What about the Ukrainian offensive?

pulslewantu.pl 2 years ago

With the beginning of June, Ukrainians began attacking Russian positions in Zaporozh, and president Zelenski announced that the expected Ukrainian offensive had just begun. Many people anticipate this offensive to turn to dust the Russian group in Zaporozh and thus decide the destiny of the war. However, the situation is more complicated. Ukrainians have a complex strategy of Russian fortifications ahead of them, which the Russians have built for the last six months. Although logistics is the Achilles heel of Russian defence in Zaporozh, its paralysis will not be easy either. delight study from Ukraine.

CZ AND author 2022/23

The Game of Destruction

Last my longer text about Ukraine was published in February. So I decided to compose a fewer words about myself about the events of winter 2022/2023.

Winter stalemate and conflict of Bachmut

Winter came under the sign of bloody fights over Bachmut. Despite the tiny strategical importance of the city, both sides allocated crucial forces to fight for Bachmut, hoping to bleed out their opponent before the spring-summer period of fresh campaigns.

"The game to destruct the opponent" led to a crucial extension of the fight over Bachmut. The Russians didn't tell us about the city until May 20. Despite Moscow's announcement of victory, the Ukrainian side inactive controls a tiny part of the buildings located on the southwest edge of Bachmut.

The fall of Bachmut does not change the strategical situation on the front. Ukrainians proceed to control the strip of hills located west of the city, thus blocking further Russian advancement towards Slavic and Kramatorsk.

The 1 who won the “battle of destruction” in Bachmut inactive remains unresolved. Estimates of both sides' losses vary considerably. The conflict itself besides had 2 phases that characterized a different dynamics of the fight. While the Ukrainians initially suffered dense losses to the Russians, in February/March the situation began to change erstwhile the Russians went out to the rear of the city defenders and threatened the main supply routes of the Ukrainians. At that time, the voices questioned the point of further defence of Bachmut.

Rumors about the Russian winter-spring offensive

At the beginning of the year, there were quite a few rumors about Russian preparations for another large offensive that would start in winter or with the coming of spring. Commentators were surpassing little and more unrealistic scenarios. any spoke of Russian plans to olanate Kharkov and march on the Dnieper line. Others warned against another Russian attack on Kiev.

In the end, however, the Russians did not decide for any major attack operation against the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Moscow's precedence was the conflict of Bachmut, fortification of previously occupied positions and training of soldiers mobilized in late 2022.

Even if the Russians were planning to do any bigger catch-up operations in the spring, the Ukrainians thwarted their plans by organizing rallies deep into the Brianian and Belarusian circuits.

It was shortly to be revealed that the rally in the Russian Federation was the “first volley” of the Ukrainian offensive.

ANNEX II

TRUTH DECISIONS

Ukrainian plans and Russian fortifications

The Ukrainian military, who were to draw up an offensive plan, faced a major challenge. After the Russians took a surprise at Kharkov and were forced to abandon their positions on the right bank of Dniepr (Cherson), they began intensively fortifying the occupied area.

Currently, Russian fortifications extend across the full front line, beginning in the north close Swatov, in front of the erstwhile ATO region close Donetsk, ending in Zaporozh and the left bank of Dniepr. Fortifications besides appeared along the full Russian-Ukrainian border and even in Crimea.

Although the Russian effort to fortify was frequently ridiculed (most of the money allocated to the fortification was to be stolen), the Russians yet managed to build not only an extended – but besides well thought out – fortification system.

Where possible, the Russians utilized the natural scenery of the area For example, in the vicinity of Swatov, the Russian lines run along the hills above Swatov and the riverbed Krasna (Red).

The biggest challenge for the Russians was the Zaporozh fortification. The open spaces and the deficiency of natural barriers present here make this area highly hard to defend (the more so that the front line in Zaporoż extends for about 160 km). To safe their positions in Zaporozh, the Russians built here a very complex fortification system, consisting of 2 (and places with three/four) defensive lines, which extend for about 20 km into the territory controlled by the Russians. The strip of no man's land and the area between the next defensive lines is densely mined, making it even more hard to rapidly break Russian lines.

*In order to facilitate further the text, these fortifications will be called the Putin Line.

Problems of Russian logistics in Zaporozh

The Russians besides prepared fortifications south of the Putin line. The towns of Tokmak (25 km from the front) and Kamjanka (35 km from the front) were converted into “small fortresses” and prepared for long-term defence in the lap. These 2 cities are of large strategical importance to the Russians, as the railway line passes through them – it is the only railway line in the region that provides a connection with Russia. Logistics is crucial to knowing the situation of Russians in the region.

Currently, Russian forces stationed in Zaporozh are mainly supplied by rail – supplies trains are coming from Russia via the Crimean Bridge, Melitopol, and then reaching the railway junction in Tokmaku. From here trains can go west (to Kachowka) or east (to Volnowa). Russian logistics in Zaporozh is assisted by a port in Berdiansk and a car transport from Donetsk.

What is very important, the Russians do not have a railway connection between Zaporozh and Donetsk. Trains that are going, for example, from Rostov nad Don to Melitopol cannot go through Donetsk, but must go circularly through Crimea. This is due to the fact that the Russians failed to full safe the railway line connecting Wołonowacha with Donetsk – the front line runs only 5 km from the Wołonowach-Donieck railway line, which does not let safe transport. Remember erstwhile the Russians stormed Wuhledar erstwhile in the winter? The intent of these attacks was to safe the Volnowach-Doneck railway line (see map above).

Russian logistics in Zaporozh is so in a alternatively hard position. It is adequate for the Crimean Bridge to be damaged, so that there are problems with supplying Russian troops in Zaporozh. The Crimean Bridge was already the mark of the Ukrainian attack in October 2022. However, this did not origin a complete stopover of traffic across the bridge, and in early May 2023. The Russians reported that part of the railway bridge had been restored to the state before the attack.

If the Ukrainians' real goal is to attack Zaporozhye and scope the Azov Sea, they should take another effort at attacking the Crimean bridge. This is the most delicate point of Russian logistics.

If the bridge fails to shut down from use, then the Ukrainians are facing a very dense crossing in Zaporozh. If the Crimean Bridge continues to operate, then an crucial threat to Russian logistics will arise only if Ukrainians take the railway node in Nowa Bogdanivka (to the west of Tokmaku). However, this node is located about 50 km from the front line. In order to scope it, Ukrainians would gotta overcome as many as 4 defensive lines of Russians.

There is besides a second option to attack Russian logistics. Ukrainians may effort to attack the Verchnij Tokmak railway junction (located between Tokmak and Kamjanka, 2 Russian “fortresses”). The node is closer to the front line due to the fact that “only” 40 km from it. There is besides no information about the Russians fortifying Verchnij Tokmak. So it may seem that this is the perfect place to attack. But it's not that simple. The business of the “Verchnij Tokmak” node will not paralyze Russian logistics in western Zaporozh, and Ukrainians will find themselves between 2 strong Russian groups that would surely effort counterattack in specified a situation, both from the west and the east.

Ukrainian Strike

As June began, the Ukrainians launched attacks on Zaporozh. The width of the front here is about 160 km, but the Ukrainians focused their attacks mainly on 3 separate sectors: Orichiw, Vylka Nowoscilek and Wuhłedar.

The attack began on June 8, but since then the Ukrainian side has not achieved much success. The land mine and well-located Russian shooting stations make the advancement of Ukrainians respective 100 metres a day and are occupied by crucial losses.

The challenge was besides the large activity of Russian aviation, and especially the Ka-52 (Aligator) assault helicopters. They operate under the “protective parasol” of the Russian anti-aircraft defence and from a distance launch armoured missiles headed 9K121 Wichr, whose scope is up to 10 km. There are estimates that even 1⁄4 of Ukrainian hardware losses, in Zaporozh, are “the cause” of Ka-52. It's hard to confirm these estimates, but from many sources, there's information that Russian aviation has turned out to be a bigger problem than expected.

Speaking about the fighting in Zaporozh, it is worth mentioning that the Russians conduct defence in a very distinctive way. In the Russian back, there are WDW troops that act as “fire brigades”. If a peculiar front sector is in a hard situation and there is simply a hazard of breaching the Russian defence, then WDW troops are headed to the given site to “extinguish the fire”.

However, the Russians are not limited to defending themselves. If the Ukrainian attack breaks down in a given place, the Russians are leading their counterattack. The results of specified Russian counterattacks are poor. At the same time, Gen. Skrzypczak, well captured the essence of Russian counterattacks in Zaporozh – the Russians are not about capturing the area, but about taking the Ukrainians “out of rhythm”, introducing chaos and obstructing the Ukrainians' further attacks on Russian positions.

Is that offensive?

Describing the Ukrainian attack on Zaporozh, I deliberately do not call it an “offensive”. First of all, we do not know whether Zaporozhye and the effort to scope the Azov Sea is the current goal of the Ukrainians. Moreover, Ukrainians inactive did not usage their full possible – it is estimated that only 4 Ukrainian brigades are active in the attacks on Zaporozh (previously, it was said that Ukrainians would have 12 brigades at their disposal during the offensive).

Some commentators believe that the attacks on Zaporozh are just another effort to confuse Russians about the real direction of the Ukrainian offensive. For example, the gene already mentioned. Skrzypczak emphasizes that much better conditions for the Ukrainian offensive be e.g. on the Donbaski Luk (Swatowo-Kreminna-Bachmut line), where the Russian group prepares to attack alternatively than to defend themselves.

Personally, I think the Ukrainians' goal is – after all – Zaporozhye. The fact that they have not yet engaged in this direction can be tried in 2 ways:

Ukrainians first want to get a break in 1 place front, and then this breach let go of more units or
Ukrainians want to fight to exhaustion, hoping that yet the Russians will not withstand the rate of failure and will not be able to full fill the full “Putin line”. Then the Ukrainians will strike at the weakest point in the Russian defence and get a break

Each of these translations is somewhat “stretched”. In the case of option 1, strong fortification of the site and many minefields, make any fast maneuvers of Ukrainians in Zaporoż are virtually impossible. In the case of option 2, it should be remembered that it is the attacker who bears more losses than the defender.

There are so 2 options. Either Ukrainians underestimated the forces of Russian troops in Zaporozh, or the Ukrainian side knows something that “commentators” do not know. Time will tell.

Leopardy on fire, which is about failure of words a few

Recently, much controversy has been caused by the losses Ukrainians have suffered in Zaporozh. We already have the first photos of the damaged and damaged Leopards. Losses on the attack are of course average and I would not pay besides much attention to the hardware losses themselves.

It must be remembered that the bulk of the dense equipment utilized in the current attacks is equipment obtained as part of assistance from the West. The fact that Ukrainians lose a tank or an armored vehicle does not substance much. The most crucial thing is for the crew to survive, which can be given another vehicle. Why do I say that? As shortly as the Ukrainians lost 17 M2 Bradley combat cars, the Pentagon announced another tranche of aid and announced the addition of Ukrainian losses.

It is actual that supplies of equipment from the West are becoming more and more problematic, due to the fact that in NATO countries there is no longer much advice that could be given to Ukrainians and we request to scope for the Natov equipment, e.g. the Leopardy mentioned. However, while the current administration of Joe Biden is in the US, it should be assumed that the American arms manufacture will proceed to supplement the hardware losses suffered by Ukrainians.

The situation can only change after a possible Republican win in the 2024 presidential election. Ron DeSantis, the most likely Republican candidate has repeatedly criticised Biden's policy towards Ukraine, claiming, among others, that it is based on giving the Ukrainians “a wait in blank” and backing the war by America without setting the goal that the US yet wants to achieve.

Even if DeSantis wins the election, he will not take power until January 2025, which is simply a distant prospect. Both Ukrainians and Russians realize this. Kiev does not want to wait until 2025 to see what aid from the West will then look like and so already wants to settle the war. The Russians, on the another hand, trust on Western “awaitment”, for example, to build an Iranian drone mill in Russia or to grow the North-South transport corridor (Russia-Iran-India).

Summary

The Ukrainian offensive has large hopes, fueled by any commentators as well as by the media. any circles make an even Ukrainian offensive for an operation that will not only lead to the liberation of Mariupol and the push of Russians into the sea, but besides to the reflection of Crimea. specified predictions are understandable (many people want the war to end eventually), though not realistic.

Unfortunately, this war doesn't seem to end as shortly as we want.

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