In the first part of the text we wrote that the spread of opinions on the deficiency of differences between Polish and American “specialists”, puts public opinion to sleep and promotes the phenomenon of military sitting on laurels. We besides pointed out that the tasks of the native units were not suited to the needs of the state.
This time we would like to tell you a bit about the shortcomings in support, logistics and equipment that are presently present in the peculiar Forces. In addition, we will pay attention to the suboptimal usage of our soldiers. They thus have small chance to get combat experience.
This, in turn, is 1 of the factors that influences the comparatively fragile organization memory of individual individuals, as well as lower activity planning skills than among American operators.
Limited useand the possible of “specials” by the state
The “specials” training strategy introduced in Poland reflects the best practices in the leading armies of the world. So going to the shooting scope with a friend from SAS or SEAL, our operator will present a akin level of individual training. And it may even happen that it will surpass the Anglo-Saxons, in 1 of the elements of the "pure" shooting.
Polish soldiers can even amaze in this field, e.g. American Rangers, who then admit that in terms of shooting Lubliniec or Grom they play in the “league of champions”. Now let us compare this with, for example, the level of training of basic officers of Polish peculiar services, whose “companies” are inactive based unfortunately on the model raised from the USSR times.
Learning in their centres is so mainly a "memorial" with a low emphasis on the applicable application of individual skills. comparatively well function those elements that have been undergoing a slight evolution since the Polish People's Republic of Poland – e.g. detection of observations. But everything that will be associated with fresh technologies is at a low level.
In the planet of service, our train has already left and we must chase. In our peculiar forces, we have staff whose training is importantly higher than the standards in our country. All the more pity that, for example, non-compliance of the tasks of individual entities with the State policy, the usage of operators is low.
Since Polish peculiar forces have not participated in real combat activities for a fewer years, they are slow losing trust from partners. If this is missing, training is limited. The slow descent of the unit down begins. It is relaxed to come into contact with the world's “top”, which is constantly walking “by the way of the sword”.
Effects of suboptimal usage of peculiar forces
Depriving elite troops of the ability to test themselves in combat besides leads to... fatigue of “continuous shooting at shields”. It besides causes that life in the unit can turn into a alleged "fun in Indians" – "Come on, let's get a school like this... or we'll buy something there..." Why do we request this? The answer is not always clear.
And on the another hand, we have specified "flowers" as the equipment that is equipped with units, which worked well in Afghanistan, but already in Ukraine could be very different... In addition, if the operator who comes to the unit is constantly proceeding that "we are Tier-1" it is not amazing that he is then on average curious in training "puppies" in a distant, sandy country.
This affects the morale of soldiers. Meanwhile, even in the realities of specified a large country as the USA, Tier 1 units are very tiny formations. Delta's numbers represent a fraction of soldiers serving in the Green Berets, for example, the main unit of peculiar U.S. land troops.
Its activities include a much broader scope of tasks, without besides excluding the conduct of "dajekts" where necessary. Individual teams besides train to operate in different geographical areas. By this they are much better prepared to act on the battlefield presently observed in Ukraine.
For we see that behind our east border in price is alternatively conducting peculiar designation and operations behind enemy lines. In turn, if Ukraine needed support, language skills, training skills, unconventional action (or COIN) or the ability to conduct operations in a way that does not leave a link with the Polish Republic would prove crucial.
And you can't be good at everything. If each of our units exercises CQB at the same time, peculiar recognition, eMejKi, unconventional activities, direkts, counter-terrorist operations, HR and for this all possible form of infiltration goal is... given their very low numbers, it will be hard for them to keep the highest level in each of these areas.
Hello! Where's the backup?
Those who erstwhile had contact with peculiar forces most likely admit that mark assault is only 1 of the stages of the operation. In order for an individual to be able to carry it out, the interview must first supply information that allows at all to think about utilizing “specials”. A political-diplomatic apparatus should in turn supply operators with the right framework for operations abroad.
Alternatively, the sending country must be sufficiently efficient and have a well-established position in the planet to be able to deal with possible repercussions related to the territorial integrity of the country in which the action will take place.
Special Forces operations must then be preceded by intelligence and operational preparations. To this end, Delta works with American peculiar services, whose tasks work with the task of the unit. 1 of the CIA's operational priorities is, for example, to make terrorist organisations.
This enables the Agency to be a valuable origin of information for “sturmans”. In Poland, terrorism is not and should not be 1 of the intelligence priorities. Moreover, the US has a specialized formation (the alleged Intelligence Support Activity – ISA), which is tasked with providing information for peculiar units.
It was ISA, using, among others, SIGINT tools and based on data provided by the CIA, that has frequently traced to Delta the exact location of drug cartel leaders, PI fighters, or... Saddam Hussein. ISA operators are so frequently included in the Tier-1 assault groups for the intent of the operation.
Apart from the issue of terrorism, cooperation between peculiar units and intelligence services in Poland looks much worse. "Some" meetings are held, but not many are based on circumstantial capabilities and actions. Moreover, there is insufficient knowing on both sides for the specificity of each area.
Interviewers do not know very much what actions they would entrust to “sturmans” and how they would proceed from the organizational side. In turn, peculiar units' attempts to carry out quasi-intelligence operations are unnecessary duplication of competence and are characterised by a deficiency of appropriate "know-how" and backroom.
Logistics Queen of the battlefield?
A very crucial aspect of support, in which there is simply a immense difference between American and Polish peculiar forces, is logistics. This applies to all aspects of it – from feeding the soldier, by purchasing and repairing dense equipment, to individual equipment.
You know, a soldier comes to a unit that everyone says is "elite" and abruptly it turns out that he must use, for example, "forgeries", not decent jackets. It gets 1 that has only a minimum layer of goretex and only in explanation protects the operator from water. And in addition, the fresh backpacks are utilized very quickly.
A peculiar Army soldier is besides expected to do a "force" in the morning, and then a half day will run on the ground. So it would be best to supply him with appropriate food during the day Especially in times where so much is said about the request to pay attention to diet. And WP inactive repents of thinking, ‘ Did he get the can? No, he got, so the caloric standards are made."
During the lunch break “specials” can besides check the latest reports from the front in Ukraine. However, erstwhile he leaves the cafeteria and looks at the vehicles standing in the unit, he will ask himself how he has to fight “russian” in an unarmed car? In the desert, that's different...
So in peculiar units there is usually a immense gap between what the logistics thinks is appropriate equipment for combat teams, and how it is seen by the "sturman".
Transport, how do we get there?
The problem is besides the anticipation of transporting the assault group close the target, its return "home", and exploratory and fire support during the implementation of the actions.
This is best shown by the situation at the NATO summit in Warsaw. An effort was then made to lift the "propulsor" in alarm mode. They were expected to leave JW Grom, which was expected to be a device holder. Unfortunately, they couldn't be picked up for more than 30 minutes.
There's a fight at the headquarters. 1 colonel said that, and the another colonel said that... So what if “specialists” were ready erstwhile they were incapable to supply transport in the right time horizon?
Some may say that in Iraq and Afghanistan both logistics, transport and support for our peculiar units functioned "as such". Well, just remember, in practice, it translates into the fact that the repair of a military plane takes respective hours for Americans, and it can take 2 weeks for us to get it fixed.
Moreover, in a situation where Poles would gotta operate on the battlefield on their own alternatively than as part of a well-oiled American machine, it could be different. Moreover, counting on allies in all aspect has its weaknesses.
For example, we remember situations from the beginning of 1 of the missions in the mediate East. “Nasi”, wanting Medevac to appear quickly, had to study that the injured was an American, not a Pole. Otherwise, the acceptable time of arrival of the aid was set at a much longer...
Institutional memory and planning skills
The gap between Polish peculiar units and the US besides exists in the alleged "institutional memory". It reflects the ability of the formation to continuously adapt to changing external conditions.
In the United States, individual formations come out of the presumption that to be the best in something, 1 should constantly develop. They are so geared towards making the most of combat experiences and turning them into new, improved procedures. Furthermore, Americans are not afraid to learn from their mistakes and are constantly monitoring what is happening in the world.
On this basis, procedures, training strategy and equipment are then adapted. In turn, our superiors frequently show a large interest in hiding mistakes. So there is no atmosphere of free discussion about what needs to be improved. The soldier is taught that it is best to ‘keep low’ alternatively than take the initiative.
The suboptimal usage of Polish units, which we wrote about earlier, besides causes that the "material" for analysis is much little than in the case of Anglo-Saxons. Most importantly, the native “specialists” operate within the organization framework of the MON, in which it is hard to translate proposals into circumstantial organisational changes.
For all the above reasons, at the level of planning operations, there will mostly be a large gap between the “Delcler” and the Polish “specialist”. There is another problem. peculiar Forces are sometimes treated as a cure for problems in training another individuals.
This, however, causes that a very limited number of operators are sometimes overburdened by tasks that flow “from above” and they deficiency time for their own training.
How to make Polish peculiar forces?
Outside solvedthe ami we proposed in the erstwhile article, The most sensible way to make peculiar forces seems to us to importantly increase their combat use. Anyone who has come into contact with the HR realises how much Poland has done for its modernization in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A return to this way would so mean the anticipation of gradually "swing up" logistical, hardware and transport shortcomings in practice. In specified situations, we should besides aim at conducting operations as autonomously as possible, as this helps to improve areas specified as the interaction of peculiar Forces with services.
Real operations could besides aid to push the ‘monovian’ bureaucracy aside. In return, a culture of improvement and organisational self-improvement should be promoted. Combat missions would besides have a affirmative impact on the morale of soldiers and would supply an chance to usage individual formations according to their intended purpose.
Where could our “specials” be used?
Units with a counter-terrorism profile could be used, for example, within the framework of assist the US and France in their actions against terrorist organisations. Since it would not be straight related to the interests of the Polish Republic, it would be essential to get tangible benefits from the allies in return.
One example is the transfer of “know-how” related to circumstantial military technology. Or negotiating with Paris to increase arms supply to Ukraine. In turn, we would collect “points” in Kiev. peculiar units can so be a abroad policy tool.
This approach could besides increase Polish capacity to halt Russia's expansionary policy in the region of Central east Europe. Irregular formations could help, for example, the pro-Western government Moldovaand in his struggles with a immense wave of Russian hybrid activities.
Not to mention the fact that a wide field of usage for peculiar forces now exists beyond our east border. W The United States is presently discussing the reopening of secret peculiar operations in Ukraine. For example, SOFs there would support local assets in the fight against Russian propaganda and collect intelligence.
Contrary to the popular opinion of the alleged "black ops", they are not operations in Western countries after which "there is no trace". They are of course classified, but at the same time seek to regulate them. This aims, among others, to reduce their escalation possible and possible negative effects on US policies.
Reports of The expanding engagement of the CIA in the war against Russia. And that's understandable. Why keep elite formations that are not utilized even erstwhile the vital interests of Poland are at stake, and the war is taking place in our immediate neighbourhood? However, this must be done “with the head” and in a way that would not be straight linked to the Polish Republic.
Revealed in fresh Days mission of Polish police officers in Ukraine shows that their presence in Kiev does not necessarily gotta affect bringing the country into conflict with Russia.
Summary
With the aid of a “big brother” from across the ocean, Poland created peculiar units that stand high. But now he must learn to usage them according to his own needs. Therefore, alternatively of reasoning about forming a WOT peculiar unit, we should consider how to improve the strategy in order to make better usage of those formations that already exist.
Let us besides remember that the planet is moving on. By resting on the laurels and attaching besides much attention to PR, we can make our peculiar forces find themselves in a situation where peculiar services are now in. And then another “firm” will stay only a legend of past times... We can't let that happen.
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