The story of the large Patriotic War as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine. Part 3 — Comparative analysis of commemorations in post-Soviet countries and the erstwhile east bloc

fakenews.pl 11 months ago

World War II is an crucial component of historical policy and a mention point in current diplomatic disputes. It is no different in Russia, post-Soviet countries and the erstwhile east bloc states. The large Patriotic War serves the Russian Federation to rise russian Resentimists visible among its citizens. The Kremlin, conducting its historical policy and shaping the historical memory of citizens, ostensibly narrates around the large Patriotic War, triumph over fascism and Nazism. In addition, he constructs parallels between the fight against the alleged Ukrainian and Western fascism, which wants to destruct Russia, as Adolf Hitler planned, starting Operation Barbarossa.

However, the subject of the story of the large Patriotic War and historical memory associated with it seems to be more nuanced in the erstwhile russian republics and states of the erstwhile east bloc. In this text, which is part of the 3rd series analysing Russia's historical policy in the field of planet War II, we will look at the story of the large Patriotic War and its formation and attempts at deconstruction in Belarus, the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine.

The story of the large Patriotic War in Belarus — memory and usage in propaganda

Even before the regulation of Alexander Lukashenko notethat the foundation of the Belarusian historical policy was admiration and respect for the achievements of the russian Union. It was besides reflected in the identity of the majority of Belarusians, who referred to themselves as "Soviet people". So it is no surprise that the large Patriotic War occupied a peculiar place in historical narrative. It was presented mainly from the position of the immense material and individual losses that have affected the areas of Belarus today.

Teared Memory — 2 Dates of the Beginning of War

The coming to power of Alexander Lukashenko in 1994 effectively blocked the timid attempts to demitologize the large Patriotic War and deconstruct the communicative of heroism in the fight against fascism. However, the maintenance of power by him blocked any attempts to revise Belarusian historiography and prevented a change of narrative. Since then, the large Patriotic War has become the most crucial period defining past and the interior and external policies of Belarus.

However, how notes Andrej Dyńko, editor-in-chief of the Belarusian “Our Niwa”, his fellow citizens live in 2 different historical realities:

There is 1 Belarus that lives in Russian, post-Soviet history. There is simply a second 1 who is aware of national consciousness, who knows that our country has been active in the war since its first days, since 1 September.

Ihar Mielnikau emphasises in turn that:

In textbooks we have the date 1 September as the beginning of planet War II. Then it is an crucial day – on 17 September as a union of the east and western lands of Belarus. But inactive the accents are spread so that many people live according to the russian interpretation: the war began on 22 June 1941, at the time of the Nazi German invasion on the USSR.

Great Patriotic War, Chatyń and the Act on the genocide of the Belarusian people

The large Patriotic War and the cruelty of the east Front are utilized to make the Belarusian people as victims of genocide. In turn the Act on the genocide of the Belarusian people, signed by Lukashenko in January 2022, is utilized to fight the opposition. At the same time, its goal is to make any narratives about victims and a war separate from Russian.

Chatin is simply a Belarusian village that was pacified on 22 March 1943 in retaliation for attacking the German convoy in which 4 soldiers were killed. On the same day, German units (118th Battalion and Oscar Dirlewanger SS troops, including criminals and collaborators, arrived in the village. 149 people died during the massacre.

The Belarusian government sets a mark of equality between the pacification of Chatynia and the participants in the protests that swept the country after the August 2020 presidential election. The massacre on the inhabitants of the village is besides actively utilized to attack the widely understood Belarusian opposition. This is evidenced by the many statements made by the president of Belarus. But here we will callback wordssaid during the celebration of the 78th anniversary of the pacification of the village:

I address all those who are convinced that fascism has "bringed civilization to our land" who heroize assassins who worship the white-red-white flag under which the genocyd of the Belarusian nation was carried out. To all of you, hypocrites and fools, they say, “Go and see.”

The 2020 protests clearly indicated the failure of Lukashenko's policy. It has become apparent that the subject of the large Patriotic War is inactive alive in the consciousness of the Belarusians, but the authoritative communicative does not scope many of them, especially erstwhile the protesters were accused of acting under the fascist banner.

Belarusian historian — Alexander Friedman — in a comment for Belsat emphasises:

To show the supporters of the government that they are on the clear right side of history, on the side of those who defeated Nazism, and that they are descendants of the victims who suffered from Nazism. The dual nature of this representation of the situation is very appropriate for today's realities: even today, 1 can imagine himself as a fresh victim of the alleged collective West, who according to state propaganda seeks to re-attack Belarus and repeat what the Nazis tried to do during the business from 1941 to 1944.

The large Patriotic War and the alleged Collective West as fresh fascists

Alexander Fridman notesThat the large Patriotic War is utilized by a propaganda device to indicate that the threat of expected fascism is real. He says:

The fresh effort to ideologically consolidate Belarusian society in the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century, based on the events of the first half of the 20th century, so seems to be a very dubious undertaking. The situation of Lukashenko complicates Russia's war against Ukraine. To justify its ‘special operation’ The Kremlin uses pseudohistoric arguments, and aggression itself is hypocritically portrayed as a continuation of the russian people's conflict against Nazism.

Lukashenko besides uses a akin card in creating propaganda narrative. It compares the situation at the western borders of Belarus with the situation that occurred on the eve of Germany's attack on the USSR. On meeting with Vladimir Putin on 25 June 2022, he asked the Russian political leadership to aid defend “our homeland from Brest to Vladivostok”.

Belarusian propaganda actively uses narratives about alleged plans for the attack of the “collective West” and the image of Belarus as the foreground of the State of Russia and Belarus.

Great Patriotic War in the Historical Politics of the Baltic States

For the Baltic nations, the symbolic date of the end of planet War II is reminderThat triumph over Nazism by the russian Union led to half a century of occupation. At the same time, erstwhile we look at the issue of historical memory, we can conclude that it is complicated, and the memory of events itself is divided and broken. In addition, collaboration with the Nazis and participation in the Holocaust are a shadow of the war. The influence of the Russian-Ukrainian War, which has been going on for more than 2 years, is besides important.

Historical memory of the large Patriotic War on the example of Lithuania

Lithuania has refused to participate in Moscow celebrations since 2005, the 60th anniversary of triumph Day. At that time, this opposition contrasted with the presence of many abroad dignitaries, including heads of state. Today, however, it is not surprising. In Lithuania on 9 May, it was always a day marked by tensions in society, as the triumph Day celebrations were held annually in various Lithuanian cities and towns by Russian diplomats along with a Russian minority. After a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia for the first time, the Vilnius authorities did not let rallies to be held at the memorial of russian soldiers who died in the Second planet War at Antokolski Cemetery due to concerns about provocations. In 2023 celebrations were modest and were supervised by Lithuanian police.

Two occupations

Speaking of Lithuania, it should be noted that, as with the another Baltic states, German troops entered the occupied country in June 1941. In 1940 Lithuania was incorporated into the russian Union as a consequence of ultimatum issued by the russian authorities.

During the year the population experienced repression, exports, collectivization. Among another reasons, the 3rd Reich's assault on the russian Union by part of the population was received Enthusiastically as part of the fight against the occupier.

Lithuanian historian Arūnas Bubnys emphasisesthat:

Within a week the territory of Lithuania was occupied by Germany, which did not treat it as an independent country, only part of the territory of the russian Union. Then the business government and the Holocaust began. During the German business the judaic community suffered the most. Not little than 90% of Lithuanian Jews were killed at the time. Certainly, another nationalities, including Lithuanians, Poles and Roma, have besides reported human losses. We don't know the exact numbers. However, it is estimated that in addition to 200,000 murdered Jews another 25-30 1000 people of another nationalities died.

The Lithuanians in Vilnius then supported the armed Wehrmacht troops. This June uprising was mainly due to the desire to support German troops, in which they saw rescue from russian repression. However, Germany was not curious in rebuilding Lithuanian independence.

This period is the beginning of the Holocaust in Lithuanian lands. How notes Dr. Jarosław Wołkonowski, this is the beginning of a immense tragedy that:

In a way, it puts a shadow on the uprising itself. It is crucial to note not only the direct participation in the crimes of the Lithuanians, but besides the anti-Semitic declarations of the Lithuanian elite. As for the full mechanics of the extermination of Jews, which was planned by the 3rd Reich, it is worth noting that the Holocaust in the areas previously occupied by the Red Army began long before the decision on mass killings on Jews in the West.

By autumn 1941, most of the local Jews were murdered and ghettos were created, whose inhabitants were to work for the German occupier. In July of that year, mass and planned murders began in Ponarach, Lithuania’s largest Holocaust site.

With the change of situation on the east front to the disadvantage of the Germans, the Red Army occupied the annexed territory of Lithuania in 1940. The period from 1944 until the end of the war is the time erstwhile Lithuania suffered the top individual losses. In the course of the war, up to 250,000 Lithuanians could have died.

The Lithuanian historian Arūnas Bubnys quoted above says of this period:

When the russian business returned in 1944, then mobilization was announced. respective tens of thousands of Lithuanian residents were taken into the army, of whom 15,000 or possibly 20,000 were killed on the front. So the biggest human losses, not including this number of Jews, were suffered not during the German occupation, but on the front. The losses on the front were greater not only due to German repression, but besides due to russian repression, which began after the re-occupation of Lithuania.

Today, despite the hard way that the Baltic States have made on their way to independence, they seem to talk internationally with 1 voice. The text quoted at the beginning of this section of the survey about the joint message by the Baltic Republic leaders is an excellent example of the paradigm of "two totalitarianisms", which dominated East European memory of planet War II.

The war on the east Front in Polish historical memory

It seems that the conflict of Lenino and the participation of the 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division will be an perfect example to examine the casus of Polish historical policy.

Use of conflict in Propaganda

At dawn on October 12, 1943, the conflict of Lenin began. During dense fighting, Polish soldiers tied up a large part of German forces and caused them large losses. They broke the enemy's first line of defence and created conditions for the introduction of the russian mechanized corps to the battle. A failure of about 20 percent of the starting states was achieved by command. However, the combat effort of the 1st Infantry Division was not used. russian mechanized troops were yet not put into combat, and as a consequence the clash did not turn into operational success.

The Union of Polish Patriots (a Polish communist organization founded in 1943 in the USSR and being Stalin's policy tool) started a propaganda action, having on purpose showing the clash as the success of the 1st Infantry Division. They emphasized courage, patriotism, the sacrifice of fighting soldiers and the Polish-Soviet brotherhood of arms. The propaganda action besides aimed at discrediting the Polish Armed Forces in the West and stressing their inactivity.

For Stalin, the conflict and participation of Polish soldiers were highly needed (and useful). He wanted to usage Polish units fighting on the east front in his propaganda message. And so Berling's soldiers became a bargaining and propaganda card on Polish affairs during the Tehran conference held in late November 1943.

Propaganda and commemoration

The Polish People's Republic focused on creating the story of the conflict of Lenino. It's become legend The founder of the National Polish Army and besides served as a genesis from which traditions were derived for the folk army. The commander of the 1st Infantry Division, Gen. Sigismund Berling, was a nuisance to the communist authorities, as evidenced by censorship Issues His memories.

The establishment in the Polish People's Republic of Poland on 12 October of the Polish Army Day shows the usage for the above purposes. The Festival was established by decree of October 7, 1950.

Another manifestation of propaganda usage of this conflict was the creation of the Museum of the Polish-Soviet Brotherhood of Arms. Object opened on October 15, 1968, in the village of Lenino, Belarus. He was to emphasize the common effort in the conflict of the Polish and russian people. It is worth mentioning at this point that the story of the shortest way to Poland is connected with the expected brotherhood of arms. By propaganda It was possible to join it through a joint fight against the Soviets against Germany.

New approach

With systemic changes, the clash at Lenino was thrown into the dump of history. Today, as they mark publicists and historians, the conflict should be considered alternatively an act of heroism of Polish private soldiers and at the same time their drama, due to the fact that just after leaving the camps they had to stand in an unequal fight. Another perspective, which is taken present in the assessment of the “church”, is that they did not make it to the army formed by General Władysław Anders. By the way, it is worth noting that on the 75th anniversary of the conflict took place in Belarus celebrations commemorating Polish soldiers.

Entering the Red Army on Polish dirt present is being considered, as in the Baltic States, as the beginning of a fresh occupation. The Red Army on its bayonets, marching on Berlin, brought communism and with it repression. The fresh "dictation of the proletariat" was not to end until 50 years later.

The real course of battle

The air of democracy in the 1990s besides brought fresh eyes and fresh findings on the actual course of the conflict and the events preceding it.

Already in August 1943, it was decided to shorten the period of training of soldiers of the formed division so that on 1 September it was sent to the front.

The logistical and strategical preparation for the clash that began the alleged Orshan operation left much to be desired. The units to take part in the conflict received respective days to prepare for it. There was a shortage of ammunition and fuel, and the warehouses were 200 km from the front line.

The conflict began with a brief preparation of artillery typical of the russian doctrine of combat recognition. The correct attack, on the another hand, was to be preceded by a fire lasting 100 minutes. The artillery preparation lasted only 40 minutes due to melting ammunition supplies.

Attack on Trigubo and Hulls and break of attack

The infantry attack began after 10 a.m. The Polish 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiment made an attack on a two-kilometre long of the front between the villages of Trigubowo and Połzuchy. The Kosciuszkoks got under fire with device guns that were not destroyed by artillery. Despite chaos and losses, they occupied villages and overtaken russian units. However, the Germans went to counterattack and scored Trigubowo. During the counterattack of the Germans, Polish infantry got under fire of russian artillery. For the same reason, the village of Połuzuchy was besides unsuccessful.

German units had air support that it was incapable to counter the russian anti-aircraft defense. The prevailing chaos and cruelty of political officers affected the morale of soldiers who surrendered to Germany.

Polish and russian armored divisions did not enter the conflict in time. The tanks, due to the deficiency of preparation of reinforced approaches, were stuck in the swamps, becoming an easy mark for the German department.

On October 13, russian command decided to proceed its attack. The attack of Polish soldiers immediately collapsed and Berling ordered troops to withdraw. The decision of the Polish commander became the origin of a rude quarrel with the russian commander-in-chief, Gen. Gordow.

So, real The image of the conflict is bad preparation and chaos in command, which are so different from the propaganda image forged in the heat of the conflict of the Polish-Soviet brotherhood of arms. In the end, Polish troops suffered dense losses to the end of the defeat without fulfilling their tasks.

Memory of the large Patriotic War in Ukraine

Ukrainian memory of war is, as in Belarus, broken and divided. However, Ukrainians do not live in 2 chronological dimensions, but geography influences the memory of past events. David R. Marples we Introduction to the “Canadian Slavonic Papers” notes that in the west of a country where strong nationalist movements existed, the memory of war is more critical of the russian Union and its function in the conflict. In the east, where pro-Russian influences dominate, communicative is more consistent with Russian. Ukraine for most of its existence was incapable to find its relation to the past. Society could not scope a consensus on what planet War II meant and meant for Ukraine, how to treat its participants (heroes or traitors in the case of CNS and UPA) and how the modern state should explain its past. Between 2010 and 2011, discussions on the Ukrainian Waffen-SS division were frequent, but the state authorities did not take an authoritative position in them.

Currently, Ukrainian historical policy aims to highlight Ukraine's distinctness from Russia. The Ukrainian national consciousness and historical memory were greatly influenced by events specified as Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbasa and the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian political elites spent quite a few time developing a coherent approaches legal to the russian past of the state. In 2015, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the alleged package. decommunisation laws. Thus, the word "Great Patriotic War" was no longer utilized to describe events from 1941 to 1945. The word was replaced by the name “World War II”. That same year, a fresh festival was established in place of triumph Day — the Day of triumph over Nazism in planet War II. In 2023, the Day of triumph over Nazism replaced a fresh vacation — The Day of Memory and triumph over Nazism in the Second planet War 1939-1945. The vacation is celebrated on 8 May.

Conclusion

There is no way in the cross-cutting text of all aspects and issues related to the memory of the large Patriotic War in the post-Soviet and erstwhile east bloc. However, as can be seen from the above examples, the issue of historical memory and forms of commemoration is highly vivid in Central and east Europe. 3 models can be distinguished: Belarus, the Baltic States and Ukraine and Poland.

Against the background of the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine, Belarus stands out. Among the citizens of this country, we can see a kind of fragmentation in memory, which is manifested to different levels of public awareness. The country's memory policy besides points to a hard relation with Russia (especially after 2014 and after 24 February 2022). In consequence to the annexation of Crimea and Moscow's quest for full Subordination Minsk Belarusian president began playing the planet War II memorial card. In this way, he wants to strengthen his position and his country as separate from Russia. Therefore, historical narratives emphasize e.g. "Partisan RepublicIt’s okay. ” In support of this thesis is besides supported by the fact that Alexander Lukashenko found the annexation of Crimea only in 2021.

The memory of the large Patriotic War in the Baltic States and Ukraine is an example of a departure from russian commemoration patterns, specified as the celebration of triumph Day on 9 May or the designation of 1941 as the beginning of planet War II. Together with the decommunization laws, these countries adopted a paradigm of memory of "two totalitarianisms". This explanation marks the equality between the crimes of russian and Nazi regimes. Among the actions taken by the authorities at different levels of the state are decommunisation and the function of anti-Soviet guerrillas.

Common features can be mentioned for the memory policy mentioned in the above paragraph — decommunisation, recourse to the paradigm of 2 occupations, highlighting the function of anti-Soviet guerrillas. By the way, it is worth noting that in Polish historical policy there is besides a clearer emphasis on the function of anti-Soviet guerrillas, who originate from the Home Army.

Sources

“Preserving the Myth, with the Politics in the Background: the large Patriotic War in the Politics of past of Belarus”, Kamil Kłysiński: https://ipn.gov.pl/en/publications/periodyki-ipn/institute-of-national-r/issues/170570,Preserving-the-Myth-with-the-Politics-in-the-Background-the-Great-Patriotic-War-.html

== sync, corrected by elderman ==

Histmag.org: https://histmag.org/Destruction-wsi-Chatyn-7745

Belsat.

Study of east Europe University of Warsaw: https://studium.uw.edu.pl/great-war-father-lukshenka-like-on-bilalorusi-history-is-mistaked-with-politics/

LRT: https://www.lrt.lt/en/awareness/1261/1984520/oboeuvres-9-May-in-Villages-ten-participants-and-Soviet-songs

Vilnius Courier: https://kurierwilenski.lt/2021/06/23/conflict-between-two-criminals-what-for-lit-meaning-22-June-1941-year/

TVP Vilnius: https://wilno.tvp.pl/72420991/il-resident-lost-Lithuania-during-ii-world war

Straight ahead: html

"The heirs Live, Kościuszko and Świerczewski. People's Army of Poland as an institution of historical memory policy”, Tomasz Leszowicz (fragment): https://histmag.org/Bitwa-pod-Lenino-mit-founder-LWP-25269

Armed Poland:

Decree of 7 October 1950 establishing the Polish Army Day on 12 October: https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19500450411

Museum of Polish History: https://muzzhp.pl/calendar/started-sie-bit-pod-lenino

“Introduction: Historical Memory and the large Patriotic War” [in:] “Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadian des Slavistes”, David R. Marples: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23617478

Center for east Studies:

Verfassungsblog: https://verfassungsblog.de/world-war-2-memories-in-lithuania-and-ukraine/

“Russian policy towards Belarus after 2014 – change or continuation?” [in:] “Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska Lublin – Polonia. Sectio K’, Paweł Bielicki: https://journals.umcs.pl/k/article/view/11140

“War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-66523-8