Péter Magyar year: large hopes and large challenges

One year before the parliamentary elections in Hungary, the ruling Viktor Orbán has a dangerous rival. Péter Magyar, formerly a little-known Fidesz activist, began to play an crucial function in Hungarian politics in the spring of 2024. He utilized the largest scandal in the ruling organization for years – the pardon by president Katalin Novák of a individual convicted of covering up pedophilia – to uncover abuses in the circles of power and dysfunction of the state and promised to end the regulation of Orbán. Since then, he has managed to become the fresh leader of the opposition, turn the social movement into a political organization of TISZA and introduce its representatives to the European Parliament (PE) and the government of Budapest, as well as to overtake Fidesz in independent polls.

Although much can change to parliamentary elections, the social enthusiasm generated by Magyar's successes so far gives him the position of Orbán's only real competitor. Hopes for a change of power are encouraged by both the image crisis of the ruling camp and the exhaustion of its narrative, focused on the ideological fight against the "liberal West" and the ever-increasing economical difficulties of the country. The possible of a fresh political hand over the Danube, however, is driven distant by the fact that over the last respective years of majority regulation Fidesh highly consolidated his power, which prevents opposition leader from competing with him in elections on equal terms.

The rival debut Orbána

Péter Magyar in just a year with a wider unknown figure behind Fidesz became opposition leader and chief rival of Orbán. He gained designation in February 2024, erstwhile the political scandal broke out in connection with the pardon of the convicted for concealing crimes against minors deputy manager of the kid home – the consequence of this case was the resignation of president Katalin Novák and the withdrawal from political activity of the Minister of Justice Judit Vargi (b. Magyar's wife), who countersigned the pardon^[1].

On February 10 – on the day of the presidential resignation – Magyar posted an entry on Facebook, which gained immense popularity. He stated that the political consequences had been unfairly pushed by Orbán into both women, and thus cut himself off from the ruling camp. He resigned from his duties in state-owned companies and gave respective loud interviews in which as an insider of the strategy he exposed irregularities in the power camp. He then announced the creation of the “Hungary Rise” movement (the name refers to the slogan of the Hungarian Peoples' Spring Revolution of 1848), in which anti-government demonstrations on the streets of Budapest took place on March 15 and April 6 on a long-lost scale (a fewer tens of thousands of participants).

In view of the fact that Magyar would not have been able to registry the movement as a political organization before the EP election, he decided to start with the so-far-known TISZA group. It is simply a organization with centre-right orientation, although now Magyar – since July 2024 its president – has been trying to avoid specified an assignment to attract the widest possible electorate. He presents it primarily as a political force aiming to remove Fidesz from power. In the June European elections, TISZA placed second (29.7%) and introduced 7 MEPs. Despite his earlier declaration that he had no intention of becoming a Euro MP, Magyar, however, accepted the EP mandate and TISZA joined the European People's organization (EPP).

Magyar's appearance on a large political phase created a full fresh dynamic in Hungarian politics. Despite the first scepticism of opposition supporters, for whom his fidesz biography may have been a problem, he grew up within a year to be the clear leader of the anti-orban camp. Magyar tries to turn his earlier organization affiliation into an asset, claiming that as a man "from within" he knows the sphere of the strategy and knows how to fight it, and 1 of its main postulates is to settle with the elites of power (although he himself belonged to them). Controversy appearing around him, exploited or even generated by the ruling organization (e.g. the evidence of the erstwhile minister, and at the same time his ex-wife revealing alleged home violence, video recordings of controversial customs in public places, or records of conversations in which he offends participants of his rallies and the Euro-Parliamentarians of TISA) did not translate into a decline in support. So far, Magyar has proved to be a "teflon policy" that no scandal can harm.

Revolution on the organization Stage

In October 2024, for the first time in 18 years, the Hungarian governing coalition Fidesz–KDNP overtook another organization in the polls. The most reliable Medián institute in fresh studies from early March this year points to 33% of support for the TISZA organization and 29% for Fidesz-KDNP among the general electors and 46% and 37% respectively of the determined voters (see Figure 1). Of the groups of the opposition to date – Liberal-Left Democratic Coalition (DK), Center Momentum, satirical Hungarian Dog organization on 2 Tails, and right-wing Jobbik and far right Our Homeland – only the second exceeds the 5% electoral threshold. And although on the political phase there has been polarization and the formation of a duopol composed of the governing coalition Fidesz-KDNP and TISZ, our Homeland may be an alternative, which will be a language in importance in the upcoming elections – it is simply a group with a very unchangeable percent of supporters (6–7%).

Last year, all major opinion poll centres^[2] noted an increase in support for the TISZA organization – both those connected with and unrelated to power, which creates a fresh polling reality. The second shows respective points^[3] be a multipoint^[4] the advantage. The centres controlled by the authorities besides note a crucial increase in the popularity of the Magyar party, though due to the more favourable to the ruling survey methodology Fidesh inactive leads in them^[5]. TISHI's polling position is mostly the effect of taking over the electorate of an earlier opposition, from which Magyar cuts off as much as Fidesz, emphasizing the pursuit of a completely fresh quality – its leaders in turn call him to belong to the ruling party. The sealing of the marginalisation of erstwhile opponents of Fidesz and the end of a certain era in Hungarian politics in May this year was the announcement by Ferenc Gyurcsány, Prime Minister from 2004 to 2009, and chief rival Orbán after 2010 – the resignation of the chairmanship in DK and the mandate of the MP, as well as the full withdrawal from political life.

Figure 1. Support for individual parties among all voters and among determined voters

Source: Mediaán poll for HVG, March 2025.

Orbán in shortness of breath: Fidesz crisis year

The circumstances in which Magyar appeared and recorded a very fast growth in the polls were the scandals in Fidesz and the expanding economical problems of the country. The key event on the can, on which he made his political debut, was the resignation of president Novák. The affair with a pardon which led to the withdrawal from public life of 1 of the most crucial figures of Fidesz, is not the only image crisis with which the organization She had to face it last year. September 25 – 1 period before the 68th anniversary of the 1956 Revolution – Political manager at Prime Minister Balázs Orbán's office stated in an interview that in the event of possible Russian aggression, the Hungarian authorities would not act like president Volodymyr Zelenski and the defence efforts of Ukraine were considered "irresponsible". The speech of the prominent advisor to the Prime Minister sparked scandal as it stands in contrare to the commemoration of the anti-Soviet uprising of the Hungarians cultivated by the right. After controversies around this statement, TISZA first overtook Fidesz in part of the polls.

Fidesz struggles with a clear exhaustion of the current narrative, focused on the problems of global politics and war. His triumph in the 2022 elections was mainly driven by the threat of a global armed conflict and the promise to keep Hungary distant from these events.. The government is presently creating the possible of Ukraine's accession to the EU as the biggest threat to the country, which would be linked to measurable “risks" to society (mainly economical costs). These are described in a questionnaire of ongoing "national consultations" – a non-binding plebiscite to profile public debate and legitimise the action of the authorities^[6]. The government besides maintains a permanent component of narrative, namely hitting Brussels and "international liberal and globalist networks". Orbán's fresh speeches focused on the extremist criticism of the European Union, which, following a change of administration in the White House, grows up to be the largest western enemy of his camp. Prime Minister accuses Brussels of intending to overthrow the government in Budapest to replace it ‘marionary government’ (as a guess – with Magyar at the head). Nevertheless, the communicative to date authorities, presenting Magyar as an allegedly EU-controlled person, did not halt the emergence in support of him.

In addition to the organization scandals and the exhaustion of Fidesz narratives, expanding economical difficulties are becoming a problem for the authorities. Consumer inflation has been among the burning topics of public debate first in many months. After it stabilised in the last months of 2024 at about 3% of January, the reading confirmed a re-growth of up to 5.7% (in February and March, respectively, it was 5.6% and 4.7%). The inflation wave highest reached 26% in 2023, while setting the EU evidence (the two-digit level remained there the longest in the EU). This translated into perpetuating bad consumer sentiments.

The weak economical situation is besides expressed in another macroeconomic indicators for 2024, specified as GDP – The Hungarian economy has shrunk by 0.8%, as well as the deficit rate, which exceeded 5.7% of GDP. While the government has promised an economical recovery since 2025, it is hard to anticipate a crucial improvement in the situation (the EC reduced this year's GDP growth forecast for Hungary from 1.8% to 0.8%) in May, especially since Budapest cannot trust on EU measures, of which 2 thirds stay frozen on the basis of a conditionality mechanics (approximately EUR 20 billion). The economical downturn in Hungary has been felt since 2020 – while the Fidesz–KDNP supporters could inactive remember the 8 years of comparative prosperity (2012–2019) during the 2022 elections, the ruling coalition could no longer number on it.

In the first months after appearing on the political phase as a critic of the Magyar authorities, he focused his actions on the organization of anti-government protests, the largest of which gathered crowds on the streets to measurement the demonstration against the discredited government of Gyurcsánya in 2006.^[7] In his speeches, not only in Budapest, but besides in the smaller cities that are seldom reached by the present authorities, the leader has branded the abuse of power and the related oligarchic environments. He peculiarly hit the National Co-operation strategy (NER), which has been liable for organization consolidation of the functioning of the political strategy since 2010. Magyar focuses on criticism of the interior situation in the country which Fidesz ‘forgets’ due to the fact that he focused on global problems and the fight against EU institutions.

After the EP election in 2024.^[8] Magyar focused first of all on the pointing of present authorities, which spheres of life in Hungary function poorly. During the vacation period of stagnation of political life, he imposed themes of debate, driving around the country, visiting public institutions (e.g. hospitals, foster homes) and showing their disastrous state in his social media – the main channel of communication with supporters, where he remains very active.

The Lone Political Magyar Show

For a long time, Magyar focused on an effective run of criticism of the authorities and the situation in the country, without presenting a appropriate programme of TISH (presented on 15 March 2024, "21 demands" included very general wording). It was only known that he would search to settle current authorities and rise the standard of surviving of Hungarians, have pro-European views and want to improve the global reputation of the country. A small more details appeared on the October commemoration of the 1956 Revolution organized by TIZA. Magyar then announced that after the election, he would make efforts to unlock EU funds (which would aid settle the failure of the current government by the European Public Prosecutor's Office), promised reforms to education and wellness services, a constitutional limitation of the Prime Minister's function to 2 terms of office (which clearly refers to the ruling 4th consecutively and the 5th overall – Orbán), an increase in the minimum salary, as well as the maintenance of benefits for families, 13th pensions and low consumer energy charges.

The applicable programme is to be formulated through a public consultation and the work of 65 working groups which has been held since December, and its outline was announced on 15 February at the TISHA organization rally, which has since the beginning of the year passed into electoral run mode (in the fresh Year's Magyar speech demanded the organization of accelerated elections). Among the key promises were: the freezing of public debt, the cessation of the sale of national assets, wage increases and the valorisation of pensions, the imposition of the most wealthy taxes, the creation of separate ministries of agrarian development, wellness and education (the second are presently subject to the MMA), the decentralisation of the state, the increase in budget expenditure on the wellness care system, the increase in education levels and the restoration of university autonomy, the construction of retirement homes, and the support of manufacturing industry, farmers and tiny and medium-sized enterprises.

The leader of TISHA has so far spoken small about Ukraine and the war, which is completely dominated by the "peaceful" communicative of Fidesz in Hungary, criticizing all manifestation of support for Russia's country as "inciting war". Indeed, in July, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a directive on the protection of individuals with respect to the processing of individual data. Magyar he went to Kiev to personally supply assistance to a Russian children's infirmary bombed by troops, but In October, Euro MPs of his group abstained on providing financial support to Ukraine. They besides did not support the organization convention of the European People's organization (EPP) in April this year's resolution, which advocated the accelerated accession of Ukraine to the EU, which Magyar justified its failure to meet the accession criteria.

However, the reason for this abstinence seems to be purely pragmatic political calculation – if Magyar had supported Ukraine's support, the government of Orbán would have responded with the allegation that he was aiming to "maneuverate the country into the war of the West with Russia" or to join Ukraine in the EU, which would, in turn, have deterred the fierce propaganda of the Fidesz voters who are fighting for. After 58% of the participants in the TISHA poll (responsible to Fideshu's "national consultations") voted for Ukraine's accession, Magyar announced a referendum on the substance after winning the election. small is besides known about how he intends to approach Hungary's relation with Russia after he may have taken power. In a January interview with the Reuter Agency, he stated that he intends to proceed in this case "pragmatically" and the flagship task of Hungarian-Russian energy cooperation, or the expansion of the Paks atomic power plant by Rosatom, cannot be suspended at this phase (although he calls for its "renegotiation").

So far, the movement of voters from Fidesz to TISZ has been insignificant, the basis of its supporters are voters of the opposition to date (largely taken over by the fresh group) and undecided. The experience of the 2022 elections shows that Fidesz has more resources in the second group. This means that while Magyar managed to consolidate the electorate of the erstwhile opposition, he inactive faces the challenge of gaining the indecisive and taking distant any of the supporters of the ruling party. Looking at the distribution of preferences taking into account the age and place of residence, TISZA loses the most compared to Fidesz among older people (over 65 years) and residents of tiny centres. Reaching these voters will require the application of another topics and means of communication, and above all the creation of solid organization structures throughout the country.

The organisational base of supporters of the group is based on the “TISHI Island” associations, which have formed over a 1000 people across the country and abroad, together with respective tens of thousands of people. However, these are not formal organization structures. As of October, members are recruited TISHI and its candidates within 106 single-mandate districts and persons who will supply expert facilities to the group. Reports are sent online, which opposition media compared to a TV-style casting "talent show". So far, the Magyar camp lacked professional politicians, and the events were mainly accompanied by artists and celebrities. The breakthrough on this issue brought a speech in mid-February at the TISHA organization rally, the erstwhile Chief of General Staff of the Hungarian Army of Romulus Rushin-Shendi, which was cancelled from office in 2023.

Déjà vu of 2021 and aces in the sleeve of Orbán

Social enthusiasm associated with the current Magyara poll results resembles the atmosphere before the last elections in April 2022. At that time six groups of highly different orientations were united, which together were meant to represent a real counterweight to Fidesz. As part of the resulting block, a joint leader and candidate for Prime Minister in the individual of Péter Márki-Zaya was besides selected. In fresh months 2021, polls indicated that the coalition jointly for Hungary could number on more support than the ruling party. Eventually, however, the Fidesz–KDNP coalition won a crushing triumph (53% of the vote), and the opposition alliance (35%) failed to even deprive it of the constitutional majority in the parliament. Among the causes of the defeat were insufficient consolidation on the opposition side – an agreement between the parties was developed to win with Fidesz alternatively than common regulation – or the fact that Márky-Zay did not grow up to be a leader. present the situation is different in these aspects, and other Fidesz stands 1 organization with a strong leader. strategy realities stay unchanged. The disproportionate electoral strategy has so far rewarded Fidesz, who, while in power, besides has a wide scope of incentives for pre-election and the mobilisation of his electorate.

Electoral ordination Fidesz constructed in specified a way as to guarantee the advantage of the seats even with less votes. In the elections to the Hungarian single-camera parliament, they cast 2 votes – 106 MPs are elected in single-mandate districts and 93 from organization lists. Adopted in 2011, the ordinance reinforced the majority component (a comparative majority is adequate to win in districts) and introduced the alleged compensation mechanics (including the "unused" votes from districts to votes for candidates from national lists). In practice, the electoral strategy is very disproportionate and powerfully rewards the winner. In this way, Fidesz was able to safe a two-thirds majority parliamentary mandate with 44% (in 2018) and 53% (in 2022).

If the Orbán organization could see that the advantage of TISZA is permanent and it could benefit from the electoral strategy under Fidesz, it cannot be excluded that there will be further transformations in the ordination. Among the solutions speculated by the press there is, for example, the establishment of single-mandate districts besides for Hungarians voting in neighbouring countries, which would strengthen the importance of number votes, forming the Fidesz electorate base. Another option is to lower the electoral threshold to 3% (this was the case until 1993) so that voters of smaller opposition groups do not view their vote as lost and support it alternatively of TIZA.

The closeness of the elections will most likely besides prompt the government to apply the already tried and tested methods of maintaining support for social benefits – the announcements for next year included additional housing allowances for families, a refund of VAT on a number of food products for seniors, or a life income taxation exemption for mothers who have 2 or more children. In favour of the ruling camp, there is besides its dominance in the media (about 78% of this marketplace is dependent on Fidesz-related people^[9]) which creates the conditions for his free formation of pre-election discourse. For more than a decade, the politicalisation of state broadcasters has been accompanied by increased obstruction in fresh months of those independents whose last bastion is the net – the "Protection of Sovereignty" Act passed in December 2023 allows surveillance of media and non-governmental organizations, as well as punishment for financial support from abroad. The change of administration in the White home and the suspension of USAID's assistance programmes provided Budapest with the chance to take further steps to combat the beneficiaries of US financial assistance – during the February message about the state of Orbán announced the appointment of a government commissioner, who will go to the US to collect data on previously supported entities.

Perspectives

The decisive successes of Magyar include declassing the opposition to date, imposing subjects on Fidesz in public debate (mainly through social media), and introducing a fresh quality in the kind of communication with voters. At the same time, it is at a point where pointing out the mistake of power may not be adequate to keep public attention, especially without an attractive programme and a clear position on many key issues. He is besides faced with the challenge of organizing group structures across the country and reaching out to the most faithful electorate of Orbán, i.e. the aged and surviving in more than 2,000 centres that do not usage the net – their votes will most likely affect the result of next year's elections. The key task of the fresh opposition leader seems not only to communicate effectively with a possible electorate, but above all to work hard at the base and to build national organization structures.

In the present situation, the main problem for Fidesz is the mediocre economical condition of the country, for which work of the authority tries to pin on the global situation (war and sanctions). However, poorer society seems increasingly aware that the standards of surviving in Hungary are beginning to deviate from those in neighbouring countries. If you look at the support for Fidesz over the years, it will turn out that it was the highest in the 2013-2019 economical prosperity period erstwhile the mediate class developed rapidly in Hungary. However, the authorities now began to make electoral promises relating to taxation relief and social benefits (support aimed mainly at hard electorate) a year and a half before the elections, but their fulfilment is hampered by the current state of public finances and the deficiency of greater prospects for the thawing of EU funds blocked under the conditionality mechanism.

The triumph of the TISZA organization in the following parliamentary elections in the spring of 2026 would be the consequence of a fresh political offer by Magyar and the weakening popularity of Fidesz, which faces the image and bad economical situation of the country. At the same time, even under specified circumstances, it seems improbable that she would have obtained a constitutional majority. In the Hungarian legal strategy established by the Second Government of Fidesz, there are around 70 laws (so-called "constitutional" laws on the most crucial spheres of action of the state, whose change requires a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes. In practice, this means that Magyar, even as Prime Minister, would most likely not be able to carry out the promised systemic changes, and there would be many tools left in Fidesz's hands to keep resources and hinder the fresh power.

ANNEX

Péter Magyar's Silvette

Péter Magyar (born 1981 in Budapest) comes from a household of legal and political traditions – his parent served as secretary general of the ultimate Court and vice president of the National Judicial Office (OBH); grandpa was a justice of the ultimate Court; grandmother's brother was Ferenc Mádl – president of Hungary in 2000–2005. In 2004, Magyar received a degree in Law Faculty Catholic University of Pétera Pázmánya in Budapest. He began his career as an assistant justice at the Metropolitan Court, then went to the private sector, where he advised abroad companies to invest in Hungary. After Fidesz came to power in 2010, he became an worker of the Ministry of abroad Affairs, and a year later (during the Hungarian EU Presidency) joined the Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels as a diplomat. As of 2015, he was employed at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, where he was liable for maintaining a relation between the government and the EP. From 2018 to 2024 he held a number of managerial functions in state institutions and companies specified as the Hungarian improvement Bank (MFB), the Student debt Centre, the Hungarian Public Roads (MKNZRT), Volánbusz. From 2006 to 1923, he remained married to Judit Varga, with whom he has 3 children. As of 2019, his wife held the office of Minister of Justice, which she resigned in 2023 after deciding to run for EP election from the first place of the Fidesz–KDNP list.