"West and War in Ukraine: Selling and Buying Hopium"

Written by Yves Smith via NakedCapitalism.com,

The kinetic war in Ukraine gained little attention in summertime than in erstwhile periods, due to the fact that a counteroffensive in the confederate circuit Zaporoze was worse than a bust. However, below we will give any examples of how the Western press mostly uses unimaginable amounts of pig maquillage to the deteriorating situation in Ukraine. At best, it is simply a desperate effort to sustain the war in the hope that someway happiness or divine intervention will tilt the scales of triumph in favour of the West. But the harm caused to Ukraine is disastrous, and the cost to the European economy resulting from sanctions, to weapons stocks in the US and NATO associate States and fiscal commitments distorting national priorities (butter pistols in societies already showing social breakdown and cracks) is besides not poor.

From time to time, we repeated advice that we first heard from investment bankers in Lazard for their CEO clients, o the dangers of believing in your own PR.

Here. We see this psychosis as a mass phenomenon.because besides many people in positions of power or close to them repeat things that are nonsense and truly seem to believe in them.

And that happens even erstwhile more and more friendly media administrations signal that the controversy is going wrong.

Another sign of problems is complaints from US and NATO officials that Ukraine has left their orders training "war with a combined weapon" (I must love these talismanic phrases) to attack tiny infantry units after its first attempts fell sick against dense Russian mines. It does not take much insight to admit that this is the preliminary positioning of the scapegoat of Ukraine. However, it is not said that "the combined armed war" in the American kind assumes supremacy in the air, something that Ukraine has never enjoyed in conflict areas.

Optimistic view is that inconsistent transmission is simply a sign of division in decision-making circles, and especially the realists (especially those talking about military officials who know that the West cannot win the land war with Russia) begin to gain the advantage.

But this visible increase in "realism" inactive has quite a few blurry thinking. For example, in the overwhelming majority, articles discussing peace talks or another final games show another pathology that we have described: that the West speaks to itself about what Russia will accept as if it were true. Exhibit 1 is the thought of a frozen conflict that Russia will agree to what an impasse means. The problem is that Anthony Blinken stated in an interview with the Washington Post last fall that the U.S. would proceed to arm Ukraine after the war and plan to reclaim all territory that Ukraine gave up to halt fighting now. From Washington Post:

Biden's administration, convinced that Vladimir Putin had failed in an effort to wipe out Ukraine, began planning a possible postwar military balance that would aid Kiev halt a repeat of Russia's brutal invasion.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined his strategy of Ukrainian finale and postwar deterrence...

Blinken believes that Russia's colossal failure to accomplish military targets should now encourage the United States and their allies to start reasoning about the post-war form of Ukraine – and how to make a fair and lasting peace that sustains the territorial integrity of Ukraine and allows it to deter and, if necessary, defend itself against any future aggression. In another words, Russia should not be able to rest, regroup and attack again.

The framework for Blinken's deterrence differs somewhat from last year's discussions with Kiev on safety guarantees akin to the Natovian Article 5. alternatively of specified a formal treaty commitment, any American officials increasingly believe that the key is to supply Ukraine with the tools needed to defend itself. safety will be ensured by powerful weapons systems, in peculiar anti-tank and air defense, along with a strong, uncorrupted economy and membership in the European Union.

The Pentagon's current emphasis on providing Kiev with weapons and training for maneuvering war reflects this long-term mark of deterrence. "The importance of maneuvering weapons is not only to give Ukraine strength now to regain territory, but as a deterrent to future Russian attacks" - explained the State Department authoritative who knows Blinken's thinking. ► "Maneuver is the future."

In another words, Blinken saw the war as ending without any agreement. The West would again inflate Ukraine with weapons to flush and repeat, and someway anticipate a better result.

The neutrality of Ukraine was and is Russia's key demand. And Russia has a large mystery that after the Minsk Agreements were revealed as a large French/Germany/Ukraine conflict, Russia cannot trust any NATO/Ukraine commitment.

Let us callback that Mark Milley had the nerve to propose that Ukraine should consider peace talks after a wide-ranging counter-offensive evidently brought territorial benefits to Ukraine so that it could then negociate with Russia from a strong position. This just accelerated the repost via the Washington Post from Blinken.

This optimistic conviction seems to be the basis of fresh talks on the "peace plan" in Jeddah, which did not include Russia. It seems that the main nonsubjective was to weaken the silent and clear support for Russia after it was assumed that Russia looked weaker after a large counteroffensive. Despite Ukraine trying to claim that the summit was a success, another reports say that participants questioned how anything could be achieved without Russia's participation and did not support the maximumist conditions of Ukraine's peace.

So we see that 2 ideas at the end of the war, formulated before the Russian mobilization forces were trained and deployed and began to show their things, seem to be on autopilot. Blinken and Biden are inactive talking about Putin losing the war. There is no sign of a crucial change in position, as US/NATO plans make a large picture.

To find out what It should now seem obvious, the problem here is the stubborn refusal to admit facts in the field, as there is no way, that Ukraine will regain Crimea or more than the trivial amounts of territory that Russia has seized, is that it prepares the ground, not for a Korean-style result, but for the fall of the Ukrainian army and possibly much of what remains of Ukraine as a nation.

This caused immense losses in people, and Ukraine did not even reach, and even more so it did not penetrate, the first of 3 fortified Russia lines. Douglas Macgregor, who has good contacts, estimates the number of fatalities (not injured, deaths) from this operation, which began early June, to approach 40,000. There is informal confirmation through cemeteries across Ukraine, which are reported to be out of space, overflowing hospitals close the area of combat and blood shortages. Oh, and more evidence of the tension of the workforce comes from Zelenski, who announced another mobilization3 and showed stopping bribery to avoid service... erstwhile anyone who had cake to do it almost surely already did.

Since Ukrainian counteroffensive in the South failed, Ukraine besides contests Bachmut4 with advanced costs and small to show. In fresh weeks Russia has been in a balanced way insistent on the Kharkivs. The hill has just announced that this run is offensive, but the level of deployed labour and equipment is far below what Russia could have done if it had decided to do so.5

Russia may have simply intended to exert adequate force to make another meat grinder and force The Ukraine to engage more force, either through a metastasis from the south, or through the usage of reserves. Alexander Mercouris said (IIRC 2 days ago) that Ukraine was sending last reserves to this front. He besides speculated ( yesterday) that Russia could devote its sweet time to the recovery of Kupansk, the city she left erstwhile she withdrew from Kharkiv last year to better favour Ukraine. Regardless, if Russia regains territory in Kharkov, which it gave last year, it will be a major intellectual blow to Ukraine and its supporters.

With this lengthy introduction, let's look at a example of press reports. This screenshot comes from the front page of the Wall Street diary on Sunday:

It must be admitted that the 3rd header clearly indicates the shortcomings of operations in Ukraine.6 But let's look at the first. First paragraphs:

The current Ukrainian run to regain the territory occupied by Russian forces may take months. But military strategists and decision makers all over The West are already reasoning of next year's spring offensive.

This change reflects the deepening awareness that unless there is simply a crucial breakthrough, Ukraine's fight to expel Russian invasive forces is likely to take a long time.

When Kiev's counter-offensive began in spring, the optimists hoped that the Ukrainian troops would repeat their last year's success in the crackdown of Russian forces. However, the first effort to usage recently supplied western tanks and armored vehicles to break through the fortified Russian lines was stuck at a dead end.

Since then, advancement has been slow and painful, relying on the tactics of tiny individuals. Resumption of force may inactive be in preparation. But military leaders and decision-makers are already struggling to ask what can be achieved in the next fewer months and how to prepare for a prolonged conflict.

An annoying concern in Kiev and Western capitals is that politicians and voters can see war as a swamp and sour support for Ukraine. Even if the western supporters of Kiev stay relentless, the clocks are ticking erstwhile Ukrainian forces burn ammunition, labour and endurance to a grueling fight.

All military campaigns end at any point – even in wars that go on for years – at a time erstwhile tactics call a climax or a point where the attacking forces cannot go further due to success, obstacles or deficiency of supplies.

The nonsubjective of Kiev is now to guarantee that the current offensive ends with adequate benefits to show Ukrainian citizens and supporters in Washington, Berlin and another places that their support has not been mislocated – and should continue.

There is so much misdirection by omission that it is hard to know where to start. Firstly, there is no indication of how much the offensive did not meet expectations. It was to pierce Russian lines reinforced in 3 weeks. Now, well in the 3rd month, it didn't even scope them.