Could be "last summertime of peace for Germans" warns military historian Sonke Neitzel. Politologist Johannes Varwick considers this to be “panicism” and Russia to be “a manageable military threat”.
The fact is most likely somewhere in between. Bundeswehra, intelligence services and our global partners are unanimous in their analysis: there is simply a clear threat from Russia. Next year, her armed forces will be twice as large as before. War against Ukrainea full of 1.5 million soldiers. We can see that each year about 1,500 conflict tanks are either produced or removed from warehouses and repaired — that is much more than it takes to fight Ukraine. And the magazines are filled with ammunition.
What's the conclusion?
In 2029 Russia will be able to carry out a conventional large-scale attack on NATO territory. Putin's goal is to weaken and destruct the alliance and discredit our western form of society. Will it come to this? We don't know. This is surely besides a question of possibility.
We are clearly limiting this chance of the opponent by deterring, through our own defence capabilities. But we're already watching Hybrid War, attacks and operations of exerting influence through sabotage, espionage and misinformation from the Russian side, which happen all day besides here in Germany.
In the Baltic States, it is speculated that Putin may usage the “Zapad” maneuvers for tiny scale attacks on their territory this autumn. How do you justice that?
Putin is curious in disturbing people in society. He'll test us as shortly as he gets the chance. Of course, this can besides happen as part of specified maneuvers — although “Zapad” is simply a cyclical exercise held all 4 years, this year for the first time under the leadership of Belarus. At the minute we presume that about 13,000 soldiers will participate in the maneuvers, which is much little than in erstwhile years. But we're watching it closely with our partners.
If there were a limited attack on the Baltic State, do you inactive believe in the United States' loyalty to the alliance?
Yes, absolutely. At this time, erstwhile we talk about the disintegration of certain safety policies, I see the heads of staff of all NATO countries approaching each other. They search to close ranks and consult and exchange analyses much more frequently than in erstwhile years. I just visited the U.S., and I didn't see any signs of my American comrades leaving NATO.
Your mission is to prepare the Bundeswehr for war. How far have you come with this assignment?
I want we could keep going. But that comes from my own impatience. We have a headlight on and we always look at the challenges ahead. But if you look in the rearview mirror, you can see that we have achieved rather a lot: we have adapted the structures of the ministry and the armed forces to national and allied defence. We accelerated the orders and, for example, cut half the time needed to buy a combat tank and deliver it to the troops.
At the end of this year, for the first time in the Bundeswehr, we will launch the so - called circulating ammunition — in another words, not only will we test specified ammunition, but we will besides usage it in combat exercises. Our brigade on Lithuania It's growing. We besides utilized peculiar resources to fill any holes from the time of the peace dividend. They have not yet been eliminated, but we will be able to do so in the coming years thanks to the stabilisation of the financing line, which is now possible. I'm very calm about that.
However, Germany lags behind its commitments to NATO. At the beginning of this year, a full equipped army division was to be formed ready to fight. Why didn't this happen?
Given the situation of the threat, we have moved the deployment of this division from 2027 to 2025, but we have indicated to NATO that we will not yet scope full operational readiness in any areas. This was besides accepted by the alliance. The division is simply a complex structure in which materials, personnel, training, logistics, combat support, but besides a communications network must be combined.
We are on the right track for the 10th armored division to scope full operational readiness this year. But 1 thing is certain: if the 10th division were needed tomorrow, it would be ready. Not as equipped as we'd like, but ready to fight.
So far, money has been a limiting factor. In the future, you should get “all you need” as the Chancellor candidate put it Friedrich Merz. What are the priorities for shopping?
Air defence has absolute priority. Then ammunition and the ability to "deep-precision impact", i.e. long-range weapons systems for precise strokes. These systems besides make a crucial contribution to deterrence. And of course drones and defence against drones. We will so gotta compensate for the gaps in our capabilities, look at the conventional armored fight and infantry, and, above all, strengthen combat support. What's the best weapon systems for us if we can't get them ammunition and fuel?
Dominika Zarzycka / AFPBundeswehr soldier, 2025.
All this must be taken into account — and ordered — in the combat network. We are besides aware of which individual weapons systems should be ordered to get these capabilities. This homework was done.
Will you proceed to buy from the United States, or will you effort to reduce your dependency?
My biggest challenge right now is to rapidly guarantee the readiness of the troops to operate — and I must do so with all the resources available on the market. Of course, we first look in Germany and Europe to see if there is anything on the shelves. If not, given the force of time, we will besides gotta acquisition in the US if the equipment is available there. Our mark date is 2029, so we should be ready to usage by then.
You have overall work for planning defence contracts. Do politicians perceive to your military advice?
I have no reason to uncertainty that.
Was the order for fresh frigates and submarines at the end of last year, which will not be delivered before 2030, your suggestion?
My advice was to position ourselves as widely as possible and compensate for the deficits that have arisen in the past. In this way, we created conditions that would let us to say in 10 or 15 years: it is good that we acted in 2024.
But how does that relate to the war readiness precedence by 2029? The Bundeswehry association complains that only 70 of 1,000 tankers and 19 of the 200 Skyranger air defence systems are available in the army.
I always gotta look at the large picture. We are looking at the organization of the full armed forces in order to combine capabilities in specified a way that we are ready for war by 2029 at the latest. We looked at this at the end of last year: what is ready to contract, what can be rapidly implemented now? They were boats. Refueling systems and Skyranger are now at the top of the precedence list. At the same time, we request to think about technological leaps and improvement beyond 2030.
“How do I save the Bundeswehr from herself and put an end to a trial that makes it impossible to accomplish results?” asked Lieutenant General Jurgen-Joachim von Sandrart recently. Your answer?
My answer is that we have made large progress. But General von Sandrart is right, due to the fact that it is simply a substance of constantly influencing rooted structures, frequently a slow strategy in which we can make changes only if we convince people in Bundeswehr.
Michael Matthey/dpa / AFPCarsten Breuer during the Bundeswehr celebration, 2024.
I have the impression that knowing the force to act by 2029 is increasingly permeating the full camera. This change in the way I think, the request to prepare for war again, has come — I can see it with my own eyes during my missions. I am arrogant of how rapidly our soldiers have adapted to these crucial changes and are surviving a fresh mission.
The Bundeswehra shrinks and ages. Shouldn't you disagree with the outgoing Chancellor? Olaf Scholz, which considered the Armed Forces staff problem to be "possible"?
I have always made it clear that we request an increase in the possible of the Bundeswehr. Currently, it amounts to about 100,000 additional reserveists. We know we can't just recruit them on the labour market. Therefore, we must trust on military service — in any form.
What is your military advice to the future German government: is volunteer service adequate or compulsory?
It's purely political, there's no military justification. I say: we request growth possible — and we are prepared in troops to train about 100,000 extra soldiers as reservists until the turn of the decade.
Currently you have about 182,000 active soldiers and about 40,000 reservists. What size are you aiming at?
Based on NATO's commitments and the function of Germany as a logistics hub for the deployment of troops on the east flank, I estimation the request for 460,000 soldiers and reservists. Our mark remains 200,000 active soldiers. Nor do I think the labour marketplace can supply much more, given demographic change.
We have a fixed reserve of 60,000 in structures that are presently being filled. And I anticipate another 100,000 reservists to come from a pool of 800,000 erstwhile soldiers who have retired over the years. That leaves a gap of 100,000 that we gotta fill.
