Europe present is more politically dependent on America than during Trump's first term. The chances of that changing in the next 4 years are slim.
Europe is facing many structural problems present and Donald Trump's presidency is just one, not the biggest one. The share of the European economy in the planet marketplace is falling regularly; European companies are becoming little innovative and thus little competitive towards the protectionistly oriented United States and China. There are discussions in the European Union on structural changes to let joint debt to be drawn and decisions to be made more efficiently in abroad policy, but these discussions do not have the desired effect. The EU would like to extend its sphere of influence to the Balkans, to the east of Europe and to the Caucasus, but it has fewer hard arguments and even little determination, which makes it hard for it to go beyond the verbal layer and to face another powers in these places that are equally strong but more aggressively seeking its own sphere of influence.
Moreover, there is simply a war in the east of the continent between Russia and Ukraine, to which the largest countries of Western Europe – Germany, France, Italy and even the UK – have small influence. Yes, they helped Ukraine with quite a few equipment and allocated quite a few funds to keep independence, but their political importance in the process of negotiating and ending the war will be much little than 3 another countries: the United States, China and Russia, and possibly India.
Prior to the outbreak of the war, Germany and France sought to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk agreements negotiated in 2014 and 2015. These actions were motivated by the belief that Russia is part of the European Force Agreement and that the solution to Ukraine's safety problem, as well as to the European-Russian relations, can only be done on a political, diplomatic level. In another words, war is not essential to alleviate years of tensions, sentiments and conflicts that have grown between Ukraine and Russia and between Russia and the West.
The another conviction was the United States and the United Kingdom. They were not willing to engage in resolving Ukraine's situation on the basis of the Minsk agreements and argued that the only way to guarantee Europe's safety was to extend NATO and accept Kiev. On February 24, 2022, erstwhile Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, the continental French-German imagination fell for a long time in clash with the Anglo-Saxon vision, according to which Russia cannot have a place in the European power strategy and according to which the solution to Europe's safety problem lies in the maximum weakening of Russia and leaving it beyond the borders of European policy.
Will Donald Trump end the war in Ukraine?
The common belief that 2025 will be a year of peace talks and the end of the war brings closer the return of the continental imagination that Germany and France had been pushing before the war. but present it's different.
Firstly, there will be no return to the Minsk agreements, as Russia occupies much more Ukrainian territory than before the war. The issue is no longer the position of Donbas, but the membership of about 20% of Ukrainian territory. This, in turn, makes possible discussions about the future of Ukraine to concern no longer the demolition of its sovereignty, but the sovereignty of the full state.
Secondly, the most crucial partners in the talks with Russia and Ukraine will be those countries that have the top leverage, namely the US, China and India. It was these 3 countries that intervened erstwhile the anticipation appeared that Vladimir Putin would usage tactical atomic weapons in Ukraine. Germany and France will most likely be at the negotiating table, but their function will be more limited than years ago, due to the fact that their assessment of the situation is somewhat different from American optics today.
Thirdly, since the circumstances are conducive to the return of the continental vision, but there is simply a large deal of evidence that the Trump administration will implement it, it means that Europe will stay even more politically subordinate to American politics. Trump has repeatedly declared that he is willing to agree with Vladimir Putin the terms of the end of the war. Whether it happens in the first months of his presidency or in the following year, there is no indication that the conditions on the front will change in favour of Ukraine at that time. So if the war ended at a time erstwhile Russia occupied about 20% of Ukraine's territory, Moscow would again become part of the European political agreement of forces. The French-German imagination would be fulfilled, but in a perverse way: the agreement with the Kremlin would sanction the United States and China alternatively than Europe, which, by the way, would be consistent with long-term political and economical trends, which clearly indicate a comparative decrease in Europe's importance to both the US and the largest Asian countries.
How will Europe respond?
There is simply a consensus in Europe that, regardless of whether Trump fulfills his promises and will effectively end the war, or whether the struggles will proceed for months to come, European allies should arm themselves and strengthen themselves to halt Putin from being aggressive again. This most frequently takes the form of appeals for spending not even 3% of GDP on defence (President Duda), not 4% (Trump in the first term), but up to 5% (Trump in early January 2025). any even think that Trump's choice is simply a essential sobering up for Europe, which may yet be mobilised to spend more on defence and more decisive defence of its borders by its own forces.
Meanwhile, the leap in defence spending and the focus of European policy on the Ukrainian issue will not strengthen Europe's position vis-à-vis the world's largest countries. In 2019, U.S. analysts Jennifer Lind and William Wohlforth argued in "Foreign Affairs" that if the liberal order of the United States is to survive, then it must take a more conservative attitude, suppress the expansion impulse and strengthen itself internally to respond more effectively to external challenges. Today, the same can be said of the European Union. If it wants to halt the decline of its importance, the first step to strengthening would be closer integration, rebuilding its own industrial and defence base, while at the same time diplomatic commitment to end conflicts that lead it distant from the first: interior strengthening and ensuring its endurance against always stronger centrifugal tendencies.
But that's not gonna happen. Europe will not become more innovative in the foreseeable future, will not increase its production base and will increasingly be willing to exploit its combined economical potential. This will not let many centrifugal trends and the deficiency of agreement by all countries on the desired direction of the EU. There is besides small indication that most European countries will abruptly change their head and recognise that the solution to their safety problem can take place at diplomatic level – even if the war in Ukraine is frozen or concluded at the negotiating table.
What is characteristic, Trump besides does not encourage Europe to change its perspective. It plays the weakness of the EU as an institution. He wants Europeans to import more and more from the US, not to produce and export more and more. It argues that trade relations with China should be restricted, and at the same time it wants to restrict their access to the US market. Above all, however, it encourages them to spend even more on arms, which will halt Russia, even though it promises to negociate peace in Ukraine.
Trump a Poland
Trump sees relations with Europe – just like the planet – purely transactionally. He wants to end the war in Ukraine, but not due to the fact that he wants peace and restoration status quo ante. He wants an agreement with Russia to free American attention and resources and then redirect them to Asia. By the end of September 2024, the U.S. legislature had given or voted to support Ukraine at over $180 billion. Trump believes that wars could have been avoided and that this was the money that had to be spent on strengthening the American army and making greater commitment to stopping China.
Trump's position is so completely different from that of European governments, which are pushing for further support for Kiev and announcing that "nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine". 1 specified country is Poland, which spends almost 5% of GDP on defence (i.e. 2025 as much as 20% of the yearly budget), but from the position of Trump's policy it will not be of much importance. This will not change his view of Ukraine and the request to end the war at the negotiating table. This will not change his view of Europe as a "weak continent" and the request to impose duties that will besides hit the Polish economy.
Even before the war, Poland advocated the Anglo-Saxon imagination and openly acted against continental tandem German-French operations. Today, erstwhile the roles turn around and Trump will want to sanction Russia's return to the European agreement of forces, Poland has no good answer. It adheres to the solutions to date and increases its defence budget gradually, reasoning that only triumph over Russia is able to guarantee its safety. However, it is not prepared for a much more probable – postwar – script that brings Trump's presidency closer.
