"We lost combat capabilities." Brutally sincere summary of the state of the Polish army and decisions of the authorities

kontrrewolucja.net 2 years ago
Ad Arma Foundation commented on fresh reports on equipment purchases for the Polish Army. According to the Foundation, fresh purchases affect a number of issues that are not mentioned or pass unnoticed.
Soldier/Illustration photo/photo. Tt/1. Warsaw Armored Brigade

Starting with the simplest things that got into the media. It was confirmed that Polish PT-91 Tough Tanks were transferred to Ukraine. We do not know in what amount, we can assume, that alternatively in a crucial part of Ukraine, and thus simultaneously in a way importantly reducing the number of these tanks in Poland. In addition, another BWP 1 was awarded (the number given is 40, so the average size of the battalion). Another carnation and another artillery equipment were besides admitted.

What does this gotta do with the proposed purchases and what is crucial to reasoning about modernization not as modeling but as real abilities? According to the Foundation, the capabilities of the armed forces should be built first in all needs speculums, not just for 1 possible conflict and 1 variant of this conflict. You can see here, according to the foundation, the large mistake of Dr. Bartosiak and his Army of the fresh Pattern, which, if it could be ready for the first phase of the war in Ukraine, would prevent action in its subsequent phases, as it was to be an amy built for one, most likely task.

However, not only the full spectrum of action but besides its temporal sustainability should be crucial. Let us presume that everything that is announced to us by Deputy Prime Minister Błaszczak will work (let us be optimistic for a moment). Depriving the Armed Forces of the Polish equipment, to which we have the full ability to keep readiness, we have spare parts, cognition of these parts, ammunition, etc., in exchange for completely fresh types of equipment, even if at the minute of the disappearance of the erstwhile equipment, THEN, in the same second, the fresh equipment would appear, means in practice 18 MONTHs of combat capability restoration. It takes six months to train crews so that the equipment is not emergency, so soldiers realize its advantages and disadvantages so that they can usage it efficiently. The next six months is to rip off these crews, platoons, companies that will constitute 1 organism, utilizing the advantages and knowing the weaknesses of fresh equipment. The next 6 months are the implementation of fresh tactical methods and the association of individuals with capabilities and weaknesses at brigade and division level. This time comes from practice and theoretically everything could go faster, but the experience not only of the Polish Army, but besides of many another armies of the planet indicates that it will not be so. This is the natural cost of switching to a fresh kind of equipment – notes the Ad Arma Foundation.

Unfortunately, this fresh equipment didn't show up in the same second we gave up the old one. fresh equipment ‘to be’ during the year (116 Abrams), within 2.5 years (250 Abrams) and respectively in terms announced from the US and South Korea. So we have lost our dense capacity (tank-mechanized) and we will only be able to start playing it, and only from the "modelry" level, that is, looking at numbers, dimensions and parameters only. If we want to enter the semi-professional level, we request to usage the right tools. specified a tool, which the Ad Arma Foundation has recommended many times, is the DOTMLPF matrix, which is analysis for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Leadership, People and Infrastructure.

Doctrine – on the basis of the purchases announced for the Polish Army, the doctrine has changed. The army is no longer to be tiny and professional. It is besides no longer to supplement the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance, as the Alliance will be an addition to the Polish Army if these plans are implemented. Polish acquisition plans, both in artillery and tanks, are larger than the full capacity of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France in this respect. Changing doctrine so requires changing leadership.

Leadership – The Ad Arma Foundation asks if our leadership is ready for this? Are the officers' staff ready? Are we ready to be independent? Due to mass and size, we are expected to make ways of reasoning about the battlefield, so it is the Polish methods of action that the British, the French or the Germans should learn, due to the fact that they will complement us, not us. However, if we look at Leadership through the prism of what retired, superior officers say, we are dealing with a full indefensibility to the opinion of the crowd, with flattering the crowd and speaking pharasons to increase our own private ratings. This is unfortunately a determinant of what opposition to cyclicalism is among the higher ranks of the Polish Army. In addition, there is the question of future officers and the moral crisis of the Academy of Land Forces and WAT, as well as the substantive crisis of Dęblin, in which more than 40% of certified jet pilots have never flown jets, yet they have received a paper confirming the untruth. We have a 100% increase in the number of seats in officers' schools, and the candidates are little than the places, and despite the pushy reception of girls who are totally unfit for dense military service, neither mentally nor physically.

The organization – on the square all amount of equipment can be accepted, as in the 19th century many Asian countries bought the latest Krupp cannons or British rifles, but could not operate them due to the fact that they could not. They could not neglect them, nor could they usage them from a tactical perspective. Spending money is easy, utilizing hardware strategy much harder. According to the Foundation, there is no organizational sighting of NIC, indicating the anticipation of absorbing specified a large amount of announced equipment into the structure of the Polish Army. They should already be thousands of trained artillery and armored weapons specialists, and hundreds of trained instructors of these thousands. Training centres are not trained or expanded. Place will take the equipment, units will not be able to.

In order to accept equipment we besides request Training, which means, among others, training courses, which were not adequate a fewer years ago as a consequence of their mass liquidation for the Civic Platform. Today, a large part of the Polish camps is occupied by US Army units, so those units of the Polish Army, which already exist, have a immense problem with the implementation of training programs.

Materials – spare parts, spare parts system, subjection of workshops with spare parts, issue of current repairs – all of this is taken out of the division and put into general structures, making the decision way and dimension of the logistics line extended unnaturally and contrary to needs. In order for the ordered tanks or cannons to be able to shoot, they request ammunition that MUST be produced in Poland, and no plans to grow ammunition factories have been announced. To realize how large the scale of the problem is, it is worth looking at 2 numbers – in 1 order we ordered ammunition for tanks in the amount of respective thousand, and in order to fill a unit of fire in planned tanks erstwhile more than 50,000 rounds of ammunition (to fill tanks once). It takes a twelve units of fire to get to 1 battle. In the case of artillery, Ukraine's usage of ammunition may be a shocking example. During 14 days of fighting, Ukrainians consume yearly production (!) of artillery ammunition throughout the United States (according to Pentagon reports). So if Ukraine can fight only through the supplies and efforts of the NATO industry, it shows how much we deficiency in our own ammunition factories. We do not have the ability to manufacture ammunition for tanks or artillery even at the level of a peaceful training request for the planned amount of equipment – reminds the Ad Arma Foundation.

Infrastructure – to receive planned equipment to have people to him to train these people and make them individuals, we request squares, garages and facilities that have been liquidated for the PO and until present since 2014 the Law and Justice Government has done nothing for the better. The planned warehouses and infrastructure (planned, presently not even started in construction) for the US Army stationed in Poland already generated costs of PLN 300 million. Not a single shovel has yet been inserted. Infrastructure costs are tens of billions of PLN, and the costs of purchasing equipment are already tens of billions of PLN.

People – Privates and Petty Officers. In terms of people to fill ranks there is inactive no conscription. There is volunteer, essential military service and there are numbers that neither manufacture journalists (who present have their glory days) nor public opinion nor parliament ask. How many people have volunteered for training? How many after a period are left for 11 months? How many of those left for 11 months have gone distant in the last 2 months? These are numbers that indicate how real the Human component is. It is absurd to invest more than PLN 4,000 per period (counting only a salary) in volunteers who can leave at any time during training. In practice, they will be considered a reserve without training. The thought that a volunteer could halt training at any time is to deny implementation into military discipline. From the minute you sign the contract, you cease to be a civilian and start to live a soldier's life. According to the Foundation, breaking this pattern destroys morale, falsifies statistic and prevents the training process from being completed.

The Ad Arma Foundation summarizes: as we can see from this very brief review, neither the Polish authorities nor the Polish Army have even outlined a plan that could give us the essential capabilities in the years 5. You just can't do it before. We've lost our abilities now. Therefore, these gigantic expenditures, financed from inflation, are clearly announced poverty, which does not give us the essential capacity.

For comparison and expression of how irresponsible the Polish authorities are, let's imagine that we sold the car to which we commute due to the fact that we just started looking for another on auction portals. Which household father would dare do specified a thing?

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