from the position of the Kremlin, a threat.
For all these reasons, it should be stressed that Since February 24, 2022, the strategical goal of the Russian invasion has not changed.. The Russians are attacking at the minute with little momentum and shorter episodes just due to the fact that they do not have the capacity to implement more ambitious plans. However, it should be assumed that since the mark remained Kiev, the Russian side would sooner or later effort to scope for it. It seems to be only a substance of time.
From this perspective, limiting the offensive to the Donbas area and War on demolition should be considered a transitional phase. The phase, which, on the 1 hand, is to let Russian forces to reorganise, as well as re- and better planning of further operations. On the another hand, the Russians decided to exterminate Ukrainian forces utilizing advantage in the force of barrel and rocket artillery. In the first phase of the invasion, the Russians decided to take Kiev to end the war quickly. In many places, opposition points were celebrated leaving them behind their backs. Thus the Russian side suffered disproportionately advanced losses compared to the losses of defenders (which additionally built Ukrainian morale). Now 1 of the main intentions of the Russians is to weaken and destruct the Ukrainian army and to break the will to fight.
Although Ukrainian losses are not public, for those who closely follow the course of the conflict it became apparent that Ukrainians began to endure crucial losses both in people and in equipment. There were much more recordings of successful Russian actions. On the another hand, the deficiency of mobilization on the Russian side is curious. Without the inflow of fresh recruits, it is hard to supplement losses, rotate tired units, and above all defend the army from the disproportionately advanced percent of losses among experienced and better trained staff.
Regardless of Russian progress, as well as problems, on the basis of the course of ongoing fighting, it can be estimated that specified an offensive pace does not, however, foretell a fast triumph (understanded as the mastery of Kiev and Ukraine). Meanwhile, events at the front are not the only concern of the Russians.
Time's moving out.
The prolonged war in Ukraine is not on Russia's side. The Kremlin authorities are aware that de facto They race against time. advancement on the battlefield is insufficient in relation to the expected minute erstwhile Western sanctions will truly take effect. And even for these reasons, the anticipation that war will not change again is not justified.
The Black Gold Lives
It is said that sanctions on Russian oil may not have the expected effect, as Russia will find alternate export directions – specified as Chinese or Indian. That's not precisely true.
East Siberia– Pacific Ocean oil pipeline consisting of 2 strands (WSTO or ESPO) was completed in December 2012 (second strand – WSTO-2), and in 2019 the Russians led to full capacity of this infrastructure. The full investment cost the Russians about $25 billion. The full maximum capacity of both strands is presently 80 million tonnes of oil per year (about 1.6 million barrels/day). Thanks to these, the Russians can export black gold straight to China, specifically to the town of Dacing.
A network of Russian oil trains with a marked section of WSTO (k. red) and relationship (k. yellow). There is besides a large number of port infrastructure in China in the field of oil collection by sea.After 2017, China became the largest oil importer in the planet (surmounting the USA). Chinese oil import needs in 2020 were close 11 million barrels/day (about 14 million barrels/day in consumption). In another words, even if the full WSTO oil pipeline were utilized for the needs of the mediate State, the Russians would be able to cover only about 15% of the external needs of the Chinese. But there is besides a sea road. In May 2022, the Russians managed to scope an overall oil supply ceiling for China at a regular level of 1.98 million barrels. This shows more or little the advanced limits of Russian opportunities in this area, which account for around 18% of all Chinese oil imports.
And although Russia has become China's largest supplier of oil, this does not change the fact that it is the only crucial supplier to carry out the contract through land infrastructure. On the another hand, close to half of the oil deficit, the Chinese complement imports from the Gulf. besides crucial directions are Angola, Brazil or Venezuela. Consequently, more than 80% of imported oil is drawn to China by sea (including part of Russian oil).
These data show that the Beijing authorities, in terms of the supply of black gold, are inactive more dependent on global maritime trade routes than on Russian oil trains. Only if the Chinese could replace the Russian natural material with supplies from another directions (by sea), the Russians could not satisfy the needs of the mediate State in the case of, for example, hypothetical maritime blockade. In another words, The Chinese may quit Russian oil, but they cannot afford to cut off offshore supplies of energy resources.
At the same time, Even the maximum usage of Chinese export direction will not replace Russian European customers. In 2020, all Russian oil exports developed at the level of ca. 4.65 million barrels/day (in 2019 it was up to 5.25 million b/d). Sales to EU countries (with Britain) consisted of approx. 45% of profits, and along with Turkey and the US for nearly half of all Russian oil sales gross . Exports are mainly made by:
- pipeline Friendship (north thread through Poland and confederate thread through Ukraine), the full capacity of which is around 1.4 million barrels/day,
- naphthoport Primorsk, in the Baltic Sea in the Kaliningrad Oblast,
- New Russian naphthoport in the Black Sea,
- naphthoport Ust-Ługa (since 2012), in Leningrad Oblast over the Gulf of Finland, powered from BTS-2 pipeline.
It is worth remembering that the naphthoport Ust-Ługa and the BTS-2 oil pipeline were built in 2012 to bypass Poland as a transit country and exclude Polish Naftoport in Gdańsk as an intermediary in the export of Russian natural material by sea.
Looking at the infrastructure mentioned above, it is clear that, despite the fact that the easiest and cheapest connection with European suppliers is land-based (pipes), the Russians expanded port infrastructure in the Baltic and Black Sea. So as to be able to blackmail countries specified as Poland, Belarus or Ukraine with a possible cut-off of supplies of black gold. At the same time, kerosene-, coal- and gas-ports over these waters (as well as the Nordstream, South Stream and Turk Stream pipelines) are to let unfettered exports of energy natural materials to Western Europe without the countries indicated. So the Russians began to implement the policy of building the alleged energy roundabout around Poland respective years ago. Hoping that in the event of problems in politics with Washington, addicted to Russian natural materials Berlin (but also, for example, Amsterdam, Rome and another EU capitals) would be on the side of the Russians, and the susceptible energy blackmailing countries of Central and east Europe would not dare to argue Berlin-Moscow.
However, where the EU besides imposes sanctions on Russian natural materials, then it does not substance which way gas or oil will be transported. Due to the aggression against Ukraine, on 3 June the European Union adopted its sixth package of sanctions against Russia and Belarus. As part of this package, the EC introduced an embargo on oil from Russia by sea. At the same time, the EU intends to reduce Russian oil imports by 90% by the end of 2022.
This puts the Russians in a very hard situation, especially as any countries importing black gold through the “Friendship” pipeline (like Poland) besides quit Russian supplies. In addition, it should be remembered that the usage of “Friendship” depends fundamentally on Poland and Ukraine.
In this situation, the Moscow authorities can effort to usage existing port infrastructure in the Baltic and Black Sea to export natural materials to countries outside the EU. First, however, the price of Russian natural material will increase by transport costs. Secondly, its transport will inactive depend on EU and NATO countries. For it is impossible to leave the Baltic Sea without utilizing the Kilon Canal (Germany) or the Danish Straits. The road to the Black Sea leads through the Turkish Straits, followed by the Aegean Sea (controlled by Greece). Consequently, If the West stops buying Russian oil and blocks for the Russians the sea routes, then Moscow will not be able to redirect the natural material to another direction.
The following graphs show that erstwhile it comes to exports of Russian oil by sea, the most profitable ports are those in the Baltic Sea (Primorsk and Ust-Luga).
It is clear that as much as two-thirds of the gross is generated in this case jointly by ports in the Baltic and Black Sea seas. Both waters can be easy blocked by NATO (Denmark/Turkey) or even by the European Union itself (Denmark/Greece). Whether specified drastic legal and political steps will be taken is 1 issue. The second is the actual implementation of possible sanctions in this area. While it would be physically possible to block the Turkish Straits or further the Aegean Sea or the Western Mediterranean, local players in the Baltic Sea do not have the right advantage over the Russian Baltic Fleet (unless they number Germans). This problem is further described in the last article: ‘Will Russia respond forcefully to Finnish efforts to NATO? – Safety in the BalticIt’s okay. ” So – addressing the issue of Polish safety in the Baltic – It is in our interest to exhibit a strong adequate Navy, which, together with its Baltic neighbours, would be able to block Russian maritime trade and close the Baltic Fleet in ports. This is another very crucial argument in favour of the expansion of the maritime fleet, which I did not put earlier in the text: "Why do we request the Navy?’ Imagine that together with the Danes and Swedes (who would besides gotta invest in the fleet) we would have the strength to completely block Russians in the Baltic. It is not even about whether specified a blockade would happen, but about the fact that then decision-makers from Warsaw (in agreement with Copenhagen and Stockholm) could decide what happens in the Baltic without the Anglo-Saxons. Consequently, we would have had more leverage in NATO and concrete arguments to require an alliance to be more firm towards Moscow.
If the MW had the right force, then bringing in the closest allies and forming a sufficiently strong squad of ships could let Russians to be shut down in port and even put a naval blockade on civilian transport. It would be political to have specified an opportunity.Turning to Russian oil outlets. Even if the oil tankers inactive have the anticipation of a free cruise, another problem for the Russians is to find recipients. Japan (in 2020 the share of 2.77% in Russian oil export profits) and South Korea (6.75%) not only can not increase imports, but limit it yet. due to the alliance with the United States. China and India remain. However, the second are very close to the Persian Gulf, so only a sufficiently lower price (including the cost of transport) can convince them to receive Russian oil (especially that Ural oil is inferior). It does. The Russians are giving large discounts so that they have convinced the Indians to take over their oil, which, however, reduces profits and will not replace the European marketplace in terms of sales volume. So the Russian maneuvering field is very limited.
The Russians save the fact that so far there is not adequate natural material on the marketplace to completely replace Russian oil. Even the increase in arabian mining and the inclusion of Venezuela and Iran will not compensate for the deficit. That takes years to invest (though in Venezuela and Iran). And it should be remembered that the second agreement with Iran may not be enough. As a result, the request far exceeds supply (especially after sanctions on Russia), oil prices have gone up. This allowed the Russians to make more money for any time than before the invasion, even though during the full-scale war in Ukraine they sold little natural material. However, this will shortly change, as the volume of exports is expected to drop drastically by the end of the year (vide EU embargo decision since 5 December). In specified a situation, the Russian budget will gotta endure immense losses. At the same time, I don't think anyone has any uncertainty that the global recession is coming. In the event of a shrinking economy (less turnover) the request for fuel will besides decrease. This in turn could lead to a situation where Russian oil will cease to be so needed and oil prices on the marketplace will fall.
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Gas bomb
Oil exports are the most crucial and major origin of profits for the Russians. The revenues from gas sales are much lower. However, gas supply is simply a higher precedence for many economies (energy) than oil imports. Among another reasons, the Russian Federation has always been more inclined to usage gas as a political weapon. due to the fact that the blackmail of turning taps with gas was frequently more painful for the recipient (especially during the heating period), and at the same time little felt for Russia. The problem is that it is in the gas marketplace that the biggest revolutions happen in supply chains. To date, Russia's most dependent Central Europe will shortly become independent (vide investments in LNG terminals: Świnoujście, Klaipeda, Gdańsk, Krk, as well as Baltic Pipe). At the same time, the gas marketplace was heavy affected by Americans who entered with their LNG extracted from shale. erstwhile Putin reduced gas supply to Europe in December, it was the US that sent a rescue to the EU in the form of 40 ships filled with gas. The subject of the gas marketplace in Europe has been addressed respective times, including in the text: "Poland will become an energy hub for east Europe?It’s okay. ”
It is worth noting, however, that thanks to the USA, the problem is not the amount of natural material needed (as in the case of oil, which is besides low to completely replace the origin from Russia) but infrastructure. Germany, for example, does not have its own LNG terminal (although it was to be built) and almost a decade ago Angela Merkel torpedoed the construction of the Turkmenistan-Azerbejjan-EU gas pipeline. As a result, the Caspian gas mined by Turkmenistan sailed eastward. To China, which invested in the Asia Central-China gas pipeline. Thus, Beijing did not gotta build a second strand of gas pipeline from Russia and limited itself to only 1 connection: the Siberian Force. This last connection was late opened, and its maximum capacity will be comparable to that of the Jamal pipeline by Poland (only 38 billion ml/year, for comparison Central Asia-China and Nord Stream have a capacity of 55 billion ml/year, like Nord Stream II). In another words, the Chinese knew perfectly well for what purposes the Russians utilized gas and made certain not to depend on Moscow in this matter.
Thus, judging the full neighbourhood of Russia – from the Far East to Western Europe – Europeans were the most dependent on Russian gas. China mostly acquires natural material from another directions (Central Asia, as well as through terminal LNG from around the world), Central Asia owns its own gas, and the Caucasus and Turkey origin gas from the Caspian Sea (as an alternate to this from Russia).
Meanwhile, Central and east Europe is independent of deliveries from Moscow and Western Europe can usage American LNG or gas from Norway. The biggest problem is Germany. Although they are connected to the EU gas pipeline network, this network was built to redistribute Russian gas, which would send Nord Streams to Germany. Of course, the gas can flow the another way, the problem is that the infrastructure allowing the reception of another gas (e.g. Norwegian or American) to the neighbouring countries is besides small. In another words, in a crisis situation, everyone will conflict to meet their own needs and there will be no greater surplus of natural material to push it further to Germany. Therefore, Berlin's current precedence should be to build its own LNG terminal. And that'll take years.
Map from 2017 gas infrastructure in Europe. The Świnoujście and Klaipeda LNG ports are already open. A gas pipeline connection between Poland and the Baltic countries (after Estonia) was besides built. The Baltic tube from the North Sea is finished by Denmark to Poland. The German Wilhelmshaven terminal, after 5 years of debate, is inactive only “in plans”. origin – DIW 2018, based on Kai-Olav Lang and Kirsten Westphal, “Nord Stream 2 – Versuch einer polytischen und virtschaftlichen Einordnung,“ SWP Studies S21 (2016)); ENTSO-G, Capecity Map (2017).Infrastructure utilized to receive gas supplies is 1 thing, but casus The LNG terminal at Freeport shows that it is besides essential to safe the facilities utilized to send natural materials. On June 9, the U.S. Gasoport crashed. Meanwhile, it is the main export terminal of the USA, which served the European market. It could take months to fix. However, these are short-term obstacles that will not reverse the progressive and unfavourable tendencies of the Russians. The Kremlin's decision makers are losing gas jacks. And it was in my opinion that Putin decided to attack Ukraine right now, as I described in the September 2019 text: "Russia will start a war in Europe or the mediate East by 2022It’s okay. ”
A ruble on the verge of a breakdown?
Many commentators believe that Western sanctions on Russia are not effective. What is to be demonstrated by strengthening the ruble in relation to the values before 24 February 2022. After the February-March collapse of the Russian currency, the authorities took fast action at the same time to save their home currency (e.g. the anticipation of exchanging rubles was limited). Effect? From the rate of 158 rubles for the dollar (beginning March) the value of the Russian currency increased and its conversion rate is now It's about 53 to $1.
However, specified a brief setting of information and drawing far-reaching conclusions leads to confusion. The real value of ruble on the marketplace is much lower. Only those who gotta buy it. In another words, if a country cannot quit imports of Russian gas and oil today, and Putin's decision has to pay in rubles, then that country actually acquires rubles. This increases the request for ruble and thus favourably affects its value. The problem is that shortly there may be a shortage of entities that will request rubles. It was precisely due to the independency from Russian natural materials and the anticipation of cutting the Russians off from alternate outlets. If this happens, then the rubles in the planet will be worth little than the paper on which they were printed. And to any extent, it already is. In the commercial market, rubles are now junk. The sanctions on trade with Russia and Russia make it worthless for Western companies. They simply don't request it (and don't want it) because, for example, they have stopped moving business in Russia and with Russian contractors (and even if the transaction occurs, it's alternatively in mottos – due to the fact that it's safer this way).
Putin’s policy, the Western consequence and the ongoing war and the uncertainty surrounding it make only speculators who are at large hazard curious in acquiring a ruble. If you don't gotta have them, the ruble gets free of them – especially now that the course is beneficial. The Kremlin authorities so introduced a ban on the exchange of rubles into abroad currencies will give Russians, which would kill the ruble. The hazard is so large that the Russian marketplace has become even little attractive erstwhile it comes to too. besides for the Chinese. A Chinese entrepreneur with a subsidiary in Moscow who sells his goods or services in Russia receives payment in rubles. Apart from the fact that in Russia the rate of return is very low, and now it will be even lower due to the fact that society is poor, something must be done with earned rubles. Either invest in Russia (risk!) or overvalue. So sale rubles and buy dollars or yuan. But to sale the ruble, individual has to want to buy it. At the moment, either speculators (margins) or states buying gas or oil from Russia are willing to buy rubles. If sales of these natural materials drop significantly, the rubles will cease to request anyone – but the Russians themselves. In specified a situation abroad capital (even from Russia's theoretically favorable states) will flee the Russian market.
In addition, even the richest Russians will flee with wealth in gold, dollars or euros – if they can (legally or illegally). And the poorer will not be able to buy imported goods due to their advanced price (vide decrease in ruble). The deficiency of availability of goods or expensiveness, the crisis visible to the bare eye, government propaganda (everyone hits Russia, we fight the full West – you gotta adjust for a hard time) - all this will multiplicate the Russian's head with the hazard of a deep crisis. So what would a sensible Russian do? He'll save money. He'll trade rubles for gold. He'll gather supplies. What can result? Reduction: consumption (after the momentary growth), turnover, money movements and consequently a decrease in GDP and production (as is already seen). The recession and the decline in production will lead to an even greater impoverishment of society and... The snowslide is moving. At the same time, erstwhile money doesn't circulate, it loses value...
However, Russia's strength is not in society and its prosperity. The Moscow authorities live off the sale of natural materials and imports of the essential technologies and devices allowing, if not for development, at least to keep what is. Meanwhile, with a possible ruble collapse, state imports from China, for example, will become more expensive. In fact, at the collapse of Russian currency, it may turn out that the Russians will trade with China on a barter basis. Oil for technology, grain for electronics, etc. In the long term, this will gotta lead the Russian Federation to collapse and collapse. The technological divide between Russia and the remainder of the planet will begin to deepen and it will jump.
Here, of course, we have run into the future a small bit, due to the fact that the state of present is that the ruble is theoretically the strongest in respective years. but that's a problem for the Russians, too. due to the fact that contracts for the sale of gas and oil were concluded at prices specified in dollars. In another words, even if individual now pays for Russian oil in rubles, the price in rubles is set on the basis of a ruble-dollar course. The stronger the ruble, the little rubles the Russians get for 1 barrel... This in turn has a negative impact on the budget of the Russian Federation, which draws profits from its oil companies and fills the state's financial needs (instead of investing in technology improvement and mining infrastructure).
Such large fluctuations of ruble in specified a short time (at the turn of 2-3 months) are a symptom of weakness alternatively than the strength of this currency and the Russian economy. At the same time, erstwhile the embargo on Russian natural materials becomes a fact (December 2022), then the ruble course will again look for bottom. This time the problem will be more hard to remedy (than it is now), as the national currency will besides weaken interior factors. This will no longer be a short-lived effect of the panic surrounding the political decision (attack on Ukraine), but a structural problem announcing the long-term crisis.
At this point, I propose you take a look at the large economical and economical data compilation published in the Center for east Studies: "Russia economy-predict-crisis"where quite a few data schedules are presented. According to them, since April 2022 retail in Russia has fallen by nearly 10% counting year to year. GDP decreased by 3% in April. Industrial production besides started to decline (1.6%), and yearly inflation in May 2022 was 17.5% (official). It should be remembered that the consequences of the invasion of Ukraine are only the beginning.
When will the Russians begin the next phase of the war?
The above data and conclusions show that real problems in the Russian economy will most likely start at the latest in early 2023. If a wave of crisis profoundly affects Russian society, it is an expanding trend in support of Russians for war against Ukraine can turn around. This may consequence in social dissatisfaction, greater skepticism towards the authorities, as well as a critical opinion on their effectiveness. Of course, the creamy propaganda will effort to exploit negative factors in its favor. Today, we are already witnessing the “wrestling” of any Russian publicists and propagandaists that the Moscow authorities have not decided to carry out the mobilization and strike Ukraine with full force. These complaints – in my opinion – are false criticisms that have de facto convince the Russian public to win the war as shortly as possible. Whatever it takes. To this end, mobilization must be carried out and the subject ended with an offensive on a very large scale, utilizing all available forces and means.
Thanks to specified decisive actions – as they will effort to convince propaganda leaders – they will be able to sign the peace on their own terms, take control of Kiev and, above all, force the West to cooperate. Then Russia's problems would be again filled with cash from the sale of energy natural materials and, in the long term, the return of western capital to Russia (investments/jobs/technologies).
However, even specified a presentation may not be enough. If the war continues and has long lasting negative effects on society and the economy, even with the rightness of conflict, The Russians may start asking themselves, ‘If the war is so prolonged, why do we have specified problems, should we proceed it?’
Certainly a large part of society – as in Russia – will stay in the position of supporting Vladimir Putin's policy. However, the percent of disgruntled or doubtful people will grow. Therefore, the Kremlin decision-makers are under force not only economical but besides social pressure.
Is the army ready?
Military aspects have come to this. Even if all the signs in heaven and earth indicate that the Russians should strike Kiev again, it will not be possible without adequate military potential. And there are most doubts about that. The losses incurred in Ukraine – even if they are estimated below what is given – are inactive considerable. On the another hand, if the Russians were reasoning of a re-, wide-ranging operation, then they would gotta prepare better than the erstwhile one. And take by far more soldiers and equipment. due to the fact that it was mainly the deficiency of numbers that decided the defeat on the northern and north-eastern sections (the direction of Kiev). The front troops occupied a crucial condition of the territory in the direction of Kursk and Eagle, going further to Kiev and leaving empty space behind. There was no 1 to defend the logistical facilities and areas already acquired. In numbers, the troops were shredded with all mile, threatening to break or break down communication lines and laps. The Russians ran out of strength to circular the Chernichs and proceed to invade Kiev from the east, even though they were able to approach convenient positions that would let specified actions. Conclusion? It appears that without much more force and mobilization (not to weaken armies guarding another borders/regions), Russia will not be able to re-exploit the capital.
It is besides hard to estimation the possible state of preparation (and whether they are conducted at all). all now and then, there's a fresh video of the Russians downloading dense equipment from distant districts. Old T-62 tanks are besides pulled out of the warehouses. However, they are not seen to be massively destroyed by Ukrainians. This leads to the belief that the equipment that has been dropped for about 2 months does not immediately enter the battlefield, and is likely to be utilized in a large part to supplement units that suffered crucial losses during February-March struggles. Is it adequate to increase the Russian army's size in Ukraine compared to the starting state of February 24? It does not appear to be, although it should be remembered that at the minute most eyes are directed towards the front and combat activities – not at Russian facilities.
However, it seems that the Russian authorities are preparing for the mobilisation scenario, besides from the formal and legal side. The age limit of persons who can be called up was late raised by 10 years (previously, the collection included persons aged 18-40). There is besides talk of sending people in the area of Ukraine in military training, as well as reservists and volunteers without specified training. However, the current scale of this phenomenon shows a desire to replenish losses in combatants alternatively than to form further groups preparing for the offensive.
It is besides worth paying attention to Belarus. For in my opinion,The Belarusian forces will should be used. And auxiliary directions: from Brest to Kowel, from Stolina to Sarny, and possibly besides from Mozyrz to Korostin. The Belarusian army is neither many nor well equipped, and for this it may have little motivation to fight than Russian soldiers. However, this does not substance from the position of the Kremlin. The point is to disperse Ukrainian defenders on the maximum number of episodes. Belarusians will not gotta win, but – they may even die. As long as they only tie up adequate part of Ukrainian forces far from the main direction of impact. For this purpose, it is possible to make mixed Russian-Belarusian tactical compounds.
And here it is worth observing the current actions of Alexander Lukashenko. For he has late begun to talk in a way (indicting Ukraine for provocations) which could later justify Belarus' active participation in the conflict. Recently, there has besides been news that the imitation combat wagons were set up by the Belarusian-Ukrainian Minsk border. Which would most likely convince the Ukrainians of the request to defend this direction and instead, for example, to strengthen the defence in Donbasa. On the another hand, erstwhile Ukrainians discovered this, 1 night boxes and balloons could be replaced with real equipment. Also, vigilance is inactive required here. On this example, it should besides be assumed that the Russians usage a akin method. Therefore, recognizing the real intentions of the Russians and the forces they actually have based on satellite images can be increasingly difficult.
All that has been described above is circumstantial evidence that can but request not prove anything. However, in my opinion, these are signs of starting a process (preparing for the final trial with Ukraine), which will most likely be more visible in a fewer weeks or even months.
It should besides be remembered that, despite crucial losses (20-30 1000 people around 700-1500 tanks and 2-4 1000 armored spaces depending on various estimates), The Russian Federation's Armed Forces have between 750 and 900 1000 soldiers, and the best equipment (such as T-90 tanks) has been available in a cost-effective manner so far (and so their service/crews also). Tanks in the T-90 household Russians own respective hundred, and in Ukraine they lost several-several. It seems that the Russians threw on the first Ukrainian fire units equipped with older equipment, and the losses of the best 1 are counted by OSINTs in plays on a scale of weeks. Russia besides saves aviation. And it's no wonder, due to the fact that Air Force is highly needed in terms of safety towards NATO. The West has much better aircraft, and the predominance in the air may prove decisive in the modern battlefield. Especially in the context of an extended Russian territory whose airspace cannot be defended with land-based anti-aircraft systems. The Russians are able to put a defence in the form of respective A2AD “bubbles” around the most crucial objectives, but without aviation, the remainder of the airspace would be susceptible to penetration by hostile aviation – especially technology-built machinery stealth(Yes, it is only the name of the technology, due to the fact that it is hard to detect and not invisible – as has been known since the beginning of the 21st century, due to the fact that the F-22 entered production in 1997 and the F-35 was flown in 2006).
Taking all this into account, as well as a number of assessments of various people analyzing the conflict in Ukraine, it is hard to measure the real possible of Russia. It is not known what the actual scale of losses is, but at the same time it is hard to find in what condition the remainder of the Russian army is in and whether the Kremlin has the ability to drop its forces from another directions, or has already exhausted all the "free" resources that could have been deployed to Ukraine.
However, it should be remembered that Although the magnitude of the failure may indicate that Russia will not be able to endanger NATO for even another decade, the lonely Ukraine is not NATO.... Russia surely has the resources and possible to deal with its weaker neighbour, only that the Kremlin authorities wanted to do so with the least possible effort and resources. Which resulted in massive losses and the failure of the operation to capture Kiev.
The question is, will the Russians decide to launch the full device in the war on Ukraine, and if so, how long will it take for them to prepare?
Given the fact that to attack on February 24, 2022 The Russians have been preparing around April 2021, and it can be estimated by analogy that the preparation of the second major strike will take about the same amount of time. The Kremlin could decide in this area at the earliest at the turn of April and May. Thus, if the Russian Federation's army were able to regenerate the depleted forces and set up an adequate army, a re-attack on Kiev would be possible around January/February 2023.
This is simply a very simplistic respect. due to the fact that if I presume that it takes a larger army to get Kiev, it would mean a longer time to set it at the starting positions. Although it should be remembered that many individuals are already in place. In addition, the stock of rolling stock is active in replenishing the supply of units inactive fighting in Donbasa. On the another hand, the Russians may already have more experience in shifting and deploying forces. A higher level of organisation could besides increase productivity. However, it should besides be taken into account that the Russians might want to better mask their movements in front of NATO and Ukrainians. An effort to accomplish the surprise effect would require a slow down of force and means, which would take place as part of the rail traffic required to operate the front. In another words, the increase in rail transport would should be smooth and insignificant alternatively than abrupt and clear for observers. Thus, from a military point of view, there are a number of factors that could negatively affect the time of preparation for the operation. However, we should not forget the increasing economical and social pressure, which may force us to abandon slow preparations in the final phase before the attack.
Truce option and Ukrainian uncompromising
Of course, the presumption that the parties will strive at all costs for a clear military solution in the conflict must be put to the test of arguments. There is simply a anticipation that the Russians, exhausted by the offensive, will agree to a truce or peace. However, for geopolitical and strategical reasons, which I wrote at the outset and more broadly in another articles, Putin’s action should be taken as an effort at a minute of rest. Time to lick the wounds to re-invade. This is the view of the Ukrainian side, which does not intend to accept compromise solutions in which it would gotta surrender part of the lost territory. The stubbornness of the Ukrainians is not unfounded here. It is in the interests of Kiev to bring about a situation where Western sanctions would take effect and thus Russia would endure immense economical losses. If the embargo on Russian oil doesn't enter until December 2022, Ukrainians will want to endure longer. Any earlier truce could consequence in the suspension of those most painful sanctions for Moscow. Consequently, the Ukrainians would be left with the devastated state and victims of the war (without clear benefits), and Russia would proceed to supply Western Europe with gas and oil, benefiting financially. The hazard of Russian strike or blackmailing another invasion would inactive should be calculated by Kiev. This script is unacceptable from the point of view of Ukraine. small wonder, then, that the Ukrainians are announcing a fight for the ultimate, uncompromising victory. As long as Russia stands on its feet and has a chance to return to play on the European energy market, Ukraine must fight.Peace – even with compromise – will be possible if the Russian Federation weakens so much (and bear specified defeat on the battlefield), That neither Putin nor his successor will think of another war for the next 20 years.At the same time, Ukrainians request to see that Western Europe has indeed taken a break from Russian gas and oil. It's not just temporary solutions, it's infrastructure. It is not about the EU never buying Russian gas or oil again (it would be naive to number on it), but about the EU (including Germany in particular) having secured alternate sources of natural materials. Right away. In specified a situation, any smallest Russian leap could be completely disciplined by a cut off from western capital. The situation in which the Russians attack in February would not be repeated and sanctions begin to hurt them in a year (because it may be over).
It is worth noting that the Ukrainian point of view in the scope described 100% coincides with the Polish national interest.
Fight to the eventual victory?
The Russian Federation must yet take control of Kiev in order to further endanger the West and NATO and to get the abolition of sanctions. At the same time, the Kremlin authorities are under economical and social pressure. which do not let conflict to be postponed forever. Ukrainians must not let truce/peace until Russia has fallen to its knees under military failures, interior problems and external sanctions. With both sides know that the longer the war takes, the weaker they will appear from the conflict. At the same time, it is the Russians who have the initiative and will decide whether and erstwhile the war will end. Russia has besides shown a number of times that it has been able to withstand economical crises and external pressures for a long time (although not indefinitely) and to keep a persistent armed conflict. Even for years (vide Afghanistan, Chechnya, Ukraine since 2014). Will she be ready for this script this time? It is hard to measure what data and estimates the Kremlin decision-makers have in terms of state resilience on different levels. It is besides worth remembering that Moscow is counting on the West of Europe to be the first. Under the influence of a crisis exacerbated by advanced energy commodity prices, as well as the deficiency of access to alternate supplies (e.g. oil). These expectations besides arise from the fact that the Russians consider Western societies weak and irresistible to negative economical factors. Therefore, in Moscow there is considerable social force on decision-making elites from Paris, Rome, Madrid, Vienna and of course Berlin. So much depends on the attitude of the West and how it will deal with the energy crisis. Although it is hard to imagine a script in which the EU is putting up a political capitulation flag admitting that the Russians' spin of the taps requires it to leave Ukraine to Putin. This would be a immense blow to the EU's image and, above all, it could break it from the inside. Of course, aside from the fact that the United States simply won't let it.
The end of the war in 2023?
Initially, just before the Russian attack in February 2022, there were many concerns about whether Ukraine could defend itself. any expected a short 1-2-week campaign. In the meantime, after 2 weeks, it was clear that the Russians had not met their ambitious goals. erstwhile the clash entered the second phase – the material war on demolition – there were predictions that the war could take years.
However, it should be remembered that, as the first phase of the clash proved to be transient, so the characterization of the war in the second phase does not request to proceed until the end of the conflict. His dynamics can change again.
Of course, an effort to foretell the course of war and its result must be doomed. It is impossible to foretell accurately, without real data on the course of battles and losses of individual parties, and without cognition of the circumstantial military possible of both armies. All this information is classified, and the Ukrainians or Russians themselves do not have complete knowledge.
However, on the basis of my own assessment of the objectives of both parties to the conflict, and besides after examining the political and economical aspects, I stay with the conviction that I raised in April of that year that Russia would strike Kiev again. The worst is before the Ukrainians.
At the same time, I am inclined to believe that the Russians will alternatively search a swift resolution of the conflict and will strike as rapidly as they can and as shortly as they recognise that the current war on demolition has weakened the Ukrainian army sufficiently. The 3rd phase of war – one more time characterized by a manoeuvring conflict carried out in many directions simultaneously – can decide the devastating defeat of 1 or the another side. It is rather likely that by 2023 it will be over... Unless the Russians are sufficiently exhausted from the current clashes that they can fool the West and, under its force on Ukraine, effort to enter a truce/room (or simply due to the fact that both sides are exhausted, action on the front will be frozen for a while, as it was after 2014). This period would service to prepare for reopening the offensive on Kiev. In specified a scenario, the final result could be a small later, although while maintaining and expanding Western sanctions and blocking Russian exports of natural materials, The Russians would gotta hurry.
Finally, it is worth noting thatThe West has the chance to provoke Moscow's more aggressive actions. If Russian tankers were blocked from the Baltic and Black Sea exits, then Russia could search an immediate solution in Ukraine and even effort to act hybridly against NATO.This has its good and bad sides, depending on whether possible victims would be prepared for a Russian reaction or not.
Krzysztof Wojchal
geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog
