Three peculiar cases. Demographic processes in the South Caucasus

In the last 35 years, the population of the South Caucasus has increased from around 15.7 million to about 17.2 million.^[1]. Only Azerbaijan was liable for this increase, in which a comparatively advanced fertility rate remained until the mediate of the erstwhile decade. In the another 2 countries of the region, the population fell, but as a consequence of various processes: in Georgia, mainly due to the outflow of the non-Georgian population and the failure of control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia^[2] (in Georgian statistics, parastates are not included) and in Armenia, emigration and low fertility rates (see Figure 4).

According to the planet Bank's forecasts, the current demographic trends in the South Caucasus will proceed in the next 4th of the century, but in a more "flated" form: by 2050, Azerbaijan's population is expected to increase slightly, and Georgia is expected to decrease somewhat (in Armenia the decline is expected to be more pronounced). Each of these countries so represents a separate, "special" case, and their circumstantial demographic situation has been powerfully affected by fresh events, especially conflicts. This does not mean that there are no trends in the full region. The most crucial of these is simply a circumstantial “homogeneisation”: in all countries the percent of individual titular nations increased importantly (this besides applies to the Abkhazians in the unrecognized Abkhazia). The processes typical of richer European countries are besides observed everywhere: the increase in the average age of citizens, the average life expectancy or the number of divorces and the decrease in fertility rates and the number of marriages.

Georgia – last red tape of the multicultural Caucasus

Georgia was – and remains – although to a lesser degree – the most multiethnic and multi-denominational state of the region. On the eve of the dissolution of the USSR, it had 5.4 million inhabitants, including 3.8 million Georgians (70.1%;for comparison: Armenians in Armenia were 93.3% at the time and Azerbaijan in Azerbaijan was 82.7%). In russian Georgia there were besides Armenians (437,000, 8.1%), Russians (341,000, 6.3%), Azerbaijan (308,000, 5.7%), Ossetians (164,000, 3.0%), The Greeks (100 thousand, 1.9%) and the Abkhazs (96,000, 1.8% – unlike the Ossetians who lived throughout Georgia, they were concentrated in their autonomous republic^[3])^[4].

In 1989. Abkhazia had 525 1000 inhabitants (including Abkhazia – 93.3 thousand, 17.8%; Georgians – 239.9 thousand, 45.7%; Armenians – 76.5,000, 14.6%; Russians – 74.9 thousand, 14.3%). At the same time, the population of South Ossetia was 98.5 1000 and consisted mainly of Ossetians (65.2 thousand, 66.2%) and Georgians (28.5 thousand, 29%).

As a consequence of the wars in South Ossetia (1991–1992) and Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the Russian-Georgian War (2008), both separatist territories left more than 200,000 Georgians, usually moving to Georgia controlled by the authorities in Tbilisi (immigration chose a minority). However, part of the Georgian population remained in the parastates. According to hard to verify statistic there, 46.6 1000 Georgians lived in Abkhazia in 2021 (the population was 17.9%)^[5], and in South Ossetia in 2015 – 4 000 (7.4%)^[6]. In both cases it was the second largest national group after titular nations. These communities, akin to the full population of parastates, authoritative Georgian statistic do not include^[7].

According to the census of 2024, the population of Georgia is 3.9 million, although in reality it is most likely 100–200,000 lower.^[8]. However, regardless of its final size, over 35 years the population of the country decreased by about 1.5 million people (it must be noted that the census did not include parastates)^[9]. The first registry data, published at the end of June 2025, did not yet appear on Georgia's cultural composition. The latest reliable information on this issue comes from the erstwhile census – from 2014. The population of the country was 3.7 million at the time, of which 86.8% were Georgians (3.2 million), and the largest minorities were Azerbaijanes (233,000, 6.3%), Armenians (168,000, 4.5%) and Russians (26.5 thousand, 0.7%)^[10].

The above figures show that although in the 4th of 1989–2014 the population of the country decreased by more than 45%, this decline was least affected by the titular nation – in this group it was little than 19%. Azerbaijan's participation decreased by about a third, Armenians by more than 1 and a half times, and Russians by almost thirteen times (not counting parastates and subsequent influx of FR citizens hiding from mobilisation).^[11]). Representatives of these nations have usually migrated to their historical homelands – especially the Russians. Nevertheless, Georgia, and especially its main cities – Tbilisi and Batumi, remains multiethnic and multicultural (as opposed to Baku, for example).

The changes in Georgia's nationality – and most likely a somewhat smaller proportion of Georgians in its population – could have been affected by the abolition of short-term Schengen visas for citizens of that country (2017). This indicates a crucial increase in the number of Georgian diasporas in EU countries (including Poland) in fresh years.

The increase in the country's population in the decade 2014–2024 is closely linked to the fertility rate, which in fresh years oscillates around 2 (in 1989 it was 2.32, in 2003 it fell to 1.55, but, for example, in 2016 it reached 2.23)^[12].

Figure 1. cultural composition of Georgia in 1989 and 2014*

Source: Own improvement based on census data: the 1989 russian and the 2014 Georgian censuses (a fresh census was held in Georgia in 2024, but no full results were published until August 2025, including cultural composition data).

Real and Virtual Armenia

Armenia, which was a single national country in 1989, became monoethnic in practice by 2022 – erstwhile the last census took place: the percent of the titular nation rose from 93.3% to 98%^[13]. This was mainly contributed by the outflow of Azerbaijani (as well as Kurdish) population as a consequence of the Caribbean conflict. It is estimated that around 186 1000 people of this nationality fled to Azerbaijan (according to the 1979 census, more than 160 1000 of them lived there – with a growth trend due to large natural growth) and about 18 1000 Kurd-Muslims and about 4,000 Russians – a full of 208 1000 people.^[14].

In addition, any of the 330 000 moved to Armenia. Armenians arriving from Azerbaijan – the remainder emigrated to Russia or another countries (those who formally remained in Azerbaijan were inhabited uncontrollable by Baku Górski Karabach). After the liquidation in the autumn of 2023, the mountainous parastates all its population (about 100,000) fled to Armenia^[15], although part of it then left for Russia and the West. However, the percent of Armenians in this country may now be even higher – regardless of the influx of around 110 000. Russians trying to avoid mobilization^[16].

Despite the influx of Armenians from Azerbaijan (and to a lesser degree from Georgia), the population of Armenia as a full is steadily decreasing. It decreased by almost 400,000 (approximately 10%): from 3.3 to 2.9 million. This is due to low natural growth (since the mid-1990s fertility rate has been well below 2, and in the early 21st century it has fallen to 1.2^[17]) and emigration. Armenians have settled in different countries for centuries, although they keep ties with the historical homeland. They make a networked "virtual Armenia" that retains its influence on Erningian politics. Although the migration balance remains negative^[18]This movement between Armenia and the diaspora takes place in both directions. After the outbreak of the Syrian civilian War, a group of about 12,000 Syrian Armenians invaded the country^[19]. They settled mainly in Yerevan, giving the city a somewhat mediate east character (they did not talk Russian and frequently found employment in gastronomy).

Chart 2. cultural composition of Armenia in 1989 and 2022

Source: own improvement based on census data: russian of 1989 and Armenian of 2022.

Azerbaijan — Caucasian hegemon

Between 1989 and 2019 (the last census in 2019) Azerbaijani population increased from 7 to 9.9 million (now it is already 10.2 million).^[20]), or almost 3 million (more than 40%). The group of representatives of the titular nation expanded from 5.8 to 9.4 million while its share in the full population increased from 82.7 to 94.8%.^[21]. This state of affairs is primarily a consequence of comparatively advanced natural growth, although in this aspect there is simply a downward trend – in the last 3 decades the fertility rate oscillated around 2 (it was 2.8 in 1989 and in 2025 – 1.96^[22]). Migratory movements as a consequence of the conflict with Armenia played a much smaller role, as most of the displaced people came from Nagorno Karabach and the surrounding area – they remained within 1 country (in 1994 the full number of displaced people was around 750,000 in Azerbaijan, which was at the time around 10% of the population of the country.^[23]). The statistic do not cover the outflow of Azerbaijani population from the Russian Federation observed in the summertime of 2025 due to the tightening of relations between Baku and Moscow, but it cannot be excluded that it will take more massive forms in the following months.^[24].

Azerbaijan is now the largest nation in the South Caucasus, representing more than half of the population of the region, even after taking into account Georgian parastates. Demographic possible translates into Baku's political ambitions, striving to dominate neighbours. It uses natural materials policy (oil and natural gas resources exported by Georgia and Turkey to European countries, including EU members, and the mediate East), as well as an alliance with Turkey.

Figure 3. cultural composition of Azerbaijan in 1989* and 2019**

Source: Own improvement based on census data: 1989 russian and 2019 Azerbaijani.

Aerial region

The logic of demographic processes in each of the 3 confederate Caucasus countries is different, although there are similarities between, for example, the depopulation of Georgia and Armenia. In both countries there was a mass outflow of national minorities – in the first 1 it occurred especially in the early 1990s, due to the general crisis and nationalist policy of the first president of Gamsachurdia. This phenomenon besides applies to Azerbaijan, although in this case the Armenian population left – on a smaller scale in 2020, and on a massive scale in 2023 – the areas that were de facto not controlled earlier by Baku. Commercial migrations from this country (to Turkey or, increasingly, Russia) are usually temporary. On the another hand, dissidents are permanently leaving, and the number of dissidents can be estimated at respective 100 to respective thousand.

The full region is affected by the process of its circumstantial “homogenisation”. In each of the countries and parastates of the South Caucasus, the proportion of the titular population is growing, with Armenia (and to a lesser degree Azerbaijan) being the monoethnic state. Only Georgia remains a country with a comparatively advanced percent of national minorities. This has been a fresh phenomenon over the last centuries, since the South Caucasus countries, and especially the large cities of the region, were mostly multinational and multi-denominational (e.g. in 1989 10% of the population of Baku were Armenians, and in the past their share was up to 20%). This situation is conducive to the strengthening of historical narratives that take into account only titular nations, which can strengthen their consolidation, but will surely hinder the integration of number groups (especially Azerbaijan and Armenians in Georgia) and dialog with neighbours.

In the South Caucasus, there are besides processes characteristic of the more prosperous countries of Europe and the West: the average age of citizens (from 30.1 to 37.8 years in the last 3 and a half decades) and the expected life expectancy (from 67.4 to 74.4 years in the same period), while fertility rates are decreasing (from 2.58 to 1.9).^[25]. The number of married couples is besides decreasing and divorce rates are increasing.^[26]. Georgia and 2024 data can be given as an example, erstwhile there were 39,500 births (1.8% little than in 2023; over 57 000 children were born in 1994) and 44 000 deaths (2.8% more than in 2023). At the same time, the number of mothers aged 25 and over 40 has fallen^[27].

These trends – notable besides in another countries of the region – involve, among another things, a change in lifestyle, resulting in greater openness to the West (especially in the case of Georgia), expanding wealth and urbanisation processes. According to the census of 2024, Tbilisi has a population of 34% of Georgia's population, and in all cities, more than 60%^[28]. The level of urbanisation in Armenia is about 64% (with 37% of the country's population surviving in Yerevan alone; with specified proportions in Poland Warsaw would gotta have nearly 14 million inhabitants), while in Azerbaijan – data for 2020 – over 56%.

Figure 4. Population of South Caucasus countries after 1991 with UN demographic projections

Source: planet Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision, United Nations, Department of economical and Social Affairs, Population Division, population.un.org.

Forecast sample

The South Caucasus region is in a demographic "transitional period" in which the simplification in natural growth is accompanied by a crucial increase in life expectancy, with these changes taking place slow in Azerbaijan. The planet Bank predicts that in 2050 the population of this country will be 11.05 million (nearly more than today), Georgia – 3.5 million (small decrease), and Armenia – 2.6 million (large decrease)^[29]. The full region (excluding the Georgian parastates) will thus have 17,1 million people, or about as many as today, but 2 thirds of this is to be the population of Azerbaijan.

These forecasts point to the demographic crisis in all 3 countries that is approaching over a twelve to respective decades, including the request to make their own migration strategies. The first sign of this is the presence on the streets of Tbilisi, Erwania and, little often, Baku of food suppliers from the countries of further Asia (India, Pakistan).