In Poland, various electoral regulations apply in different elections. In the legislature elections there is simply a majority rule, and in the Sejm elections there is simply a multiple proportional rule. A candidate who received more votes from competitors is awarded a majority mandate. In a proportionate rule, the mandates shall be shared in proportion to the number of votes received by the group. Therefore, in a proportionate rule, a candidate who has received less votes from a ‘rejected’ candidate from another group may be awarded a mandate due to the fact that that another group as a full has received less seats for division. This is so a form of multi-donate proportional ordination with alleged closed organization lists, for which different types of methods of conversion of votes are utilized to allocate mandates between different groupings. The d'Hondt method is utilized in Poland. It should besides be remembered that the d’Hondt method applies not only in elections to the Sejm, but besides in elections to the Europarliament, in local elections – to municipal councils with more than 20,000 inhabitants, powiat councils and voivodship seymists.
The d'Hondt method is to divide the number votes cast into individual electoral lists by subsequent natural numbers: 1, 2, 3, ... etc. The illustrious number shall then be numbered from the largest to the smallest and, on this basis, the mandates of the individual committees shall be assigned. Only those Committeesabove the 5% threshold electoral (if the committee is simply a coalition, this threshold is 8%). It should be borne in head that the electoral threshold does not apply to a single electoral commission or constituency, but is considered on the scale of the full region afraid by the vote. It so concerns the full region in the elections to the councils of the county, the full voivodship in the elections to the Sejm of the voivodships, and yet the full country in the elections to the Sejm. The electoral threshold, besides referred to as the barrage clause, eliminates tiny ("weak") groups from the allocation of mandates, but besides eliminates in practice local groups which have no coverage throughout the electoral area. On the another hand, this prevents excessive fragmentation of mandates among a large number of groups, which could make it hard to make coalitions and unchangeable governance.
Notwithstanding the assessment of the relevance of the electoral thresholds, their rule seems simple and understandable. Unfortunately, it is not always the candidates themselves and voters who can foretell the consequences of this mechanism. Votes given to groups that do not exceed the electoral threshold not only destruct candidates from the lists of these groupings but indirectly support another groups, frequently with diametrically different programs. Much harder to realize is the allocation method of the numbers votes cast into individual electoral lists by subsequent natural numbers: 1, 2, 3, ... and numbering of number of numberings. Let me explain this on a simple example:
They run for election 2 groups: A and B, to be covered by 2 seats, votes 100 voters.
The descending number is: 70(A), 35(A), 30(B), 15(B). The 2 largest quotients correspond to the 2 allocated mandates: two mandates for the group A and group B without mandate.
In this example, it can be seen that this method further rewards large ("strong") groups. The greater the advantage of the group afraid over competition, the more mandates proportionally.
This is precisely the way of counting, precisely these mechanisms caused that in the last elections to parliament in October 2023 votes cast for the niche PJJ group Rafał Piech, which did not exceed the 5% threshold, weakened the United Right and strengthened left-wing – liberal groups. Analysts say that if the PJJ voters voted for the Law and Justice Party, the United Right would have had 14 more mandates and the creation of the government by Donald Tusk would not have been so obvious. The presentation of these calculations across the country would be hard and complicated, so I will mention an example of a akin nature from the fresh local elections. This will be an example of the elections to the territory Council, and so the elections in a tiny area, making it easy to analyse.
Let us so look at the elections to the territory Council in the Podwarszaw Region. 5 constituencies were formed in this district. 5 committees registered their letters in all 5 districts to the election. These were KO, PiS, TD and 2 KS1 and KS2 local government committees. 1 local KL committee besides volunteered, but this committee registered the list in only 1 of the 5 districts. That alone put this committee in a very risky position. And indeed, despite a comparatively good consequence in this 1 territory in the full district, the KL committee obtained only 4.05% of the vote and did not exceed the required 5% threshold. Let us look at the detailed results in this territory and the consequences of the breach of the threshold by the KL Committee:
In this district, six mandates were assigned according to the order of the largest number of titles as follows: 1 → KO, 2 → KO, 3 → PiS, 4 – this mandate was assigned to the KL committee, but due to the non-compliance by the KL the 5% threshold was allocated to the KO committee as follows: 4 → KO, 5 → KS1 and 6 → TD. It can so be seen that the 3rd Way TD Committee did not have adequate support in this territory to get even 1 mandate, but as a consequence of the ‘exemption’ of the 3rd Way KL Committee from the allocation of mandates, it obtained 1 mandate. In practice, therefore, the votes of voters cast on the KL committee contributed to the TD committee's mandate. The paradox is that candidates from the KL list can be considered right-wing and the votes for these candidates most likely cast mostly voters with right-wing views. However, as a result, their votes contributed to the right-wing opposition committee's mandate.
In order to full realize the consequences of wasting the votes cast on a committee that has not crossed the electoral threshold, let us make a simulation of a situation in which the KL committee would not issue an electoral list in this district. Simulation is purely theoretical due to the fact that there is no warrant that voters who voted for KL candidates would vote 100% for the Law and Justice. But for analytical purposes, let's take this hypothetical assumption. The votes actually cast on the KL (2227) I sum up with the votes cast on the PiS (2302) which would give the PiS Committee 4529 votes and would consequence in the following division of 6 seats in this constituency:
What's the consequence of the simulation? The KO Committee had and has 3 mandates, the KS1 Committee had and has 1 mandate, but the PiS Committee alternatively of 1 mandate obtains 2 mandates. Moreover, in the actual election, the first committee at the bar was the TD committee (he benefited from the "extraction" of the KL committee), and now the first committee at the bar is the PiS, which is thus close to obtaining 3 seats (no 70 votes).
This real example from 1 territory in the last local election, backed by a simulation, shows how drasticly they can influence the final result of the election of committees that did not exceed the electoral threshold in the area. This could even lead to number power being taken over by a number option, which benefits from a "stunk" vote by any voters of the majority option. individual might say it's guilty of electoral ordination, d'Hondt's method. But all system, all ordination has any flaws. In any countries, alternatively of the d'Hondt method (dividing votes by 1, 2, 3, 4 ....) the Sainte-Laguë method is utilized to divide votes by 1, 3, 5, 7 .... This method flattens the somewhat obtained illustrious, but is it better? The problem is not in the method, but in the cognition of applicable law. Candidates setting up and registering committees should search to anticipate the consequences of their actions. Failure to exceed the electoral threshold is not just their individual failure, but can reverse the result of the full election. Similarly, voters should not be guided solely by the evaluation of the programmes of the individual committees, but should effort to anticipate the consequences of their decision as a consequence of the existing legislation. So first of all, they should know the rules in force in the elections.
Unfortunately, in Poland, as a individual with left-wing liberal views takes an unthought-out, unwise initiative to stand as a candidate in a "contra" election to his environment, he is sentenced to complete ostracism by this environment. If specified an initiative is taken by a individual with right-wing views, he grows up to be almost a hero. She is valued as an active, courageous, followable person. And then the full right-wing community hurts that the liberal – left-wing wins. But it is frequently so (casus PJJ in the last election to the Sejm) that it is not the left that wins, but the right that loses, at its own request. There is much talk about the request for cooperation between different environments. However, it is impossible for the right and left to work together. Water and fire won't connect. Cooperation must be sought in your environment, in your environment you must build and support structures capable of winning elections. We can't do anything alone. Especially in elections with proportional ordination. But in order to change the order, you gotta win the election first. And the wheel is closing, we can go back to the beginning of this text.
Mr Bogdan
