The European Union is gradually closing the grey zones around the Russian war machine. First, companies from Kazakhstan appeared on sanctioning lists, which supplied industrial equipment and dual-use technologies to Russia. Then came the turn for Kyrgyz banks and institutions serving cryptocurrency transactions and re-exporting European machinery to Russia. In the 19th package of sanctions, 3 banks from Tajikistan have besides joined this group, recognised as an component of the sanction avoidance infrastructure.
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- 20. The sanctions package removes Tajik institutions from the list
- Three companies from Kazakhstan on sanctions lists
- Uzbekistan - economy grows 6-7 percent per year
- Brussels looks at the hands
- Tashkent – candidate for the exam?
- Road of Tajikistan or Kazakhstan
20. The sanctions package removes Tajik institutions from the list
However, the 20th package adopted in April 2026 shows that the EU's policy on Central Asia is not limited to punishment. The EU Council decided to remove Tajik institutions from the sanction list – Spitamen Bank, Dushanbe City Bank and Commercebank Tajikistan – after Dushanbe provided credible guarantees for compliance with EU rules, tightened compliance standards and strengthened the anti-money laundering system. At the same time, Tajikistan, unlike Uzbekistan, has no common banking institutions with Russia. Tajikistan is so given a "second chance", which is inactive missing from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
Three companies from Kazakhstan on sanctions lists
W Kazakhstan has already received circumstantial EU lists of companies identified by Brussels as brokers for the supply of advanced equipment and components to Russia. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, packages 19 and 20 extended restrictions to the banking sector, covering banks operating cryptocurrency-related transactions, as well as limiting exports of parts of machinery, electronics and telecommunications equipment to that country. In parallel, discussions are ongoing on the conditions under which Kyrgyz institutions could be removed from the list in the future, showing that the EU is besides utilizing sanctions as a tool for regulatory pressure.
Uzbekistan - economy grows 6-7 percent per year
Against this background, Uzbekistan stands out – an economy that has been increasing since 2022 at a rate of about 6–7% per year, with GDP exceeding $115 billion and an ambitious improvement course for president Slawkat Mirzijoev. However, this increase is mostly based on closer cooperation with Russia: bilateral trade has almost doubled in respective years, and in 2025 it exceeded $13 billion, with the possible of further "exponential" growth by 2030. Uzbekistan has become a logistical and financial hub for companies that after exiting the Russian marketplace are looking for an alternate entry into the russian space.
Brussels looks at the hands
This is precisely what draws Brussels' attention. In 2025, European officials had already considered covering the Russian-Uzbek sanctions of the AO ‘Asia-Invest Bank’, affiliated with the Uzbekistan National Bank, as a possible channel for backing Russian entities. The 19th and 20th packages showed that the EU's patience with Central Asia is ending - and subsequent decisions, among 3rd countries, are hitting Uzbekistan's neighbours.
Tashkent – candidate for the exam?
In this arrangement Uzbekistan grows up to be the next "test candidate". For the EU it is simply a key trade and financial hub between Russia and the remainder of the world, for Moscow – an attractive gateway to technology and capital and for investors – a marketplace with advanced growth but expanding political risk. If Tashkent fails to show a tangible tightening of control over re-export, financial flows and the function of the Uzbek National Bank in serving Russian interests in the coming months, then the Uzbek institutions may be the next ones to replace Tajik banks on EU sanctions lists.
Road of Tajikistan or Kazakhstan
From the position of Warsaw and the full east wing of NATO, the situation is clear: without the closure of the “back” in Central Asia, each subsequent circular of sanctions on Russia will be incomplete. Uzbekistan present has a choice – either it will go through Tajikistan and clean up its financial sector from risky ties, or it will join Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as another “hub” formally EU-friendly and actually working on the Russian war economy.
AI WorldEU Uzbekistan JKN Pictured: Tashkent, Uzbekistan Photo. Asrorbek O’ktamjonov 26.04.2026.
