Arbitrary, whimsical, and immoral will in an unobvious way combine with thinking. It can run them, even if it is not slow to reason. He can besides argue him, destroying the conclusions and resolutions we have come to wisely.
The urges, the desires, the will
The ambiguity of human condition, not only as a consequence of the conflict with external reality – nature and the presence of others, the necessity to cohabit with them, but as an essential origin of mental, emotional and somatic life, Freud saw. Unlike Rousseau, he recognized the evil within man—a destructive force, destructive, not only the consequence of social institutions. It is the conflict of Eros – the love and desire of life – with an innate, natural tendency to hostility and aggression towards others or oneself, the drive of death – either own or individual else – that is essential for human life (in the translation of Jerzy Prokopiuk appearing contrary to the first form of Tanatos). The point is that the erstwhile should win, defeating the latter. This is served by various treatments made by family, educators and culture, which uncover themselves as superego, what binds the interior and natural tendencies that can harm others or even themselves, representing the ideal, even if impossible to realize or incompatible with what man truly is (in his reflections on the erosion in Christianity Benedict XVI came from a akin assumption). This, however, does not only have affirmative effects, as 1 might anticipate or want. These demands and expectations make man unhappy, can lead to spiritual suffering, drive to self-aggression or force against those who identify (even if mistakenly) restraint. Even the restrictions imposed on Eros, not only in his lewd variety, but besides in his upbuilding and potential, have contributed to this. As Freud stated: protection against aggression can make force as unhappy as aggression.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is an aversion to the rules in force or to those which were intended to be established. To those who have defined and keep existing rules, or to those who would like to change them to shared by themselves. To all those who influence or want to influence our desires, set their frames, restrain them. Not only the desires of individual life, but besides how we can imagine social life, a good society. After all, those who are not free from human condition are not so different from them again. It may be from this regulation – consciousness or feeling or feeling – that there has always been a desire to base social rules on what could exceed thinking, to appear beyond the ability of the concept. Hence, at times God’s rules were guided. In Augustine, drawing from Greek ideas, knowledge, and language, they were based on the transcending experience of infinity—the infinite temporal God, his infinite love and infinite good. On another occasion, attention was paid to the laws of nature or history, to which man cannot influence, cannot change them. Even though it turned out to be more than erstwhile that they had to be defended, not only by reason, from those who endanger or hold them for nothing. Yeah, you could even proceed to rape them for centuries. There was another way of reasoning that tried to go beyond its specified restriction, or collective wisdom. It took on various figures – collective thought, balance of strength, interests or arguments, and could hide in the form of tradition, wisdom of generations or cognition from the past, which could besides say something to contemporary ones.
It complicates the fact that we do not have full control over all our desires. They slip distant from our consciousness, our thinking. But they control our actions, actions, and even reasoning and thinking. This can lead to a discrimination between an unconscious, most primal, childish, spontaneous, or survival-related will, and a thoughtful, recognized, consciously and intentionally targeted will, appointed upon thought. The first name of the will is frequently refused.
In a work devoted to Hannah Arendt's will, she points out that in European tradition an aristocratic can be considered a predecessor of will proairesis. It is simply a concept relating to the art of choice, of telling and adopting a circumstantial solution, which is essential for action. Thus Aristotle placed this ability to choose between desire and reason. She was expected to mediate between these authorities, have a kind of human conversation with herself, an interior discussion. The stagirite inactive understood the desire as the pursuit of happiness and the "good life" of his and his community. It was unnegotiable to him, unchosen. He felt that only the means could be chosen. He opposed desire and desire to the 1 intelligent and proper. They would be liable for, or active with, or be willless, passionate, or spontaneous.
The obscure or disputing remains (both internally and socially) what happiness and good life are, and what they mean. possibly that's why any take these concepts as a good coin, others are suspicious erstwhile they hear them. The first sees self-fulfillment, oppressive and forced social expectations. How do we separate them from the results of passion, which give happiness or his sense of feeling, those feelings that may make us feel or confuse us, but besides our reasoning and his misdiagnosis and judgments? What if there are differences between people about what they reason for happiness and good life, on an individual and a Community dimension? So, though, proairesis, the art of choosing a circumstantial solution, is crucial in politics, possibly even constitutions it, is 1 of its foundations – does not the dispute over funds find 1 of the axes of political conflicts? – this, however, is insufficient for her. He does not yet, and surely does not have to, designate an existential enemy. This is not the case in the case of differences in the knowing of happiness and good life erstwhile they are, appear to or are considered to be incompatible, whenever either annihilation (the way of reasoning or physical, at least as an crucial social force) or a pact of non-aggression that may appear devilish to each organization (tolerance, neutrality, common recognition) can be solutions.
Supreme authority
Augustine went further in his consideration of will, reason and passion. He created the concept of free will, most likely due to the fact that it is not restrained on the 1 hand by drive, desire, and passion, while allowing to choose from the available possibilities (arbitrator liberal). On the another hand, it is not subject to reason and thinking. Not only is it independent of them, but it can besides be the origin of them, if they do not force themselves to reason or think of passion or desire. Thus Augustine distinguished his will as a self-reliant force or power possessed by man, determining his actions, including those related to thinking, and thus crucial to politics. It is simply a pure desire freed from the bonds of reason, but besides of passion, incapable to admit good and evil, being rather arbitrary. It can be said of her that she is the desire of desire, of this most human experience—the desire of reason, prompting man to reflect and act on the basis of its result, as well as the desire of passion, not only nor above all capable of doing evil, but besides the passion of doing good, expressing love, and of receiving them from others.
As with proairesis, however, it is not clear what decides in situations – not so uncommon at all – the interior conflict, erstwhile a individual fights himself, clashes with himself, various desires, he cannot decide between them, and yet ultimately, which 1 wins, even if related to decision paralysis, which is an expression of a desire not to make an uncomfortable decision or a desire to reconcile what is unconciliable – eating and preserving the cookie. possibly in specified clashes it is decided by the arbitrary, whimsical, amoral highest desire? Or do these Freudian principles – pleasance (although from experiencing pain), reality (calculation of pleasance and unpleasantness) and repetition (playing a script characteristic of a person) come to mind? But which of them is decisive? Is this dependent on the strength or strength of individual desires at a given time? What would be the determinant of their power? Is her index sewn in our body, related to experience and experience? But what about what is unknown – curiosity? Here it may seem that the affirmative or negative experience of trying a fresh 1 plays a role. In general, though, each of us has experienced 1 and the another since he was a child, so what determines one’s superiority over another? Again, we return to the substance of strength and intensity. Is it more crucial to experience weaker feelings more often, or is it rarer, or possibly even single, very strong? But may it not be for the body to decide, but for our head to influence the power of desires? If he is not always able to set goals or at least the means for them, then to specified an degree that he can change our attitude, influence not only the desires, but besides aid us to choose from conflicting possibilities?
This dispute between emotions stored in the body (passive and intelligent, strong and weak) and a reason supported by emotions, but able to execute operations besides in isolation from bodily sensations is another revelation of a conflict of desires. The sucurse of his solutions may be jungian preferences – individual tendencies to follow reasoning or feeling, intuition or sensory, i.e. experiences or experiences, ethics or morality, logic or rationality, metaphysical position or will of power. It is not clear whether these preferences, or more specifically their hierarchy, are natural to a given person, whether they are acquired. due to the fact that he has them all, man can surely make those weaker, support them stronger, sometimes replace them, and sometimes restrain them, or have no chance to make them. This again leads to the question of the triggering origin of a given tendency – feelings, experiences, reason.
It is believed that in a situation of uncertainty, man follows his strongest preference, the innate 1 he developed most since childhood. Hence, different people in the same or akin situation can make different decisions, differently look at matters, choose different desires, even if the interior conflict of 2 people is between the same options. You can't forget the Freudian function superego, produced by both crucial others and culture. It can besides influence the choice of desire in dispute. In specified a case, however, the decision may depend on the jungle preferences of the individual – to follow the interior tendencies resulting from it (logics, morality, experiences, wills of power) or external ones, flowing from others ( rationality, ethics, experiences of others, metaphysics).
Desire for Desire
All these difficulties with will or desires come to be seen by Kahneman and Tversky. The choice of desire – conscious or not – in a situation of uncertainty is simply a mistake. We may not decently admit the situation, including by reasoning in a circumstantial language and the resulting inappropriate categories, which are culturally dependent (small and large communities in which you live, to which you belong). We can mispredict, be incorrect about probability. The experiments of psychologists have shown that, even in situations with the correct solution, we tend to err in discerning and choosing the incorrect answer. Neither expert knowledge, which distorts reality, even through besides much self-confidence, nor by being aware of the pitfalls of thinking, protects from this. technological knowledge, statistics, better knowing yourself by experiencing, all of this is expected to reduce the probability of making a mistake, but does it yet aid in the choices of desires? Limiting uncertainty can affect desires, but the question of why the desire to do so and not otherwise prevails remains unanswered.
For example, present the fashionable desire to cultivate an interior kid and release his joy of life or curiosity, but not to all data – surely to experience – to the same extent. This leads not only to a choice between conflicting desires (those related to childhood and those belonging to the adult world), but besides to a choice of the minute at which 1 can afford it. These pitfalls of reasoning take place on both conscious and unconscious levels. Are they not partially motivated by desire? How would we like to see the world, the phenomena in it? With the desire to respond decently in a situation of uncertainty, even erstwhile the situation does not require it?
All of this seems to be due to the desire for desires, demanding them, coveting them, wanting to increase their diversity, so that it may seem that without making the task easier. Often, however, this is not a problem for us. We deal with choices better or worse, consciously or unconsciously. From time to time, erstwhile faced with a more severe trial, we feel or realize the tension of conflicting desires. Sometimes it occurs that what Heidegger described as a will to not want, not a deficiency of desire, but 1 of many others.
The desire for desires has nothing to do with our dilemmas, our troubles. He's playing us. It's consistent, it's inconsistent. It's constant, it's variable. It's simple, it's perverse. It is elusive, eludes itself from knowing, and at the same time it is recognisable, even to the degree to which it is described here, or far insufficient. So it reminds us of the time that Augustine described it in Confessions – is something apparent and clear until we start reasoning about it. And then more than about him, we can tell about his manifestations, what we do with him and what he does with us, as he proclaims the subtitle of Rüdiger Safranski's book dedicated to him. possibly this is the case with the top intangible engines of humanity – sometimes, will, freedom. They besides have ambiguity. Freedom, 1 of the overwhelming desires, is divided, so that all expectations that can be attached to it cannot be fulfilled. Time contains both the linear and the cyclic. The will does not stand out in this respect.
For the Christian Augustine, this was a challenge. So not only does fleshly or sensual desire lead to sin, harm done to others, or self-inflicted, what escapes behind it by superego the culture concerned. He besides pushes to him another than the desire for goods, fame, or survival, including those related to forbidden acts. besides for sinful deeds, it is not adequate to blame misthinking and following him, as Augustine accused him of modern philosophers or Manicheans. Thus, 1 can sin as if for no reason, being guided only by the free will which God has given men, allowing them to do evil, and thus besides to experience it on the part of others or through their own actions. Augustine had to justify how, since God is infinitely good and is the creator of a planet whose all part is good and the full is even better. How is joy and happiness possible in this world? His answer to this question is double. First, more joy and happiness comes after the experience of suffering – both the 1 who has experienced it and those who have seen it, erstwhile a man or a community emergence from misery. Second, no little perverse, that the actual happiness is only faith, the desire to know God, to be loved by him and to love him, to trust him, to sink into his infinite love and goodness, even though it involves suffering, to accept him, to see any sense in it, like Job.
Nietzscheanism
Yet amongst the philosophers, Augustine is not associated with the concept of will and its praise, but by 15 centuries later Frederick Nietzsche. So this was after the modern breakthrough, in which the will gained greater autonomy, became a conscious motor of historical events. The future, this earthly one, has become more obsessed than ever. It looked at the improvement of human fate, if not disposed of, at the maximum simplification of suffering, not only through intellectual procedures—the appropriate attitude or doctrine of life—but besides the mastery of nature (this is simply a trend powerfully present since Francis Bacon) and the removal of evil that could be eliminated from human intercourse (although it besides aimed at religions that began to be seen in the Enlightenment, if not as a origin of evil, are forces that keep human harm; although not all Enlightenment philosopher shared this, as evidenced by the case of Lessing). It is simply a substance of desire, and these are always set for the future, even if it is simply a desire to regain or reconstruct something, as is repetition, play or play the same thing. The exception is the desire to return, impossible in linear time. Backward desires, alongside another desires of the impossible (determination of which is burdened with reasoning errors), lead to or may lead to a sense of inability of will, which turns into manifestations of evil—revengement, resentivity, hybris. erstwhile you look back, you can besides get the impression that everything that happened was necessary, including the present, which would gotta lead to the abolition of the thought of will.
For Nietzsche – formed during Darwinism, though critical towards him – the rudimentary life force, both in the case of individuals, societies and humanity is the will of power. However, this concept is somewhat unclear. He appears in respective of his writings a small inconspicuous. He wanted to dedicate the book to her, but he abandoned writing, leaving different quality passages – from ready, not very long fragments to those with loose remarks sometimes only words of the note intended to develop. It was collected and arranged after the death of the philosopher his sister, issuing the title Power will. For this reason, there are many interpretations—from supporting human autonomy to the search for the justification of Nazism or fascism. So we are dealing with noise, but any elements seem unquestionable.
The will to power drives the action of man, the perpetrator of events and his survival, thanks to it events happen, including those unintentional. It is not the desire to survive, but the growth of its strength, its position, the desire to dominate, the growth of power that is most crucial to man. The will of power is the principle, arche People's lives. So he ridicules the concepts that attribute this function to pleasure. She, like unpleasantness, is simply a function of the will of power. These feelings inevitably appear on the occasion of action, and in connection with them are only conscious impressions. According to Nietzsche, they cannot be a driving force or their main engine. The nineteenth century philosopher, however, could not take into account the somantic markers described by Damasio, making pleasance or unpleasantness, experienced and assumed, a driving force for action.
This unpleasantness stimulates the will of power, not diminishing it, but even stimulating it. Only what resists leads to strengthening is the drive, but yet besides becomes a origin of pleasure. Nietzsche cited in this context an example of fleshly love, in which at first irritating rubbing, friction turns into pleasure. pleasance occurs in moments of overcoming obstacles and after satisfying the will of power, if specified a condition is something another than this overcoming opposition intended to be only stages to it.
The will of power or eternal return
Here besides the question arises of how much this will of power is or can be conscious. surely Nietzsche wanted her to be made aware. Realizing it would help, if necessary, to liberate ourselves from embarrassing individuals of values, convictions, dogmas imposed by superego culture, by crucial others. But it may have been culturally determined, in the request to overcome the dominant Christianity, the dominance of its priests. In Christian culture, everything that lives most, and thus related to the natural will of the power of people, is not only suppressed, but besides imposed a strategy of values promoting weakness, grumpiness, apathy, acedia, leading to the death of the vital and vital forces of individuals and communities, and yet favoring decadence, although understood not as the distribution of the moral and cultural values to date, but the distribution of the people and societies to which Christianity leads. Hence Nietzsche's insistence on re-valuing all values, on specified favorable wills of power, those unaware of it, as well as the conscious. In this context comes the thought of superhuman, or alternatively those who find their own values, whether individual or community, capable of destroying or building superego culture, decision distant from it or convince the community to fresh values.
Power is preferred to find what is right and what is incorrect and another values. This is how Nietzsche first portrayed it in So says Zaratustra. due to this, she is immoral in herself. The will of power as a power of man may manifest itself as a desire to rule, to regulation others, but besides to yourself. It is thus seen in the desire for freedom and desires which can be implemented within it, including self-fulfillment, self-expression. It may besides mean submission to the community, being useful to it. It can besides express itself in a sense of superiority associated with belonging to a better group, not only stronger, but besides weaker or little numerous, but representing or sharing a characteristic or values to show its superiority. Finally, the will of power can mean organizing the weak and the powerless, or at least those who consider themselves to be. The will of power is besides to combat the thought of the will of power or the values favorable to it and those in which it is manifested. Its awareness, or more specifically the awareness of the peculiar expression or character it adopts, can rise opposition to those who do not see or admit space for their will to power. We must not forget the will of power in the form of mastery of nature, and besides overcome its limitations by reasoning and technology to the degree that another human authorities, including ethics, allow.
As arche The will of power is no little arbitrary and capricious than the Augustian will, as the power of man. Although it seems easier to grasp certain dependencies, which makes Nietzsche, attributing the revelation of the will of power in the form of a desire for freedom among the oppressed, the desire for justice among the impotent of their will of power to be full realized, and the desire for love—given and received, urging all the strongest. But can the will of power decently admit and justice the situation and position of a person? If this is already done with or triggering thinking, there are possible errors in judgement and decisions, individual preferences and individual and individual experiences, individual and collective. And since the issues that do not have a single right solution concern the future, uncertainty is very big.
The Nietzschean drawing can be found in the earlier concept of Milla's freedom as experiments in living or in the agonistic concept of politics reaching back to ancient Greece. In the beginning of his technological career, Nietzsche took care of her. Agon He even devoted his essay Homer's Competition. The relentless struggles of the Greeks were not only cultural, but contributed to prosperity policy By constantly stimulating rival citizens who thus landed natural destructive urges. According to Piotr Sawczyński in Entity policies, it besides made no 1 feel the eventual winner, could permanently dominate, which gave the community a democratic character. He besides compares Nietzsche's approach to agon with Hannah Arendt. This besides stressed its importance for the improvement of a person, a citizen. Confronted with different perspectives, acquainted with different options, he had to have an interior conversation or even fight and make decisions. This was surely the function of reasoning errors, preferences, experiences, political noises, but besides the will of power to enslave the influence of these factors. We are dealing with akin phenomena not only in the democratic world, but besides in brave rulers and secret counsellors. In a word, the will of power is simply a force in history, a force in politics. It gives announcement erstwhile a decision is to be made, to convince a individual to do so alternatively than another solution, and to establish or keep superego culture, even based on the individual will of power, to extract the superhuman from anyone who establishes his own values. That's where the moral side of politics comes from, the desire to find what is right and what is wrong.
Arendt, as 1 of the few, besides drew attention to Nietzsche's anti-volunteer dimension of thought, which is either an example of its inconsistency, so characteristic of modernity, or how almost all of us can be subject to the rules of representativeness, accessibility or anchoring. You hear Nietzsche, you think “the will of power”. But there are passages in his doctrine going against the full modern tradition directed at the future, in which will and desire play a key role. This is the concept of eternal return presented by the German philosopher. It involves a thought experiment. Imagine a demon haunting you and asking: Would you like to live your life, all pain and all delight, all meaningful and insignificant situation, in the same order of infinite times? However, there is simply a major problem that may be overlooked at first glance. On the basis of the Nietzschean, we have no criteria to justice our lives. We can only want or not want to arbitrarily and capriciously. So why would we want to change things? And if we would like to do so, we would only realize the inability of the will of power, its weakness. In this case, however, we could not talk of the evil coming from here, due to the fact that it is simply not there.
Arendt suggests that the last words on the subject of the will of power were those about the eternal becoming of the world, having no end and no purpose, and thus not being entirely judged and judged. Each minute represents the same value. What's earlier isn't worse or better due to the fact that there's no good or bad anymore. Goals, even if appointed, cannot be a measurement of action. It means nothing or nothing to accomplish them. Causes and consequences are irrelevant. It besides means the final rejection of the utilitarian calculations of pleasance and unpleasantness, the sum of happiness. So there is no longer area for the concept of will and modern hopes for the future. The only thing that remains of man—or, in fact, superhuman, the 1 who has grasped and assimilated the teachings of Nietzsche—is the joyful affirmation of what is. Overcoming will, eventual overestimation of all values. It's like the last act of will, the only possible, though powerless, disowning it, admitting to infirmity, serene acceptance of reality. Being joyful of the full of our lives, of the world, loving everything that it is, we can say, each and all 1 of us together: I want it would repeat everything indefinitely. It's an act of will that's meaningless, a thought experimentation that nothing depends on. If this concept of eternal return did not presume cyclical time and renunciation of judgment, we could talk of the end of past and of life in the best possible worlds close Leibniz's theodice. And in the end, their equivalent to dealing with a situation in which only erstwhile we experience life, the inability to both repeat it and change it – what was there and what will be, and so to accept the consequences of situations of uncertainty, mistakes of reasoning and acting, decisions made.
Happiness, rationalism, irrationalism
In social life, however, we want to defend ourselves against mistakes, especially those causing harm, which, due to its inability to specify it, did not fall within the concept of Nietzsche. Even if there is no single and unambiguous criterion, however, there is simply a multitude of them, which, of course, leads to confusion and confusion, is causing noise. But in this way, we can be guided by the actions of reason, even the learned, instilled, which are part of our culture. This, however, makes us to any degree unhappy. At the same time, it is simply a safeguard against suffering that can happen to us from others, as well as those that we could do. This is simply a Hobbes situation in which people renounce part of freedom and transfer power to safe the rest, in order to avoid the anticipation of death at an unpredictable minute from another. To push distant life in this uncomfortable state for greater stableness and the anticipation of utilizing this space, which is guaranteed by power, or to strengthen its safety or to take risks. Similarly, Freud had a pessimistic view of man’s condition.
The Vienna psychoanalyst and philosopher in his work in the early 20th century besides faced a strong current culture of utilitarianism, as well as war traumas or increasingly many accidents in transport related to its fast development. At work Except the rule of pleasure He sought to show that man was guided by another motives, knowingly or not. 1 of them is the mentioned rule of reality, and so the ability to calculate pleasance and unpleasantness in specified a way as to increase gratification or an chance for it in the future through sacrifice and renunciation. This mechanics reminds Max Weber of the influence of Protestantism on the improvement of capitalism by the ability to set aside the prize for the future, even for the hypothetical happiness beyond earthly time, after death. The second factor, far more crucial in Freud's opinion, which is incompatible with the rule of pleasance in life, is the tendency to repeat the same behaviours, the same script of events, even if they are associated with sorrows and do not consequence from utilitarian calculation.
Such behaviors considered irrational have always caused problem to rational thinkers. Can they be incorporated into the imagination of a rational world? possibly they're the consequence of any mistake. Is it worth your while? possibly it is better to focus, if not on what is rational, at least on what can be rationalized, even if this contributes to mistaking the planet and judging it? And it will not change the ease with which rationalists come to search mistake in others. It's like individual else's mistakes are expected to prove the right 1 who detects and points them out. This would be possible in zero-one situations, but there are fewer in social life and politics. Even if we frequently like to present them that way or to make specified a choice. It may be another mistake of thinking, a manifestation of coping with an uncertain situation, or possibly a deliberate procedure in which showing an mistake would not automatically prove right, but depreciating the opponent, showing superiority over him, his will to power. So no of these cases aid in rational calculation, not bring us closer to a rational view of the world. It's not rational.
One of its varieties, after abandoning its spiritual foundations, was utilitarianism. In it happiness became a divine motor and a intent of social life, archeusing the Greek definition of origin and principle. And there is something Greek about it, due to the fact that already in ancient times happiness was attributed to large value in both individual and social life. Of course, it was understood differently, making it a contentious subject. And Aristotle tied them, appropriate knowing of them, with the life of the mind, its endurance and its guidance. Epikur, on the another hand, combined happiness more with sensual experiences and feelings than spiritual ones, above agápē So he was buying philia. The difference between them may have been due to the jungle personality preferences. There was inactive a wide stream of hedonism. He looked to the highest good in pleasure, and the more pleasance he gave, the better. It should so be pursued, whether in a unitary or in a social dimension. The change of hedonism was besides to direct only your own egoistic pleasure, which is simply a measure, even if the failing man has, but better than others, and so to be pursued. A certain variation of hedonism, considered by Christianity, as mentioned by Benedict in Deus Caritas est, it manifested itself in the institution of sacral prostitution mentioned in the Old Testament, but with which we have besides encountered in ancient Greece, the cults of bodily love practiced in or close the temples and associated divine sensations.
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