International Tournée Vladimir Putin

ine.org.pl 1 year ago

Zdjęcie: Chińska polityka energetyczna (32)

Analysis in Brief

In May 2024 Vladimir Putin made 3 abroad trips: to China, Belarus and Uzbekistan. In June, he visited North Korea and Vietnam.
The Russian President's "Tournée" was to emphasise the importance of Russia's relations with individual countries. For Moscow, meetings in Minsk and Tashkent signal the engagement of the Russian Federation in east Europe and Central Asia. For Russians, it is an area of the alleged "near foreign".
Since 2022, W. Putin has restricted abroad visits to countries that: 1. did not recognise the decision of the global Criminal Court in The Hague to arrest the Russian president and 2. did not join Western sanctions.

W. Putin, Beijing. 16-17 May 2024.

Vladimir Putin's first abroad journey after his swearing in on 7 May was Beijing. China began to become a key partner for Moscow since cooling Russian-West relations in 2014. The last decade of Russian-Chinese relations was under construction Moscow-Pekin axle, which was directed against American hegemony.

During the visit of the Russian President, a number of agreements concerning the economical or political sphere were signed. At the same time, no consensus on the gas pipeline was developed during the joint discussions Siberia Power 2. The construction of the "second Siberian force" divides Moscow and Beijing. To China it could be carried by gas from gas fields to the west of Russia, which had previously reached customers in the European Union. An additional gas supply way to China would improve the economical situation of Gazprom, which presently sends gas to you via pipeline The power of Siberia. In turn, Beijing focuses on diversifying gas supply sources (e.g. from Turkmenistan). It besides proposes to increase the share of renewable sources in the alleged energy mix.

In global relations, W.Putin's visit was of 2 importance. From the position of the Russian Federation, the next gathering with Xi Jinping is to direct a clear signal to external and interior needs.

The deepening isolation of the Russian Federation causes Chinese-Russian cooperation not only to legitimize W. Putin's actions internationally. He besides stresses that Russia is not alone in confronting the West.

At the same time, the Chinese side has already signaled a deficiency of commitment to military support for Russia. She stressed that her actions were aimed at stabilising the situation in Ukraine. An example is the "Chinese peace plan" published a year ago.

From the messages following Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping's gathering there was a clear message: United States actions destabilise the situation in the Indo-Pacific region[1].

It can so be assumed that Russia and the PRC will be further deepened in the close future. Beijing sees an crucial (although not the most important) economical partner in Russia. Her actions distract the United States from the Pacific region. At the same time, China has consistently stressed its neutrality and its willingness to make a peaceful solution to the situation in Ukraine. This improves Beijing's position in relations with the European Union. However, it is questionable how long China will win in conducting this policy.

Belarus, 24-25 May 2024.

Upon his return from Beijing Vladimir Putin went to Minsk. The two-day visit of the Russian president to Belarus was mainly marked by talks about military cooperation between the 2 states. Its key component is the announced exercises related to the usage of tactical atomic weapons.

The presence of Russian atomic weapons in Belarus is 1 of the key elements of Russia's force on NATO states. At the same time, the announcements of joint Russian-Belarusian atomic weapons exercises respond to the statements of president Emmanuel Macron, who would like to include the French atomic arsenal in European defence concepts[2].

For Russia, Belarus is simply a key ally among the states of the USSR. During the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian Federation actively uses the territory of Belarus in the form of logistics facilities and as a circumstantial "missile base". Minsk was 1 of the closest partners for Moscow long before 2022. Russia considered that the alleged ZBIR (the Union of Belarus and Russia) and A. Lukashenko in power was a form of securing Russian interests in this part of Europe. The deep dependence of Belarus on Russia is evidenced, among others, by the fact that during anti-government protests in the summertime of 2020, the Russian Federation helped Lukashenko keep power.

Uzbekistan, 26-28 May 2024.

Uzbekistan's president Shawkat Mirzijoev met Vladimir Putin during the first direct visit of the Russian president to Uzbekistan after 24 February 2022. Last time W. Putin hosted in Tashkent in September 2022 at the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Uzbekistan is 1 of the key countries in russian Central Asia next to Kazakhstan. From Moscow's perspective, Tashkent had an ambivalent attitude towards the war in Ukraine. In February and March 2022, members of the Uzbek government stressed that Uzbekistan did not recognise the existence of quasi republics in Ukraine. They argued that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict should be resolved under global law[3]. It is crucial that Uzbekistan is not a associate of global organisations specified as the Organization of the Collective safety Agreement (OUBZ) or the Eurasian economical Union (EUG), which brings together the states of the erstwhile russian Union under the leadership of Moscow. Uzbekistan has a multi-vector global policy in which it seeks balance between China, the EU and Russia.

W. Putin's visit to Tashkent was maintained in a speech of "friendliness and peace between both countries"[4]. Its most crucial points were: the 1st announcement of the construction of a atomic power plant in Uzbekistan by Russian companies, the 2nd increase in Russian gas imports, the 3rd establishment of a Russian-Uzbek investment platform.

In contrast to the visit to Minsk, mainly economical issues were discussed in Tashkent. From the position of economically isolated Russia, Uzbekistan can become a platform to circumvent Western sanctions[5],[6Like Kyrgyzstan.

In the area of regional security, Afghanistan's stableness has been addressed, which is crucial for the national safety of Uzbekistan.

The visit of W. Putin, however, did not bring a fresh beginning in Russia's relations with Uzbekistan, due to the fact that the functioning dynamics of their relation was in line. The decreasing importance of Moscow in Central Asia causes Tashkent, like Astana, to look more at Beijing, which is 1 of their main trading partners.

North Korea, 18-19 June 2024.

This is Vladimir Putin's first visit to North Korea in 24 years. Increased cooperation between the Russian Federation and North Korea was already recorded after 24 February 2022. In July 2023, the North Korean authorities hosted Sergei Szojgu, then Minister of Defence of the FR-. His visit was intended to deepen the military cooperation of both countries. It can be assumed that this year's visit of W. Putin was besides focused on strictly military matters. North Korea is 1 of the main arms and ammunition suppliers for Russian troops alongside Iran.

The North Korean side accepted W. Putin with all honours. There were no portraits of the Russian president and Russian flags along the streets on the Russian delegation's route.

In bilateral relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, the issue of the signing of the strategical Partnership Treaty comes first. Both parties declared: 1. common assistance in the event of an attack on 1 of the signatories to the pact, 2. assistance of the assaulted organization and 3. non-instrument with another countries that may be targeted in North Korea or in the Russian Federation.[7]

During the Asian tour, the Russian president besides addressed South Korean authorities. He described their plans to deliver arms to Ukraine as reckless. The answer will be military support for a neighbour from the north.

Vladimir Putin's gathering and Kim Jong Un's gathering have been reflected in an intensification of cooperation between the Russian Federation and North Korea since 2022. In abroad policy, both countries place strong anti-Western accents. The signing of the Common strategical Partnership Treaty proves that the Moscow-Pjongyang axis is simply a real geopolitical agreement. In erstwhile years North Korea was not a key partner for the Russian Federation. The situation has changed with Russia's deepening isolation internationally. North Korea has become 1 of Russia's main partners in the region with an ever-increasing dispute between the "east and the west". Deep cooperation between the FR and the DPRK is simply a clear signal for Tokyo and Seoul that Russia is betting on Pyongyang, which is considered the main threat to the safety of this part of Asia.

Vietnam, 20-21 June 2024.

After a two-day visit to North Korea, the Russian president went to Vietnam. Hanoi and Moscow's relations remained good for years. This is simply a decline after the Cold War erstwhile Moscow was 1 of Vietnam's main allies. W. Putin met Vietnamese president To Lam and president of the Vietnam Communist organization Nguyen Phu Trong. According to the Russian news service TASS The main nonsubjective of the visit is to strengthen the bilateral relations between Hanoi and Moscow, which have always been a precedence for the FR.[8]

States have so signed a number of agreements to deepen cooperation, mainly in sectors related to education and energy. The Russian side described talks with Hanoi as “constructive and maintained in a business atmosphere”. Russia and Vietnam are to deepen cooperation in the gas and infrastructure sectors. They besides indicated the request to increase the share of national currencies in financial accounts and credit operations. [9]

In abroad policy, Vietnam balanced between the Russian Federation, the United States and China. Presidents J. Biden and Xi Jinping arrived in Hanoi last year, which clearly indicates the multi-vector nature of Vietnamese abroad policy. FR is an crucial trading partner for Vietnam, though mainly in the military sphere. Russia has a affirmative image among elites and society, mainly due to history. However, relations with Washington play an equally crucial function in Hanoi optics.

Vietnam holds a neutral position on the war in Ukraine, e.g. refused to participate in the last peace summit in Switzerland.

The Russian Federation recognises Vietnam as an crucial outlet for the arms sector. In the context of Russia's global isolation, it is besides 1 of the fewer countries in which the Russian president is welcome.

Summary

These visits form part of Russian abroad policy after 24 February 2022. It is worth noting the very limited number of countries that the Russian president visited at that time. W. Putin was hosted by the USSR, China and the United arabian Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This is closely related to Russia's global isolation.

A gathering with Xi Jinping is undoubtedly of crucial importance. There was no agreement on the Siberian forces 2But choosing China for the first abroad visit after swearing in gives the planet a clear message. China has taken a neutral position against the conflict in Ukraine, but their economical support, especially in so-called. dual-use technologies, is crucial to Moscow. In many areas of the Russian economy, China successfully filled the gap after western companies At the same time, however, Russia's increasing economical dependence on China weakens Russia's position in the informal axis of Beijing-Moscow. It is becoming increasingly asymmetrical.

It is besides worth noting the two-day visit of the Russian president to Pyongyang due to the strategical partnership agreement concluded. This paper cements an alliance between states. From the Russian perspective, possible military support from the DPRK is highly crucial – North Korean troops usage russian equipment or its modified versions. The usage of weapons from North Korean magazines would not pose a major logistical challenge for the Russian army. It could so importantly improve the situation on the front.

However, in the light of the actions of China or North Korea. W. Putin can send a clear message to the West that not only Russia negates the current global order. specified a message is besides resonated within Russia.

Meanwhile, the visit to Uzbekistan is simply a clear signal to the region that Moscow does not forget Central Asia. This is peculiarly crucial in the context of E. Macron's visit to Kazakhstan in the fall of 2023 or Anthony Blinken's visit to the region that same year.

In conclusion, Vladimir Putin's tour was not to constitute a novelty in Russian abroad policy. It was expected to confirm the validity of erstwhile assumptions.

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