Russia's invasion of Ukraine from February 24, 2022 changed a lot in terms of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and especially the position of Poland in this duo. At the same time, it is clear that whatever the end of the war in Ukraine, the geopolitical situation in the region of Central and east Europe will be diametrically different. Either Russia ceases to be a threat for the coming years (or possibly even at all?), or after taking control of Ukraine, it will become a immense threat for the remainder of its neighbours.
However, focusing on the possible consequences of this affirmative script for us, the first scenario, many commentators, including the author of this text, draw attention to the request to build a Polish-Ukrainian alliance. On all possible levels, from political to military to economic. This is due to the calculation that specified an alliance could let us to grow political subjectivity in our part of Europe. The Warsaw-Kijów axis could become a political magnet for another countries of the region (most notably Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania and possibly even Belarus in the future?), which would besides translate into a position in the European Union. safety cooperation could build a permanent military bloc that would deter Russia (especially if Ukraine were in NATO, then it would be covered by a atomic umbrella). Finally, the economical imagination of the Mediterranean and fresh trade routes between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea is highly attractive.
The possible benefits of the Polish-Ukrainian partnership could be mentioned much more. Undoubtedly, it is simply a possible of a historical chance for Poland and Ukraine. To correct the mistakes of the past and build the future together. But even in the most optimistic variant of events, this imaginary "golden age" of the reborn and better Republic of Both (maybe even 3 or four?) The nations will not come next day or even the day after.
The fact is, Even after the winning war, Ukraine will become a immense burden for both Poland and the full West. The reconstruction of this country will most likely take at least 10 years, or longer. Until then, Kiev will be a petent of anyone who wants to engage his possible and resources in rebuilding Ukraine. Since Poland is not and will not be the richest country of Europe in the foreseeable future, Warsaw will not play a dominant function in the reconstruction of Ukraine. Just can't afford it. Consequently, it is expected that Poland will cease to play the function of Ukrainian messiah in global politics. And we gotta accept that future state of affairs. Even more, we should realize and support a future Ukrainian policy aimed at obtaining all possible euro or dollar to rebuild Ukraine. Because Ukraine was weak, devastated and destroyed, it would never be an asset for Poland to support our own strength. Only the restored Ukraine can become specified an asset, while Poland cannot stand to pull its neighbour out of the gap in which it was located, but about it further.
A fallen state?
Ukraine before the invasion
Before the war resumes, the state of Ukraine's GDP of 31 December 2021 elevated Only $200 billion. Only, due to the fact that much smaller Poland generated 674 billion dollars during this time. That's 3.4 times more. The population of Ukraine was around 41 million citizens (without the Crimean population and occupied in 2014 Donbas). In the case of Poland it was little than 38 million people.
Of course, we are talking about a country nearly twice as large as the surface, from the country on the Vistula. So with a reasonably akin number of inhabitants, Ukrainians had much more land to land – which, in addition to the benefits, besides creates difficulties. Comparing GDP per capita with the purchasing power parity of money, nearly $13,000 was spent on each Ukrainian in 2021. GDP per capita Ppp in Poland amounted to over $34,000. At the same time, the largest share of GDP in Ukraine was... Agriculture. Second place was services, 3rd production. On the 1 hand, this is confirmed by the image of Ukraine as a Spichler state, on the another hand, with specified low GDP, shows how the economy of this country is weak and backward as a whole.
To the mediocre always wind in the eyes
Weakness is besides evidenced by advanced vulnerability to external factors, but besides many interior problems, which translate into, for example, inflation problems. After hyperinflation from 1993, Ukraine managed to descend from inflation rate to the single digit level only in 2002. However, already in 2005 inflation again amounted to 13.5% (the Orange Revolution took place in 2004). The Ukrainians tried to bring it down in the next 2 years only to jump to 25% as a consequence of the 2008 global crisis. It was only in 2012-2013 that the marketplace was calmed and prices stagnated (approximately 0%). But in 2014, we had to deal with protests in Majdan and the war. Inflation then jumped to 12% and in 2015 to 48%. Between 2016 and 2018, the rate remained at respective percent, then the price increase in 2020 was stopped (2.7% of inflation). Kiev barely mastered another crisis, and already in 2021 inflation rose to 9%, and in early 2022 Russia decided to make a full-scale invasion... It is already estimated that inflation this year could be around 30%. Why do we request specified an accurate historical analysis of the price growth rate? Since many inflation leaps repeated over 3 decades show that Ukrainian society has no savings. Money put aside simply loses value. Only the oligarchs and the rich Ukrainians could afford to defend capital by escaping into assets or mottos. The average citizen of Ukraine lived and lived from the first to the first, and what he spared – if at all he managed to put something down – rapidly “steamed”.
Inflation in Ukraine year to year.Average wage in Ukraine in 2021 was 17.4 1000 hryvnia, which in terms of the amount of PLN 2.450 gross (Poland – PLN 5.888 gross). This is on average twice as much as in Poland, but it should be remembered that Poland (except Slovakia and Greece) is lowest country the indicator of wealth inequalities in society in the EU. Meanwhile, in Ukraine – where there is an oligarchy strategy – social dissection is huge. As a result, in any industries, earnings in Poland are even 3-3,5 times higher than in Ukraine. any Ukrainian specialists inactive in early 2021 indicatedthat the wage in Ukraine will be equal to Polish in about 30-40 years. And that is provided that in Poland the increase in wages would be frozen for this period... After the invasion, this kind of script is even more distant and little real.
Nor is it possible to ignore the communicative of the quotations of hryvna. Ukrainian currency has been devastated by warfare, and this means that import will be even more expensive. Ukrainians can afford less and less products and goods not produced in the country. Life in this country will affect many sacrifices, even after the war. Of course, hryvna's weakness creates additional budgetary problems across the state, as the debts incurred in abroad currencies will become even more costly and more hard to pay.
(De)population
It is besides worth noting the demographic trend concerning Ukraine – and this 1 is unfavourable. The highest was in 1992, erstwhile Ukraine was inhabited by over 52 million people. Thus in nearly 30 years the population of Ukraine decreased by 10 million or 1/5. In comparison, during the same period authoritative data on the number of residents in Poland indicate a decrease of 1 million people (2.6%). In both cases the realities may look somewhat different (immigrants counted as residents), but 1 thing is certain. The process of shrinking residents in Ukraine was 10 times faster than in Poland, and all this before the invasion of February 2022!
Chart showing the regression in the population size of UkraineThe average age of Ukrainians was nearly 42 years (PL – 43), which proves that there is besides an ageing population.
However, all these data may be very outdated. Mass, counted in millions of emigrations, war losses (both in the military and among civilians), as well as unestimated losses resulting from the killings and resettlements of Russians (especially the export of young children), can all have a devastating impact on demographic indicators. Furthermore, we should besides think about what will happen after the war. It is not excluded that the Ukrainians will leave the country in search of a job, and the Ukrainians in the West, but besides in Poland, are looking for workers (although it will stay that way, it is not foregone). Even before the 22nd invasion, the authoritative unemployment rate in Ukraine was over 9%, which was not so fatal, but twice as bad as in Poland. However, it is estimated that during the war work could have lost up to 30% of Ukrainians. The question is, after the conflict, can they get it back?
How to pay for import?
In 2014, Ukraine managed to almost zero the losses from the trade balance, and in 2015 it even recorded a tiny profit. However, from 2016 to 2019, import value importantly exceeded export value reaching at the end of the deficit nearly $11 billion. In 2020 and 2021, negative results were halved. The year 2022 is not looking well. Close 30% of values Ukrainian exports to date were corn, wheat and vegetable oil. As a consequence of the war, the collections were smaller (tractors frequently served not for plowing but for collecting orc tanks). Additionally, any of the supplies were seized by the Russians, and what was collected and produced was a considerable amount of time in the warehouses due to the blockade of the sea in the Black Sea. Another 20% of the Ukrainian export value consisted of iron ore and various semi-processed or processed forms. Here, too, sales will surely fall due to the demolition (e.g. the steelworks in Mariupol), but besides the expected increase in the needs of the Ukrainian arms industry, as well as problems with trade routes. Thus, part of the decline in exports is due to the fact of the war – and after it is over there is simply a chance to return to earlier sales volumes – but any sales losses are already due to the permanent demolition of industrial and production plants. After the war, it won't be rebuilt overnight.
At the same time, it is expected that due to the war, demolition and economical problems, the request to import many products and intermediates will increase importantly in Ukraine. In another words, it is not to be expected that Ukraine will become rich in trade in the post-war years. On the contrary, the trade deficit can increase significantly, which will translate into financial terms.
Debt
At the end of 2021, Ukraine recorded public debt of nearly 49% in relation to GDP. This is simply a completely decent value (Polish debt – 54%), in the context of the level of debt of Western countries. However, with specified deep structural problems in Ukraine, this country is far worse off the burden of regulation than Western countries with comparatively higher levels of debt. Moreover, this debt is already increasing rapidly and fresh liabilities are entered into in abroad currency (dollar/euro). Let us besides remind that so far the majority of debt has been drawn in the mottos (about 55%). This means that advanced inflation not only does not aid to reduce debt, but even affects its level very negatively. The budget deficit at the end of 2021 was 3.4%, which is simply a continuation of the multi-annual state debt trend. With specified unfavourable processes existing even before the invasion of February, 1 of the main problems to date of the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance was the handling of debt. Already then indicatedthat without access to fresh loans there will be a problem with rolling existing debt.
Perspectives — loans, donations, subsidies and aid
Estimatedthat Ukrainian GDP could fall by up to 46.5% in 2022 as a consequence of the war! With a GDP of about $100 billion, the level of Ukrainian debt – without taking into account the fresh liabilities created in 2022 – may be higher than 100% in relation to GDP! Of course, a twice smaller economy generates little budget revenues (taxes), and this means that if in 2021 Kiev had debt-handling problems, then for this minute it can be assumed that Ukraine is bankrupt incapable to handle commitments. Of course, this would be the case under average conditions, while Ukrainians are now being kept alive by many aid taking on various forms (e.g. suspension of debt repayment). That is why we are not formally dealing with bankruptcy yet. However, it is worth remembering that at the end of 2021 only Kiev's abroad debt was worth $55 billion. At the same time, it is estimated that rebuilding the country after the war could cost as much as $750 billion.
With this kind of size, USD 5 billion credit from the IMF and the planet Bank, about USD 9 billion of existing US support, EUR 6.5 billion of EU support, or even the planned $30 billion from the G7 and the EU are not very impressive. Especially since, for example, support from the United States is in rule immediately "burned" for the handling of war activities. Furthermore, it should be suspected that most financial assistance provided by abroad institutions is immediately spent on the day-to-day payment of budgetary expenditure. It is estimated that Ukraine's monthly budget deficit in 2022 was between $2-5 billion.
Without decommitment of part of the debt, subsidies and non-refundable aid Ukraine will not be able to stand up after the war. This country is going to go bankrupt financially and, consequently, may besides fall economically but socially. Ukraine is threatened with syndrome which we Poles have attributed to ourselves for years (overgrowth and mostly wrong). At the time of the threat, the nation united, and after the war, the state could be dissolved and dissolved.Unless it receives the essential external assistance.
The client?
On the basis of the above-mentioned data, it is clear that even the spectacular war success of Ukraine – which would consequence in winning peace and guaranteeing its future accession to NATO and the EU – may not be adequate for Ukraine to return to the right path. She rebuilt the destruction, reformed the administration, the judiciary, the economy, and yet experienced Prosperity in the Western edition.
Without external assistance, no Ukrainian government can cope with financial and economical collapse. In a devastated and mediocre country, 1 should anticipate an increase in social discontent and a return to old divisions that can resound with much more force. A society that is poor, disappointed and divided is 1 that is easy to manipulate and initiate further levels of conflict. It will surely effort to usage Russians who will never accept mentally the failure of Ukraine.
W The Kiev realize it. Therefore, it is apparent that After a successful end of the war, the Kiev authorities will embark on a large pilgrimage to search help. Ukrainians will scope out for any support they can get. This will be a time of large submission and humble attitude of Ukraine, especially towards those who will be able to offer the most. Among them there will be no Poland. With the capabilities of the USA, the full European Union and alone: Germany, large Britain or France, Poland will alternatively be qualified for the second "donors" league.
In another words, it should be realistic to presume that The post-war policy of Kiev will be geared towards offering influence to those who pay the most. And if Germans pay, then 1 of their conditions may be the resignation of Ukraine from the task Intermorze or alliance on the line of Warsaw-Kijów (anyway understood).
This means that as long as Ukraine is on the coast of the West, there is no request to make large hope of building a Polish-Ukrainian political bloc. In the short word (up to 10 years after the war), there is no large chance.
Business is business, you can't make money if you don't invest
The reconstruction of Ukraine will proceed precisely as in Iraq. Whoever gives the money will decide what they will be spent on. In another words, for German Euros, Ukrainians will rebuild the country with German construction companies. For dollars, American corporations will be built. There will be an old good regulation – to get something out, you gotta invest something first. In this context No 1 will let Polish companies to enter Ukrainian contracts unless they are financed for our zlotys. Crying that we don't usage business as much as we helped during the war won't help.
Of course, the mechanics of this redistribution should be understood. The Polish private sector will gain as much as the Polish State will contribute to the reconstruction of Ukraine in support of Kiev (simplified). Here comes another “groan”, due to the fact that any of the environments in Poland will rise larum, why the Polish payer consists of aid for Ukraine (funding out of his own pocket its reconstruction), and besides any of the money later returns to the privateers' pocket. frequently they are carefully "chosen" due to the fact that there is no hope that at least any of the funds do not scope the "friends" of the respective officials – this is how it works. Always and everywhere, all over the world.
For these reasons, the power that will want to usage the state budget a small more to gain influence in Ukraine may encounter misunderstandings and even social opposition. Which, in democratic conditions, may limit Poland's ability to make greater efforts in this area.
It will be hard to explain that the gold donated to Ukraine will return to the Polish economy through Polish companies. Companies – even run by a “friend rabbit” – will hire individual and their owners will transfer profits to Poland and spend money there. In another words, they'll make money. In addition, investment in Ukraine can contribute to the construction Prosperity In our country. This is all alongside political influences and benefits, for which we should simply fight from the position of our national interests.
It is worth to let for a digression here, that society can effort to minimize left-wing interests by forcing politicians to make Polish companies rebuilding Ukraine as Polish as possible and employing Poles to a large extent. The function of journalists will be to search private links between business and politics to indicate pathological arrangements and arrangements. Although it must be assumed in advance that any of the funds will simply be misused in any way. This should be addressed with a cool head and treated as an indispensable cost for the full planned event.
Polish position – challenges
With all this in mind, 1 should be aware that this is now the minute erstwhile Poland can warrant itself the most benefits in terms of rebuilding Ukraine. Because there's inactive a war going on right now. Therefore, almost all aid going to Ukraine passes through the Polish territory or is carried out through Polish means. Organizational and political. At the same time, Poland's credibility as a partner and ally is valued in the eyes of Ukrainians at the most. Therefore, at the minute Kiev will be the most open to cooperation with Warsaw. This minute will not last forever, and as shortly as it presses the sound of cannons, the negotiating position will gain you with a thick wallet.
So the biggest challenge for the Polish authorities in the current situation is to usage this minute and build with Ukrainian partners the framework for future, sustainable cooperation. At the same time, we should conclude as many agreements and agreements as possible to rebuild Ukraine after the war. At the same time, it is highly crucial to act with appropriate sensitivity, naturally. Do not force a decision on the Ukrainians “hard” and do not break the built relationships with a claim attitude that will dress us in the image of hyena, which tries to consume even a part of injured animal. Why?
Because the credibility, trust and image of Poland and Poles as partners and allies capable of unconditional assistance is our capital in the average and long word – as regards relations with Ukraine.
In the short term, we are not able to top the EU or Germany offer. For Ukraine, the euro will have a much higher value than gold. But now we are building capital on time erstwhile Ukraine will appear from inertia and become a real asset. After utilizing financial assistance, Ukrainians will naturally focus politically and socially on the country and nation that helped them most in the critical minute for Ukraine. The political alliance is not based solely on business conditions, on the contrary, 1 can do business with someone, but it is not necessarily essential to have hopes of friendship, partnership and alliance in pursuit of akin goals.
Poland's future for Ukraine
No substance how much the EU and Germany put the euro into rebuilding Ukraine. In the short term, they will gain political concessions, but in the long word Ukrainians will be more likely to focus on building a political-military community with Poland. Our attitude of 24.II.2022 gives immense capital here, but it is besides a community of interests. For both Poland and Ukraine must calculate the threat from Russia. Neither Germany nor France nor the USA have specified a common ground with Kiev.
Here we should mention to the second challenge standing by Poland. We must build specified military possible so that the Ukrainians naturally view it as an act in their sense of security.
This is not about the fact that due to any sentiment (remembrance of Polish aid) Kiev will play again for 1 goal with Warsaw in the years 10-20. This sentiment and memory will of course have its value (unfailing, but weaker partner is more valuable than a powerful one, on which 1 cannot rely). But the sphere softpower we will gotta support a real force that the Ukrainians can resist. We must be a stronger brother whose support the Ukrainians will feel behind their backs.
This is 1 of the priorities in the strategy for the Polish State for the period 2030-2040, which I described, among others, in the text entitled:"The large strategy of the Polish State".
A strong army capable of giving its neighbours a greater sense of safety will besides be crucial given that Ukraine, which is undergoing a deep crisis, will not be able to keep large armed forces while rebuilding the states. After the war, the support of the West for reinforcements is likely to cease. Thus, the Ukrainian budget itself will gotta keep and rebuild (after dense losses) its army. Ukraine may not be financially able to do so. Moreover, the Ukrainian army is already losing on many levels in relation to the Polish Armed Forces. Especially in terms of equipment and technology. We are a much richer country that invests in a very modern army. Ukrainians will not be able to match this level for decades to come.
Condemn oligarchy and flood pathologies
It is besides crucial to be aware that Poland is besides weak (and poor) to force the breakdown of economical oligarchy in Ukraine, as well as the introduction of a credible judicial system. In order to invest over the Dnieprem, there must be conditions. fewer from the private sector will want to take advantage of the chance in Ukraine to know that the Polish entrepreneur can be deceived by local partners who will be impunityless due to the pathological justice strategy and corruption in it. This importantly increases business risk, so it makes investments unprofitable. Nor can it be that, after Poland or its companies have invested funds, the Ukrainian state will abruptly change the "rules of the game" (although taxation but besides another legal ones) in specified a way that the investments will not return.
However, the European Union has the possible to mobilise Ukrainian political authorities to reform. The strategy of subsidies, payments of funds, subsidies and, finally, recovery aid – with an additional carrot in the form of admission to the Union – are mechanisms that give the EU a strong incentive tool. In another words, Poland will not be able to control the nature and conditions of the Ukrainian marketplace on its own. Without this, there is no partnership. For everything would gotta come down to utilizing force arguments and supporting them with lions (showing what we will do to Ukrainians, if they do not fix this and this), and this will lead to tension in relations, quarrels and as a consequence of Kiev's conduct on, for example, the centre of force in Berlin.
Ukrainians must want to improvement and repair their own state. The European Union is the only institution that can motivate them to do so. This is why it is so crucial that Ukraine enters not only NATO but besides the EU. Which, of course, will besides affect – surely in the short word – weakening Warsaw's strong position in relations with Kiev. However, this hazard and cost must be accepted. so Poland should not only fear the entry of Ukraine into the EU, but even support and lead this process. knowing how large and affirmative this can be in the future.
Build lasting relationships, organic work
In the context of the future of Ukraine and of who will regulation this country in the future, it can surely be assumed that it will be the people who are fighting for Ukraine on the battlefield today. Ukraine has mobilized a millionth army. If this 1 wins, the founding story of Ukrainian independency from Moscow will rise. Among the soldiers fighting on the front today, future Ukrainian elites will forge. Modern 20-30 year olds in 2040 or 2050 can decide the destiny of the country. These are the people who present receive packages with clothes, equipment and weapons from Polish volunteers. Who run with Polish GROT in hand or drive Polish tanks and howitzers. They are dressed in Polish underwear, winter jackets and operate Polish drones. frequently purchased from a social collection organized by Poles. Wives and children of these soldiers receive care in Poland, from Poles and Poles. The injured are treated in Polish hospitals. This will not be erased from memory. You can't buy that with any money.
This is the time of organic work and building relationships at the lowest level. In 10-20 years, war veterans will be politicians, officials or businessmen. Which we can handle, which we can easy access. Even if he had a telephone number.
So remember that on our side, People who present as volunteers go to Ukraine are our human capital in future relations with Ukraine. No 1 else has that value. Not Germans, not French, not Americans.
This is an act in Polish hands, which will be percent for subsequent – not years – decades. And in all the tragedy of the situation, this act arises spontaneously. Downside. Not planned by the state apparatus, although this besides makes efforts in this respect. However, it would be good for you to take an interest in and manage specified people in the future. For example, if most of them go to Germany after the war in search of a better life than that which they have in Poland, our possible will not only be wasted, but besides our competitor will gain.
What's something to work on. But it will surely be easier to accomplish another goal. I.e. taking part in creating the founding story of Ukrainian independency from Russia. The story of the winning Ukrainian army, which won thanks to Poland and Poles. Supply of weapons and supplies from Poland and through Poland. It has been 100 years since the Hungarian aid during the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919-1920. This fact is not an incidental known only by historians, but an event that has carved a deep trace in the memory of Polish society. Poland must build with Ukraine a common cultural-historical foundation (founding title) of the future alliance (whatever it takes form).
We are already becoming an highly affirmative part of Ukrainian history. And this will translate into a concrete relation erstwhile Mr Czesław of Radom goes to an old friend from the time of the war – Dmitri of Lviv, will stay at his place and decision on to Odessa to do business together. erstwhile Mr. Thomas wants to invest money in Ukraine, and in the office to issue him approval he will meet an authoritative of Artemis. The same guy he utilized to deliver underpants to on the winter front. erstwhile yet Helmut from Berlin will look for a place to invest, and Mrs Jolanta from Zamość – a broker – will be a good friend of Olena, who owns the right plot. The same Olena that Mrs Jolanta and her children took to her home during the war.
This kind of relation surely exists present on an authoritative and political level. erstwhile Polish-Ukrainian delegations establish details of the transfer of aid to Ukraine.
Stage Wisdom
For the economical reasons mentioned above, it is vital that in the first years after the end of the war in Ukraine, Poland understands the situation of Kiev and accepts the fact that Warsaw will not always be on the pedestal of Ukrainian abroad policy.
Of course, we should effort to do everything possible – for example, to guarantee that Poland introduces Ukraine into NATO and the EU – to keep its advanced position in relations with Ukraine. Nevertheless, there may come a minute erstwhile Kiev will gotta (although seemingly) present a submission to the requirements of the "West" at the expense of Poland's interests.
This must be made aware (although of course not passive), and what is more, Ukraine will request to be supported in obtaining funds from external sources. due to the fact that Ukraine will not be an asset, an ally or support for Poland, but a burden. That's why you gotta do anything to get Kiev back on its feet as shortly as possible. Only then will the time come for collecting political fruits from the tree that revived. Ukrainians are a arrogant nation that will become more assertive to the West in a situation of greater independence. At the same time, sensitivity to sentiments and memory of Polish aid will be a good basis to remind Ukraine that this partnership with Poland is in their vital interest. Both in terms of safety and economics, due to the fact that the connection to the western markets by land will inactive lead through Poland.
The facts are that the "bad history" between Poland and Ukraine was mainly due to respondents, but besides errors in interior politics made on both sides. As a result, Ukrainians fell into subjection to Moscow forever. This was a mistake, due to the fact that Warsaw could open gates to the west for Kiev. It always has been. However, only now, on the Ukrainian side, came a deep knowing of this state of affairs, and at the same time, the attitude of Poland and Poles erased old injuries which did not let Ukrainians to look at the geopolitical environment in a rational way.
We, too, will request to be calculating and aware of our own assets for the future. It may be a challenge to refrain from accusing the Ukrainians of their pro-Western attitude erstwhile they search funds to rebuild the state. The best political method then would be to play the function of intermediary and trustee. Polish ministers should even inform Ukrainian counterparts and effort to negociate aid for Kiev on their own. To later only invitation the Ukrainians to the table on the previously prepared ground to deposit the appropriate initial. All this will require quite a few skill, wisdom and patience to remind Ukrainians on the 1 hand of their interests (and the function of Poland), and on the another hand to do so in a affirmative way. Not to be a jealous lover, but alternatively to be aware that we want to build a permanent matrimony in the future. With a country that brings something to a relation and not just becomes a hold-up to our pocket. Before this matrimony happens, we should effort to lead Kiev by hand in the salons of the European Union. We must be an ally of Ukraine for good and for bad not only during the war, but besides just after it. It would be a immense mistake to number and make an immediate effort to get a concession to pay for the aid previously granted. We won't get much from the bankrupt, and it's better to have a partner erstwhile he gets back on his feet. Polish interests must, of course, be represented and clearly communicated, but this should be done naturally, while dealing with, for example, another matters beneficial to Ukraine – not claims. The point is that the Ukrainians should see and be aware of what we anticipate in exchange for their own actions in favour of Kiev and want to rematch themselves. This is precisely the attitude that is now seen in Ukrainian society. The same mechanics should be pursued at political level. The same can be achieved in different ways, and it should be remembered that our east policy must be conducted with a view not to the next 5 years, but to at least 50 years. So, like the Chinese, you can build softpower on the basis of building a relation based on credit support and investment and then spoil everything with profits here and now (e.g. after 3-4 years putting the debtor under pull) and you can besides adopt the Anglo-Saxon method. Build a framework in which partners will feel comfortable adequate to have the chance to last decades.
Polish east Strategy
The above considerations lead to moments where in a completely natural way 1 can be tempted to outline Polish priorities and state reasons in the context of east policy (relative to Ukraine) in the close future.
Such priorities will be:
- the ruthless maintenance of Ukraine outside the control of Russia,
- organic activities on social, administrative (official), political and military levels in order to build the levels of agreement and the foundations for future cooperation,
- building your own modern army with the possible to go beyond the borders of Poland and increase the sense of safety for east neighbours,
- the introduction of Kiev into NATO and the EU after the war, supporting reforms of the Ukrainian state,
- supporting Ukraine in obtaining backing from 3rd parties for reconstruction purposes,
- maintaining good relations with Kiev, a affirmative fight for its own position in the region without communicative condemning Ukrainian vulnerability to influence (in return for financial assistance),
- supporting the construction of the Ukrainian founding story (year 2022 – triumph over Russia), in which Poland played a decisive and affirmative role,
- patient waiting until Ukraine becomes a non-continuous asset – building the Warsaw-Kijów alliance, erstwhile Berlin will no longer be able to enforce the conditions of aid in Ukraine.
- when conditions arise for this, building a political-military-economic block in Międzymorz – utilizing previously accumulated capital both in softpower and with real arguments (military possible raising the sense of freedom in the region)
Summary and forecast
The current planet event is beneficial for the interests of Poland. Which in the future will give emergence to certain opportunities, but besides challenges. The challenge now is to argue Russia's momentum in Ukraine and to keep Kiev outside the Russian sphere of influence. Warsaw's efforts in this area seem to set the maximum limit of our capabilities. Good. We're doing the right thing.
However, in the position of the future, it is crucial to halt imagining that, after the war in Ukraine, Poland will immediately become a regional leader. A leader who will make a political-military-economic block through his partnership with Ukraine. It may be possible, but not soon. Therefore, the authorities in Warsaw – in the context of east policy – must be aware of the far-reaching position to be taken to accomplish Polish geopolitical objectives.
The biggest mistake we could make is the corruption of already built relations with Ukraine through demands and claims against Kiev after the war. So it is essential to tame Polish “realists” who are not lacking, and who will surely call for immediate consummation of the relation with Ukraine. And that's before he even formally and actually happens.
We request a patient and wise abroad policy that will be based on the right interior policy. Poland cannot require others (including Ukraine) to implement its concept of building Intermortal based on Warsaw. That's reasoning wrong. Wishy. The essence of the construction of the Intermortal will be to build our own interior strength (including military strength) so that others want to make it or join it. This will be easier, the better we build relationships now and the more reliable the partner we will remember. It takes time to make the right potential. The Polish army improvement suggests a possible of 2035. Of course, for this year, it is possible to accept the "highest" erstwhile it comes to building an army. This should have the appropriate capacity, which is gradually acquired, before.
Nevertheless, it should be assumed that the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war will take at least 10 years. It is not yet known erstwhile the conflict will end for good. And if there's no overtime. During the reconstruction period, Kiev will be very susceptible to western influences due to the expected launch of the Marschall Plan equivalent for Ukraine. At the same time, the Polish Armed Forces will be in intensive construction and reconstruction over the next 8-10 years.
So in the most optimistic variant, the seed sown now will only be born for us in the mediate of the 4th decade. possibly only in the 1930s will Poland be able to start reasoning about playing a bigger function in Europe. On the realization of the concept of Intermortal (in a somewhat different form) which during the life of Marshal Józef Piłsudski was not possible. In another words, if it goes well, the structure of the Inter-sea could materialize in 1 form or another from 2035 to 2040. If we do this right, it could last more than a decade.
Today we are building the future position of Poland, which may only be utilized by our children. The Polish Armed Forces according to the current concept besides build for the next generation, due to the fact that equipment and personnel built circa for 2035 will service Poland the next 15-30 years. Who knows what happens in 2050? There may not be a European Union, NATO, but present we must do everything to guarantee that Poland survives until then, and even is stronger then than today. This is besides crucial not to remember this position at a time erstwhile individual recklessly proposes immediate consumption of profits that could be made from investing in Ukraine.
Krzysztof Wojchal
geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog
P.S.
During the writing of this study, the author came across an article by Sławomir Matuszak of the OSH, where data on the value of losses in Ukraine were besides presented: "Fight for survival. Ukraine's economy during the warIt’s okay. ” It is worth a look, although the data comes from IX.22
